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PREFACE 
Present day Thembuland is situated roughly between the Mthatha and Kei 
rivers. It lies within the south-western portion of the po lit ica l 
unit which has been known since 19a6 as the Republic of Transke i . It 
comprises the territories formerly known as Emigrant Thembuland (now 
the districts of Cala and Cofimvaba) and Thembuland Proper, i.e. the 
districts of Mqanduli, Umtata, Engcobo and 8omvanaland. We have 
evidence that Thembu people had already sett led in Thembu land Proper, 
at the Mbashe river, by the beginning of the 17th century. Pi oneering 
clans many have entered the territory at a much earlier date. 1 In the 
1830's some clans broke away from the Mbashe settlement, and moved to 
the region of present day Queenstown. In 1853 their lands were 
included in the so-called Tambookie Location, which in 1871 became the 
district of Glen Grey.2 Emigrant Thembuland came into existence in 
1865 when four chiefs from Glen Grey accepted Sir Philip Wodehouse's 
offer to settle on the lands across the White Kei whence the Xhosa 
chief Sarhili had been expelled in 1857. 3 This thesis deals with the 
history of the people who lived in these territories between 1850 and 
1900. 
This period deservedly engages the attention of the historian for 
various reasons, among them the lack of a good historical 
reconstruction of the events re lating to the complex history of the 
paramountcy. The most important of these events were the western 
migration of a section of the Mbashe Thembu, and their alienation from 
the parent society; the Cattle-killing of 1857; the emergence of 
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Emigrant Thembuland; the extension of Colonial control over Thembu 
territories; the outbreak of the war of Ncgayecibi in 1877; the 
Transkeian Rebellion of 1881; the annexation of Thembuland in 1885; 
the decline of chiefly powers; the emergence of an intellectual and 
politically aware class who replaced the chiefs as spokesmen for the 
people. 
Social and economic contact between the Thembu and the white 
community, produced a conflict of cultures and a consequent difference 
in needs amongst the various Thembu groups. This thesis explores the 
situation of the Thembu who lived in immediate contact with the Cape 
Colony, and those who were cushioned from it by the territories of 
their neighbours. The latter section had their own disagreements with 
surrounding tribes, as opposed to those on the frontier whose conflict 
was in the first instance with the Cape Colony itself. These 
conflicts across the Colonial border brought the needs of this secti Dn 
in line with those of other black peoples on the eastern frontier who 
became united in their struggle against Cape Colonial intrusion. 
After 1870 Colonial penetration and British imperialism put an end to 
the isolation of the Mbashe Thembu, so that the people who lived there 
were also brought into the main stream of Cape politics. Thembu 
reactions to European onslaughts on their traditional cultures form 
the main theme of this thesis, and they were remarkedly divergent. 
Research in this area is hampered by the fact that virtually no work 
has been done on the history of the Thembu. Letters of early 
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missionaries, which often provide valuable information with regard to 
other chiefdoms, are almost non-existent as far as the Thembu are 
concerned. The Rev. Peter Hargreaves who worked in both Thembuland 
and Pondoland kept a regular diary while in Pondoland, but neglected 
to do so during his Thembuland years. The manuscript of E.G. Sihele, 
Councillor of the Thembu king, which was written in 1933, is one of 
the few scources which offer interesting perspectives on early Thembu 
history . Sihele writes well, but his perspectives are predictably 
influenced by loyalty to the rulers he served. 4 
Conquered people have often been known to make common cause with their 
conquerors in order to preserve the residue of shattered power. In 
the subtle rivalry of the Transkeian people, once tribal wars had been 
brought to an end, there was a tendency among the Thembu to highlight 
the extent of their cooperation with the Cape Colony. The work of the 
amateur border historian, Dr. A.W. Burton, reflects uncritically this 
Thembu point of view. This makes his manuscripts interesti ng but not 
comprehensive. 5 An interesting document written in 1925 by W.T. 
Brownlee, who was chief magistrate of the Transkeian territories in 
the 1920s showed the same kind of bias. 6 
In an attempt to justify the Thembu claim to precedence over other 
black races, Brownlee maintained that this question of precedence 
had arisen in 1920, during the visit of the Prince of Wales · to the 
Transkei. Disregarding the fact that Umtata was - and still is - the 
capital of the Transkei, and thus the place where royal visitors would 
naturally have be received, he wrote that the Prince of Wales was 
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received in Umtata, on Thembu territory. He then concluded: "And so 
important was this matter of precedence among the native tribes that 
no chief of higher rank would visit a chief of lower rank to his own 
lest his precedence been cal led in question. According to custom any 
chief of another tribe coming into Thembuland tacitly admits the 
precedence of the Thembu chief . " Brownlee does not in any way 
indicate what other arrangements could have been made on this occasion 
that would not have reflected on the status of any of the Transkeian 
chiefs. Writings such as these must obviously, even though coming 
from a high-ranking official, be treated with circumspection . 
Although this thesis dea ls specifically with the period 1850 to 1900, 
it was necessary to provide a historical background that would exp lain 
the complex relationships between the Thembu and other peoples at the 
start of the narrative. Chapter one, then, starts with the rule of 
Ngubengcuka in 1810. This chapter is mainly concerned with the rift 
that deve loped within the Thembu nation in consequence of the westward 
migration of a large number of Ngubengcuka's subjects. The divergent 
reactions of the eastern and the western Thembu, first to the War of 
the Axe, and then to the War of Mlanjeni is then traced . It was the 
participation of a large number of Thembu on the side of other black 
nations that led to Governor Cathcart's settlements, at the end of the 
war, which made provision for the proclamation of the Tambookie 
Location - the later Glen Grey. The mainstream of events after 1853 
is then followed chronologically in chapters two to five, with the 
emphasis on those important events referred to earlier. 
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Chapter six diverges from the chronological line to deal with three 
prominent Thembu chiefs. Each of these chiefs provides an interesting 
case study of the responses of a 19th century chief to the Colonial 
onslaughts on traditional lands and cultures. In Thembuland Proper 
the young and inexperienced Ngangelizwe became the victim of a 
vilification campaign as hi s expansionist ideals clashed with Colonial 
and British expansionism in the 1870s. Too weak to resist the 
militarily superior enemy. he abandoned his plans and. through a 
policy of cooperation with the Cape Co lony. sought a means of securing 
for his people their ancestral lands. In Emigrant Thembuland. 
Matanzima rose to prominence after 1881. at a time when most other 
Thembu leaders in consequence of their participat ion in the Transkeian 
Rebellion. had disappeared from the scene. By means of shrewd tactics 
he managed to maintain a workable relationship with the Cape Colony 
while ret aining as much power as possible under the white umbrella. 
and growing rich in the process. The story of Glen Grey's Mfanta 
differs remarkedly from those of his two brothers . He was caught up 
in the general spirit of discontent in the 1870s. partook in the War 
of Ngcayecibi. and died in prison in Cape Town. 
Although political and economic factors are inter-related. the 
economic dimens ion as such could not easily have been dealt with 
adequately in the main narrative chapters without confusing the 
argument. Chapter seven therefore deals specifically with the 
economic aspects of the Thembu territories after 1870. Three 
territories have been singled out for special attention. They are the 
district of Glen Grey which fell within the boundaries of the Cape 
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Colony; Emigrant Thembuland and Thembuland Proper . 
1. M. Wi Ison and L. Thompson (eds.): The Oxford History of South 
Africa, I, pp.78-84. 
2. See pp. 
3. See p. 
4. Sihele was not on ly council lor to the Thembu king, but the 
introduction to his manuscript reveals a close association with 
the Jumba clan of which he was most probably a member. Between 
this clan and the Royal Thembu House there were very close links. 
There are two translations of Sihele's manuscript in the Cory 
Library, Rhodes University, one by N.D. Sandi, and one by Tani 
Tusani, the former suffers from hav i ng been translated too 
literally. In this thesis the T~ani translation has been used. 
5. Burton Papers, MS 14.636 (in Cory Library): Gl impses from 
History. Burton relied on oral interviews for information. 
6. W.T. Brownlee: The Precedence of the Thembu, Butterworth, 7 
February '25, File 6/12/1, (Cory Library). 
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
Following the accepted orthography for African names, the use of all 
prefixes such as ama- and aba- has been dropped. The matter of 
orthography, however, remains a tricky one. In official letters, the 
names of tribes and people vary in spelling. An attempt has been made 
in this thesis to follow the most generally accepted forms of t he 
African names. However, in quotations, and in official references the 
spelling has, as a rule, not been changed. Hence, for example, the 
name Ngangelizwe is used in the text, but footnotes will refer to the 
Resident with Gangelizwe. Similarly the modern form, Sarhili has been 
used for the Gcaleka chief, but footnotes will refer to Resident with 
Kreli. 
The Thembu were also known as the Tambookie. Around this term many 
theories have developed. Some authors thought it was a remnant from 
the remote past when pioneer Thembu c lans intermarried with the San of 
the Tsomo Val ley. (The 'Tam'buki Bushmen as they were called.) A 
modern day historian, Jeff Peires, is of opinion that the word 
Tambookie is a Khoi version of Thembu. Qwa is a suff ix meaning 
people; hence Thembu-Qwa. In th is thesis the term Thembu has been 
used, except in quotations. However, the Thembu location, proclaimed 
in 1853 by Sir George Cathcart (the later district of Glen Grey), was 
known as the Tambookie Location, and always referred to as such in 
offic i al letters. This term has therefore been kept. 
Chapter 1 
The Era of Ngubengcuka, Mtirara and Maphasa (1800- 1850) 
(a) Domestic Conflicts 
In 18101 Ngubengcuka (Hyena's cloak) also known as Vusa ni (he who 
wakes others) succeeded hi s father, Ndaba, as king of the 
conglomeration of clans - col lectively known as the Thembu - who lived 
between the Mbashe and Mthatha rivers in the present Transkei. Among 
these clans there were those who believed themselves to be the 
descendants of a common ancestor, Themb u, who had lived many hundreds 
of years earlier. 2 His fo l lowers, according to tradition, migrated 
from central Africa along the east coast via Pondo land into the 
present Transkei , where they were firmly established by 1600 .3 
Besides these clans, there were also groups other than Thembu who, 
in the course of time, had settled on Thembu territory. We ca n thus 
see that Ngubengcuka's subjects were not of homogeneous descent, . but 
they developed as a single, loosely-structured political enti ty which 
comprised various kinship groups (clans). The term Thembu. therefore, 
denoted those people who owed allegiance to the Thembu roya l family, 
the Hala, and its head, the king. 
The installation of the Hala as the royal family dates from 1680. In 
that year, the two sons of king NxeKwa fough t for supremacy in a 
battle on the Msana river. Dlomo defeated his elder brother, Hlanga, 
and t he ma in section of his clan later took the name of the former ' s 
chief son, Hala. 4 The paramountcy of the Hala king was acknowledged 
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by most of the Mbashe clans. but in varying degrees. Even those clans 
which were directly descended from the royal house lived as semi-
independent groups. 
Tshatshu. 
Two such cases were the Ndungwana and the 
The Ndungwana took their name from NxeKwa's first born son. 5 
apparently an ambitious usurper who grasped the opportunity. while on 
a royal friendship mission. to estab l ish his authority over some 
immigrating amaFene and other Sotho clans. According to one Thembu 
tradition he later sided with the victorious Dlomo in the Battle of 
the Msana. and the two brothers thereafter ruled jOintly over the 
Thembu. 6 We have no other evidence that such a partnership existed 
nor how long it lasted. What we do know is that when Ngubengcuka 
became king. the Ndungwana lived as a separate group under their chief 
Quesha. who at times openly defied the Thembu paramountcy . 
Tshatshu. a contemporary of Quesha. was a particularly restless and 
troublesome chief. A descendant from Hala's right hand house. he 
succeeded in building up his power to a point where it exceeded that 
of the monarchy itself.? Furthermore . his linkage by marriage to 
Hintsa8 gave this Xhosa chief. who already harboured pretentions to 
authority in Thembuland. the opportunity to medd le in Thembu affairs. 
The Thembu hegemony was further weakened by the presence of foreign 
clans such as the Gcina. of Mfengu origin. and the Vundhli. of Sotho 
origin. who nominall y acknowledged the Thembu king. but had preserved 
their chieftaincy and territorial integrity. The Qwati . of Xesibe 
origin. lived independently. and. being more formidable warriors than 
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the Hala, they considered themselves to be the real rulers of the 
Mbashe area. 9 Lastly, there were those clans which, though li ving on 
Thembu territory, did not acknowledge the Thembu king. Both the Ngabi 
and the Nshilibile paid allegiance to the Xhosa paramount. 10 The 
inherent weakness of a nation thus composed manifested itself in the 
Thembu's inability to produce strong leaders, and in their military 
inferiority. Under a succession of insipid rulers, they became an 
easy prey for surrounding neighbours who despised them, considering 
them cowards. 11 
When Ngubengcuka became king in 1810, the tottering monarchy had 
reached its lowest ebb. The reign of his father, Ndaba, a notorious 
trouble-maker, was marked by a series of disasters which cu lminated in 
the king's flight to Gcalekaland following a revolt instigated by the 
Ndungwana. They were assisted by the Qwati chief, Fubu, and the Xhosa 
king, Rharhabe, to whom the Ndungwana chief was linked by marriage. 
Ironically Ndaba, too , was linked by marriage to Rharhabe, being 
married to the latter's daughter, Bede. She followed her husband into 
exile, and Rharhabe, finding this an untenable situation, generously 
forgave his offending son-in-law and offered him asylum. Given the 
ex-king's record as a troub le-maker, it seems more t han likely that 
his attitude fomented trouble in the Great Place. 12 When Rharhabe 
fell ill, his diviners were quick to blame his sickness upon Ndaba and 
warned: "Have two horns ever existed without sharing the same head? 
Exactly what are you trying to cure? Please go back to your country, 
otherwise your chief will die.,,13 
His life once again endangered, Ndaba turned to Ntlanzi, who now acted 
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as Thembu regent, for help. Ntlanzi wished to save the Thembu people 
the humiliation of seeing their king killed by foreigners. He 
enlisted the help of Fubu to "steal" Ndaba. The Qwati, seeing an 
opportunity to strengthen their own position, fulfilled their 
mission, not only returning the king, but bringing a handsome quantity 
of booty as well. Soon afterwards war broke out between Rharhabe and 
Ndaba. Soga maintained that the dispute dated back to the time of 
Ndaba's marriage to Bede, when the Thembu king had insulted Rharhabe 
by sending him inferior cattle as lobola , 14 while Sihele mainta ined 
that Rharhabe wanted to recover his cattle which had been taken by the 
Qwati. 15 Be that as it may, Rharhabe was routed in 1782 and killed by 
a Qwati army . This strengthened the Qwat i claim to supremacy over the 
Mbashe area. 
The Thembu, more vulnerable than ever before, suffered inroads by 
surrounding nations, notably the Xhosa. The latter invaded 
Thembuland, burned down houses, raided cattle and carried Thembu away 
as servants. 16 To add to their dilemma, new threats emanated from 
the territory between the Mzimkulu and the Mzimvubu rivers where 
refugees from Natal were incorporated by the chief Madikane into the 
Bhaca chiefdom. 17 
These, then, were the internal and external challenges that confronted 
Ngubengcuka at the beginning of his rule. As king, he remains a 
somewhat controversial figure. The Xhosa historian, J.H. Soga, found 
his rule totally insignificant. 18 By contrast, Thembu and some 
European chroniclers, especially those who wrote at the beginning of 
the century, portrayed him as a hero, the architect of a united 
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Thembu nation, and a shrewd diplomat. 19 They point out that his 
policy of cooperation with the mili tarily stronger Cape Colonial 
Government, as with Ngqika, greatly enhanced Thembu ability to 
withstand attacks from ~urrounding nations,20 and, above all, that as 
a brave and skilled military leader, he restored the self-respect of 
his battered nation. His death, in 1830, as a result of a wound 
inflicted upon him during a revolt of the Great House was deeply 
lamented by his people. Sihele remarked that his death marked the end 
of a great man. "A dark cloud," he wrote "descended upon the Thembu 
nation. Gone wa s the leader who could not easily be replaced in 
Thembuland.,,21 
circumspection. 
However, one should treat these eulogies with 
The aura around the person of the king may have been 
inspired by his own charisma or by t he political ideologies of 
interested people whose writings may not be without bias. 22 An 
investigation of the political realities that sprang from his regime 
could open up other perspectives. The story of the incorporation of 
the Qwati into the Thembu kingdom, is of relevance in this context. 
According to tradition it took place shortly after Ngubengcuka became 
king, and it is seen as one of his major achievements. Sihele tells 
that the Qwati (after the Ndaba debacle) became more contemptuous than 
ever before, claiming supremacy over the Mbashe area. Qwati boys, 
when playing, had a saying: "Chiti, chiti, gxotisha bu Hala." 
This meant that if one were chasing an opponent, one had to do it in 
such a way that t he opponent would flee like a Hala.,,23 Inevitably, 
the simmering di spute culminated in a battle in which the warring 
parties used knives, spears, bows and arrows and other sharp weapons. 
Ngubengcuka, aided by his half-brother, Jumba, first defeated the 
Qwati and thereafter reconciled them by relieving them of th e war tax 
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they were traditionally expected to pay. A humble and submissive Fubu 
so we are to ld, said to Ngubengcuka: "I am pleased to have had a day 
like this, so that I had an opportunity to experience your manliness, 
because your cowardly father never gave me enought support against 
other nations." This battle, according to Sihele, ended the strife 
between the Qwati and the Hala. Ngubengcuka, as proud victor, issued 
a warning that unity is strength and that therefore no nation in his 
domain could in future stand aside if he was engaged in war. 24 It is 
dubious whether Ngubengcuka ever managed to exert full authori ty over 
either the Qwati, or the Gcina , whom he was also said to have 
incorporated during his reign. Later events imply that these clans 
retained their autonomous status. This is corroborated by the 
observations of a young trader, John Thackwray, who visited Thembuland 
in 1827 and wrote: "There are numerous chiefs of whom Vusany , king of 
the Mahala tribe, king Foubau of the Macqcutee and Galeyka of the 
Machadulu are the most important. ,,25 This observation would 
hardly have been possible had Ngubengcuka's paramountcy been complete. 
While the partial subjection of the most troublesome chiefdoms brought 
greater stability to the Mbashe area and enhanced, to some extent, the 
Thembu's capacity to withstand external pressures, the continued 
existence of these semi-independent states within the Thembu state , 
made it very difficult for the king to carry out his titular 
responsibilities and to preserve unity. 
It seems, furthermore, that Thembu military achievements during 
Ngubengcuka ' s reign have been exaggerated by sympathetic historians. 
Sihele refers, for instance, to his victory over the Sotho under 
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Moshoeshoe,26 but in his book, Survival in Two Worlds, Leonard 
Thompson gives well-documented evidence that Thembuland was twice 
invaded by the Sotho, who each time carried away a handsome booty. 
These mafisa cattl e enabled Moshoeshoe to add many people to his 
chiefdom. 27 It was only in 1835, five years after Ngubengcuka's 
death, that a Sotho expedition into Thembuland ended in disaster. 28 
The Thembu were also not capable of defending themselves effectively 
against Gcaleka and Bhaca inroads. In 1828 attacks by the Bomvana , 
who were subordinates of Hintsa, forced them to move further north, 
abandoning the coast. War was only averted by missionary and 
possibly Cape intervention. 29 The Bhaca were a formidable enemy , and 
their continual inroads greatly sapped the strength of the monarchy. 
Ngubengcuka's greatest defect as ruler was his inability, at such a 
critical time, to reconcile dissident groups under his rule. 
Internal disputes resulted in a wave of north-westward migration in 
the 1820's.30 The first tribe to break away was the ever-restless 
Tshatshu under Bawana. 31 They were followed by the Ndungwana and the 
Gcina. 32 The settlement of these clans on the banks of the Black Kei 
river, then the Cape frontier, marked the beginning of an epoch 
characterized by group formation and by military alignment and re-
alignment, as the Thembu, like the Xhosa before them, came face to 
face with white colonists . 
In other respects, too, the migration was a cruci al event in Thembu 
history. Territorially there were tremendous gains. During their 
period of forced dispersal , the Emigrant Thembu, as they were later 
termed,33 had spread themselves thinly over the territory between the 
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Stormberg in the north and the Winterberg in the south, and from the 
Indwe river in the east to the Black Kei and Klaas Smit rivers in the 
West. By 1830, then, the Thembu king ruled over an area stretching 
from the Mbashe river to the present district of Queenstown, and from 
the coast to the Stormberg in the north. The most important result of 
these migrations, was the breaking up of national cohesion. 
An accumulation of factors contributed towards the alienation of the 
new settlements from the parent society at the Mbashe river. The 
emigrants, having penetrated territory bordering on the Cape Colony, 
were brought into close contact with the European economy, and were 
introduced to the use of money, and the application of western 
agricultural methods. Furthermore they were in a favourable position 
for conducting trade with their white neighbours. 
While a certain measure of acculturation to white norms was forced 
upon the emigrants, the Mbashe Thembu, contained within territory 
fringed by other black tribes and thus cut off from the European 
communities both in the Cape Colony and Natal, were anchored to 
ancient traditions. Despite some missionary contact they remained 
untouched by the new influences that were beginning to shape the 
history of their kinsmen on the north-eastern frontier of the Cape 
Colony. Economically and socially the interests of the two Thembu 
factions thus diverged. Political factors widened the gap. 
Ngubengcuka's death was followed by a civil war which left the fertile 
Colosa river valley desolated. 34 The government now devolved upon 
the regent Fadana (often spelled Vadana in official letters) who, 
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according to traditional custom. ruled on advice of his councillors. 
his paternal uncle and his brothers. It is generally accepted that a 
regent wielded les s authority than the paramount. Furthermore. the 
increasingly independent attitude taken on by emigrant chiefs. whose 
hands were strengthened by a constant stream of refugees from the 
Mbashe. undermined t he authority of the central government to a point 
where it became almost impossible to exercise control over the 
outlying districts. 
But although the cleavage of the Thembu into an eastern and a western 
bloc had by 1830 already taken tangible shape. there was still one 
common factor that preserved some semblance of homogeneity. This was 
an acute sense of vulnerability in the face of Bhaca . Gcaleka and 
assumed Difaqane threats. 35 It wa s for this reason that all the 
chiefs from the Mbashe to the Black Kei followed a pragmatic policy of 
friendship towards the COlOny.36 Once these two blocs became divided 
upon this important issue. a process was set into motion that cul-
minated in the f inal fragmentation of the nation thirty years later. 37 
By 1830 a breach between the Thembu sections became inevitable as 
demographic changes led to mounting tension between the emigrant 
Thembu clans and their white neighbours. The simultaneous influx of 
farmers from the eastern frontier and Thembu refugees from the Mbashe 
led to a jostling for land . The situation was further complicated 
when large numbers of Thembu. attacked from the north by the 
militarily advanced Kora and Griqua. 38 were driven into the Cape 
Colony where they swelled the numbers of those Thembu who had sought 
refuge t here during the Difaqane wars. The f armers found their 
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presence irksome and complaints about cattle raiding were soon pouring 
in. 
At this critical time Bawana was murdered by the Gcina. 39 His 
successor, Maphasa, was intensely disliked by white frontier 
officials. The Commissioner General of the Eastern Districts, Andries 
Stockenstrom, denounced him as an "apathetic barbarian",40 while 
Capt. Henry Somerset wrote derogator il y of the "il l -disposed. 
ignorant, grasping savage.,,41 Sihe le painted a very different 
picture of the new leader: he described him as a great warrior "who 
dared situations that were usually avoided by others", an eloquent 
speaker, and a capabl e leader, "always unwilling to take up a neutral 
stance. ,,42 These contrasting views need not be mutually exclusive. 
They are merely judgements on a man and his actions, seen from 
different perspectives. In the final analysis they all confirm the 
image that emerges from the pages of history: that of a shrewd and 
ambitious leader, whose aspiration to establish Tshatshu autonomy over 
the emigrant Thembu clans did not allow room for his father's 
conservative polic ies of goodwill towards the Cape Colony. Apart from 
the deteriorating relationship with his white neighbours, he also 
suspected his father's close friends, the Morav ian missionar ies, of 
being hand-in-glove with his main rivals, the Gci na. The Brethren 
first aroused his suspicions in 1828 when Colonial forces aided the 
Gcina in recovering cattle raided from them by Bawana ' s people. For 
some or other reason Maphasa felt that the missionaries had, on this 
occasion, betrayed him . When his father was killed by the Gcina he 
once again accused the missionaries of having sided with the Gcina, 
and he consequently attacked the miss ion station .43 Having turned 
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his back on the trad itional friendly Tshatshu-European alliances , he 
became increasing ly associated with the restless Ngqika. Not only did 
his settlement in the present district of Whittlesea bring him into 
close proximity with this clan, but he was also related to them by 
marriage. 
For some time, however, Maphasa's attitude towards the whites remained 
ambivalent. Despite t he cons tant fr iction between the two groups, his 
position was far too precarious to risk an immediate and complete 
breakdown of the traditional alliance. In 1831 his opportunistic 
attempt to so licit the aid of surrounding chiefs against the Gcina to 
avenge his father's death did not pay off. 44 Although he received 
considerable support, he was defeated by the Gcina in January 1831 in 
a battle near the Klipplaats river, and his people were once again 
driven into the Cape Colony, where they met with a very cool 
reception. In 1833 a Griqua attack forced t he chief himself into the 
Colony, and in the following year he had to ask for Colonial 
assistance against Ndhlambi. The event that eventually seemed to have 
caused the chief's radical breach with the Cape Colony was t he 
outbreak of the Sixth Frontier War. 
Wh il e the Mbashe Thembu confirmed their alliance with the Cape Colony 
by harbouring missionaries,45 Maphasa resorted to what can best be 
described as a benevolent neutrality.46 His precarious position 
precluded active participation on the side of his Ngqika associates, 
but he made his lands available for the harbouring of cattle raided 
from the Colony by the warring clans. His own people certainly made 
use of the opportunity to fish in troubled waters, and white farmers 
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increasingly complained of thefts committed by the Thembu. Clearly 
Maphasa's lands could not be seen as immune from the complex eastern 
frontier situation, a fact which Sir Benjamin D'Urban kept in mind 
when he finalized his post-war settlements in September 1835. 47 These 
settlements, although a radical modification of the Governor's initial 
proposals which envisaged the expulsion of the "irreclaimable savages" 
forever beyond the Kei, subjected the chiefs in the annexed area 
between the Kei and the Keiskama rivers - the so-called Province of 
Queen Adelaide - to British rule. Maphasa's lands fell within the 
annexed area; hence a chief who was not guilty of any proven act of 
hostility was robbed of his independence . D'Urban sent Col. Henry 
Somerset to Maphasa to make the final arrangements regarding his 
lands. Somerset duly arrived at Shiloh wi th an armed force of two 
hundred men. Maphasa was put to the choice of staying on his lands 
under British protection - implying subjection to the British 
Government - or removing himself beyond the Kei. Maphasa chose to 
remain on his own lands and said that without British protection "he 
was a dead man".48 Somerset was satisfied; he cou ld report to his 
superiors that Maphasa had welcomed the offer of receiving British 
protection, as he was too weak to defend himself against all his 
surrounding enemies. This is debatable. A signatory to the treaty, 
the Rev. Bonatz of the Moravian Missionary Society, was convinced that 
Maphasa, overawed by the armed force, expected an attack upon himself 
should he not accept the offer. Sir Andries Stockenstrom in later 
years maintained that it was the bitterness caused by the annexation 
of his lands that led to Maphasa's participation in the frontier war 
of 1846. It should be kept in mind, though, that Stockenstrom was 
severely opposed to D'Urban, and he let no opportunity pass by to 
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denounce the actions of the Governor. Sihele also indicated that 
Maphasa accepted the offer, but was soon disappointed when the 
Government started to interfere in his internal affairs. 49 In view of 
all this evidence it seems reasonable to assume that the Somerset-
Maphasa agreement further bedevilled the Tshatshu's shaky relationship 
with the Cape Government. The agreement was also, for other reasons, 
of considerable importance. The Tshatshu were now, fo r the first 
time, politically separated from their independent kinsmen at the 
Mbashe, so that their interests became more closely interwoven with 
those of the other restless tribes. The gap between the eastern and 
western Thembu therefore widened. 
The annexation of Maphasa's lands was of short duration. Sir 
Benjamin's settlements were rejected in Britain where both treasury 
officials and philanthropists opposed the annexation of tribal lands. 
Amongst the philanthropists were prominent men like Fowell Buxton and 
Lord Glenelg; t he latter was the newly appointed Secretary of State 
and Colonies. It was at the instigation of Buxton that a Select 
Committee was appointed to investigate, amongst other things, the 
policies concerning the black races on the Cape frontier. This 
committee which met in July 1835 under the chairmanship of Buxton, was 
strongly influenced by the former Commissioner-General of the Eastern 
Districts, Andries Stockenstrom, who was highly critical of both the 
Colonists and the Colonial government. 50 Acting largely upon 
Stockenstrom's evidence, the Committee condemned the D'Urban 
settlements as costly and inhumane. There then followed the well-
known Glenelg despatch wh ich put the blame for the war on the 
colonists, and informed D'Urban that Andries Stockenstrom had been 
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appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Districts, in which 
capacity he was to implement the Glenelg System. The Province of 
Queen Adelaide was to be abandoned; the chiefs were to be freed from 
their allegiance to the Queen, and treaties were to be made with 
border chiefs. Diplomatic Agents were to be appointed for each tribe. 
Henry Fynn was appointed as Diplomatic Agent to the Tambookies, and he 
took up residence at Tarka Post. 51 
In accordance with the Glenelg policy, a treaty was made with Maphasa 
in June 1837. If the Glenelg treaties were aimed at bringing about a 
more amicable relationship between the Colonists and the independent 
chiefs - which certainly was what Lord Glenelg had in mind - it failed 
hopelessly in the case of Maphasa. The basic problem was that the 
complexities of the north eastern frontier situation had not been 
taken into account when the lengthy treaty had been drawn up. Mapassa 
had to promise to do everything in his power to promote the 
tranquility of the several tribes by whom he was surrounded and to 
preserve peace with the colonists." Not only did he have to accept 
responsibility for the Bushmen under Mandoor - the original 
inhabitants of the area - but certain Thembu clans, who acknowledged 
the Mbashe paramount, were also placed under his jurisdiction. 52 
Thus, estranged from the parent society at a time when tension was 
building up in consequence of the shortcomings of the treaty system, 
Maphasa became increasingly caught up in the local black movements. 
Such movements were manifested in the rise of prophets whose call for 
the consolidation of all frontier people cut right through existing 
alliances. In a way, Maphasa became the spiritual ancestor of those 
Thembu who, in the 1870s, came to believe that the interests of the 
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Thembu were interwoven with those of other blacks rather than with the 
militarily superior whites. 53 
The pattern of future divisions between collaborators with the Colony 
and non-collaborators had thus clearly crystallized by the 1840s. As 
the decade progressed, the cleavage between the adherents of the two 
opposing policies became widespread. 
An opportunity to fuse the rival Thembu groups into some form of 
homogeneity presented itself when Mtirara became king in 1844. Five 
years earlier , Bhaca attacks had caused the removal of the royal house 
from the Mbashe to Hohito on the Imvani (White Kei) river. 54 Thereby 
the main theatre of Thembu activity had shifted to the Cape frontier, 
and since the king was now in close touch with his emigrant subjects , 
the consolidation of the Thembu people seems to have been a realistic 
possibility. Available evidence is far too scanty to allow definite 
conclusions as to the measure of consolidation that Mtirara achieved 
during the very first years of his reign. It would seem that he 
succeeded in bringing the Gcina and Ndungwana under his umbrella, but 
his relationship with the Tshatshu remained problematic. In September 
1845 Governor Maitland tried to restore peace on the frontier by yet 
another modification of the existing treaties. This time the Thembu 
treaty was s igned with Mtirara, while Maphasa signed as one of the 
sub-chiefs. Later events proved that Maphasa's acknowledgment of 
Mtirara's authority was only nominal. As the years passed, his 
influence increased. Not only was he older than Mtirara and possessed 
a stronger personality,55 but his policies were more attractive to 
young malcontents. This made it more and more difficult for the 
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Thembu king to exercise his monarchical powers. The fragile 
solidarity that Mtirara managed to bring about could hardly withstand 
the strains of the crucial years between 1839 - 1853 which witnessed 
two frontier wars, and increasing interference from the Cape Colony in 
Thembu affairs. 
The first of these wars, commonly known as the War of the Axe, because 
of the opening incident, had its roots in the unstable frontier 
conditions that followed the new Maitland treaties. Not only did 
these treaties fail to address the main grievances resulting from 
previous settlements, but they were also insensitively 
implemented. 56 Trouble was therefore fermenting when in March 1846, 
Tsili, a follower of the petty Ngqika chief, Tola, was arrested after 
having stolen an axe from a Fort Beaufort farmer. His friends staged 
a rescue, cut off the hand1 of the Khoi-prisoner to whom Tsili was 
handcuffed, and left the unfortunate man to die. Sandili, the Ngqika 
chief, refused to hand over the murderers, and Maitland decided to act 
swiftly, setting out for the frontier with troops and burghers. 
The war, which was to last till the end of 1847, gave Mtirara the 
opportunity to promote his own interests. His attitude during the 
time was nevertheless ambivalent. He could hardly rally open support 
for the Colony without estranging the militants within his own clan, 
and thereby strengthening Maphasa's position. Alternatively, 
participation on the side of the Colony could give him the opportunity 
of not only getting rid of Maphasa, but also of settling his land-
disputes with Mandoor and the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili. Moreover, 
ominous signs were coming from the Mbashe area where Pondo attacks had 
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once again forced a number of Thembu to seek refuge across the Indwe 
river. 57 An alliance with the Cape Colony must thus have been more 
vital than ever before. Mtirara, cleverly waited for the propitious 
moment to act against Maphasa. 
The opportunity came in August when Maphasa was in open conflict with 
the Colonial forces. This chief's participation in the war was 
triggered off by two unfortunate incidents. The first was the 
decision of Henry Fynn to make use of Mandoor's people who were 
residing at Joseph Read ' s "Bushman Institution", to protect the Shiloh 
mission station against possible Thembu attacks. As previously noted 
there was strong enmity between the Thembu and Mandoor's people. 
Maphasa set off with two hundred men to protest against this 
decision. Inevitably a fight ensued during which Maphasa's people 
were driven back. Reinforced by his Ngqika allies, he launched a 
counter-attack the next day, but was again repulsed and this time he 
suffered a loss of numerous cattle, captured by the Colonial 
forces. The infuriated Tshatshu could not be controlled when, a few 
days later, Maphasa's brother was accused without proof of guilt. of 
having murdered a trader. In defiance Maphasa set fire to the 
Imvani mission station which was situated in his country.58 In the 
skirmishes that followed he lost almost all his cattle, the 
final blow being dealt when Mtirara attacked him in the rear, seized 
4,000 cattle - left over from the original 12.000 which the chief was 
said to have raided from the Colony - and broke his power 
t 'I 59 emporarl y. 
For the rest, Mtirara's part in the war is rather obscure. Thembu 
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chiefs later cl aimed - and this was also t he opinion of J.C. Warner, 
at that time lay preacher with the Thembu king - that he rendered 
valuab le service. 50 They are, however, very vague on this point. 
Theal argued that, besides having captured Maphasa's cattle, he took 
no active part and that, in fact, he had harboured cattle raided from 
the COlony.51 Given the unstable frontier situation, both views might 
conta i n an element of truth. 
With Maphasa's power temporarily broken, Mtirara had settled his 
internal problems for a while , but his military adventure did not 
bring other benefits. Governor Maitland's proposals in December 1845 
would, had they been accepted by the British Government, have given 
him the rewards he was hoping for, but nothing came of them. These 
proposals envisaged the extension of the Colonial border to the 
Keiskama river, the subjection of the chiefs between the Fish and the 
Keiskama to British rule and the appointment of a magisterial 
commissioner to rule over them. The area was to be divided into three 
parts, with Mtirara's people located in the northern portion. Mtirara 
was the only chief who would be allowed to exercise "such a 
chieftain's power as would not be inconsistent with the paramount 
authority of the British Magistrate.,,52 
In a further attempt to strengthen his position, Mtirara met Maitland 
at Block Drift, where he implored the Governor to place him under 
British protection, the reason for his request being the vulnerable 
position of his people after the war. Ma itland was easi ly persuaded 
to recommend Mtirara's request to the British Government, and in his 
draft proposal he defined the Thembu boundaries in such a way that 
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they included lands at that time occupied by both Mandoor and 
Sarhili. 53 
Mtirara was soon to be disillusioned. Before Maitland's proposals 
could even have been considered, the Governor, weary of war, had 
resigned. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Pottinger. "In that way a 
new Pharoah that did not know Joseph had come," Sihele wryly 
commented. 54 Pottinger, an impatient man, had no intention of making 
a careful assessment of Maitland's promises to Mtirara, and he 
condemned his predecessor's recommendations outright as "an 
extraordinary and inadmissab le scheme.,,55 The rejection of Maitland's 
proposals can be seen as a unilateral abrogation of an agreement with 
the Thembu king, and it undermined Mtirara's confidence in his white 
allies. Greater disappointments were to follow. 
In December 1847 Pottinger was succeeded by Sir Harry Smith, who 
viewed the frontier problem as a strategic one wh ich could not be 
solved on a piecemeal basis. In effect, his design was to extend 
British sovere ignty over the greater part of South Africa. Within 
three weeks after his arri val he proceeded to Grahamstown and annexed 
the old Ceded Territory between the Fish and Keiskama rivers under the 
name Victoria East. The territory between the Kei and Keiskama was 
proclaimed a separate British dependency, to be known as British 
Kaffraria. This territory was not annexed to the Colony, but was 
directly ruled by Smith in his capacity as High Commissioner, 55 on 
behalf of Brita in. To ensure firm control over the tribes, Kaffraria 
was divided up into counties with British names. In allocating t hese 
counties to the various tribes, Smith gave recognition to the separate 
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existence of the Tshatshu people. Initially Mtirara was to be settled 
at Howick. and Ma phasa at Alnwick. 67 However . following an agreement 
with Smith soon afterwards. Mtirara moved to the lands between the 
Colonial boundary and the Indwe river where he was promised protection 
against Sarhili as compensation for his neutrality in the war. The 
chiefs Tyopo. Fadana. Jumba. Kelelo. Kolobeni. Mali and Quesha were 
placed under him. The inclusion of Maphasa's lands in Kaffraria. 
where this chief now lived as a British subject. led to further 
estrangement between the Tshatshu and the Hala. 
The agreement with Mtirara proved to be an over-hasty and ill-
conceived plan. The fact that his people were thinly spread out over 
an area of 2.400 square miles . which bordered on the two large 
districts of Cradock and Albert. soon gave rise to friction. Adjacent 
farmers coveted the uninhabited patches of land. and a well-known 
frontier situation - European intrus ion on tribal lands and raiding of 
cattle by Africans in retaliation - inevitably followed. The farmers 
claimed that the increasing cattle raiding was unwarranted. and they 
could easily persuade Sir Harry Smith to reconsider his earlier 
promise to Mtirara. 68 It was now argued that since the Thembu 
received the lands between the Kl aas Smits and Indwe rivers on 
condition of good behaviour. they had forfeited their claim to 
independence. In July 1848 Mtirara's lands were consequently annexed 
to the Cape Colony.69 
In later years J.C. Warner maintained that the annexation of Mtirara's 
lands was the major mistake in t he history of Colonial relations with 
the western Thembu. Smith blundered further. according to Warner. by 
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sending a police force with the commission that was to adm inister the 
new territory. These police, who were recruited from the Ngqika, 
taunted the Thembu saying: "Yes we fought against the white man, and 
you did not help us, and now we are to govern you." Another galling 
incident, Warner claimed, took place at Smith's notorious meeting with 
black rulers at King William's Town. Sir Harry put his foot on 
Mtirara's neck, as he did with the other chiefs so as to i llustrate 
their submissiveness to the British Government. 70 
In Maphasa's territory conditions were no better. In the final 
delineation of boundaries this chief was, as we have seen, excised 
from Thembuland and legally located in Kaffraria. His position was 
indeed anomalous. He himself and part of his clan was located in 
British Kaffraria under the Smith system, but the boundaries were 
drawn in such a way that a section of his clan was excluded from 
Kaffraria and did not really fit into any form of territorial pattern. 
His authority over the inhabitants was still, in theory, that of an 
unalloyed chieftainship, but he could not in practice exercise it. In 
Kaffraria he was in practice a chief, but his functions were 
limited. 71 Under these circumstances the location of the chief in 
Kaffraria, in close contact with the core of Xhosa turbulence, was 
indeed inexpedient. 
The Thembu clans were now not only deeply divided amongst themselves, 
but the royal clan was once again split. Sihele tells us that when 
Mtirara felt his end approaching, he warned his people to return to 
the Mbashe so as to avoid further trouble with the Whites. 72 The 
Great House under his brother, Joyi, heeded this advice, taking with 
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them the child-heir, Qeya. Most members of the Right Hand House 
remained behind. Mtirara died in 1848. Not only did his followers 
now lack his clear guidance but, not unusually, the death of the king 
sparked off suspicion and internal dissent. 73 The regency was first 
offered to his senior brother , Ncapayi, who had by then returned to 
the Mbashe. Ncapayi, presumably unwilling to rule over people 
subjected to Colonial control, declined the offer. Shweni, his second 
brother , a man greatly respected by the Cape Town authorities, was 
then appointed, but he accidentially shot himself. 74 
For the Colonial Government which had, for some time , been thinking 
along the lines of a divisive policy of regionalism as a solution to 
frontier problems, the golden opportunity had now arrived. 
Among the Thembu who remained behind with the Right Hand House, was a 
remarkable woman , Nonesi , Mtirara ' s foster mother. 75 Like Mtirara, 
she had close relations with J .C. Warner, whose advice on Thembu 
matters was well received by the Government. Warner used his 
considerable influence and in an unprecedented move, two regents were 
apPointed: Nonesi to rule over the western Thembu and Joyi over the 
Mbashe section. As Sihele points out, two people could not be regent 
for one person. He maintains that if Nonesi was regent, then Joyi was 
to be an ordinary chief. 76 Not only was this an unusual situation, 
but it was unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the 
Thembu. 
By 1850, then, the Thembu seemed to have been subjected to the 
vagaries of fortune. They were territorially, as well as politically, 
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divided amongst themselves, and were jostled on the one front by white 
farmers, and on the other by the Gcaleka. The annexations of 1848 had 
weakened the influence of those chiefs who had traditionally been 
friendly to the Colony, and many young malcontents were wait ing with 
Maphasa, as frontier tension was once again mounting, to join a war 
against the Colony. 
The eighth frontier war, the War of Mlanjeni, broke out in December 
1850. Maphasa, after some hesitation, joined the Ngqika, thereby 
bringing into the war, not only his own people, but many young 
activists from Nonesi's people whom he seemed to have attracted like a 
magnet. It was reckoned by frontier farmers that, at the commencement 
of the war , Maphasa was more influential than Ngqika himself. 77 
Not only did Maphasa's participation strengthen the numbers of t he 
warring tribes tremendously,78 but the whole area of confl ict was 
extended. In some parts, his men resorted to a devastating type of 
guerilla warfare, in others they joined in concerted movements with 
the Ngqika and Gcaleka to attack strategic points. 
The attitude of the Hala was, as in 1846-1847, uncertain. Nonesi 
earned for herself the title "Nonesi the faithful", and proved her 
loyalty by moving with her clan to the border of the Cradock district 
so as to protect this part of the frontier . Her example was followed 
by Quesha and some other chiefs who were supplied with arms. The 
fact, however, remained that Nonesi's control over her people was not 
absolute, and the Colony could not count on the neutrality of her 
whole c lan. The excitement of war, backed by the Mlanjeni promises. 
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was contag ious to young men who had probably never accepted Nonesi's 
regency. An incident which took place in January 1851 would certainly 
have estranged a number of Colonial supporters. A commando under 
Gideon Joubert claimed that they were attacked by a section of 
Nonesi's people under her Chief Councillor. In revenge, Joubert fell 
upon Nonesi's people, dispersed them completely and then demanded a 
war tribute of 2,000 head of cattle and 150 horses. Nonesi was 
further ordered to retreat beyond the Mbashe. 79 The fact that 
Nonesi complied with this demand indicated either an admission of 
guilt or her realization that she lacked control over her people and 
that it would be safer to remove them from the danger zone. 
The turning point in the war came in 1852 brought about, amongst other 
factors, by the unexpected death of Maphasa while on his way to the 
Klaas Smits river to join in a combined attack on Turvey's Post. The 
fighting spirit of his people was now temporarily paralysed, not only 
because they lacked leadership, but also because disputed claims to 
leadership led to internal discord and susPicion. 80 
Meanwhile, military success finally seemed to have come within Sir 
Harry Smith's grasp , but the British Prime Minis t er, Lord John Russell 
as well as the Colonial Secretary, Earl Grey , had convinced themselves 
that Smith had prolonged the war through his leniency to Khoi-khoi 
rebels and inadequate vigour against t he enemy. He was recalled, and 
on 31 March 1852 , Sir George Cathcart arrived as new Governor and High 
Commissioner . 
Cathcart found the tribes semi-starved and weary of war but by no 
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means subdued. Determined to bring the war to a speedy end, he acted 
swiftly, conducted successful operations in the Amatola and Waterkloof 
mountains and then appointed a commission to discuss the possibility 
of peace with the Thembu. 
Despite strong protests from the farmers who believed that they had 
been robbed of complete victory over their enemy, Cathcart was con-
vinced that the time had come to put an end to hostilities, and, after 
having dealt with the Gcaleka chief Sarhili, he granted pardon to the 
rebellious Thembu chiefs who were now prepared to surrender arms. 
The peace terms which Cathcart dictated were largely aimed at the 
relocation of rebellious tribes beyond the Cape Colonial boundary and 
the resettlement of forfeited Thembu terri tories by European settlers. 
As he was of the opinion that Maphasa had surpassed all the other 
chiefs in guilt, this chief's lands were forfeited and the name and 
independence of his tribe were to cease. The remnants of the tribe 
were allowed to place themselves under a "responsible" Thembu chief. 81 
The other tribes, living on the lands formerly annexed by Smith, were 
to be resettled in locations. Nonesi and her fOllowers were invited 
to return from the Mbashe and to occupy the location west of the Indwe 
river - the so-cal led Tambookie Location82 which later became the 
district of Glen Grey - where J.C. Warner was placed as a government 
representative. 
For the Thembu the war of 1853 was in many respects decisive. Some 
tribes emerged stronger after the war (Nonesi ' s people), others lost 
all the i r lands, wh ile others remained behind at the Mbashe under t he 
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regency of Joyi. The question now remained as to whether tribal 
rohesio"\ 
cehere~e would stand the strain of the enforced peace and the 
po litical division. 
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(b) Missionary and Colonial Influences on the Thembu (1800-1853) 
The geographical situation of the Mbashe Settlement, far from European 
communities and barricaded by black nations, influenced early Thembu-
European relations in various ways. 
While the Thembu were economically adversely affected by being barred 
from the lucrative markets in the Cape Colony and Natal, so readily 
accessible to the Mpondo and the Xhosa,83 their insulation was 
politically advantageous. Cushioned by the frontier peoples against 
the onslaughts of European expansionism, they enjoyed a long per iod of 
tranquility at a time when their Xhosa neighbours were fight ing 
desperately against a militarily superior enemy. It was only by the 
mid 1820 ' s that this "splend id isolation" was shattered by var ious 
external factors that stimulated closer contact between European and 
Thembu. One such factor was the perennial 8haca and Mpondo attacks 
upon the Mbashe people that forced thousands of Thembu north-westwards 
where they encountered European farmers. Another was the inevitable 
influence of the British policy of aggressive expansionism, the gist 
of which had been made clear in their dealings with the Xhosa after 
the Frontier War of 1819. 
Parallel with these developments was the missionary influence which 
commenced with the establishment of the f ifth link in the chain of 
Wesleyan mission stations at Clarkebury in 1829. In comparison to 
other frontier nations where the London and Glasgow Missionary 
Societies were already firmly established by 1825 , this was a late 
start a delay which was in part due to the hesitancy of missionaries 
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to start work in a far-off, sparsely populated and unsettled country, 
as well as to the at titude of Ngubengcuka. 84 
While the Thembu king's counterparts on the frontier had willingly 
accepted missionaries as a matter of political expediency , 
Ng ubengcuka, who evaluated the position from a safe distance, 
distrusted the motives of the newcomers. Attempts by various societies 
after 1821 to gain a foothold in Thembuland met with a negative 
response. Whether his eventual compliance could be ascribed to the 
di screet behaviour of the Rev. Shepstone who took up temporary abode 
in Thembuland after the closing of the Morley Mission Station, as is 
sometimes maintained,85 is debatable. 
It is more likely that af ter an initial delay the king at last 
responded to the political eXigencies of the late 1820's created by 
the Simultaneity of black invasions into Thembuland and Cape Colonial 
expanionism on the eastern frontier. Aware of the expediency of 
coming to terms with the militarily superior Cape Colony in order to 
buttress his own vulnerable position, Ngubengcuka, having observed 
missionary activities amongst his neighbours , spotted the possibility 
of obtaining, with missionary help, a useful link with the Cape 
Government . 
With the establishment, then, of the Clarkebury Mission Station, by 
the Rev . J. Haddy and the lay preacher Joseph Cox Warner, and the 
subsequent emergence of sub-stations on the north-eastern frontier, 
the foundation was laid for a long tradition of close , albeit often 
uneasy, friendship between the Wesleyan missionaries and the Thembu 
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monarchs, a relationship which forms one of the dominant themes in 
Thembu historiography. Although Christianity at first made little 
headway in Thembuland,86 the missionaries made their presence felt in 
various ways. 
On the north-eastern frontier the Moravian missionaries played a 
considerable role in the socio-economic field. They established a 
station at Shiloh, near the present day Queenstown, in 1828. The 
decision to do so was, in part, a result of a period of great 
progress experienced by the society and, in part, a response to the 
political and economic need of Bawana ' s people. Separated from the 
parent society and exposed to attacks from other tribes, on uncertain 
terms with the neighbouring Ngqika as well as with the white farmers, 
the Tshatshu were in a precarious position. Under these circumstances 
the presence of a missionary, which had come to be regarded by chiefs 
as a means of protection against surrounding enemies as well as a 
prestige symbol, was most desirable. Furthermore, having settled in 
an area suitable for agriculture, Bawana realized his people's need 
for instruction in this field. Therefore, on the advice of the 
landdrost of Somerset, he applied for a missionary. Governor Lord 
Charles Somerset supported such a project for political reasons, and 
his successor, Bourke, requested the Rev. Hallbeck to establish a 
station where the Tshatshu could learn trades and agriculture. The 
Moravians hoped - in vain - that the tribulations endured by the 
Tshatshu would make them more receptive to the Gospel and that through 
them, access might be gained to other chiefdoms. 87 
There were marked differences between the Moravian approach to 
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evangelization and those of other societies. While the Glasgow and 
London Societies. and to a lesser degree the Wesleyans . were often at 
loggerheads with the farming community as well as with the 
administration. the Moravians were regarded with far less suspicion. 
D. Williams suggested that it was because the administration was not 
afraid that they would set up a state within a state. 88 During his 
travels of 1839. James Backhouse noticed that the Moravian 
missionaries at Shiloh maintained a distance between themselves and 
neighbouring Thembu chiefs. He ascribed this to fear on the part of 
the missionar ies that too much familiarity could subject them to the 
caprice of the chiefs as had happened with missionar ies from other 
societies. 89 
The significance of the Moravian work in the north-east is not to be 
found in the extent of their work - in 1853 the Thembu. Mfengu and 
Bushmen at Shiloh numbered about four hundred. 90 and no other stations 
were estab lished. However. the missionaries undoubtedly contributed 
to the rise of a so-cal led civilized class .91 Since t he Moravians 
inculcated a desire for work among the i r fOllowers. 92 and the farmers 
wanted labourers. it follows that a relatively large number of Thembu 
made contact with the western way of life. Their communication with 
the farmers was faci l itated by the fact that the Moravians instructed 
the children through the medium of Xhosa and Dutch. 93 
While the Moravian activities were confined to the Tshatshu. the 
Wesleyans did substantial work among the other Thembu chiefdoms on the 
north eastern frontier. One such a station was the Lesseyton Station. 
The Rev. William Shaw bought a farm on the Zwart Kei for the benefit 
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of ex-slaves, Mfengu and Thembu. During the war of 1847 the 
inhabitants assisted the Colony and in recognition for their services, 
Sir Harry Smith gave them land at Lesseyton. At this station, there 
lived mainly people of the Gcina chiefdom, but there was also a large 
Bushman population. 94 It was a prosperous station and the pride of 
the Wesleyan Mission Society. In 1855 good progress was reported and 
in 1858 a sub-station was built. The industrial school made provision 
for the training of wagonmakers, carpenters, smiths and shoemakers and 
it gave guidance in the agricultural field especially in the planning 
of orchards and quince hedges. 95 
We have very little information on the Glebe station, established by 
Rev. Patten for work among the Ndungwana, but in the light of later 
events it would seem that he made a great impact on the chief 
Ndarala. 96 
The acceptance of European ways of life inevitably penetrated 
traditional institutions. Tyopo and Nonesi adopted a system of 
granting patches of land for cultivation to influential Christians in 
an attempt to induce such people to settle among them,97 Two Mfengu 
farmers who gave evidence before the Thembuland Land Commission in 
1881, referred to Tyopo's policy of giving land in individual tenure, 
a custom which, they claimed. was later continued in Emigrant 
Thembuland by his son, 98 Gecelo . J.e. Warner followed the same 
policy when he was appointed Thembu Agent in the newly established 
location. 99 The introduction of the European system of landownership 
by some Thembu certainly accentuated the schism between the 
"westernized" Thembu - a term which became synonymous with 
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"Christianized" - and the large majority of traditionalists who 
suspiciously regarded the mission stations as alien, perhaps even 
disruptive, communities . The assimilation of western thoughts and 
ideas which often followed on the adoption of western modes of living, 
was a further cause for suspicion. The chiefs themselves could not 
afford the dilution of their power by their acceptance of a foreign 
religion, but they were not averse to their close relatives being 
christianized. Ndarala's two sons, Joseph and Benjamin were educated 
by the Bishop of Grahamstown , while Mtirara entrusted the education of 
his heir, Ngangelizwe, to J.C. Warner . 100 
Although missionaries had definite instructions not to meddle in 
political matters , they could, in the long run, not keep out of 
secular affairs. In Inter-tribal matters for instance, they jealously 
guarded t he interests of their particular tribe. Annual reports from 
Thembuland are studded with references to occasions when war between 
the Thembu and their traditional Gcaleka enemies was prevented by 
missionary interference. 
It was, however, with regard to Thembu-Cape Colonial relationships 
that the missionaries played their most important role. To the 
Warners, Pattens and many others - zealous evangelists that they were 
- the spread of Christianity was inseparably linked with the expansion 
of British rule. After the annexation of Thembu territories in 1848, 
they preached loyalty to God in the same breath as loyalty to the 
Queen. 101 The black people were introduced to two foreign abstract 
concepts: the invisible unknown God of the white man in heaven , and 
an equally invisible and unknown ruler across the sea . To what extent 
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the chiefs themselves different iated between these concepts is not 
clear. The praise song composed by Ndarala for his 1,500 followers, 
to be sung for Prince Alfred on his visit to Grahamstown in 1858, 
suggests that the images could sometimes be confused, even allowing 
. . for the fact that these might have been methaphorlcel, implying a 
comp Ii ment: 
"We have seen the child of heaven 
We have seen the son of our Queen" 
Sir George Grey's address on this occasion also seems to have some 
biblical allusions. Talk ing about the Queen's great interest in the 
welfare of al l the people, he emphasised that "a greater proof of this 
could not have been given than that of sending her son, whom she so 
dearly loved, to this distant country as her representative. ,,102 
Admittedly, this may be reading too much into what may be purely 
politica l remarks,103 but, that there did exist in the minds of both 
missionaries and converts a link between Christianity and imperialism 
cannot be denied. The convergence of pol itical and religious concepts 
brought the role of the missionary as preacher of the Gospel, adviser 
of the chiefs and communicator between the chiefs and the Cape 
Colonial government into sharp focus. By the time that the Thembu 
felt the brunt of British expansionism, the way had already been paved 
for the creation of loyalties towards the Cape Government. This 
facilitated the process of imperial conquest. 
A study of Thembu-Cape Co lonial relationships in the period 1800-1853 
reveals two clearly discern~Jle periods. During the first, up to 
1847, nearly all relationships between the two groups were 
cooperative. The exception was the Tshatshu whose po lic ies had by 
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1830, diverged from traditional Thembu pOlicies. 104 After 1847 a 
growing alienation between the Thembu and their white allies, became 
apparent. It culminated in the participation of a large section of 
the western Thembu in the war of Mlanjeni in 1853. 105 
The close relationship in the early period is understandable. By 1820 
Britain had already been involved in four costly wars against the 
Xhosa and the frontier situation had remained unstable despite 
Somerset's declaration of a neutral belt between the Xhosa and White 
farmers. Under these circumstances, an alliance with Ngubengcuka, 
who, through his missionary, had made friendly overtures to the Cape 
Colonial Government, was most valuable. In the not unlikely event of 
another war, the Thembu could attack the Xhosa from the rear. On the 
other hand, Ngubengcuka was as much in need of an ally against 
perennial Bhaca, Mpondomise and Xhosa attacks. 
The relationship between the Cape Colony and the Thembu was further 
cemented by the events of 1828, when the Cape Colony sent a force to 
Thembuland in response to Ngubengcuka's appeal for help against Shaka 
who demanded his submission on threat of invasion. Earlier, the 
Ngwane chief, Matiwane,106 had settled near Ngubengcuka's Great 
Place, and in the confusion that followed, the Ngwane were mistaken as 
Zulus and routed by a combined Colonial-Xhosa-Thembu Army in the 
Battle of Mbholompo.107 Nothing came of the expected Zulu invasion, 
but the episode had once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the 
Thembu if attacked from the rear . Thus, throughout the last turbulent 
years of his life, Ngubengcuka nurtured his friendship with the Cape 
Colony. This policy was continued after his death by the regent, 
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Fadana, who in the Sixth Xhosa War incurred the wrath of surrounding 
chiefs by harbouring missionaries. 108 
In the north-east, where white farmers and Emigrant Thembu lived in 
common insecurity, the relationship was even closer. Problems did 
arise from time to time when Thembu fled into the Cape Colony for 
protect ion, and we certainly have to accept that some friction was 
unavoidable in a frontier situation. Theal alleged that, while a 
refugee in the Cape Colony in 1827, following attacks by Matiwane , 
Bawana was 
they had 
guilty of causing damage which "was little less 
. .. 109 been avowed enemIes, but official reports 
than i f 
do not 
substantiate this statement. On the contrary, the Bawana-Macomo 
dispute of 1829 demonstrated very clearly the close association which 
Bawana had with both Cape officials and frontier farmers. 110 
This dispute dated back to the time when some stray Thembu, having 
escaped Ngwane attacks, sett led on, or near, Macomo ' s lands. The 
opportunity to get rid of these intruders came in 1829 when 8awana's 
mind was occupied with his quarrels with the Gcina chief, Mtayelele. 
Macoma's attack on Bawana's people in 1829 led to Cape Colonial 
interference and the eventual expulsion of the Xhosa chief from the 
Kat River area. 111 The attitude of the Cape Government at the time of 
the dispute was explained by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Lieutenant-
Governor of the Eastern Province, in his evidence before the 
Aborigines Committee in 1836. He made it clear that the Thembu had 
been l iving peaceably on the Cape border and that "the Government were 
always in the habit of threatening any tribe that disturbed them." 
Other tribes, so Stockenstrom claimed, were aware t hat they would give 
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the Government offence by plundering the Thembu, who, in turn, would 
have no alternative other than to rush into the Cape Colony and 
plunder the farmers. 112 Stockenstrom's evidence was supported by 
Major Dundas who referred to the Thembu as "useful neighbours ".1 13 
The good relationship between the greater part of the Thembu and the 
Cape was still evident. Although Mtirara did not receive the rewards 
he hoped for in 1846 , the Cape Colony did benefit from Mtirara's 
indirect aid during the Seventh Frontier War, as well as by the more 
substantial aid given by Christian converts at the Haslope Hills and 
Lesseyton stations. 
Increasing alienation between the Thembu and the Cape Colonial 
government after 1847 was certainly rooted in Sir Harry Smith ' s 
unprovoked annexation of Mtirara's lands and his treatment of the king 
at the King William's Town meeting. 114 The establishment of the 
Tambook ie Location on the annexed land after the War of 1853,115 was 
in fact, a perpetuation of a morally indefensible act, and, like Sir 
Harry Smith, Sir George Cathcart hoped to veil its full imp licat ions 
by allowing the Thembu chiefs to rule according to their own customs, 
thereby creating an illusion of independence. Thus there developed a 
situation that can best be described as a client-patron relationship. 
This arrangement was still workable in 1848, not only because a policy 
of Colonial non-interference could be observed , but because the 
Thembu, probably looked upon annexation as a means of securing 
protection against their enemies. The 1853 settlement after the war 
of Mlanjeni, in which the Thembu were formally declared British 
subjects, was made in the aftermath of the Mlanjeni War under far more 
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strenuous circumstances. Although the war ended in the military 
defeat of the frontier nations, the rising tide of black nationalism 
was not stemmed. From 1850 onwards Cape Colonial policy was mainly 
directed by the fear of a black alliance against the Colony. 
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Chapter 2 
The Tambookie Location: Uneasy Pacification 
Cathcart's settlements after the War of Mlanjeni. which made provision 
for the creation of a Thembu location, the boundaries of which were 
drawn in accordance with the conditions of strategic defence. were 
typical of a man who was inclined to view frontier affairs from a 
military rather than an administrative point of view. The northern 
and western boundaries stretching from the point where Bram Neck runs 
into the Black Kei river, across a range of high mountains up to 
Theodorus Rand and thence to the Stormberg, enclosed the Thembu within 
a well-defined mountain barrier. 1 The Governor deluded himself into 
believing that they were "perfectly satisfied and most grateful", 
having been provided with "ample space and a fair amount of good 
land.,,2 
Cathcart ' s hope that a mountain barrier would eliminate cattle raiding 
and reciprocate trespass by farmers and Thembu on each others' lands 
soon foundered upon the rocks of frontier reali t ies. The concept of 
a "well-defined boundary line" proved to be nothing but an illusion as 
a look at the map will show. First, i t will be noted that the north-
eastern boundary on the Indwe River, was adjacent to Sarhili's 
country, while the southern limit bordered on the Ngqika Location, so 
that the Location Thembu were, in fact, an extension of the vast 
Kaffrarian population . Secondly, the Stormberg, which formed the 
, 
boundary between the Location and the sparsely populated Albert 
district, was by no means impassable, and it was here, as will be 
seen , that friction arose as white farmers and Thembu jostled for 
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land. 
Tensions that arose on the one hand, from ineffective boundary 
arrangements, and on the other from internal rivalry between diverse 
groups forced to live together within a confined area, underlined the 
shortcomings of the administrative system of indirect rule, set up to 
deal with the many complex problems of the Location. This policy, as 
applied in various parts of the British Empire in the 19th century 
rested upon the belief that Europe and Africa were culturally distinct 
and that the form of government that was most suited to the latter, 
was that devised by Africans themselves. 3 In Southern Africa its most 
successful exponent was Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent in 
Natal between 1845 and 1850 and, after the redesignation of the post, 
Secretary of Native Affairs until 1875. 
Shepstone ' s policies of indirect rule, divide and rule, the exemption 
of Africans from tribal law and the recognition of Christian 
marriages, all of these also featured prominently in the Location 
system as appl ied by Warner. The latter believed, like Shepstone, 
that no system of management half as effective, at even ten 
times the cost, could be substituted for tribal organization. In 
o.d~i,,"i s.f1QI i >Ie 
accordance with the convict ion , Shepstone devised an adminsitrative 
system whereby well-disposed, traditional chiefs were recognized 
while at the same time commoners were apPointed as new 
chiefs. Such commoners, having gained from their appointments, 
were usually more amenable to control by the white government. 
Although these chiefs and headmen functioned, in theory, under the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, it was Shepstone who acted as "supreme 
47 
chief." 
In the Location, too , there were, at the base, traditional as well as 
appointed chiefs and headmen under four principal chiefs . These 
chiefs were Nonesi (Hala), Tyopo (Gcina), Quesha (Ndungwana) and 
Yiliswe, the mother of Maphasa (Tshatshu). Nonesi was appointed as 
the "Paramount" of all the Location Thembu. 4 At the top of the 
pyramid was the Thembu Agent, J.C. Warner. 
There were good reasons to assume that Warner was well-qualified for 
his task. The son of an 1820 Settler, he was brought up on the 
Eastern Frontier, and at the age of seventeen took up the post of lay-
preacher at Clarkebury. James Backhouse, who visited the mission 
station in 1839 was greatly impressed by the young man whom he 
considered to be lI one of the finest kafir scholars in the country, 
having gained much of his practical acquaintance wh ile working with 
the people as an art isan. ,,5 Although some of the stories regarding 
Warner's activities in war-torn Thembuland - such as his unarmed 
approach to invading Oifaqane armies, and his persuading an invading 
Bhaca expedition to release Thembu women prisoners and children6 - may 
be dismissed as apocrypha l, there nevertheless is reason to believe 
that he gained considerable prestige in Thembuland. When Mtirara left 
the Mbashe for the Black Kei he took Warner with him and , throughout 
the king's life , they remained in close touch, even after Warner had 
taken up a post at the Lesseyton Mission Station. It was whi Ie he was 
at Lesseyton that Warner experienced an emotional crisis that led to 
his resignation from the ministry. "I did not leave", he confided to 
his friend, Robert Godlonton," f rom any distaste to the work, nor on 
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any account of any alteration in my views of the doctrine and 
description of the Wesleyans, for I hope to l ive and die a Methodist, 
nor for worldly gain, but merely and solely because my own soul is not 
prospering in personal piety and I feel that I am utterly unfit for so 
holy an office."l He took up residence at Alice, from where he 
viewed the frontier developments with apprehension. Shocked by the 
annexation of Mtirara's lands8 he prepared himself to start a crusade 
on behalf of the Thembu. He maintained that he had been appointed as 
their "Regent" (presumably by Mtirara) to act as Secretary and Agent 
for them to take their case, if necessary, to the Aborigines 
Protection Society and the Br itish public. 9 Nothing came of the 
intended crusade, and for some time Warner faded into oblivion, until 
1853 when his name was linked to a rather strange incident . In 1853 
the Albert farmer s sent a petition to the Governor signed, amongst 
others by Warner, in which they lodged complaints against the chief 
Tyopo. They claimed that at the beginning of the war, the chief had 
entered into a treaty with them whereby he promised to move his people 
away from Cathcart's proclaimed boundary. The removal never took 
place. Cathcart rejected the silly pet ition , pOinting out that 
treaties could only be made between lawful governments. He also 
expressed his indignation at this illegal procedure. 10 However, 
Cathcart did not seem to have taken the matter seriously and soon 
afterwards he offered Warner the post of Thembu Agent in the newly 
proclaimed Tambookie Location. A supporter of D'Urban's policies, 
Warner had little confidence in the Cathcart system, which he regarded 
as far too lenient, but he accepted the post, hoping perhaps that he 
could bring some stability to this turbulent area. 
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The ideas underlying Warner's policy epitomized frontier official 
thought of the day : a belief in what they considered to be a firm and 
just policy towards the Blacks and the conviction that a potential 
black alliance could only be avoided by the extension of British rule 
across the Kei river. His political credo, which constituted the 
essence of his Location policy, was best expressed, right at the end 
of his career, in his election manifesto when he stood as M.L.A. for 
Queenstown: "They (the black people) should be kept in order by a firm 
and manly policy and be taught that we as a master race are not to be 
trifled with. It must never be forgotten that they consider us as 
intruders in South Africa - a sort of common enemy and the Colony a 
fair field in which to exercise their predatory propensities. Hence, 
in dealing with them we should - while always treating them justly -
shape our policy accOrdingly . ,,11 
As Thembu Agent, Warner undoubtedly had aspirations of becoming a 
second Shepstone, acting the part of the benevolent white chief. 
Unfortunately for him, he lacked not only personal qualities such as a 
sound legal training, diplomatic skill and cool judgement in times of 
crises, but he was also severely handicapped by the very system under 
which he had to operate. Incomprehensible as it may be, his executive 
functions were never carefully circumscribed and had not even been 
legalized; nor did the chiefs know the limits of their power under 
the new dispensation. There was the constant danger that those who 
had to carry out the laws could come into collision with the judicial 
department of the Cape Colony. Swift and determined action was simply 
not possible. 
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In an attempt to normalise the situation, Warner suggested in 1855 
that the Thembu be exempted from the laws of the Cape Colony, and be 
considered as falling within Kaffraria, and therefore to be governed 
by their chiefs under the Thembu Agent. 12 A bill to that effect was 
introduced by Governor Grey and passed in the Upper House, but it was 
thrown out when sent to the Lower House. The status of the Location 
Thembu and their relationship with the Thembu Agent was uncertain. 
Were they Cape Colonial subjects or not? Nobody seemed to know for 
sure. To a certain extent their separate identity was recognized: 
the chiefs were allowed to govern their people according to their own 
laws and customs,13 and in May 1856 it was stipulated that none of 
the laws in force in other parts of the Colony would be applicable to 
th L t ' 14 e oca Jon. Legally however , there were no safeguards. The 
Location dwellers had no political status distinct from that of other 
Colonial subjects; the chiefs were, like Warner, operating without 
having their powers legalized, and as late as 1865 Warner could not 
say for sure whether the Thembu were Colonial subjects 15 or not. We 
can understand Warner's dilemma when he once complained: "I am placed 
in a most unpleasant position , for whilst I am expected to manage 
15,000 barbarians in such manner as to ensure peace and tranquility of 
this part of the frontier, I am not in possession of a particle of 
legal power to enable me to do so; for although the Executive 
Government has always supported my authority and approved of the 
manner in which I have hitherto governed these people, and will no 
doubt continue to do so ... I cannot lose sight of the unpleasant fact 
that the authority I exercise is, stricly speaking illegal, and that 
the 'charter of justice' recognizes no such powers as I am almost 
daily necessitated to exert, and that consequently both myself and the 
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chiefs under my supervision, frequently subject ourselves to the 
liability of civil actions being entered against us; or even to the 
more unpleasant and serious liability of being called to account by 
the Attorney General.,,16 
To add to the confusion, there was Nonesi. Her position had always 
been something of an enigma. It is not possible to ascertain to what 
extent she was accepted by the Thembu as regent in 1849. It could be 
that some ambitious chiefs approved of her appointment as they might 
have felt that the div i sion of power and the appointment of a woman 
would lessen the chances of usurpation by a young regent. After all, 
tribal chiefs wanted the central monarchy to be weak. It is equa lly 
possible that many of the young activists of the Mlanjeni War rejected 
her authority. The Cape Government's reasons for having appointed her 
are obvious. After the death of Mtirara a ruler was desperately 
needed to control the large number of Thembu on the frontier, and Joyi 
had no intention of leaving his Mbashe abode. No better person could 
be found t han Nonesi. She proved her loyalty during the Mlanjeni war 
by removing her people to the Mbashe river, but her presence between 
the Mbashe and Umgwali rivers, where she took up abode, annoyed the 
Gcaleka. They were determined not to make room for her. She 
therefore welcomed the Cape Government's invitation, after the war, to 
return to her former lands where she was offered the paramountcy over 
the newly-created Location. This appointment turned out to be a 
thorny issue. The term paramount would seem to imply permenancy and 
absolute authority, but it is doubtful whether either the Government 
or the Location dwellers themselves viewed it in this light. Nonesi 
soon experienced the problem that arose from what could be termed a 
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government appointment not supported by traditional claims. Given the 
Thembu concept of one nation under the paramountcy of Joyi, it is 
understandable that they would not unanimously and willingly have 
accepted the diversion of the monarchy. Rival claims were soon set 
up, the most formidable being that of the ex-regent Fadana, who 
retained much of the support he had held at the time of his regency 
after the death of Ngubengcuka. Furthermore , Nonesi had to reckon 
with the Tshatshu and their allies of 1853, who resented the 
dismantling of their traditional tribal leadership and their land 
losses in terms of the Cathcart settlements. 
This meant that after the proclamation of the Location there were 
within the boundaries of the Cape Colony some 30,000 people, a large 
number of whom were of dubious loyalty, ruled by chiefs whose powers 
had never been defined, and subjected to a regent who had no 
traditional claims to her position. As long as matters were fairly 
stable, Nonesi could exercise some semblance of authority; but the 
tra nquility of the Location rested precariously upon the stability of 
her Kaffrarian neighbours, her own ability to appease disgruntled 
groups, and the unwavering support of the Thembu Agent. The Cattle-
Killing episode was to show how weak these foundations were. 
This tragic event, at one time referred to as the "National Suicide of 
the Xhosa" by the neighbouring tribes, originated in British Kaffraria 
where a number of prophets had become active in the 1850's . The most 
influential of these prophets was a young girl, Nongqawuse who was 
assisted by her uncle Mhlakaza. 17 Common to all the prophesies was 
the promise of a coming millenium provided that all cattl e would be 
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killed and all crops destroyed. Such prophecies swept through 
Kaffraria and adjacent chiefdoms, leaving a trail of destruction as 
thousands of people destroyed their property, waiting in vain from 
full moon to full moon for the resurrection of the dead, which event 
was to introduce the new era. Rumours grew in extent, and even news 
of the Crimean War that filtered through was distorted to suit 
the prophecies. It was said that the English had been defeated, that 
the Russians were actually black people who would come to the 
assistance of the tribes to drive the English into the sea, that the 
Russian leaders were in fact the great Xhosa prophets and leaders, 
Macomo, Mlanjeni and Lynx - who had been resurrected and were now 
fighting the English . 18 As the movement gained a pathological 
momentum of its own, 19 even those chiefs who did not believe the 
prophets were unable to restrain their people. It was estimated that 
when eventually 21 February 1857 - the final date set aside for the 
fulfillment of the prophecies - passed uneventfully, eighty five 
percent of the Xhosa people had responded to the call and that two-
thirds of all their cattle were killed . 20 
There is no mono-causal explanation for the Cattle-Killing. With Sir 
George Grey's policy of civilization and westernization that struck at 
the heart of tribal traditions,21 with the chiefs desperately 
experiencing their loss of authority, with people demoralized after 
having lost eight major wars, with the last symbol of their pride 
their cattle - being wiped out by the devastating lungsiCkness 22 which 
sowed havoc in 1855, with crops destroyed by blight and drought, with 
all these problems and no possible solution in sight , many theories 
can be mooted as to why the Xhosa people were driven to these suicidal 
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acts. Monica Wilson saw it as a pagan reaction to the imposition of a 
foreign culture; a spontaneous movement not instigated by one 
23 person. J.B. Peires believes that lung-sickness was one of the root 
causes. The Xhosa explanation. according to him. was that sick cattle 
had been contaminated by the witchcraft practices of the people. and 
these cattle had to be slaughtered lest they infected the pure new 
cattle which were about to materialize. The ban on cultivation was 
also associated with the destruction of old food stocks and the 
expected dawning of a new era. 24 In this connection mention can be 
made of incidents in the later Emigrant Thembuland when in the 1880's 
people started killing their pigs on a large scale. Some people then 
maintained that they were acting on the instructions of witchdoctors . 
while others said that the animals were causing a fatal disease 
believed by the resident-magistrate to be measles - and that they were 
infecting the others. 25 The killing of contaminated animals may 
then not have been such a unique occurrence among tribesmen. but it 
was only under unbearable stress that it assumed fanatical 
proportions. 25 
In contrast to Peires and Wilson. who. despite differences. agree that 
rumours about the prophecies originated within the tribal communities. 
there are black historians who have put forward a theory - still 
widely believed by the Xhosa - that the plot was designed by Sir 
George Grey and the missionaries who hoped to destroy Xhosa military 
power and make land available for white settlement . 27 Such theories. 
however . lack weight as they are not supported by any evidence linking 
those suspected with actual involvement. 
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A fourth theory, rejected by most present day historians,28 is of 
great importance for our discussion. This theory, adhered to by Sir 
George Grey, suggests that the whole episode was a grand strategy of 
political revolt, instigated by Sarhili and worked out in conjunction 
with Moshoeshoe, who, when trouble in the Orange Free State was 
mounting, looked southward for allies. John Maclean, the Chief 
Commissioner for Kaffraria, maintained that the killing of cattle and 
the general excitement in Kaffraria reached a zenith at times when war 
between the Orange Free State and Moshoeshoe seemed imminent. 29 
Charles Brownlee, the Ngqika Commissioner, believed at the time that 
it was a plot to enable the chiefs to force their people on the Cape 
Colony in a state of desperation, but thirty years later he changed 
his mind and confined himself to the opinion that Sarhili instigated 
Mhlakaza to spread the rumours. 30 J.C. Warner believed that 
the movement was directed against the white man. "The Kafir 
tribes", he wrote in 1856, "have become so thoroughly imbued with 
hatred to 'the white man' , and appear resolutely determined on his 
destruction ... ,,31 Convi nced, then, that Sarhi 1 i master-mi nded the 
whole plot, Sir George Grey took punitive actions. In 1857, following 
rumours of the Gcaleka king's intention to invade the Cape Colony, 
which in view of the plight of the tribe after the Cattle-Killing 
could not have been well-founded, Grey ordered an expedition against 
him. Sarhili was expelled from the territory between the Kei and 
Mbashe rivers by the F.A.M.P. under Walter Currie, assisted by farmers 
from Queenstown. He fled into Bomvanaland where he lived for the next 
six years on a tract of land which he received from the chief Moni. 
As we are particularly concerned with the Thembu here, we should now 
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examine more closely their reactions towards the Cattle-Killing, and 
analyze its far-reaching results on their history. Although, as we 
will see, there was no large-scale Thembu participation in the 
movement, there were those who in two frontier wars had fought against 
~~~ 
the Cape frn~i~Ceio~~I-movements, and who could not now remain aloof. 
It is suggested here that the Cattle-Killing was a local pan-African 
movement which strove to cut right through tribal divisions and 
affiliations in its call to unity. But it was in effect bound to be 
divisive. 32 It divided the Xhosa people, and it divided the Thembu. 
It was crucial because the ki lling of cattle, the breaking of tools 
and pots, the destruction of seed - all ritual acts - were overt acts 
by which a man's allegiance to the movement was openly declared. 
Discreet and diplomatic equivocation was no longer possible. 
Therefore those Thembu who adhered to the prophecies, by implication 
rejected the authority of their chiefs who opposed the cattle-killing 
movement. 
The Mbashe Thembu found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Hitherto 
they had experienced none of the socio-political changes that had had 
such a disruptive effect upon the Kaffrarian tribes. Participation in 
a destructive movement would have had little meaning. 33 On the 
other hand overt neutrality could have been risky in the extreme. 
Rumours were rife that Sarhili had been trying, either by persuasion 
or by threats, to win the Thembu over to his side. In 1856 a certain 
Fabu - a rather shadowy figure, though described in official sources 
as an influential chief - returned to Thembuland after having visited 
Gcalekaland allegedly on the invitation of Sarhili who promised to 
show him the people who had arisen from the dead. He brought with him 
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a message from the Paramount which promised victory over the "white 
things" (the English) as soon as all cattle were slaughtered, and 
called for the peaceful unification of all the black tribes. 34 From 
other sources came news of an alliance between Sarhili and the mighty 
Moshoeshoe, hitherto the only black chief who had succeeded in 
defeating a British army.35 Joyi certainly realized that should the 
rumoured war on the Colony take place with the Gcaleka and the Sotho 
nlJ/o,"Ic.f! 
in a}t9nment, it would be necessary for the Thembu to redefine their 
allegiances. He therefore sent conciliatory messages to Gcalekaland. 
Sarhili's reply was that the river was not broad, it might be crossed 
without difficulty. At the same time he warned that the Thembu would 
not escape the general destruction if they disobeyed the proPhet. 36 
But in the end these ventures made little headway. It could be that 
Joyi was not interested in promoting what seemed to be a Gcaleka 
scheme in which the Thembu were likely to be an inferior partner . 
Tradition has it that Joyi informed Sarhili that he would take part in 
the movement provided a prophet from among his own people would tell 
him to do so. Joyi may also have considered the possibility that the 
Sotho-Gcaleka alliance might fail, the white man might emerge 
victorious and the Thembu, through their participation might then have 
lost a valuable ally. Furthermore, should they refrain from killing 
their cattle, and the movement did fail, they would have a great 
advantage over the impoverished tribes. Whatever the reason for his 
non-participation, Joyi was one of the chiefs who succeeded in 
restraining his people from taking the road to self-destruction. 
In the Location, conditions were less favourable . By the beginning of 
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1857 Nonesi had to admit that she could no longer restrain her people 
from yielding to external pressures . While Warner adhered to the 
opinion that, being a woman, she was regarded by her people as a mere 
cipher ,37 she blamed all the trouble on the weak administrative 
system , which forced her to cajole her people at a time when swift and 
effect ive action was necessary. In the end both Nonesi and Warner had 
to admit having lost control over the Location, and they realized that 
it was only by recognizing the authority of the Mbashe regent that 
trouble could be averted. As nothing came of the intended 
reconciliation between Joyi and Sarhili, the way was clear for Nonesi 
to invite Joyi to the Location . His visit showed that despite all 
their divisions, the Thembu were still united in their loyalty to a 
monarchy in which undisputed authority was vested. A favourable 
reaction began almost immediately, and by the time the killing of 
cattle came to an end about 2000 Thembu had lost their lives - a 
rela t ively low figure. 38 
But long after the movement had died down, echoes of the prophecy in 
distorted form were still to be heard. The hesitancy of farmers to 
risk adding to the crisis by taking action against famished marauders 
was exploited by those leaders who participated in the killing , 
foremost amongst whom was Fadana. 39 In the following months he and 
the Ndungwana chief, Quesha, in conjunction with some of Sarhili's 
Gcaleka undertook extensive raid s into the Albert and Queenstown 
districts, causing trouble in the Location. Not only did they attack 
Quesha's grandson, the loyal Ndarala, but they allegedly threatened to 
kill Warner. Many Thembu f led to nearby farms for protection . The 
episode came to an end when the two chiefs were captured in 1858 with 
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the aid of Nonesi and other loyal Thembu, many of whom were followers 
of Ndarala. Quesha was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and 
Fadana to seven. Sir George Grey's conviction that Sarhili was also a 
leading spirit in these raids strengthened him in his decision to 
expel this chief from his lands. 
The Thembu had emerged numerically as the strongest border tribe. 
Their main enemy, the Gcaleka, had suffered a reduction in numbers 
which had rendered them, for the time being, militarily inferior, and 
they were deprived of Sarhili's strong leadership. The need for 
Colonial protection, hitherto the cornerstone of the Thembu-Cape 
relationship, had consequently lost its urgency. From a Cape Colonial 
point of view the once trusted allies became potential enemies. The 
resident-magistrate of Queenstown, G. Shepstone, warned that "the 
kaffir tribes to some extent look upon the Tambookie in the 
Queenstown district as the nucleus on which to build further 
resistance.,,40 
Clearly then, the relationship between the Thembu Location and the 
Cape Colony could collapse under provocation and this danger 
underlined the untenable way in which Thembu affairs were managed. 
The Colonial Government found itself in a dilemma. It was believed 
that for the sake of peace, firmer control over the chiefdoms had 
become imperative. Sir Harry's much criticized annexation of Thembu 
territory would have to be carried to its logical conclusion, and 
Colonial rule be extended over the Location. But such a step was sure 
to estrange those chiefs who had hitherto remained loyal. The 
introduction of Colonial law was thus hardly a recipe for peace. It 
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was under these circumstances that Warner first proposed an emigration 
scheme that would not only, so he hoped, solve the Location problem, 
but would also deal with the danger that loomed largely in official 
minds - the possible return of Sarhili to recl aim his lost lands. 
Warner suggested that the full implications of the introduction of 
Colonial law should be explained to the chiefs, and should they 
object, they were to be offered part of Sarhili's lands41 where they 
could govern themselves according to their own laws and customs. The 
emigration suggestion was not favourably received at the time. Sir 
Richard Southey thought such a step unwise as it could lead to the re-
unification of the two Thembu sections. 42 
Warner's suggestion to have Cape laws in modified form introduced in 
the Location was based on assumptions which later proved to be 
unsound. One such assumption was that after the Cattle-Killing the 
chiefs were more humble and ready to submit to Cape rule. Another was 
that the Nongqawuse delusion had finally destroyed the feelings of 
veneration which the Thembu had developed for their chiefs. 43 
Convinced that his assumptions were correct, he claimed divine 
approval for the implementation in the Location of Sir George Grey ' s 
policy of westernization: "The Kafir tribes now ... have so resolutely 
and perseveringly refused to give to the Gospel even an attentive 
hearing, it seems to me that t he way on which they themselves are so 
obstinately bent is the one which God will make use of to bring about 
this desirable object; and that the sword must first - not 
exterminate them, but break them up as tribes, and destroy their 
political existence, after which ... civilization and Christianity will 
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no doubt make rapid progress among them. ,,44 Of his own accord Warner 
now assumed the title of "Head of the House of Ngubengcuka,,,45 in 
which capacity it became easy to rule autocratically under the guise 
of paternalistic concern. His recommendations of 1858, aimed firstly 
at the compensating of "well-disposed chiefs", and secondly, at 
weakening their authority to a point where they would become mere 
puppets. 46 Chiefs were appointed and dismissed as he saw fit , the 
object being to cultivate collaborators who could contribute towards 
the maintenance of law and order. Lineage claims were not infrequently 
disregarded in the appointment of so-called "first class chiefs" 
those who had traditional rights to chieftaincy - while the 
appointment of "second class chiefs" rested upon favouritism. An 
example here, is that of Petrus Mahonga . Although related to chief 
Tyopo, he himself did not rank as chief, but, in recognition of his 
services during the Cattle-Killing, was made a "second class" chief . 47 
Nonesi was the first to feel the full brunt of Warner ' s new policy. 
Up to 1857 he had tacit ly made allowance for her disregard of the 1853 
settlements, the aim of which was to prevent the Location from coming 
under her sole influence. Although she was still recognized as 
"Paramount of all the Location Thembu", there was now a contradict ion 
between this recognition of her paramountcy and. the firmness with 
which Warner, for the first time since 1853, insisted that the people 
should keep within the limits of their respective locations. Nonesi 
certainly would have grasped something of the irony of the situation. 
For nearly a decade she was "Nonesi the Faithful". She restrained her 
people from participating in the cattle-killing and she was 
instrumental - even though she might have acted in her own interest 
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in crushing the Quesha and Fadana rebellions in 1859. Now. she found 
herself in exactly the same position as the Kaffraria n chiefs who had 
for years desperately struggled against the power of the white man. 
Thus ended her long history of friendship with the Cape Colony. 
Although she was not in a position to offer effective resistance. she 
managed to get up a strong party to oppose Warner and to insist upon 
the several locations being placed once again under her sole 
authority.48 Her efforts failed. but Warner was acutely aware of 
increasing restlessness in the Location. especially among the Hala. 
Their dissatisfaction became manifest in increasing reluctance on the 
part of the chiefs to submit to Warner's decisions in cases of cattle 
lifting. and he noted that. incidentally. the malcontents were those 
whose lands bordered on the locations of the chiefs Anta and Sandi le 
in British Kaffraria. This. coup led with the fact that the Thembu 
could boast a thousand warriors. contr ibuted to an obsessive white 
fear of a combined attack by hostile chiefs. 
Discontent among the Location dwellers at the time resulted not only 
from official interference in tr ibal affairs and from the confli ct ing 
interests of the Location Thembu and neighbouring white farmers. but 
also from social and economic changes that were taki ng place within 
the tribal structure. Warner suggested that the Thembu were passing 
through a transi tional stage when old social. political and religious 
customs were falling away. leaving both the chiefs and the common 
peop le in a state of uncertainty . This view. however. is not 
altogether correct. as there was never a complete transformation from 
tradit ional to westernized society. It would be more accurate to say 
that the inhabitants of the Location were passing through a period of 
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instability since many of the new modes of adjustment to white contact 
struck at the very pillars on which the traditional society was 
founded . 
It is difficult to determine exactly to what degree acculturation to 
western norms had taken place by 1865, but we can reasonably expect 
that four decades of close contact with Europeans would have had 
considerable influence on the traditional way of life . The long 
periods spent in the service of white farmers (in some cases up to 
twenty years), the accumulation of wealth during periods of farm 
labour,49 the expansion of missionary activities and the need for 
readjustment to new experiences thrust upon t hem during the 
governorship of Sir George Grey - all these would have been strong 
inducements for the acceptance of European standards. It could be 
argued that the application of Sir George Grey's policy of 
"ci vilization" was then only a recent development, but comparative 
studies indicate that length of exposure is not necessarily a 
determining factor in an acculturation process. Melville Herskovits, 
who studied changing cultural patterns in Africa, concludes that "just 
as culture, being learned, makes cultural learning a matter of 
opportunity and not of generation , so learning the ways of another 
culture depends on motivation and not on antecedent tradition ... 
complex forces making for cultural readjustment, the factor of the 
length of exposure should not be given undue importance. ,,50 
Although the acceptance of western standards did not happen on a 
revolutionary scale, the white impact became more and more marked. In 
his report of 1864, Warner mentioned that many Thembu were anxious to 
adopt "civilized habits".51 There were, he said, already a large 
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number who could read and write perfectly.52 By 1865 about 200 men 
were granted certificates of citizenship of the Cape, chiefly on 
account of what was then termed, 'civilization' .53 
The most conspicuous aspect of westernization was to be found in the 
conversion to the white man's concept of money and private property. 
The acquisition of large flocks of wool led sheep and valuable herds of 
cattle, as well as an inclination to invest money in land - even 
paying up to £1,500 for a farm,54 all these developments indicated a 
new approach: the number of cattle was ceasing t o be the sole 
determinant of a man's wealth. It follows that where such changes 
took place in a traditional society, characterized by the close 
relationship between land tenure and tribal authority, not only the 
system of authority, but also the whole social pattern of the 
chiefdom, would be subjected to strains. 55 
Private ownership brought into question factors such as inheritance, 
which were incompatible with the traditional marriage system,56 and 
it was in this respect that the difference between the so-called 
civili zed and the uncivilized classes became most marked. While the 
westernized, and more particularly the Christianized woman, would have 
welcomed the legalization of the Christian marriage since it would 
have afforded both herself and her children protection, the 
undermining of the traditional marriage system, linked as it was with 
concepts such as polygamy, lobola , division of labour - all of them 
crucial in upholding the existing social pattern - was resented by 
those who stil l adhered to traditional laws, It became impossible to 
reconcile Christian and non-Christian practices within the same 
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administrative system. 
Warner alleged that Sir Harry Smith had, in 1848, prohibited the 
"buying and sell ing of wives", 57 but it would seem that Warner, not 
infrequently, was inclined to put his own interpretation on laws, and 
he was not following official instructions when, in certain cases. he 
refused to recognize traditional marriages. Such mishandling of 
matrimonial matters was yet another example of administrative 
clumsiness in dealing with sens iti ve issues. In 1863 Warner, reacting 
to a government circu lar concerning passes and marriages , asked in 
desperation: "What does the government mean by marriage?,,58 
Confusion further arose from the fact that verdicts in adultery cases 
could depend upon whether a plaintiff was a Christian or not. In one 
particular letter Warner referred to a case where the plaintiff - a 
man converted to Christianity who had taken a second wife - claimed 
compensation from another man who had committed adultery with the 
plaint iff ' s first wife. According to the arguments used by Warner. it 
would seem that he was of opinion that a person, on accepting the 
Christian faith, exercised a choice. By doing so he automatically 
accepted the western custom of monogamy, and had therefore, according 
to Warner's argument, become divorced from his first wife before 
remarrying. By doing so he had forfeited his common law right to his 
first wife, and was not entitled to compensation on the grounds of 
adultery. Warner ' s letter on this subject makes it clear that the man 
would have been entitled to compensation had he not been a Christian. 
This letter illustrates effectively that both African subject and 
Colonial ruler were confused by the superimposition of Colonial rule 
on a tribal society.59 
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Women in particular were adversely affected by Warner's interference 
in matrimonial affairs . Many fathers in the Location looked among 
their kinsmen who worked on European farms. for prospective husbands 
for their daughters. If these daughters had been living in a tribal 
society. beyond the boundaries of the Location. their marriage would 
have been solemnized according to the usages of the particular clan to 
whi ch they bel onged. and they would have been given certain rights and 
privileges. In the Location wives married under common law. were 
looked upon as concubines. and they. as well as their children. had no 
conjugal rights. A man could therefore cast off a woman at will 
because no legal marriage existed between them. 60 
It is important to notice that at this stage Colonial law had not 
been introduced in the Location. and it is once again doubtful whether 
in his dealings with marital affairs. Warner carried out official 
instructions. Sir Phil i p Wodehouse. who succeeded Sir George Grey in 
1863. definitely discouraged any attempts to meddle with black 
customs. In 1862 John Maclean. then Lieutenant-Governor of British 
Kaffraria. sent a circular to his magistrates to the effect that. 
while he could not legally suppress polygamy or the lobola custom. it 
was advised that they should refuse any case in which cattle or other 
property was claimed on account of a wife leaving a husband. The 
Governor directed Maclean to withdraw the circular and the matter was 
referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Newcastle, who 
supported the Governor ' s views that official interference in black 
customs was highly impoliti c and dangerous. He added that, by 
interfering in black customs . Maclean had virtually contravened the 
Royal Instructions which preserved the laws. customs and usages 
67 
prevailing among Africans. The power of amending such laws and 
providing better administration of justice among Blacks was reserved 
by the Crown . 61 Although the administrative systems of British 
Kaffraria and the Location differed , there is no reason to assume that 
both the Governor and the Colonial Secretary would have approved of 
actions in the Tambookie Location while disapproving of the same steps 
being taken in another British dependency. This confirms the view 
that Warner was acting on his own, and his motives for doing so are 
quite clear. He had an aversion to the system of polygamy, which he 
regarded as one of the chief causes of stock theft. This problem 
became more serious in the late 1860's as the number of women from the 
Location who married men from outs ide began to increase. If a 
constant stream of Thembu should be allowed to enter the Colony in 
order to obtain cattle from white farmers , the farmers would soon 
object as this would increase the freque ncy of stock thefts. Acting 
once again on his own initiative, Warner now instructed that a pass 
had to be obtained from him before a man could take his daughter to be 
married to someone beyond the bou ndaries of the Cape Colony. He 
refused to comply with any such requests unless satisfactory 
proof could be given that the girl in question was willing to 
go.62 
Warner 's radical approach towards marriages not only left many men 
without redress to which they were just ly entitled under their own 
customs, but also tended to degrade women honestly married. 
Moreover, when cases of inheritance were brought before him, he was 
compelled to follow the traditional law, thereby indirectly 
recogni zi ng the form of marriages which he ignored in other cases. 
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Wodehouse realized that the Government could not "in justice abstain 
much longer from recognizing in some form native marriages and 
inheritance resulting from them." He told Warner that he could see 
nothing improper in the exchange of cattle as a legalization of such a 
marriage.,,53 Warner nevertheless continued to act on his own in his 
efforts to abolish polygamy. 
It ha s been stressed that once customs were tampered with, the whole 
system of authority was affected. The chiefs found themselves ruling 
over people no longer bound by the same restrictions as of old . Their 
authority was further undermined by the constraints of the system 
under which they had to operate as neither their own authority, nor 
that of Warner - on whose support they had to rely - had the force of 
law. It naturally fOllows that unpopular measures, such as those that 
arose from the application of the system of collective responsibility, 
became increasingly difficult to impose on the peoPle .54 This system 
by which a whole village was kept responsib le for the trespasses, real 
or alleged, of an individual member, was resented wherever it was 
followed, as it was open to many abuses. Warner was not blind to the 
disadvantages of this system, but at the same time he was convinced 
that the mass of Africans could not be control led by Colonial laws, 
and that there was no other way of preventing cattle raiding. The 
more westernized people rejected a system that was both ineffective 
and unfair. Increasingly they turned to law agents who, either for 
humane reasons or for financial gain, began to interfere in the 
Location affairs. Such interference was bound to expose the irregular 
way in which Warner and the chiefs executed their judicial powers . 
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The fact that he was treading on thin ice in his application of the 
spoor system was brought home to Warner when a court case arose in 
1854, following the theft of a valuable ram and ewe possessed by a 
certain Mr. Goddard. 55 The spoors of the animals were traced to the 
vicinity of Nonesi's village where they disappeared. Neither the 
animals nor the thieves could be found, and therefore, according to 
the system of collective responsibility , compensation was demanded 
from the village . Some of the inhabitants voluntarily clubbed 
together to make redress while others did so under protest. Those who 
lived nearest to the spoor had to pay the most. As they considered 
this to be unfair, they resisted the chief's orders. Convinced that 
they had acted on the advice of certain law agents, Warner asked for 
governmental support in applying the principle of collective 
responsibility which, he stated, was the only way "in which 30,000 
barbarians could be managed". He recommended that the chiefs should 
be entitled to make seizures should the people refuse to pay. The 
Governor approved, and a month later Warner confirmed the seizure of 
twenty head of cattle, twenty sheep and two mares to compensate the 
farmer for his losses that were estimated at fl07. 
that this was still less than his actual losses. 
actual thief was arrested and brought to trial. 
Goddard claimed 
Then, in May, the 
He pleaded guilty , 
but objected to the fine imposed upon him as he maintained that he had 
already been punished by Warner. The latter's explanation that the 
stock claimed from his village was not meant as punishment. but as 
compensation for the farmer, did not satisfy him. The people from 
whose village cattle had been seized also felt that since the guilty 
man had been brought to justice , t heir case should be re-examined, and 
they turned to a law agent for advice. The agent informed Warner that 
70 
legal action could possibly be taken against him since he had acted 
illegally in seizing the cattle. The agent argued that in terms of 
the Cape laws the Governor's approval of the chiefs' seizure of cattle 
carried no weight, as such seizures could take place on instruction of 
Warner who in turn could only act on the direct instructions of the 
Governor. This argument exposed the dangerous situation that had 
arisen. Should it happen that the Governor lose one case, it could be 
the signal for the opening up of every single case since 1848. There 
is no evidence of any court cases brought against Warner, but he was 
cautioned, in a private conversation, by Judge Watermeyer that even if 
the system of management applied in the Location was effective. it was 
completely illegal, and should therefore either be abolished or 
legalized by an act of parliament. Acting on the judge's advice. 
Warner again urgently requested the legalization of the system of 
collective responsibility under which the Thembu themselves had become 
a police force to be reckoned with. 
Three matters had now become clear. First, it had become impossible 
for the Thembu Agent to operate under an illegal system. Secondly, 
there was no effective way of reconciling traditional Thembu and 
western customs within one administrative system. Thirdly , and most 
important, should Cape law be imposed, it would mean that the 
Thembu , who had always been allies of the Colony, would be brought , 
against their will, under Colonial control. This the chiefs would 
resist with all their might. There seemed to • . . . be, only one 
solution and that was to revert to the abortive 1858 plan of a Thembu 
settlement across the Indwe river. Such a plan had the whole-hearted 
support of the European farmers in the adjacent Albert and Wodehouse 
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districts. who coveted Thembu lands. 66 
The Albert district had hitherto been in part a transit camp. in part 
the territorial outlet for farmers in need of cheap lands, As the 
district became more prosperous and the value of property rose. it 
could no longer provide its growing population with cheap land. 
Eastward expansion was hampered by the San: hence the 
number of farmers who coveted the green pastures of the 
increasing 
Location. 67 
Over the years white farmers had ignored the boundaries: and the 
Location had hardly been proclaimed when squatters, in defiance of the 
Government. settled on de facto Thembu lands. They were probably 
encouraged to do so by the presence of farmers. illegal and legal. who 
had already been living in the Location at the time of its inception. 
Illegal squatting on Maphasa's lands had . in fact. been gOing on since 
1849. The farmers had rega rded uncultivated land there as waste land. 
An order by the civil commissioner. Shepstone , to evacuate these 
lands was evaded by the farmers. who cleverl y bribed the people with 
gifts of blankets and tobacco. to "invite" them to stay on their lands 
despite the chiefs' prohibitions. 68 
The farmers who were lega lly living in the Location were there as a 
result of an oversight by Cathcart . Having been ill-informed about 
the Smith Settlements of 1848. 69 the Governor had extended the 
boundaries of the Location to include farmers who had been given land 
south of the Stormberg. These farmers were as disinclined as were the 
squatters. to move. The Government, despite former promises that they 
would support the Thembu in keeping their lands clear of white 
settlers, remained silent. and indignant chiefs demanded an explana-
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tion from the civil commissioner. A deputation led by chief Tyopo who 
acted as Nonesi's chief councillor. wanted to know whether the 
Government merely connived at intrusions on the Theodorus Rand area. 
or whether they were incompetent in controlling their own peoPle. 70 
The truth was that the Government had no intention of diminishing the 
white population; in fact officials were recommending exactly the 
opposite. Concerned about the increase in the Thembu population after 
the Cattle-Killing. Shepstone recommended in 1859 that the lands east 
of the Location. formerly occupied by Sarhili and Fadana. should be 
settled by white farmers in sufficient numbers to be able to defend 
themselves. He argued that these fertile lands could be divided into 
500 farms. supporting at least 1000 to 1500 men. "sufficient to over-
awe the Tambookies when combined with the Queenstown force.,,71 
While there was. from a Colonial point of view. justification for the 
settlement of Europeans on the lands from which Sarhili had been 
expelled as punishment . no case could be made out for the occupation 
of the so-called Fadana ' s lands between the Umgwali and the Indwe 
rivers. These lands. to which the ex-regent retreated when Mtirara 
became king. were included by Cathcart in 1853 in that part of the 
Location allocated to Nones i . and were. in fact . transferred to her. 
White farmers. either ignorant of Cathcart's settlements. or out of 
indifference. disregarded Nonesi's authority over the Fadana lands. 
and. claiming that the chief had forfeited his rights in consequence 
of his participation in the war of 1858 and his imprisonment. 
petitioned for possession of these lands. Shepstone's suggestion as 
to their redistribution among white farmers. was not carried out at 
the time; nor did the Government take steps either to declare the 
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lands legally forfeited or to annex them to the Colony. Conflicting 
grazing right cla ims by white and Thembu farmers created tension, 
especially when Thembu cattle trespassing on lands claimed by white 
farmers, were impounded. Warner watched these irregular procedures 
with dismay and he warned the farmers that should a court case arise , 
matters would be decided in favour of the Thembu. He emphasised that 
the lands should either be restored to the Thembu or legally be 
declared forfeited, and annexed to the Colony. A formal annexation 
was not carried out , nor were the farmers removed, and during a locust 
plague Hemming allowed more farmers to settle there. For all 
practical purposes the Thembu had been robbed of their lands. Annoyed 
by their land-losses, they retaliated with cattle raids. 72 In 
turn, white farmers , notably those from the Albert district, renewed 
their attempts to have the Thembu evicted from the Location. The 
desire for land was certainly the reason for such appeals, but in 
pressing for the eviction, they maintained that the Thembu posed a 
threat to the stability of the area. They argued that, in consequence 
of their numerical super iority, the Thembu could playa dominant role 
in any black alliance against the Colony. Fear of such an alliance 
had come to dominate the minds of farmers and frontier officials. 
Tension was augmented by the increase in the number of black farmers 
who, by the acquisition of individual property, would be in a posit ion 
to claim the right to vote. 73 
We can understand why white attempts to evict the Thembu became 
absolutely pivotal in the history of the Location. The years between 
1865 and 1885 witnessed various resettlement schemes, the first and 
most important of which was the Emigration of 1865. 
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Chapter 3 
The Emigration : Territorial Consolidations vs. Politi cal Fragmentation 
A swell ing black population; the stratification of Thembu society: 
the collapse of the traditional Thembu-European alliance: inter-
faction rivalries; administrative problems arising from attempts to 
reconcile within the same system traditional and western customs. and 
the desire of white farmers to obtain fertile Thembu lands - all these 
factors had nullified Cathcart's hopes of bringing stability to the 
north-eastern frontier by the inclusion of the western Thembu within 
the boundaries of the Colony. No wonder that, soon after the 
demarcation of the Location, the Cape Government and its officials 
were already beginning to suspect what a Transkeian magistrate said 
bluntly many years later: 
"It is a great pity that the Glen Grey district exists at all. 
It is a pity that the natives were not removed from the 
district.,,1 
Warner's suggestions of 18582 which, amongst others, made provision 
for the resettlement of the Location Thembu on Sa rhili 's old lands 
must be seen against a background of the general disillusionment with 
what was meant to be a grand scheme for the pacification of Black and 
White. At first there was little enthusiasm for Warner's proposals in 
Cape Town, main ly as a result of Richard Southey's attitude, but the 
final word on resettlement had not been spoken. Negotiations between 
J.C. Warner and the chiefs. not ably Nonesi, continued throughout 1860. 
Warner obviously impressed upon Nonesi the consequences of the pend ing 
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introduction of Cape rule in the location, to which Nonesi reacted by 
saying that rather than to submit to the Cape courts, she and her 
people would remove themselves beyond the Kei where her chieftainship 
could be preserved. 3 It was, however, only after the arrival of Sir 
Philip Wodehouse in January 1862 as Governor and High Commissioner 
that the matter was given serious consideration. 
The new governor was an ardent imperialist who believed in the 
extension of British rule beyond the Kei as a way in which to preserve 
the peace, protect the black people from domination by the whites, and 
fulfill the civilizing mission of the British Empire in which he 
believed so fervently. Therefore, when confronted on his arrival by 
the unresolved problems surrounding British Kaffraria and the lands 
evacuated by Sarhili,4 he envisaged the extension of British rule over 
the whole of the Transkei with the exception of Pondoland. Similar 
suggestions had earlier been made by his popular predecessor Sir 
George Grey, who had thereby raised the hope of land hungry farmers to 
obtain cheap farms. Unfortunately for Sir Philip , the time was 
unsuitable for such grandiose schemes, as his arrival coincided with a 
particularly lugubrious period in the history of the Cape Colony. A 
trade depression, viticultural diseases, a prolonged drought and a 
severe economic recession, all these had greatly sapped the economy. 
While reports of black unrest reached his office almost daily, the 
Governor not only had to face a deficit budget, but he also had to 
satisfy the Home Government , whose declared policy it had become since 
the 1850's to cut expenditure and to reduce military commitments in 
South Africa. 5 This implied that Whitehall would only be willing to 
support Wodehouse's plans for the colonization of the Transkei should 
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this not mean an increase in the cost of defence. 
Wodehouse pinned his hopes upon the incorporation of British Kaffraria 
into the Cape Colony as the way least costly to the British treasury 
of preserving the peace. The rationale behind such thinking was that 
since British Kaffraria was created to protect the Cape Colonial 
frontier, it was the duty of the Cape to take it over. 6 The British 
treasury would then be reI ieved of the cost of the defence of e"dist. 
Kaffraria which, ever since its proclamation in 1847, had been 
considered to be a mil itary risk of which Britain was eager to rid 
hersel f. Moreover, Sir Philip would be able to embark upon his 
Transkeian experiment. The Governor was greatly encouraged in his 
plans by what he considered to be his successfu l dealings with 
Sarhili. Acting on instruct ions from Whitehall, shortly after his 
arrival, to move Sarhili into a tract of country sufficient for the 
needs of his people, Wodehouse sent Walter Currie, commander of the 
F.A.M.P ., to settle the boundaries of Sarhili ' s location. The latter 
readily agreed to an offer already made t he previous year to . settle 
east of the Mtatha river, and he was willing to accept a magistrate. 
The Thembu regent, 
British magistrate. 
Joyi, also asked to come under control of a 
It was now a matter of urgency to settle 
Sarhili's evacuated lands as quickly as poss ible in order to thwart 
any attempts by him to take repossession . Meanwhile Wodehouse had 
already received almost a thousand applications for lands in this 
forfeited area. 7 
At this juncture the Thembu in the Location once again entered the 
scene. As part of his Transkeian scheme the Governor envisaged a land 
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deal whereby the Thembu would evacuate the Location in exchange for 
part of Sarhili's former land between the Tsomo and the Indwe rivers. 
With this he possibly had a dual purpose in mind: to satisfy European 
demands for farms in the fertile Location and to provide a buffer of 
loyal blacks on the border of the Colony.8 Sir Philip visited the 
Location early in 1864, and, after negotiations with the principal 
chiefs,9 J.C. Warner was sent to finali ze matters. On the 8th of 
April Warner could report that meetings had been held at which the 
chiefs unanimously consented to move into a tract of land. the 
boundaries of which were laid down by themselves. They further 
demanded that the country should be secured to them, only to be 
forfeited in case of war, and their independence was to be guaranteed 
as far as this was consistent with humanity and the pa ramount 
authority of the Queen. Another condition was that their stipends 
should be continued and that they were to enjoy all privileges which 
up to then they had possessed. In conclusion they asked that the 
removal should take place as soon as possible as they were desirous of 
building their homesteads before the winter set in , and they wished to 
be settled on their new lands by the beginning of August in order to 
take advantage of the cultivating season. 10 The chiefs. in fact, 
asked for a considerably larger portion of territory than the Governor 
had had in mind,11 and he was not prepared to purchase the Location 
at so dear a rate. Sir Philip's counter-proposal of granting the 
Thembu all the territory east of the Tsomo - a piece of land about 
one-third in size of the later Emigrant Thembuland 12 in return for 
the Location, was also rejected by the chiefs . 13 The question of 
Sarhili's evacuated lands thus remained unresolved. 
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In the following months a settlement with regard to these lands became 
a matter of urgency. Sarhili was beginning to show greater 
determination to return, and there was strong suspicion that he was in 
communication with Moshoeshoe, with whom, it seemed at times , the 
Afrikaners of the Orange Free State were engaged in a losing battle . 
From a Colonial perspective the ideal solution to all these problems 
still seemed to be the large scale colonization of the Transkeian 
territories with the exception of Pondoland, but Sir Philip was left 
in no doubt as to Whitehall's feelings on such a venture. "You must 
understand", Cardwell had already informed him in 1863, "that the 
paramount object of Her Majesty ' s Government is not to obtain 
extension of territory, but only to secure that frontier which is most 
likely to be tranquil or would in case of disturbance be most easily 
defended".14 Under these circumstances he gave serious consideration 
to the annexation of British Kaffraria, but his bill for its 
incorporation was refused by the Cape Parliament. The Governor now 
faced a series of crises. First, there were the financial 
difficulties in Kaffraria. Secondly, there was the increasing power 
of the black chiefdoms from Moshoeshoe in the north-east to Sandile in 
the east. Thirdly, there were the large masses of Africans in the 
Cape who had t o be controlled. Lastly , and perhaps most important, 
there was Sarhili who, from beyond the Mbashe, was as much a factor on 
the frontier as if he had been physically there. In May 1864, for 
instance, the frontier was thrown into a state of panic by rumours 
that he was preparing to cross the Mbashe. Walter Currie,15 who 
hurried to the frontier, strongly advised an attack on him. Frontier 
officials were, however, by no means unanimous in their condemnation 
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of Sarhili. There were even suspicions that Currie instigated the 
rumours so as to give himself the opportunity of driving Sarhili 
beyond the Mtatha, thereby clearing a large area for white 
settlement. 16 Although Currie did not receive sanction for a 
punitive expedition, Cape officials feared that rumours could be the 
precursors to real problems. 
From a distance the Governor, although at the time severely criticized 
for his views, gauged the situation correctly. If there was to be no 
financial support from the Home Government to protect a white 
settlement in the Transkei, and if the Cape Colony was unwilling to 
take over t he administration of British Kaffraria, thereby easing the 
burden of the Home treasury , then the logical step would be to pacify 
Sarhili, abandon all expansionist ideals and settle Africans, either 
Mfengu or Thembu, on at least a part of Sarhili's former lands. 
thereby preventing him from taking repossession of the entire area. 
The Governor's assessment was shared by Richard Southey, hitherto a 
firm opponent of a Thembu settlement in the Transkei which could serve 
as a bridge between the eastern and western Thembu and lead to the 
eventual unification of the two sections. 
Meanwhile Sarhili had been sending conciliatory notes to the Governor. 
Warner, in his capacity as newly appointed British Resident fo r the 
Trans ke i, was therefore sent to the Gcaleka to negotiate the best 
course to be followed. His report, which enphasised the deplorable 
situation of the Gcaleka 17 jolted the Governor into action. Dismayed 
frontier farmers had to accept that not only was the work of their 
idol, Sir George Grey, being undone and their arch-enemy allowed to 
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return to a part of his former lands, but Wodehouse also made it clear 
that the Kei was to be the limit of British sovereignty and that all 
imperial troops were to be withdrawn from the frontier. 
Criticism of Wodehouse had been building up before his Transkeian 
policy had been made known, the gravamen against him having been. not 
undeservedly, that he tended to favour the interests of the Home 
Government rather than those of the Cape Colony.18 He was now faced 
with vociferous opposition from both white farmers and Cape 
politicians who used every possible means to vocalize white 
apprehensions. George Mcall Theal. the first clerk for Native 
Affairs, in later years maintained that this "retrograde movement" 
(i.e. the abandonment of plans to extend British control over the 
Transkei), was believed by the vast majority of the Europeans to have 
been a severer blow to the prosperity of South Africa than even the 
abandonment of the Sovereignty ten years previously had been. 19 The 
editor of The Kaffrarian Watchman launched a stinging attack upon the 
Governor: "O'Urban's policy" he wrote, "was aggressive, Andries 
Stockenstrom's submissive, 
Wodehouse's retrogressive.,,20 
George Grey's progressive, Philip 
His popularity with the Colonists at a low ebb, the Governor was at 
the same time severely criticized by the Home Government for what they 
considered to have been his unsatisfactory handling of the separation 
question. 21 His renewed attempts in 1865 to achieve a land exchange 
with the Location residents might then have been an attempt to satisfy 
both the Home Government and the farmers - the former by strengthening 
the eastern frontier through the creation of a black buffer between 
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the Cape Colony and the Transkeian people, and the latter by mak ing 
farms available in the Location. Commenting on events during this 
period, Theal cynical ly remarked that it was an attempt by the 
Governor to save a few planks from the wreck. 22 Thea l 's observation 
certainly contained an element of truth, but the land deal was to be 
undertaken for far sounder reasons, of which t he most important was 
the key role that the proposed Thembu settlement could play in Thembu -
Gcaleka relationsh ips. 
The abandonment of plans for a European settlement in the Transkei 
left the Cape Government with a choice between what seemed to be two 
evils - the restoration of the whole Kei-Mbashe area to Sarhi li or the 
settlement of Thembu and other Blacks on part of this territory. To 
follow the first option, thereby strengthening Sarhi li's position. 
would, Southey argued, be hazardous in the extreme and another war in 
a few years' time would be certain. 23 The second choice, which could 
lead to the emergence of a strong united Thembu kingdom, seemed from 
the European point of view to be the lesser of the two evils as the 
whole idea of the resettlement of the Thembu was coloured by one 
dominant consideration: the fear of Sarhili. To stop any devious 
designs from his side, both Sir Philip and Richard Southey relied upon 
a po licy of divide and rule, which aimed at the weakening of black 
chiefs by making use of their mutual rivalries and the fostering of 
their antagonistic interests. "In dealing with the natives", Sir 
Philip wrote to Cardwell: "we ca n only hope to neutralize their 
dislike of whites by use of their feuds among themselves.,,24 The 
location of Thembu, Gcaleka and Mfengu in a restricted area could 
therefore be the best insurance against a coalition of tribes on the 
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border of the Cape Colony. The three tribes, so the Governor 
be lieved, would be jealous of each other and ready to betray each 
other in se rious fighting. 25 The decision to settle the remainder of 
Sarhili's lands with people potentially hostile to the Gcaleka was not 
a device by Sir Philip to restore some of his lost cred ibil ity with 
the Colonists, but a move based on carefu ll y calculated political 
considerations. 
At the beginning of 1865 Warner was once again instructed to open up 
negotiations with the principal Thembu chiefs in the Location, a task 
which he accepted with mixed feelings. Though still broadly in favour 
of the land exchange, he took umbrage at having been insufficiently 
consulted. In later years when the flaws in the scheme became 
apparent, and accusations and counter-accusations were rife, he 
apologized for his share in promoting it by pOinting out that the 
whole thing had been worked out beforehand by Wodehouse in conjunction 
with Walter Currie, and that he hi mself was presented with a f ait 
accompli, so that he had to execute a plan of which he was highly 
critical . 26 
Whether this was absolutely true or whether it was Warner's 
hypersensitivity and his almost paranoiac suspic ion of his co-
officials which blinded him to t he fact that he had often been 
consulted - as Theal maintained 27 - is difficult to establish, the 
problem being our lack of authentic and unbiased evidence for this 
period . Our main source of information on the Emigration comes from 
Warner himself who kept up an almost daily correspondence with the 
Colonial Secretary. In addition he wrote frequently to the Governor 
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as well as to other officials. 28 Although the factual information 
that these letters contain is very useful, Warner was by no means an 
unprejudiced observer, and unfortunately there are few letters from 
the other two people closely associated with the movement, Walter 
Currie and Charles Griffith, the Resident Mag istrate at Queenstown, to 
balance his views. 
It is also difficult to get a balanced and clear idea of both Imperial 
and Cape policies concerning the Emigration. When asked by Sir 
Walter Stanford in 1884 to give his views on the subject, Theal 
noted that the records for that period were in great confusion as 
Wodehouse was in the habi t of writing semi-officially to almost every 
offic ial , and a portion of the correspondence had been lost. 29 It is 
therefore not surprising that officials complained about the 
contrad ictory and conf l icting instructions received during this 
period. 3D Inevitably misunderstanding arose from such confusion. 
Wodehouse had possibly never accepted that the rejection of his 1864 
proposals signalled the end of negotiations with the Thembu chiefs on 
the question of their emigration; hence he saw the 1865 negotiations 
as a continuation of those started in 1864 . As fa r as Warner was 
concerned , the events of 1864 and those of 1865 were two ent irely 
different issues. 
Under the 1864 agreement, the Thembu were to have a certa in part of 
Sarhi li ' s lands in exchange for the Location, while the greater part 
of the Transkei was to be settled by Europeans and annexed to British 
Kaffraria under protection of t he Irregular Horse. This scheme had 
Warner's wholehearted support, as he had always regarded the presence 
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of a strong. white settlement as a pre-requisite for the peaceful 
settlement of the Thembu in that part of the Transkei. 31 The 1865 
land deal was planned under entirely different circumstances. The 
plan for a white settlement had fallen through and Warner had to 
supervise a scheme of which he was highly critical. but despite his 
reservations. he was willing to give it his support. Abiding by his 
long-held conviction that a mass of black people could not be ruled by 
Colonial law. he argued that the evacuation of the Location would at 
least put an end to the undesirable situation of "a kingdom within a 
kingdom" as he described the Location .32 
Another consideration was that Warner's personal ambitions were at 
stake. Although his active involvement in Thembu affairs had already 
started in the 1830's. it was in the wars of 1846-1847 and of 1850-
1853 that he rose to prominence as mediator between the Thembu rulers 
and the Cape Government. and during this time that he earned for 
himself the title of "the uncrowned king of Thembuland". He often 
referred to himself as Head of the House of Ngubengcuka, thereby 
inSinuating that he had the right to interfere in Thembu household 
affairs. 33 It was therefore with great frustration that he worked as 
Thembu Agent in the Location where his influence on Thembu affairs. 
both within the Cape Colony and across the Kei, was inhibited by the 
system under which he had to operate. The 1865 efforts to resettle 
the Thembu, which coincided with his appointment as British Resident 
in the Transkei. opened new avenues along Which he could channel his 
administrative zeal. He was 
hoped would bring him autocratic 
now not only in a 
powers,34 but he 
key post which he 
also found himself 
in a position where a network of Official and personal obligations 
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from those serving under him put him in a position of paternal 
control. His son, E.J. Warner, who succeeded him as Thembu Agent, was 
to be placed in charge of the proposed new settlement across the Indwe 
river (the White Kei). In the Idutywa Reserve, another son, H.B. 
Warner, was appointed officially as clerk to the British Resident, 
but in reality to act as his father's eyes and ears . 35 Lastly, hi s 
"adopted son", Qeya, had just been installed as the king of the 
Thembu. 36 Through him Warner hoped to gain influence over the core 
Thembu settlement on the Mbashe. 
Warner's commitment to the emigration scheme, despite his many 
reservations about its practicability, is understandable. This was 
his great opportunity to rega in the title of "uncrowned ki ng of the 
Thembu", or, even better , to become a second Shepstone. With some 
luck on hi s side he could even improve upon that great administrator's 
game. It was with myopic optimism rather than a sense of realism that 
he assured the Governor at the beginning of 1865 that he foresaw no 
obstacles in the way of a large scale Thembu emigration. But hi s 
hopes soon evaporated. The scheme was so ill-conceived and badly 
planned that it had little chance of succeeding. Conflicting and 
contradictory instructions from Cape Town to the officials on the spot 
led to misunderstanding and disagreement between these officials over 
details . In fact, Warner differed from his superiors on almost every 
point. 
The first point of disagreement was related to the strateg ies to be 
followed once it became clear that the majority of the Thembu. 
contrary to Warner's expectations, were not going to emigrate. Richard 
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Southey, like Wodehousejwanted the move to be voluntar j · ·, and while 
they urged Warner to get the Thembu out of the Location as quickly as 
possible, they would not allow him to.use any force. Warner, faced 
with t he task of resettling 30,000 people, the majority of whom 
refused to cooperate, regarded some form of coercion as inevitable. 
He therefore advocated the immediate introduction of Colonial law in 
the Location. The chiefs, so he believed, rather than allowing the 
erosion of their powers by the transfer of tribal judiciary to the 
Cape courts, would exert themselves in getting their followers across 
the Indwe where they would rule according to their own customs. 37 
Southey's hesitancy to comply with Warner's requests delayed the 
emigration. Many Thembu began to doubt whether Colonial law was ever 
going to be introduced. After all, when the Thembu Location was 
proclaimed in 1853 they had also been warned that this was going to 
happen ; but now, twelve years later, the chiefs were as firmly in 
control as ever before. 
When it became clear, by May 1865 , that there was to be no mass 
emigration , Warner proposed more stringent measures. Among the 
suggestions set out in his letters of May and June 1865,38 he asked 
that the Thembu Agent should be transferred immediately across the 
Indwe to the newly created Emigrant Thembuland , thereby leaving the 
Location residents without the go-between through whom they had access 
to the Government. Warner hoped that this would convince those who 
refused to emigrate that the Government was determined to see the plan 
carried out. He further recommended the use of force to ensure the 
t otal eviction of the residents. Should some be allowed to stay , he 
feared, many of those who had left would return and the Thembu would 
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get hold of land on both sides of the Indwe river. Earlier . in an 
attempt to protect prospective emigrants against intimidation. 39 
Southey ordered Walter Currie's F.A.M.P. to the frontier . and he 
strengthened the police force at Glen Grey.40 He now proposed the 
immediate occupation of any evacuated lands by these F.A.M.P. 
A third suggestion set out in Warner's letters. dealt with the young 
Tshatshu chief Gungubelle and his 15.000 followers. Initia lly 
Gungubelle indicated his willingness to move. but the influence of the 
Ngqika upon this section of the Thembu had remained very strong. Part 
of Wodehouse ' s Transkeian scheme made provision for the settlement of 
this Xhosa tribe on lands south of the proposed Thembu settlement. 
Sandile first accepted the offer. but by March 1865 it became known 
that he had backed out. part ly out of fear of Sarhili who. it was 
rumoured. was determined to recover his lost lands. and partly because 
he feared that the position of the Gcaleka paramount could be 
jeopardized. When the Tshatshu also refused to move. Warner feared 
the possible unification of Gungubelesand Sandi Ie's clans who were 
divided only by the Kei river. and he proposed stern measures to 
forestall such a possibil ity. Critical of the Government for having 
failed to implement the Cathcart Settlements of 1853. according to 
which the name and separate existence of the Tshatshu had to be 
forfeited. 41 he now suggested that the Tshatshu shou ld be made to 
understand that they had no claim to lands in the Location. and that 
they would have to be content with any land allocated to them by the 
Government should they refuse to move. 
Lastly. Warner focussed attention upon the chiefs. The "pra i se-
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worthy" ones - those who supported the move - were to receive 
stipends, while petty chiefs like Uglincuba , who opposed the 
Government, were to lose their subsidies. 
Nonesi had meanwhile jo ined the anti-emigration faction, and her 
posit ion as paramount of the Location, would have been profound ly 
affected by the implementation of Warner's suggestions. The latter. 
thorough ly disgu sted with what he regarded as Nonesi's treacherous 
behaviour, insisted that she should be made to understa nd that she was 
not chief in her own right, but that Ngangelizwe, then still known as 
Qeya, was paramount and his orders were to be obeyed. 42 Ngangelizwe 
was at that time, for various reasons, still a staunch supporter of 
the emigration movement. 
Warner hoped to gain support for his suggestions by emphasising that 
should the land deal fail, there would not be enough land available 
for white farmers in the Location . But his suggestions met with a 
lukewarm reception in Cape Town, as had his suggestions in August 1865 
which aimed at further undermining the power of the chiefs as well as 
re stricting the movement of the Location residents by putt ing an end 
to the issuing of passes. And so all Warner's attempts to gain 
official sanction to coerce the Thembu into moving out of the Location 
failed, and merely served to highlight the accumulating divergencies 
between Southey and himself. As for his suggestion that everything 
short of physical force should be used,43 Southey adhered to 
Wodehouse's principle of "moral persuasion". Nonesi, Southey argued, 
had to be made to feel, rather than be told, that she might lose her 
authority, and that the Tshatshu, instead of being threatened with 
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resettlement had subt ly to be made aware of their insecure position. 
Warner's suggestion that we ll -disposed chiefs should be rewarded, drew 
the retort that the people had to be strengthened against the chiefs 
and not vice versa. Earlier in 1865 Southey had, in an ent irel y 
private letter, advised Warner that money should be spent to acquire 
the goodwill of influential men. 44 While Warner believed that the 
scheme could only succeed if all the Thembu were removed, and that 
those who refused to go, should run the r isk of losing the ir land and 
being resettled wherever the Government preferred, Southey held 
diametrically opposed views. He had never expected all the Thembu to 
move. "I have from the f i rst", he informed Currie, "contemplated that 
some Thembu would remain behind, and was prepared to treat with such 
as having no chief and to give them individual titles of land, of 
course in small quantities. 45 In a letter to Griff ith he 
emphasised that "it was never the intention of the government to 
deprive of land those who elected to remain behind in the Location 
which they hitherto occupied" . 46 The fai lure to reach agreement on 
these pOints left Warner without any muscle to carry out his 
decision. Furthermore, he had often told the chiefs that some form of 
Co lonial control was going to be introduced, on ly to find th ere was no 
governmental approval for carrying this out. He consequently lost 
cred i bility with those ch iefs who began to look at the emigration 
scheme as Warner's measure. ,,47 This idea was reinforced by the 
unfortunate relationship between Warner and Charles Griffith, the 
civil commissioner of Queenstown , under whose jurisdiction the 
Location fell. Griffith was never officially informed about the 
emigration of a large number of people from his district, nor did he 
receive any instructions as to the treatment of those who remained 
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behind. Offended by this treatment, he distanced himself from the 
move and at times sympathized with the chiefs who, he believed, had 
reason to feel that they were being coerced in an underhand way. 
Feelings bet ween the two men were exacerbated when Southey, as a 
personal favour to Warner , dismissed one of Griffith's most trusted 
headmen, Carolus, who allegedly supported Nonesi in her opposition to 
the move and then went around boasting that he had beaten Warner. 48 
Griffith angril y reminded Southey that since he himself, as government 
officer , had never been invited to any of Warner's meetings, the 
chiefs understandably regarded the whole scheme as Warner's, and 
consequently treated it with contempt. Carolus's actions were. 
Griffith maintained, not directed against the Government, but against 
Warner personally .49 Gri f fith further differed from Warner in that he 
believed that the introduction of Colonial law, far from driving 
people out of the location, would be an incentive for them to stay 
there, since they preferred Colonial law to the arbitrary rule their 
chiefs . 50 He furthermore regarded t he transfer of t he Thembu 
Agent as a grave mistake which had thrown the administration of the 
Location into confusion. As to Warner's suggestion that he, Griffith , 
should be made responsible for the good government of the Location in 
addition to his magisteri al duties, he waspishly remarked that "it was 
an absurdity that could only have been thought up by old Warner" . 51 
Griffith was not the only official with whom Warner fell out: in time 
he became embroiled with almost every other official except his own 
sons. 52 Temperamentally unfit to work with people - as he himself had 
on occasion admitted - he acquired a reputation of arrogance, unco-
operativeness and egoistic ambition. His most severe critic was 
• 
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Walter Currie. Currie was entrusted by Wodehouse with the task of 
settling Mfengu on a part of the Transkeian lands originally set aside 
for the Thembu. 53 The Governor had taken this decision once it became 
clear that a large number of Thembu were not gOing to move. Currie 
&,)hilc:.. 
acted promptly and the Mfengu were well settled ~§ befer~ Warner was 
still trying desperately to persuade the Thembu to move. 
Major Charles Cobbe was put in charge of the Mfengu Settlement. 
Warner resented both the presence of Mfengu on lands originally 
promised to the Thembu. and the presence of Cobbe. a man whom he 
neither liked nor respected. 54 He further resented the fact that 
Currie was entrusted with the task of resettling the Mfengu and he was 
dubious of the methods which he used to achieve his goal . Currie on 
the other hand. having completed his task to his own and the 
Government's satisfaction. watched. sometimes with haughty ruefulness. 
at other times with disdain. as Warner stumbled on. estranging both 
his fellow officials and Thembu chiefs in the process. "The poor man" 
he once wrote to the Governor. "seems bewildered and not at all equal 
to the task he has undertaken. His nervous and timid conduct all tend 
to create difficulties at a time like the present ... He sinks under 
difficulties in a most melancholy manner. and he discovers imaginary 
obstacles. He has certainly disappointed me after his great 
experience of the native character."SS In a less generous mood. he 
advised Southey to "give old Warner a retiring allowance on condition 
that he resides nowhere in Transkeian territory or in Glen Grey."S6 
Thus discredited by his fellow officials in the eyes of the Governor. 
Warner was blamed in Cape Town for the failure of the emigration 
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scheme. This was rather unfair. The removal of 30,000 peop le from a 
country in which they had resided for many generations was a task 
which could not have been accomplished without the use of force. In 
the final analysis it is doubtful whether anybody else would have 
succeeded where Warner failed. The fact is that the Thembu did not 
want to go. 
When finally the move came to an end, only four chiefs with their 
followers - about one-third of the inhabitants of the Location - had 
accepted the Governor ' s offer to settle across the Indwe in the area 
that became known as Emig rant Thembuland. 57 These chiefs were 
Matanzima (Hala), Gecelo (Gcina), Ndarala (Ndungwana) and Sitokwe 
tJ<i lde.. (Qwati). Warner maintained t hat they were the most influential 
chiefs, but this is highly debatable. On the contrary, it would seem 
that it was exactly because they lacked influence in the Location that 
they accepted an offer which the majority of their kinsmen found 
unattractive. Matanzima was an ambitious man, but under Nonesi's rule 
in the Location he was a nonenity. Across the Indwe he would be a 
chief in his own right, and being the brother of Ngangelizwe, he would 
certainly gain ascenda ncy over the other chiefs. 58 Gecelo was no 
chief in his own right, but acted as regent for his brother Mpange la. 
Since the latter was nearly of age, Gecelo would soon have had to make 
way for the younger chief. Ndungwana's situation was slightly 
different. He became paramount of his tribe in 1853 when his 
grandfather , Quesha, voluntarily handed over power to him. His 
position was, however, very insecure. Of al l the chiefs he could be 
singled out as the most loyal to the Colonial Government and he had 
the strong support of his own missionary, the Rev. Patten. But within 
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his clan there was a faction strongly opposed to the Cape Government, 
and during the Fadana-Quesha Rebellion of 185759 there had been 
attempts by his uncle Matshoba to seize power . Although the plot had 
failed, the anti-Government faction enjoyed considerable popular 
support, as could be seen from the warm welcome that Quesha received 
on his return from Robben Island, where he served a two-year term of 
imprisonment. 60 There were also rumours that Ndarala was in trouble 
over debts 61 and t his may have influenced his decision to move. The 
fourth chief, Sitokwe Ndlela was the son of a Qwati chief who held a 
subord inate position under the Gcina. 
little influence in the Location. 
Like the other three, he had 
The decision of these four chiefs to move was in part a reflection of 
a personal ambition, but it was al so an express ion of a spirit of 
independence - a Thembu Great Trek undertaken to preserve their ethnic 
identity and traditional way of life. They held a utopian vision of a 
country where a strange marriage between "complete independence" and 
"acknowledgment of the paramountcy of the British Queen" would allow 
them th e freedom to ru le as independent chiefs while at the same time 
enjoying the physical protection of the Colonial Government against 
surrounding enemies as well as the psychological sat isfaction of 
remaining part of t he Thembu nation. What must be emphasised here is 
that their move had nothing to do with the land deal. They moved 
independently , and the Location people were not bound by their 
decision . There is no support for Warner's argument that they were 
the rea l contracting power, and that their decision was binding on the 
Location peop le. 
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The majority of the Thembu chose to remain the Location under Cape 
law, even though this meant the further erosion of the power of the 
chiefs and of Thembu traditions. In view of this it may well be asked 
why the chiefs had first accepted the offer of independence across the 
Indwe and then, suddenly it seemed, changed their minds. To 
understand this decision it is necessary to look at the story of 
Nonesi and her resistance to the emigration movement. 
When Ngangelizwe became king in 1863, Nonesi was still the recognized 
"paramount" of the Location and for the time being her authority 
remained unquestioned. 52 It was, however, already clear that her 
contumacious resistance to any restrictions upon her authority had 
become an embarrassment to her former allies. Nonesi, the faithful -
as Sir George Cathcart had dubbed her - had obv iously served her 
purpose. 
Emigration, 
questioned. 
After March 1855, when she decided to work against the 
her position as head of the Location Thembu was 
The official argument, as presented by Warner, was that, 
with Ngangelizwe's assumption of power, her authority over the 
Location Thembu had legally and rightfully expired,53 and that all 
powers had devolved upon Ngangelizwe with whom negotiations were to be 
carried on . Nones i did not accept this abrogation of her power. She 
based her argument on the fact that she had been invited back from the 
Mbas he after the war of 1853 and that the recognition of her 
paramountcy over the Location was a reward for services rendered. The 
title of paramount, as far as she was concerned, implied permanancy.54 
Warner based his claim on the legal complexities and the western 
concept of regency. His arguments would perhaps have had validity in 
a court of law, but they were most confusing for people not entirely 
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familiar with the language and customs of those with whom negotiations 
were conducted. It would seem further that the legitimacy of Nonesi's 
position was only called into question after 1865 when she fell foul 
of Warner in consequence of her refusa l to move across the Indwe 
river. In his report of 1864. Warner had mentioned that Nonesi was 
getting old and had lost much of her former energy and character. He 
then made the statement. significant in this context. that Raxoti 
would soon rep lace her as deputy for hi s brother. 65 By imp li cation he 
had thus re-affirmed the 1853 decision of having a separate regent 
over the Location. 
Nonesi was a woman with a remarkably strong personality. and her 
cooperation was essential for the successful execution of the 
emigration scheme. It was therefore with great relief t hat Warner 
cou ld report at the beginning of 1865 t hat she had accepted the 
Governor's offer to move across the Indwe where she could retain her 
power as chief. which she would lose in the Locat ion upon the 
introduction of Colonial law . There were several reasons for her 
sudden volte face soon afterwards. one of the most important being 
Fadana's return from Robben Island in 1865. The ex-regent. as high-
spirited as ever despite his weak phys ical condition. soon mustered 
considerable support for his opposition to the emigration . Rumours 
were rife. Warner was told that Fadana had assured the Thembu that 
the introduction of Colonial law was an empty threat. already used at 
the time of his imprisonment seven years earlier. At the same time he 
was said to have urged the peop le not to emigrate should the 
Government this time decide to carry out the threat. as a strong 
united people. he believed. would be in a better position to resist 
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the implementation of Colonial law. He allegedly also tried his 
utmost to win the common people over to his point of view by saying 
that. if united. it would be possible for them to resist both the 
chiefs and the Colo~ial Government. 66 Fadana told Griffith that on 
his release from prison he was ordered in Cape Town to go to his land . 
stay there and behave himself. This he saw as another proof that the 
emigration was Warner's scheme. 67 Rumours such as these reached 
Warner's ears via his headmen. who obviously hoped to strengthen their 
own position by keeping the Thembu Agent informed about possible 
unrest. Warner. in turn. could use the information to convince the 
Cape Government of the expediency of immediately introducing Colonial 
law. thereby curbing the power of those chiefs who were opposed to the 
scheme. Most likely. Fadana's reasons for opposing the scheme were 
far simpler than Warner suggested. Like other Thembu chiefs, he may 
have argued that the land exchange would be a bad bargain. In 
comparison with the Location. the territory across the Indwe was 
badl y watered. The former was fed by about eight or nine streams 
while there was only one significant river in the trans-Indwe area. 
The pasturage in the Location was also vastly superior. Furthermore. 
it was clear that. after the settlement of the Mfengu on proposed 
Thembu lands. there was not sufficient land left for the Thembu. The 
territory allotted to them was only sixteen to eighteen miles in width 
and sixty to seventy miles long . and it was estimated that only one-
third was suitable for cultivation. 68 Rumours were also rife that 
Sarhili had sworn vengeance on the Thembu and on Warner . whom he 
blamed for his land losses. Why then would the Thembu exchange their 
peaceful country for one where they might feel insecure. The chiefs 
were influenced by traders who were strongly opposed to the move . 
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In view of the above, Nonesi's behaviour after 1865 is understandable. 
What was at stake was, first, her chieftainship and, second, the 
Thembu claim to their ancestral lands. She was wil ling to sacrif ice 
the second for the sake of the first, but she would only be able to 
retain her paramount position in the new country if she could take a 
significant number of followers with her. Once the majority had shown 
their reluctance to move, she was no longer prepared to go. But if 
she stayed, she had to prevent her fol lowers f rom joining her 
ambitious grandson, Matanzima, across the Indwe. Hence her anti-
emigration activities, which brought her into conflict with Warner, 
whom she accused of having told lies to the Government when he said 
that she consented to go. Warner was not slow in taking up the 
cudgels, making use of every opportunity to vilify her in the eyes of 
the Government. In officia l correspondence, "Nonesi the faithful" now 
became "the old liar", "the feeble-minded old woman", "the old 
creature", "the drunkard". Yet it was on this feeble-minded old 
woman, so Warner believed - or at least tried to make the Government 
believe - that the success or failure of the movement depended . 
It is difficult to know whether Warner actually believed that it was 
so lel y Nonesi's influence that kept the majority of the Thembu in the 
Location. After all, he himself had admitted to Southey: "It is a 
gigantic task to remove 30,000 souls out of a country they love and 
which they had inhabited for several generations past into a country 
which they don't like so well and with the chance of exchanging peace 
for war into the bargain . ,,69 Be that as it may, Warner had convinced 
himself that Nonesi was the cause of all his troubles, and that once 
she had experienced the effects of Colonial law, she would be 
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more amenable to his wishes. His first opportunity to humiliate her 
came in 1866 when some of her people stole and slaughtered oxen 
belonging to a certain Klaas Mayekiso. Gilfillan, who was then 
at the head of the F.A.M.P. called on her for assistance. She 
acted promptly: the thief was traced and some of his stock 
confiscated to compensate the owner . When , however, Gilfillan 
demanded the compensation on behalf of the Cape Government , whose 
laws had been violated, she refused to hand the cattle over. 
She had , in fact, already distributed them among her followers. 
When this incident became known, Southey reprimanded Gilfillan for 
having, by implication, acknowledged Nonesi's authority in asking 
her assistance. Griffith was ordered to inform all chiefs that 
henceforth they would have no more judicial authority. Southey held 
that Nonesi was actually guilty of a crime when she confiscated the 
cattle. 70 It is difficult to underst and the ground on which Southey 
could justify these instructions. Colonial law was not yet 
proclaimed; a law could certainly not be applied before it was 
promulgated. 
Gri ff ith interpreted Southey's instructions as meaning that he had to 
hold a public meeting of all chiefs to inform them on the latest 
developments, and he immediately convened such a meeting . It turned 
out to be a most unfortunate affair . As Griffith disagreed with the 
Government on this issue, he found it difficult to handle the meeting , 
and he appeared to be aggressive and unsympathetic. He bluntly to ld 
the chiefs that they had lost all power , and any questions they asked 
were brushed aside by a reminder that he was there to carry out the 
Government's orders and not to answer questions. 71 
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In her response to Griffith's announcement, Nonesi emphasised the two 
aspects of the Emigration that directly concerned herself: the 
maintenance of her paramountcy over the Location and her resis tance to 
the alienation of the Thembu ancestral lands . Speaking sadly, but 
with dignity, she challenged Griffith on these issues: "I am an old 
chief", she said, "one of an old race. I never agreed to cross the 
river, and it is not known what I have done that the Governor should 
be angry with me ... I am a chief, why should I be treated as less than 
a chief? I have always been loyal to the British Government. I was 
loyal when the chiefs were fighting. In the cattle killing I was on 
the English side. I have all the country this side of the Indwe river 
and have kept it loyal. We do not deny being under government. The 
Tambookie wherever they may be, 
wi sh it otherwi se . I am the 
mine.,,72 
are under the government. We do not 
government's child, but the land is 
This speech had no impact upon official policies, but it inspired 
compassion in certain white circles. The Rev. W. Holden was the most 
outspoken in his criti~ism of both the Cape Government's policies and 
Griffith's handling of the meeting. He saw it as a blot on the name 
of "proud Britain", that the questions of "a great, widowed chief" 
could not get an "honest and manly reply". Castigating Griffith. he 
wrote: "It must have been gall ing t o the magistrate ... if he was 
capable of feeling. ,,73 Upset by this unsought publicity given to the 
Emigration Southey reprimanded Griffith severely for having convened a 
meeting, instead of having spoken to each chief privately. "The 
questi on at issue", he made it clear, "seems to be whether, when you 
received inst ructions for your guidance, it was necessary and proper 
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to hold a meeting for the purpose of making those instructions 
known. ,,74 Griffith had an intense dislike of what he called "hole and 
corner" meetings, but orders had to be obeyed. 
public meeti ngs. 
There were no more 
It could be that the moral support which she received after the 
meeting strengthened Nonesi in her determination not to leave the 
Location. Shortly afterwards, a deputation of Thembu chiefs informed 
the acting civil commiss ioner, J. Hemming , that they had no intention 
of leaving , and that Warner had never been justified in telling the 
Government that they had promised to do so. They further objected to 
Warner's threats that "all kinds of disagreeable things would happen 
to them should they not move across the Indwe." They emphasised that 
the Thembu had never been guilty of any act that would justify their 
expulsion from their ancestral lands. 75 Warner was understandably 
aggrieved by these accusations and henceforth he became almost 
obsessed with Nonesi and her "intrigues" . 
Meanwhile Warner also became disillusioned with his other ally, 
Ngangelizwe. 76 Negotiations as to the evacuation of the Location had 
started between the two men in March 1865. In return for his promise 
to forfeit all claims to the Location, the Thembu king was to be 
"given" all the lands across the White Kei up to the Tsomo. This 
promise disregarded the claims of the four chiefs who emigrated on the 
understand ing that they would receive complete independence in their 
new country . Ngangelizwe at first welcomed the Emigration as a means 
to further his own interests. Once again a united Thembu nation had 
become a realistic possibility. Initially he acted with great zeal, 
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in curbing Nonesi's influence. But when he found that the large 
majority of Thembu were not inclined to move and that the Government 
was not gOing to allow him to use force to achieve his aims, he 
adopted new strategies. Working against the Emigration was now a far 
more exped ient course to follow. If a large number of Thembu remained 
in the Location, he seems to have argued, it could mean that the whole 
area south-west of the Mbashe and the Stormberg could be brought under 
his influence.?? In that case it would be sound policy, first, to win 
the friendship of the anti-Emigration faction so as to enable him to 
put up a united front against the Cape Government should this become 
necessary, and secondly to prevent a mass exodus of Location residents 
that would strengthen the hands of the Em igrant chiefs. Warner was 
therefore certainly correct when he suspected Ngangelizwe of trying to 
prevent the emigration of the Location Thembu and of encouraging 
Nonesi to remain on her lands.?8 Once Ngangelizwe had fallen foul of 
Warner, the latter turned against him. The most hair-raising stories 
about his cruelty reached the colonial office almost daily.?9 On the 
other hand, Matanzima had emerged as the favourite, whose friendship 
and loyalty Warner was keen to cultivate. Matanzima was quick to take 
advantage of Warner's support, and he let no opportunity pass without 
discrediting Ngangelizwe as an interfering autocrat. At the same time 
he appealed to Warner to take action against Nonesi whom he accused of 
keeping his people away from him. 80 
We do not know Nonesi's side of the story, but Warner and Matanzima 
succeeded in portraying her as a troublesome old woman whose 
subversive activities not only prevented many Thembu from emigrating, 
but also disturbed the peace both in the Location and in Emigrant 
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Thembuland .81 At one stage, according to their reports, she asked for 
a farm in t he Location, indicating her willingness to settle down 
under colonial law. When a surveyor turned up, she chased him away, 
claiming that the Location was under her authority, and that he had to 
obtain her permission to survey farms. Thereafter she twice crossed 
the Indwe to settle under Matanzima , but each time she clashed with 
her grandson. Matanzima maintained that he tried his utmost to 
accommodate her, having offered her one of the best plots in Emigrant 
Thembuland. This, he said, she had refused, and had asked for a plot 
which belonged to one of his ch ief councillors. During the ensuing 
dispute she sounded the war cry, which brought her followers from the 
Locat ion into Emigrant Thembuland where war was only prevented by 
Warner's interference. 82 An uneasy truce followed, with Warner 
suspecting Nonesi of carrying on with her intrigues in the Location
J 
although she was now living in Emigrant Thembuland. At last the 
Governor, influenced by the constant stream of reports on the 
unsettled state of affairs in the Location, decided to mete out 
exemplary puni shment. Nonesi played into her enemies ' hands by 
entering the Location without a pass. (The pass laws by which 
intercourse between the Location and Emigrant Thembuland were 
restricted, were issued in 1867). 
brother, Damas, in Pondoland. 
She was arrested and sent to her 
There are two versions of Nonesi's arrest. Major Hook in Sword and 
Statute quotes J.M. Grant as saying that three troops of F.A.M.P. 
under direction of C.D. Griffith captured her without f iring a shot . 
Hook himself recalled that they reached the queen's homestead at 
daybreak in advance of the Civil Commissioner, who was coming along 
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with the main body. As they feared a rising of the tribes, they got 
her as quickly as possible into a mule wagon, attempts at rescue bei ng 
prevented by relief police all along the route. 83 
The Free Press gave a completely different version. Early one 
morning, the report stated, police pounced upon her and she and her 
councillors were brought to Queenstown where they were tried by 
Griffith for being in the Colony without passes. They were sentenced 
to one month's imprisonment. The jail was filled with Africans and 
there was much sympathy for the "il lustrious prisoner." This 
imprisonment, the report continued, was just a cover up , as early the 
next morning a mule wagon, properly furnished, turned up, escorted by 
fifty police. The report ended: "The queen was very unwi II ing to 
undertake the journey and had to receive assistance. The wagon soon 
rolled off. Nonesi was gone and let us hope the last scene has been 
played in the Tambookie difficulty . ,, 84 
As we come to the end of Nonesi's story one question remains: Why did 
the Government find it necessary to take such harsh actions against 
her? It is clear that at the time of her arrest the Em igration had in 
any case come to a standstill, and her opposition to the movement was 
no longer an issue. Furthermore, some years earlier Warner himself 
had referred to her as a "mere cypher", unable to command the 
obedience of her people. 85 Why then was it now believed that she 
could Nield such strong influence both in the Location and in Emigrant 
Thembuland? Major Hook hinted that the whole thing was an attempt to 
get hold of her lands. He wrote: "The exact quality of her offending 
or intriguing I never learnt. Certainly the arrest happened at a time 
109 
that claims for extension of territory on the border were exercising 
the minds of many.,,86 
The most likely explanation seems to be the one given by E.J. Warner 
many years later in his evidence before the Glen Grey Commission : 
"Nonesi, finding that her chieftaincy was gone and Colonial law likely 
to be enforced, wished to move over into Matanzima's location. but he 
objected and when she tried to force her way in, he appealed to the 
government, and so Nonesi was apprehended and sent to Pondoland.,,87 
It would then seem as if Nonesi's arrest was a ploy devised by Warner 
to uphold his prest ige among the Emigrant Thembu and to strengthen his 
bond with Matanzima. 88 
The Emigration was one of the most significant episodes in Thembu 
history. It signalled the final fragmentation of the Thembu nation. 
Instead of the eastern and western f actions, united despite deep-
seated differences, by a common loyalty to the Mbashe paramount, there 
were now the Thembu in the Location under Colonial rule, the Emigrant 
Thembu who in varying degrees acknowledged the paramount , and the 
Mbashe Thembu who lived independently. But it was not only the nation 
that was broken up , the polarizing of the pro- and anti-Emigration 
factions cut right acros s earlier allegiances . Within the Hala. 
Ndungwana and Gcina clans there now emerged divergent groups, the 
ruling Hala clan being the most broken up of all. Thus the position of 
the paramount was severely weakened. This would, in part, explain why 
the Thembu could not in the 1880s effectively resist Colonial 
expanionism. 89 
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European farmers and frontier officials gauged the situation from a 
different angle. They saw reasons for anxiety in two developments: 
first in the consolidation of Thembu territory with the creation of 
Emigrant Thembuland which now linked the Co lonial Thembu with the core 
settlement at the Mbashe river and, secondly, in the survival of 
Thembu ethnic ties - despite political fragmentation - as reflected in 
their common loyalty to the paramount. There was now the danger that 
territorial consolidation could lead to greater political cohesion. 
Apprehensions of a united Thembu nation, in league with other black 
tribes, gave urgency in the 1860s to appeals by the press, traders, 
missionaries, farmers and frontier officials for the extension of 
British influence over the Transkei. 90 As far as the white farmers 
were concerned the irony of the situation was that the Emigration , 
far from having dissipated tension in the Location - as it was 
intended to do - not only augmented it, but extended the area of 
possible conflict. 
Looking at the Location in the post-emigration era we can distinguish 
three major developments. First, following the failure to remove the 
Thembu from the area, the Cape Government used more strenuous methods 
to obtain Thembu lands for white sett lement , and this led to the 
resettlement schemes of the 1880s . Secondly, the introduction of 
certain land and administrative po li cies paved the way for the 
introduction of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. Lastly, attempts by the 
Cape Government to extend its control over the Location led to 
discontent that culminated in armed resi stance in the 1870s. 91 
There can be no doubt that the main object of the emigration scheme 
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was to make more land available for white farmers. This did not 
happen. In some cases Thembu who emigrated left an influential 
relative behind to take hold of their evacuated farms. In other cases 
many of those who originally emigrated returned . Other farms were 
taken up by labourers who returned from the Colony.92 By 1872 the 
population of the Location was numerically stronger than in 1865, and 
all hopes that the Queenstown area would become safe for white settle-
ment were nullified. But Europeans, having once castee their eyes 
upon the fertile Location, were not gOing to give up the struggle. 
In the following years, the legitimacy of Thembu claims to the 
Location was called into question. It was argued that since the 
Thembu had refused the offer of emigration, the Glen Grey district had 
become crown land; the Thembu were consequently regarded as squatters 
with no legal rights and could be removed at any time. According to 
evidence given in 1892 by Jenner, resident magistrate in Queenstown, 
the Thembu had held the land in tribal tenure before 1870, but 
thereafter they had resided upon crown land. 93 In this connection 
it is important to consider a statement made by Hammond-Tooke in 1891, 
when the introduction of individual landownershi p in Glen Grey was 
debated. Since the Thembu had refused to move, he said, nei ther 
loyalty nor legal rights entitled them to consideration for private 
ownershiP.94 These opinions were highly debatable. Warner had argued 
in 1865 that the Governor had agreed to his negotiating with the 
chiefs in "their representative character" and that the decisions 
would thus be binding on their peoPle,95 but from later 
correspondence it emerged that neither Southey nor Wodehouse regarded 
the negotiations as being conducted by the chiefs as representatives 
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of their people. Southey emphasised that no man was to be deprived of 
his land as a result of his refusal to emigrate. 96 The Thembu 
themselves did not accept Warner's view. In a petition presented to 
the Governor in 1884 by certain Thembu chiefs, when this resettlement 
of a section of the Glen Grey people became a matter of public 
debate,97 they emphasised that the four chiefs had accepted 
Wodehouse's offer after the exchange had failed, but that the people 
as a whole had positively refused to go. The arrangement with the 
chiefs was therefore a special arrangement which did not concern the 
inhabitants of the Location. 98 
George McCall Theal upheld Warner's argument when he responded to the 
claims put forward by the Thembu chiefs in 1884. He informed the 
Governor that "no common man was asked to consent to the exchange for 
the reason that they were under tribal government, and consequently 
bound by the acts of these chiefs and headmen. Individuals were not 
asked to move for that was just what was not wanted, but the Emigrant 
Thembu as a body were invited through their chiefs to go".99 The 
argument that negotiations were carried on with the chiefs in their 
representative character was accepted, despite all arguments to the 
contrary, and from 1870 onwards the Thembu were made aware that they 
were living on sufferance on lands from which they could be evicted at 
any time. The 1880's did in fact see a series of resettlement 
attempts. 100 
The failure of the Cape Government to evict the majority of the Thembu 
from the Location once again emphasised the problem of governing a 
large mass of people within the Cape Colonial boundaries according to 
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their own laws and customs. The decision to introduce Colonial law 
was therefore treated with greater urgency. Also, the competition 
between white farmers and Transkeian Thembu for lands evacuated by the 
Emigrants, forced the Cape Government to revise its land policies. 
Since the Land Tenure Act of 1868, which made provision for some form 
of ind ividual landownership, did not solve the above-mentioned land 
problems , a commission was appointed to investigate matters. This 
commission consisted of E. Judge, J. Ayliff and R. Southey. 
In its report the Judge Commission emphasised the great population 
increase in the Location and suggested that in order to facilitate its 
administration, the Location should be divided into two, with one half 
joined to the Dordrecht district and the other to Queenstown. Po. block 
of European farms was to separate these two sections. The European 
farms were to be acquired gradually by the substitution of black 
homesteads in the proposed block by homesteads elsewhere , but with the 
understanding that there was nothing to prevent the ultimate exclusion 
of Thembu chiefs from this block by refusing to renew their claims at 
any time. As for the admi nistration of the Location , the Commission 
advised the abolition of white superintendents. Such superintendents, 
the Commission felt, contr ibuted towards a feeling of independence 
among the clans since the people saw them as the executives of their 
own l aws and not those of the Cape Colony. In order to bring home the 
idea of the paramountcy of the Cape Colony more effectively, the 
system of chieftancy had to be broken down once and for all, and 
magistrates were to replace superintendents. 
The Judge Commission further recommended that the whole Location 
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should be surveyed. and then divided into blocks with a senior headman 
in charge of each block. The blocks were then to be divided into 
farms under a headman. These recommendations were carried out 
promptly. and after farms were surveyed. Judge visited each one in 
order to appoint a headman. As far as possible. chiefs were replaced 
by headmen who assisted the Government in collecting taxes and 
applying Colonial laws. Since they were well-compensated. often by 
the granting of a small farm. they were useful collaborators. 
Furthermore. they could be dismissed at the Government's discretion 
without causing trouble. as would possibly happen when a chief was 
dismissed. In years to follow the Location Thembu become thoroughly 
acquainted with concepts such as individual landownership and rule 
through appointed headmen. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 was broadly 
based upon these principles so that. when it was eventually 
introduced. it was merely the legal confirmation of an already 
existing situation. 101 
The extension of Colonial rule over the Location and the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Judge Commission were not 
accepted complacently by the Location dwellers. Discontent. as people 
felt themselves subjected to alien laws and customs which they did not 
understand. created a spirit of resistance to the Cape Government. 
This spirit became more marked as land shortage. resulting from the 
subdivision of the Location. set in. It was under these circumstances 
that young pretenders. such as Mfanta. the brother of Ngangelizwe. and 
Gungubelle. the son of Maphasa. stepped into the vacuum left by the 
Emigrant chiefs. Their close association with black resistance 
movements on the Eastern Frontier. culminated in their participation 
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in the Ninth Frontier War. 102 They failed to muster large-scale 
support for their military ventures: the majority of the Location 
dwellers were not prepared to settle their grievances by means of 
armed resistance against a militarily superior power. 
Looking at Emigrant Thembuland. the Emigration was important for two 
reasons. First. since the Emigrant Thembu settled in their new 
country under paramountcy of the British Government. Britain now 
obtained a foothold across the Kei. The way was thus paved for 
British interference in the affairs of the Transkeian Thembu. 
Secondly. the chief Matanzima. backed by the Cape Government. 
succeeded in establishing himse lf as chief of Em igrant Thembuland. In 
this way the foundations of the House of Matanzima were laid - a 
development which played an important part in 20th century South 
African and Transkeian history.103 
A last observation with regard to the consequences of the Emigration. 
concerns Thembuland Proper. Inevitably disputes arose from time to 
time between the paramount and those chiefs whom he regarded as 
subordinates. but who viewed themselves as independent from him. Even 
though Sihele maintains that Ngangelizwe respected the authority of 
Matanzima over Emigrant Thembuland. 104 there are suggestions in 
Warner's correspondence with Southey between 1865 and 1969. that 
commoners did appeal to him against sentences imposed by the Emigrant 
chiefs. In consequence of Ngangelizwe's opposition to the Emigration 
he became the object of a vilification campaign. while Matanzima 
emerged as the favourite of the Cape Government. This way 
Ngangelizwe's pOSition was weakened. This situation enabled those who 
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wished to see the extension of British rule across the Kei, to meddle 
in Ngangelizwe's interna l affairs . The disturbances in Thembuland in 
1872 and Ngangelizwe's eventual deposition as chief , to be discussed 
in the next chapter, can directly be linked to conditions created by 
the Emigration . 
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Chapter 4 
The Restless Years: British Expansionism: 
the Annexation of Thembuland and Thembu Reactions (1870-1881) 
i. British Expansionism 
Thembuland Proper 
The years 1870 - 1881 not only witnessed strong Thembu resistance to 
intensified Cape and British expansionism across the Kei: they also 
saw widening divisions within the Thembu nation as, under European 
influence, the interests of Christian and non-Christian, of communal 
landholder and private entrepreneur, and of government-appointed 
headman and traditional chief came into conflict. If during the years 
1865 - 1869 - the period of the Emigration - the Thembu had been 
offered their last opportunity of uniting in a peaceful way, then in 
1877 - the year of the Ninth Frontier War - and 1880 - the year of the 
"Rebellion",1 they were to have their two last opportunities to 
combine in armed resistance against the Cape Government's intrusion 
upon Thembu lands and culture. In each case the ideal of Thembu unity 
foundered on the rocks of sectional interest, successfully encouraged 
and exploited by the Cape Government in its own interest. 
Apprehensions of a united Thembu nation in league with other hostile 
tribes gave new urgency , in the late 1860's, to appeals by the Cape 
press and missionaries, farmers , and white officials for the extension 
of British influence over the Transkeian territories. 2 Although the 
official policy of the Cape Government did incline towards an 
interference in the affairs of extra-territorial chiefdoms, its 
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approach was conservative, with the emphasis on a gradua l process of 
integration. On the other hand, the attitude of the Imperial Ministry 
under Gladstone, between 1868 and 1874, was decidedly anti-
expansionist. Admittedly the British Prime Minister, supported by the 
Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, was not averse to accepting 
responsibility for territories already acquired, provided the 
colonies, particular ly those with frontier problems, could be sel f-
reliant. 3 He therefore envisaged the incorporation of Natal , 
Griqualand East and Basutoland into the Cape Colony, and he urged the 
introduction of responsible government as a pre-requ isite to the 
successfu l federation of these states. The granting of self-
government was rejected by Governor Wodehouse who found the handing 
over of large native territories to a country "unfit for independence" 
incompat ible with his sense of justice. 
by his successor, Sir Henry Barkly.4 
It was accomplished in 1872 
The simultaneous introduction of responsible government and the new 
office of Secretary for Native Affairs in 1872, engineered a period of 
greater Colonial control over the black people both within and without 
its borders . The regulation of extra-territorial relationships, 
hitherto the prerogative of the Cape Governor in his capacity as High 
Commissioner, now passed into the hands of a Cape official who had to 
take cognizance of an elected parliament. But the first man to be 
appointed to this important post, Charles Brownlee, followed an 
independent line. Often heavy-handed and autocratic in his ways, he 
managed to gain undisputed authority in respect of African affairs: so 
much so that he has been credited by an admirer as the person who 
"deliberately and designedly" laid down the lines of the Transkeian 
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native policy.5 This policy, with its emphasis on detribalization and 
civilization, was based on the vision of Sir George Grey of whom he 
had been a close confidant and admirer. Initially he moved 
cautiously, in full agreement with Barkly whose concept of gradual 
extension of power over the black tribes, embraced the idea of the old 
chiefs being allowed to die off and being replaced by Christianized 
and educated men .6 As far as extra-territorial chiefdoms were 
concerned, Brownlee intended a policy of non-intervention. However, 
he had to give priority to the defensive needs of the Cape Colony, and 
Sarhili was still regarded as a real threat to the safety and 
stability of the frontier districts. As Thembuland formed a buffer 
against Sarhili, the Cape Colony was drawn into the Thembu-Gcaleka 
feuds as the long-standing land disputes escalated in the 1870's. The 
focal point of these disputes was Bomvanaland, an area over which 
Sarhili wished to extend hi s influence. 
Bomvanaland stretched from the Mbashe river in the north along the 
coast and was bordered by vacant lands which were desired by both 
Sarhili and Ngangelizwe. 7 The Thembu believed that the Bomvana, under 
their chief Moni, were living on Thembu lands and by acknowledging 
Sarhili as paramount, they had created an intolerable situation. The 
Thembu claim rested upon an old tradition that during the time of 
Hintza, the Bomvana under Gambusha, fled into this area where 
permission to settle was granted by Ngubengcuka. When some Thembu 
were driven eastward in 1827, the Bomvana were at the same time 
expelled from their lands and found refuge with Sarhili in Gcalekaland 
where they lived until well up to 1850. While some Thembu believed 
that these Bomvana had returned at the beginning of the War of 
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Mlanjeni. it was generally accepted that they had returned during the 
Cattle-Killing as they did not want to slaughter their cattle. The 
Rev . Peter Hargreaves was amongst those who believed that. on their 
return. they acknowledged the Thembu chiefs. In 1872. as evidence 
before the Judge Commission. he quoted an incident in 1858 when Joyi 
prevented Walter Currie from following Sarhili into Bomvanaland as he 
said that the Bomvana were Thembu. A European trader in Bomvanaland 
supported the Thembu claim. It was customary. he said. that a trader 
gave presents to a chief. and that while he had usually given presents 
to Mo ni . thus recognizing that chief's independence. he also. on 
occasion gave presents to Ngangelizwe. but never to Sarhili. Most 
Thembu chiefs. however. maintained that the lands belonged to the 
Thembu. but that the Bomvana acknowledged Sarhili's paramountcy. 
There was f urthermore a conglomeration of Pondo and Gcaleka people 
who had settled in Thembu land during the Cattle-Killing. but who 
accepted Sarhi li' s authority. 
lead to trouble. 
A situation such as this was bound to 
The l and dispute reached a crisis at a time when Ngangelizwe was 
confronting grave internal and external problems. The deteriorating 
relationship with another traditional enemy. the Mpondo. had 
culminated in the outbreak of war in 1869. Ngangqizwe's position was 
precarious. not only because the ~ndo were a formidable enemy. but 
also because many of his people - amongst others his uncles Mnqanqeni 
and Fadana - were unwil ling to fight a war which they thought could 
have been avoided. When some dissidents fled from Thembuland. 
Ngangelizwe took punit ive measures. His confiscation of th e cattle of 
a certain Xego. who sought refuge in Gcalekaland. led to a drawn-out 
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dispute. 8 Xego took revenge by raiding all the cattle on the Wesleyan 
mission station. The newly appointed Resident with Ngangelizwe, E. 
Chalmers, rushed to the trouble spot. Xego reacted by sounding the 
war cry in answer to which Mpondo and Gcaleka rushed in from the 
eastern bank of the Mbashe. They surrounded Chalmers who had 
considerable difficulty getting away from this situation. Ngangelizwe 
admitted that the son of Xelo, his Chief Councillor , had made a 
mistake in confiscating Xego's cattle, but although the latter was 
compensated, he refused to give up mission cattle. This episode 
embittered Ngangelizwe. He felt that Xego had been compensated, but 
not those Thembu on the mission station who had lost their cattle. 
Chalmers feared that Ngangelizwe was waiting for the opportune moment 
to take revenge. He also noted with concern that Mpondo raids on 
Thembu cattle occDred at times when friction between Sarhili and 
Ngangelizwe reached a zenith. He therefore had reason to believe that 
all these people were in an alliance against Ngangelizwe. 9 
A new round of trouble started when Mnqanqeni after having tried in 
vain to gain sanction from the Cape Government for his efforts to set 
up an independent chiefdom, left his abode at the Mbashe and settled 
with some followers nearer to the borders of Emigrant Thembuland. 10 
Among these followers was Mnqanqeni's brother, the ex-regent, Fadana. 
When Ngangelizwe, in an obvious attempt to strengthen his own 
position, invited neighbouring Mfengu to settle on the lands thus 
evacuated, his uncles objected, and turned towards the Mfengu Agent, 
Matthew Blyth, for interference on their behalf. Although Blyth did 
not approve of Ngangelizwe's invitation to the Mfengu, he had little 
sympathy with the rebel chiefs. Snubbed by Blyth, they took matters 
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into their own hands, and attacked the Mfengu. Ngangelizwe 
retaliated, and after a short and indecisive battle, Blyth was invited 
by both warring parties to act as mediator. Convinced that Sarhili 
was the instigator of the trouble, Blyth hoped to settle the 
Ngangelizwe-Mnqanqeni dispute once and for all. He therefore arranged 
a meeting with both chiefs, Mnqanqeni admitted guilt and promised to 
restore the cattle. Ngangelizwe, in return, modified his demands for 
the expulsion of Mnqanqeni from Thembuland, allowing him to stay on, 
but as a commoner. Mnqanqeni not intending to give up his 
chieftainship, raided cattle from Ngangelizwe's people that very same 
night. Thereafter he fled to Idutywa where he was sympathetically 
received by J. Cumming, the resident agent of the Reserve who, as it 
happened, distrusted Ngangelizwe. Cumming believed that Mnqanqeni 
had a just cause, having taken up the battle for "institutional 
government" against Ngangeliz~we's despotism. He also believed that 
Mnqanqeni was a friend of the Cape Colony and therefore needed support 
against Ngangelizwe. 11 Mnqanqeni's settlement in the Idutywa Reserve 
was bound to lead to further trouble. When Ngangelizqwe decided to 
remove his cattle from a camp near his uncle's new abode, he had to 
make use of a footpath through the Reserve. Cumming , having been 
warned by some informers that there was gOing to be a fi ght between 
the two chiefs, immediately ordered ten policemen to the trouble spot 
to prevent the Reserve people from becoming involved. These policemen 
confiscated the cattle as they were under the impression that 
Ngangelizwe had removed them illegally from Mnqanqeni's people. 
Ngangelizwe was enraged, and although his cattle were restored, the 
incident exacerbated the ill-feelings that had existed between the 
Idutywa people and the Thembu ever since the establishment of the 
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Reserve. 12 By that time mutual cattle-raiding had increased to such 
an extent that war seemed inevitable . 
While all these disputes were on the go, rumours regarding 
Ngangelizwe's ill-treatment of his wife, Nomkhafulo (Novili) added 
fuel to the smouldering fire. This ill-fated marriage had been 
arranged in 1866 by Sarhili, either in an attempt to secure a united 
Gcaleka-Thembu kingdom for a future grandson, or in the hope of 
lessening tension between the Gcaleka and their Thembu neighbours. As 
a diplomatic marriage it was a hopeless failure . In 1870 Novili fled 
back to Sarhili who claimed that she had been badly maimed by her 
husband. 13 As far as Sarhili was concerned this assault on his 
daughter possibly came at a propitious moment. For some time he seems 
to have had problems controlling the more militant faction among his 
people who wished to solve the land question by means of war. This 
was a risk he could not take as the Cape Colony would certainly have 
come to the aid of the Thembu. Now Ngangelizwe's behaviour provided 
him with a casus belli which even the Colonial Government would find 
justifiable. 
As the possibility of war increased official reports from the Transkei 
became contradictory and confusing. W. Cumming branded Ngangelizwe as 
the aggressor, and he believed that this chief had , through false 
accusations, bedevilled the relationship between the Cape Colony and 
both the Gcaleka and the Idutywa peoPle. 14 In Gcalekaland, where the 
relationship between W.R.D. Fynn,15 the Resident Magistrate, and 
Sarhili posed a problem, the former, not surprisingly , blamed Sarhili 
for having caused the unrest. He maintained that Sarh i li was acting 
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in an underhand way by professing to seek peace while at the same time 
encouraging his people to commit thefts. 16 Fynn was supported by 
Matthew Blyth, a confidant of Richard Southey. Blyth had apparently 
decided to manipulate the situation in the interests of the Cape 
Colony, and he believed that these interests could best be served by 
supporting Ngangelizwe. He advised the appointment of a commission of 
inquiry into the assault case, at the same time warning the Government 
that any weakening of Ngangelizwe would strengthen Sarhili. 17 
A special commission was appointed by Sir Henry Barkly to settle the 
lingering disputes. The three commissioners, Charles Griffith, James 
Ayliff and Inspector Grant failed to submit constructive proposals for 
the attainment of peace, but they recommended the extension of British 
control over the area: "The result of our inquiry, and observations 
during the time we have passed in Kaffirland," they wrote, "has served 
to convince us that the time for making a stride in that direction 
(i.e. extension of control) has now come.,,18 In Cape Town it was, 
however, felt that the time was not yet ripe for the implementation of 
the commissioner's findings. 19 
Sarhili had meanwhile reluctantly agreed to submit the assault case to 
Colonial arbitration. He was convinced that the Cape Government was 
biased in favour of Ngangelizwe, their "pet chief". As time went by, 
without the Government taking active steps to settle the case, he 
became increasingly suspicious of its impartiality, and he regarded 
the appointment of E. Chalmers as Resident to Ngangelizwe, as yet 
another attempt from Cape Town to strengthen the Government's ties 
with that chief. When Brownlee, then still commissioner to the 
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Ngqika, was sent on a peace mission, he found Sarhili's intransigent 
att i tude an obstacle in the way of a satisfactory settlement. Sarhili 
insisted that it would be humiliating for him "not to accept blood" as 
compensation for the assault on his daughter. This led Brownlee to 
the conclusion that Sarhili wanted war since the outcome would enable 
him to occupy a part of Mnqanqeni's country. At the same time he 
accepted as genuine Ngangelizwe's wish to make atonement. This, he 
realized, was certainly not because the Thembu king was not equally 
keen to make war on the Gcaleka, but because he was afraid of the 
Cape Goverment. 20 From Balfour, Abercrombie-Smith, though admitting 
that Ngangelizwe had behaved shamefully, nevertheless expressed the 
opinion that Sarhili was trying to make capital out of this dispute, 
since his heart's desire was to get more land. At an earlier meeting 
with Smith, Sarhili had complained that he had been waiting for nine 
months for an answer from the Cape Government, and he had threatened 
to take the matter into his own hands. 21 
The case was settled in April 1871 when Ngangelizwe was fined forty 
head of cattle. By this time the dispute had become too complicated 
to be solved. It was clear that if Ngangelizwe were to pay the fine. 
and his wife was not returned , he would claim the dowry, in which case 
Sarhili would set up a counter claim. Moreover, Sarhili regarded 
Ngangelizwe's crime as unpardonable and the forty head of cattle did 
not satisfy him. Reports that he was "biding his time" seem to have 
been correct. Meanwhile, assuming the role of peace-maker , he sent a 
message through Fynn to Ngangelizwe , in which he stated that he had no 
desire to go to war on the Thembu ; that he would put an end to catt le 
raiding by his people; and that he was willing to settle their 
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disputes once and for all. Ngangelizwe's answer was less amenable. 
He listed many grievances, referring amonst others to the 
confiscation, during the Xego-Xelo affair , of Thembu cattle which 
had not yet been returned. 22 And so, despite all attempts by the 
agents to restore some kind of peace, the years 1871 - 1872 saw a 
rapid deterioration in the relationship between the two chiefs with an 
increase in mutual cattle raiding. There was also increasing excite-
ment in the Reserve. Cumming complained in August 1872 that stock 
raided from the Reserve had been seen in Thembuland, but that the 
Thembu were so hostile that the Idutywa people would not dare to cross 
the border to recapture their property . Cumming accused the Thembu of 
having held a meeting in the presence of Chalmers, where they spoke 
openly of their desire to attack the Reserve peoPle. 23 Chalmers 
immediately refuted all such allegations . He, in turn, assured the 
Government of Ngangelizwe's goodwill towards the Reserve people and 
his continued efforts to stop cattle raiding . 24 In this situation 
where emotions had become so tense that the least provocations could 
spark off a war, Chalmers injudiciously allowed Ngangelizwe to 
accompany him incognito when he took a surveyor to Bomvanaland to 
investigate the Thembu- Gca leka border dispute. 25 
During this visit to the troubled area a meeting between Chalmers and 
Moni ended on an unsatisfactory note. Moni emphasised that he was an 
independent chief who , although living on Thembu lands. acknowledged 
Sarh i li's paramountcy. He refused to discuss the possibility of 
recognizing Ngangelizwe's authority should the disputed lands east of 
the Mbashe be awarded to the Thembu. Meanwh i le somebody had 
recognized Ngangelizwe, and the news of his presence at the meeting 
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was greeted with dismay by Sarhili, who was now more convinced than 
ever that he could not rel y upon the Cape Colony's impartiality. In 
the next couple of months, various incidents strengthened his 
suspicions. When in 1871 there was trouble between Moni and a 
subordinate chief, Mtatla, Chalmers ignored the fact that the border 
dispute that led to the disagreement was still under investigation, 
and claimed the right for either himself or Ngangelizwe to be 
consulted should the problem not soon be solved. On top of all this 
it became known that Ngangelizwe was planning a second trip to the 
sea. 26 This never took place as he wanted to take more men with him 
than Chalmers thought advisable. 27 Ngangelizwe's motives in planning 
these visits to Bomvanaland remain a mystery, but it seems reasonab le 
to assume that, having been accompanied by a government agent, he 
hoped to impress Moni. Sarhili, still harbouring grudges because of 
what he felt had been an unsatisfactory settlement of the assault 
case, was justified in assuming that Ngangelizwe had undertaken these 
trips in an attempt to establish his authority over Bomvanaland. He 
was now more convinced than ever that the Bomvanaland dispute would 
not be settled in his favour, and since land was at the root of all 
disputes, war became inevitable. It broke out in October 1872. 
The war was short and ended in disaster for the Thembu. Sarhili took 
up a position just beyond the Mbashe, in Moni's country, on a peculiar 
spot which formed a sort of basin with a number of thickly wooded 
kloofs leading away from it . Ngangelizwe attacked Sarhili there with 
five divisions, of which the centre division was to make a feint 
attack upon the centre of the kloof, so as to provoke Sarhili, after 
which the right and left armies were to close in from the rear. The 
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left division attacked prematurely and met with fierce opposition. 
When this division was forced to give way, a general retreat of the 
Thembu armies followed, during which the entire left division was 
wiped out. A feature of this battle was the astonishing number of 
fire-arms used by the warring parties , especially the Thembu . 28 
The news that Ngangelizwe was hemmed in caused great commotion among 
the Mfengu who, but for Blyth, would have rushed to the aid of the 
victorious Gcaleka. 29 Sarhili followed up his success by sweeping 
through Thembuland, burning huts as far as he went and sowing panic 
among the Thembu . Ngangelizwe's chief councillor sought refuge in 
Emigrant Thembuland. Ngangelizwe himself , his Great Place having been 
burnt down , fled to Chalmers, who received him sympathetically, and 
justified Thembu participation in the war as though Ngangelizwe had 
only acted in self-defence. 30 In a moment of panic Ngangelizwe 
asked that his country should be taken over by the British Government 
as he had no hope of retaining it against onslaughts by his 
surrounding enemies. Chalmers, acting with conSiderable foresight, 
proposed that the matter should be postponed for a week so as to give 
the Thembu chiefs the opportunity to express their oPinions. 31 When 
the matter was raised during the investigations led by the Judge 
Commission , most chiefs objected to Ngangelizwe's request. The 
Paramount himself withdrew his request when he realized that by 
implication it would mean the complete loss of his jurisdiction over 
his tribe. 32 The vulnerability and military weakness of the Thembu, 
illustrated by their ignominious defeat, nevertheless called for 
interference by the Cape Government, which could not stand aloof while 
Sarhili was strengthening himself at the cost of the Colony's 
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potential ally. Although it was officially stated at the time that 
Hargreaves had persuaded Sarhili. after his victory. to withdraw from 
Thembuland. 33 Brownlee was secretly convinced that the Gcaleka were 
overaw~ed by the presence of a police force concentrated at the Bram 
Neck. 34 
Although Peace was nominally restored. the Thembu~Gcaleka disputes 
were by no means resolved; in fact the activities of Colonial 
officials in the post-war years led to increased tension. The members 
of the Judge-Edmonstone Commission. far from having tr ied to find a 
workable solution to the Bomvana land dispute. emphasised the 
expediency of maintaining two antagonistic blocs in the Transkei. On 
their own admission they made no attempt to bring the two chiefs 
together. as they t hought it the "worst policy possible" to encourage 
amicable relat ionships. Their report further emphasised that nothing 
should be done to weaken Ngangelizwe. In laying down guide lines as to 
future Cape Colonial policies. they advised: "It is of the greatest 
importance to the Government of the Colony that Ngangelizwe's 
weaknesses and silly disputes should not destroy him. He had always 
been a faithful ally to the Colony and every opportunity should be 
used to assist hi m in the improvement of his government and of 
checking his exerci se of despotic power in that country and. if 
possible. land unoccupied should be filled by colonial Tambookies. 
This would restore the balance of power in the Transkei and with 
Mfenguland and Idutywa in good order. the Government could dictate its 
terms to surrounding tribes". As for the Bomvanaland dispute. the 
Judge Commission admitted that Ngangelizwe had no claim to the 
territory. but they warned at the same time that Sarhili's claims 
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should also be rejected. 35 
The sentiments expressed in this report were echoed by C.D. Griffith, 
ex-magistrate of Queenstown and at the time Government Agent to 
Moshoeshoe . He impressed upon the Government that "the Tambookies 
have always been looked upon by the other Kafirs as Government people, 
and now it will be said that Kreli had beaten Government, and I am 
afraid it will have a very bad effect on the whole of Kafirland." 
With reference to the positive part played by the Thembu in the 
campaign against Sarhili in 1858 he concluded: "I consider the Thembu 
to be our own allies and that by accepting their serv ices in the way 
above mentioned, we morally bound ourselves by an offensive and 
defensive treaty as binding as any written document made by the three 
Emperors now at 8erlin. 36 I have no hesitat ion in saying that we are 
bound by every principle of honour and justice to see Ngangelizwe and 
his Tambookies are not deprived of an inch of ground. If Kreli is 
allowed to do so, then as far as any intercourse with natives in 
Kafirland is concerned, it will cease, and I shall even be ashamed to 
call myself an Englishman - to have been loyal to the British 
Government will be synonomous, in the eyes of the natives, to be 
called a fool". 37 
While still at work, the Commission already warned the Cape Government 
that Sarhili's defiant conduct could provoke another Thembu-Gcaleka 
war. Brownlee was consequently asked to proceed to the Transkei for 
the purpose of bringing about peace. 
On hi s arrival in the Transkei, Brownlee found both chiefs in a sulky 
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mood. Sarhili made no secret of his misgivings regarding the 
Government ' s impartiality in the Thembu-Gcaleka dispute. The previous 
year Brownlee had re jected his request to be allowed to take 
possession of the lands that he had conquered from the Thembu in 1872 , 
or, as an alterantive , to demand a thousand cattle from the Thembu as 
war indemnity . He now accused Brownlee of having "screened" 
Ngangelizwe, and he maintained that if he, (Sarhili) had been the 
aggressor, he would have been punished. His renewed demand at his 
meeting with Brownlee, for the territory conquered from the Thembu in 
the 1872 war was once again brushed aside , and Brownlee warned him to 
be careful lest he find himself once again a fugitive, as he had been 
in 1858 when he had been expelled from his land for his part in the 
cattle-killing. By this time Sarhili must have realized that only 
another war could bring him the land he needed and desired. 
Ngangelizwe, who hoped that he would have been compensated for his 
long friendship with the Colony, was dismayed to learn that his right 
over Bomvanaland would under no circumstances be recognized. 
Brownlee's visit had therefore merely served to accentuate the ill-
feelings that still existed between the chiefs. With the land issue 
unresolved, the fertile Nechana Valley, which Sarhili claimed by right 
of conquest, became the most hotly disputed area. 
The war of 1872 had proved that the Cape Colony's policy of non-
intervention would no longer work. This Brownlee made clear in his 
report of 1873 : "Our first object is the protection of our frontier 
districts from violence and disturbance ... With the chiefs beyond our 
borders there should be no unnecessary interference, and interference 
should be resorted to only under circumstances when the peace and 
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tranquility of our borders are endangered by the acts of our 
neighbours, and when their actions are clearly detrimental to the 
interests and welfare of the Colony . While laying it down as a fixed 
principle that interference with matters beyond our borders is to be 
avoided, there are cases, however, which force themselves on us which 
we cannot disregard ... There are weak tribes imploring our protec-
tion.38 In a confidential letter to the Governor he admitted: "Not 
the tribe, but Ngangelizwe himself is our weak spot in the Transkei. 39 
In his instructions to W. Wright, who in 1873 succeeded Chalmers as 
Resident to Ngangeli zwe, Brownlee explained the new direction his 
policy had taken, more clearly. Wright was instructed to make the most 
strenuous effort to maintain a good understanding with the Thembu , 
detaching them and keeping them separate from any scheme which might 
endanger the peace in Thembuland, and more especially the peace with 
the Cape Colony. Furthermore, it was emphasised that he should seek 
to gain such an influence over the chiefs as in course of time would 
enable him to exercise a beneficial control over the internal affairs 
of the tribe. 40 In an "entirely private" letter he went much 
further. In li ne with the policy of divide-and-rule he advised Wright 
to cultivate the friendship of the semi - independent chiefs Oalasile 
and Mgudhlwa. The former resented Ngangelizwe ' s actions which had 
plunged the Thembu in 1872 into war. It was also Oalasile who 
overruled Ngangelizwe's proposal that the Thembu should be placed 
under British rule . Incidents like these, Brownlee told the Resident 
Agent , should be used "to obtain such an influence as to be able to 
bring pressure on Ngangelizwe's authority and bring him more directly 
under your influence. 41 
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That Brownlee was by this time already thinking in the direction of 
British expansionism across the Ke i , is borne out by views he 
expressed in a 
that Gatberg42 
confidential letter to Sir Henry Barkly. He suggested 
should become "a strong advanced post, from which we 
can gradually extend our influence and protection to such tribes as 
desire it ... overawe the Pondos, support the Tambookies and Umhlonhlo, 
and prevent any combination for evil between the Amapondas and 
Kreli. .. " In this way he hoped that eventually the influence of the 
Cape Government could be extended over Nata l. He assured the Governor 
that "the main motive is to mainta in peace on our borders.,,43 
Brownlee certainly would have preferred to extend Colonial contro l 
over Thembuland immediately, but he could do so only should a request 
for such i ntervention come from the Thembu themselves. When 
Ngangelizwe tried to solicit Colonial aid in settling his long-
standing di spute with the Mpondo, he was informed, through his agent, 
that the Thembu could not, as a matter of right, cla im Cape Colonial 
protection. Should they, however, require such support they could, 
like the Sotho and other tribes, place themselves under the Cape 
Government, and if their submission was to be accepted, they could 
then claim protection as British subjects. 44 When Ngangelizwe 
defaulted by not restoring Mpondo cattle raided by his people, 
Brownlee issued a stern warning to him in which he was reminded of his 
vulnerability: "For you are surrounded Chief, upon all sides, with 
powerful tribes who are all your enemies. The Government is trying to 
befriend you. But it will not be able to do so if you allow your 
people to make raids without your authority ... And you cannot help 
knowing from your past experience that your enemies are on every side, 
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and that they are too many and too strong for you.,,45 
Brownlee's somewhat cautious approach became more dynamic after 1874. 
following the return to power of Disraeli's Conservative Party in 
Britain. The Prime Minister's appointment of Lord Carnavon as 
.fbi f.t...v 
Secretary of, . State : " Colonies. was seen as a confirmation of the 
expansionist trend in the Government's po licy.46 Confident then. that 
there would be no interference from Whitehall. official letters from 
1875 onwards reflect an increasing tendency on the part of the Cape 
Government to interfere in Transkeian affairs. 
Therefore when Sarhil i and Ngangelizwe both laid claim to the Nechana 
Valley. we may well be justified in suspecting that it was the 
attitude of the Cape Government that exacerbated the issue. Sarh il i. 
fearing Colonial retribution. was rendered impotent; he could no 
longer settle the matter in the traditional manner through raiding 
cattle or waging limited warfare. Ngangelizwe. on the other hand. was 
reminded by the Secretary for Native Affairs. through the Thembu 
Agent . of his indebtedness to the power which had helped him t o 
maintain his independence against Sarhili at a t ime when he was facing 
defeat. The matter seems to have been further complicated by the fact 
that each paramount might have become aware. not only of the advantage 
of appealing to the Cape Government against the other. but also of 
capitalizing on events which seemed likely to result in an outcome 
favourable to his interests. This is exactly what happened in 1875. 
Sarhili at this stage was faced with the realization that only some 
astute diplomatic manoeuvre on his part could bring about a settlement 
of the Nechana dispute that would be favourable to the Gcaleka . The 
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opportunity he needed presented itself when rumours regarding the ill-
treatment and, subsequently, the death of his niece, Nongxokozelo, 
started to circulate. 47 
When Novili married Ngangelizwe, NongxoKozelo accompanied her to 
Thembuland, and she remained behind as Ngangelizwe's concubine after 
Novili returned to her father. NongxoKozelo had been forgotten for 
almost three years; but on 17 March 1875 Sarhili requested that she 
should return home as it had been some time since her friends had last 
seen her. In response to repeated requests, Ngangelizwe gave evasive 
replies. In May it was rumoured that she was actually dead. Sarhili, 
still unable to obtain a satisfactory response from Ngangelizwe, now 
formally handed over the matter to Ayliff and asked for a governmental 
enquiry. On 27 July Ngangelizwe reported that the woman was ill, and 
on the 29th he reported her death. Sarhili reacted by saying that the 
matter was in the hands of the Cape Government to whom he looked for 
an impartial judgement. 
The satisfactory settlement of this case was of the utmost importance 
to the Cape Colony, and Brownlee immediately took matters in hand. In 
a detailed letter to the Colonial Secretary he outlined the strategy 
to be followed. The matter could either be left for the chiefs to 
settle t hemselves - which Sarhili would have preferred - or be settled 
by the Government, which Brownlee presumed Ngangelizwe would have 
preferred. He warned that should the first course be followed, there 
was a possibility of the Thembu being attacked and defeated, the 
consequence of which would be the proportionate strengthening of the 
Gcaleka - a development which had to be prevented at all costs. He 
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therefore advised that the Cape Government take immed iate action, 
without prior consultation with Ngangelizwe . Only after the 
appointment of a commission should Ngangelizwe be informed that 
Sarhili had referred the matter to the Government, and his consent to 
have the matter settled by arbitration be obtained, together with a 
promise that he would abide by whatever decision was taken. Brownlee 
did not foresee any problems . Ngange lizwe, threatened by the Gcaleka , 
and conscious of the possible withdrawal of Colonial support in the 
event of his non-compliance, presumably would abide by any decision. 
Finally, Brownlee warned that there was one possib le comp lication, not 
likely to arise, but which nevertheless had to be considered: 
Ngangelizwe could refuse to submit to any investigation, and could 
endeavour to obtain a settlement simply by asserting his innocence. 
Here Brownlee held the trump card. Should such a comp li cation ar i se, 
a detachment of the F. A.M.P. would be sent to the Umgwali river. 
This, besides overawing Ngangelizwe, would have the further effect of 
keeping all parties quiet until the matter was fin ally sett led. 48 
A show of force was not immediately necessary . Ngangelizwe agreed to 
Colonial arbi tration and W. Wright and W. Ayliff were appointed to 
investigate the matter. Their final verdict was that Ngangelizwe, 
smarting under disgrace of his defeat in 1872, had vented his rage on 
Sarhili's niece. He had thrashed her on the head until she was all 
but dead, then forced her in a crippled state to attend him at a beer-
drinking. After their return he sent two young men to force her from 
her hut and beat her to death. The Commission also pOinted out that 
there had, for a long time, been ill-feeling between Ngangelizwe and 
Sarhili as a result of Ngangelizwe's acts, which, if unchecked, would 
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involve the whole country in war. 49 The report was submitted to 
Brownlee who f ined Ngangelizwe two hundred head of cattle, to be paid, 
not by his people, but in his personal capacity, to Sarhili. 50 
Even before the Commis sion gave its verdict , both Brownlee and Sir 
Henry Barkly, had stressed the desirability of bringing the Thembu 
under the direct rule of the Cape COlony,51 but they had to bide their 
time. Under these circumstances Brownlee now embarked upon a po licy 
of direct interference in Thembuland. Four years earlier, during the 
Mnqanqeni dispute, the Cape Government had been adamant that it would 
not interfere in the disputes between Ngange li zwe and a subordinate 
chief. 52 Now, when in 1875, a dispute arose between Ngangelizwe and 
the Mfengu chief, Menziwe, Brownlee did not hesitate to interfere. 
Menziwe had, many years earlier, sought refuge in Thembuland where he 
lived as a loyal subject. In the war of 1872 he fought on 
Ngangelizwe 's side, but, disgusted with t he Nongxokozelo affair, he 
informed Ngangelizwe that he would stay neutral should another war 
arise out of the murder. When Ngangelizwe threatened to take revenge. 
Menziwe fled to t he Idutywa Reserve where he dispelled all rumours 
that Nongxokozelo had died of ill-health. The lands from which 
Menziwe fled formed a buffer between Sarh ili and Ngangelizwe, and 
Brownlee , for defence reasons, supported the chief when he wished to 
return. Ngangelizwe who fo rbade Menziwe to re-occupy these lands, was 
warned by Brownlee that he had no right to expel a chief from a 
count ry that was held by the Government's favour without reference to 
that Government. "Hitherto," Brownlee told Ngangelizwe, "we have not 
interfered in the i nterna I affa i rs of your tri be, ,,53 thereby 
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indicating that a new phase in Thembu-Cape Colonial relationships had 
started. In fulfilment of his promise to protect Menziwe once he was 
resettled, against reprisals from Ngangelizwe, a detachment of the 
F.A.M.P. under Captain J.H. Bowker was sent to Thembuland. 54 The 
presence of a police force had a decisive influence on the further 
developments in Thembuland. 
Sarhili who was intensely disappointed that the Nongxokozelo case had 
not resulted in any territorial gains for him, but instead had only 
brought cattle - which he considered to be inadequate compensation 
expressed his disappointment in no uncertain terms. 55 It was only 
in December, certainly influenced by the presence of the police force, 
that he final ly notified his agent that he would accept the cattle. 56 
He was further distressed when a number of cattle died of 
lungsickness on their way to Gcalekaland. 57 Meanwhile there were 
constant rumours that he was preparing for an invasion into 
Thembuland. 
Co.,- ,dW .... Q.u..tko..,if'es h"/~.,( 
Aware of Ngangelizwe's vulnerability, it -was -hOfJeeJ if! €ape-Tewn that 
the time had come when the Thembu paramount would be compelled to seek 
protect ion. J. Rose-Innes, the Civil Commissioner and Resident 
Magistrate at King William's Town, assured Wright that any request by 
the Thembu to be taken over would be favourably received by the Cape 
Government . 58 
The local news media pressed for even more decisive steps. 
Criticizing what they regarded as inadequate punishment for 
Ngangelizwe's brutalities, the Daily News advocated t he annexation of 
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the whole country between the Kei and Natal, in which case proper 
magistrates and a proper police force could be set up and the new 
subjects could then be subjected to a system of taxation. 59 
Ngangelizwe found himself in a situation that he could no longer 
handle. The Gcaleka threat had not yet receded, and he could no 
longer rely on Colonial support in the event of another war. He was 
furthermore overawed by the presence of a police force which was 
placed in a strategic position to act swiftly in case of Thembu 
resistance. To add to his problems, he found the support of many of 
his chiefs wavering. They showed their disapproval of his actions by 
refusing to pay fines imposed on them, and by staying away from 
meetings. There were rumours that some of them were contemplating 
pl acing themselves under Colonial rule. In his distress, Ngangelizwe 
turned towards Hargreaves who advised him to accept British rule. 
Ngangelizwe agreed and on his request Hargreaves drew up some 
conditions which were shortly afterwards shown to S.A. Probart, the 
M.L.A. for Graaff-Reinet, who was then on his way to Kokstad. 
Probart proposed some amendments. These conditions were taken by 
Hargreaves to Clarkebury where they were accepted by the Thembu at a 
large meeting. 50 Dalasile and Sitokwe Tyali were the only chi efs who 
refused to attend the meeting. 
The Clarkebury meeting was held in the presence of Capt. J.H. Bowker 
who had for a long time been propagating the annexation of Transkeian 
territories, and who saw in the existing situation a perfect 
opportunity for the fulfilment of his expansionist ideals. What 
followed is a very good example of policy being made by the man 
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on the spot. It transpired later that the Clarkebury agreement was 
far too liberal for Bowker's liking. It is not clear whether he later 
intentionally gave the Colonial Secretary the wrong impression. but 
his summary of the Clarkebury agreement was interpreted in Cape Town 
as meaning that the Thembu should be administered by a system of 
government similar to that in Mfenguland. By implication. the chiefs 
would have lost their power. As a step towards preparing the way for 
Colonial control over Thembuland. he suggested that Ngangelizwe should 
be deposed and replaced by his son together with his mother. Sarhili' s 
daughter. who would in turn be placed under the care of the Thembu 
Agent. This, he said. would satisfy Sarhili. and put an end to 
"pol it i ca I i ntri gue" . 61 The Government's rep Iy to Bowker was in 
accordance with the assumption that Ngangelizwe would cease to have 
any power. 62 This was a deviation from the Clarkebury agreement. but 
Bowker lost no opportunity in assembling the chiefs and informing them 
accordingly. Walter Stanford disapprovingly wrote to Judge that "Mr 
Bowker deposed Ngangelizwe that day.,,63 
Mistaking silence as a sign of agreement. as was so often the case in 
European-African dealings. Bowker hurried on with his plans. He sent 
messages to Dalasile and Sitokwe Tyali. the two chiefs who remained 
aloof. to inform them of the Government's decisions. and rather 
brusquely asked them what they had to say on the matter. In time 
these two chiefs had little option but to agree to their being taken 
over by the Government. Meanwhile S.A. Probart. M.L.A. for Graaff-
Reinet. was appointed as special commissioner to proceed to the 
Transkei to arrange t he take-over. 64 On his arrival he found that 
Bowker had already informed the Thembu that their country was to be 
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taken over as British territory, and that Ngangelizwe's authority 
would cease in every way. Bowker was justified in boasting that he 
had annexed Thembuland on his own, thereby having secured for his 
government a coastline of twenty miles containing almost inexhaustible 
forests and valuable timber with rich pasturage and good wagon roads. 
Like Bowker, Probart was aware of the economic advantages that 
annexation would have for the Cape Colony. In addition to the rich 
agricultural and pastoral possibilities of the country with its 
ade,u4{~ rainfall, considerable revenue could be obtained from the 
population and an abundant supply of labour could be siphoned towards 
the Colony. It would seem that in their haste to get hold of this 
valuable territory, there was little time for other considerations. 
Probart acted in a great hurry. He met the assembled chiefs on 4 
December 1875, and he announced that the conditions, as agreed upon at 
Clarkebury, were accepted, but that Ngangelizwe , owing to his bad 
behaviour, would be deprived of all authority. He added that it would 
depend on his behav iou r whether he was to be reinstated. Probart 
further submitted a proposal to the Cape Government for the division 
of Thembuland into four judicial districts: Emyanyani whose 
magistrate, W. Wright, had the additional authority of Chief 
Magistrate for Thembuland Proper, Engcobo with W.C. Stanford as 
Magistrate, Umtata under J.F. Boyes, and Mqanduli, under the Rev. John 
Scott. Probart's conditions were accepted in Cape Town. Government 
officials, however, did not only la ck an understanding of the exact 
conditions under which the Thembu submitted to Colonial rule, but in 
believing that the Thembu had voluntarily accepted the deposition of 
Ngangelizwe, they deluded themselves about realities. The following 
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extract from Sihele's account of the events of 1875 reveals something 
of the feeling of indignation and shame of having been betrayed , 
experienced by the Thembu at the time: 
"The whites constantly enquired from abaThembu as to what 
the position of amaGcaleka was. Then (the whites) would 
remind them (abaThembu) that they had long advised them to 
hand over their country to the government because Sarhili 
was coming. While amaThembu was still confused, not knowing 
which way to go, the government quickly posted its regiments 
allover Thembuland, under the pretext that the regiments 
were for their protection, and at the same time telling 
abaThembu tha t they should submit on their own terms. It 
was at that time, and under those circumstances of white 
regiments that abaThembu gave in and started drawing up 
stipulations of agreement of submission to the government. 
The prime mover in the whole Agreement was Hagile 
(Hargreaves) who repeatedly said, 'just remember this, we 
are at your service. You must say that it is you who are 
asking to be put under the wing of the government. Sarhili 
will confiscate your land. All this army you see has come 
to your aid.' Oh what a pity about the abaThembu who read 
no newspapers and who were also ignorant of the trickery of 
the whites ... the Thembu saw the advice given by the servant 
of God as being a sound one ... the outcome of the meeting was 
the acceptance by the government representative of a request 
by abaThembu that they be put under the wing of Queen 
Victoria .. . the Regiments of the government were then 
withdrawn having obtained what had been so strongly desired 
- the incorporation of abaThembu under the wing of the 
government Withggt shedding blood, since they were allies of 
the government. 
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Emigrant Thembuland 
When the four chiefs, Matanzima, Gecelo, Ndarala and Sitokwe Ndlele, 
settled in Emigrant Thembuland in 1865, the understanding was that 
they would be independent. 
E.J. Warner, the first Thembu Agent, gave the following account of the 
attitude of the people in 1872: "One great idea of chief and people 
is to be on friendly terms with us and be called government people. 
They find it much more to their advantage, especially the common 
people, to be in this position than to be in an entirely independent 
state. But they have no desire to be annexed to the Colony, and any 
such attempts will create distrust. When they removed to this country 
the inducement was held out that in doing so they would avoid being 
subject to colonial law , hut taxes, etc. They have no objection to 
being under immediate and direct control of the Governor as High 
Commissioner, but they have a dread of colonial law and tax-paying. 
And it is my opinion that rather than (to) submit to these they would 
give up their present advantage under government, and prefer being 
left to themselves as independent tribes." Warner's own feelings were 
that it would be more advantageous to the Cape Government if Emigrant 
Thembuland could be annexed to the Colony, but as it was not yet 
possible, he thought the position they held was satisfactory. "We are 
gradually gaining more control over these people. The Government 
officer is looked up to by them as Paramount Chief, and by judicious 
management, laws and regulations suitable to their condition can be 
gradually introduced from time to time without creating bad feeling 
with either chiefs or peoPle.,,66 
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Although Sir Philip Wodehouse had in 1865 officially declared that it 
was the intended policy of the Cape Government to relinquish all 
rights and sovereignty over the territory between the Kei and the 
Mbashe rivers, it had, in fact, assumed certain powers over Emigrant 
Thembuland. The problem was that the position of the chiefs had not 
been clarified at the time of the Emigration. It is true that they 
were promised the right to settle all cases in their respective 
territories, and the position of the Thembu Agent was to be that of a 
diplomatic agent. 67 Yet, when E.J. Warner tried in 1870 to establish 
whether he was acting in accordance with the Government's wishes in 
exercising authority over the Emigrants, or whether he had nothing to 
do with the internal affairs of the country , he was informed that the 
Government would have no objection to his continuing a wholesome 
influence and control as far as the people were willing to submit to 
his doing so.68 During his whole term of office he tried in vain to 
find a satisfactory answer concerning his exact powers and duties, and 
when he retired in 1874 to return to missionary work. he could not 
hand any written instructions to his successor . W. Fynn, as to the 
administration of the territory. In the absence of any clear guide-
lines, the distinction between advice and interference soon became 
blurred. 
The extent to which Fynn actively interfered in the internal affairs 
of the Emigrant chiefs can be seen in two events that took place in 
1874. The first concerned the Vundhli chief, Kosana. Kosana's people 
actually lived in Ngangelizwe's country under the authority of Sitokwe 
Tyali, but the chief himself had settled in Emigrant Thembuland. 
Successive agents had found themselves unable to gauge his attitude 
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towards the Colonial Government. At one stage he was rewarded for his 
good conduct by being acknowledged as chief. but in 1874 Fynn found 
his behaviour troublesome enough to deprive him of his chieftainship. 
He and his people were henceforth to come directly under the control 
of the Cape Government. Gecelo then claimed that Kosana's followers 
were his subjects. 59 It would seem that Gecelo had justifiable 
grounds for his claim,70 but Fynn, without any investigation, denied 
this and told Gecelo that "it was not for him to prevent any chief or 
people from coming under the government.,,71 This certainly was a 
negation of a chief's control over his own people. and it caused 
bitter resentment. 
The second incident also concerned Gecelo. For a long time there had 
been disputes between Gecelo and the Qwati chief, Sitokwe Ndlele, and 
in 1874 they fought each other. As they were independent chiefs, they 
certainly had reason to be disgruntled by the actions of Fynn, who 
interfered and fined each one fifty head of cattle for going to war 
"on Government land". This, Fynn hoped, would convince all the chiefs 
that "Government is not to be tri fl ed wi th" . 72 Fynn had further 
exceeded his powers by taking Sinquanqati, Matanzima's younger brother 
with him when he visited the chiefs. Sinquanqati had no authority 
whatsoever, but he received a portion of the fine. 73 This strange 
behaviour on Fynn's part, can only be explained in terms of his 
apprehension of Matanzima's increasing influence in Emigrant 
Thembuland, and he probably spotted in Sinquanqati a like I y 
counterweight. 74 Matanzima's protests led to an investigation by 
Brownlee and to Fynn's subsequent dismissal from office. Brownlee 
accused him of having actively encouraged Sinquanqati in his 
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subordination to Matanzima; of having illegally deprived Matanzima of 
part of his income from traders' licenses, and of having undermined 
Matanzima's authority by encouraging his people not to pay the fines 
rightfully imposed upon them. Fynn was succeeded by Charles Levey 
whose term of office coincided with the take-over of Ngangelizwe's 
country. 
Encouraged by what was rega rded as the successful dealings with 
Thembuland Proper in 1875, the Cape Government pressed forward, and 
extended its influence over Emigrant Thembuland as well. Without any 
prior consultation with the chiefs, it was decided that this territory 
was to be divided into two judic ial districts, Southeyville and 
Xalanga, under magistrates Levey and Cumming respectively, and that 
these two magistracies were to be included in the Chief Magistracy.75 
Although Emigrant Thembuland was not legally annexed to the Cape 
Colony, the chiefs had now, for all practical purposes, lost their 
authority . Both Levey and Cumming assumed powers that were hardly 
compatible with the rights and powers that were promised to these 
chiefs at the time of the Emigration. 
Charles Levey , frankly admitted that he had at times ~~eeded his 
powers. He described his magisterial duties as judicial, po l itical 
and diplomatic. Although he did not consider his judicial authority 
to be legal , he felt himself obliged, in his capacity as magistrate. 
to assume such duties in the interests of the more "advanced" people 
who, he feared, would otherwise leave the country. "The actual 
position I am justified in assuming", he replied to a questionnaire. 
"is Diplomatic Agent. The chiefs under my charge are really 
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independent. ,,76 A devoted disciple of Sir George Grey, Levey was an 
implacable opponent of traditional chieftainship which he regarded as 
the greatest stumbling block to progress and "c ivilization". His 
administration was characterized by attempts to curb the influence of 
the chiefs. One effective way in which this could have been done was 
by the appointment of paid headmen, a policy that had been followed 
since 1865 in Emigrant Thembuland. Sir Richard Southey believed that 
this was the key to efficient management. "I fancy," he once advised 
Warner, "if I were in your position and Cobbe's I should frequently, 
at stated periods, assemble all the paid men. say once a quarter. and 
have long talks with them. I should endeavour to let them see and 
feel that they get the money from me, and that if they did not do what 
I thought right they might lose it, and I would tell them what I think 
right and ... I fancy I could obtain such an influence among them as 
would enable me to do almost anything with them. At any rate I think 
this is the right thing.,,77 Southey's judgement proved to be 
correct. Headmen paid by the Cape Government were useful in detecting 
and recovering stolen property, especially as there were no policemen 
in the Transkeian Territory. E. Warner, during his term of office 
would have liked the number of headmen to be increased, but initially 
the Cape Government could not increase the expenditure beyond the 
payment of three headmen , two petty chiefs and four principal chiefs. 
From time to time new appointments were made, often for political 
reasons. In May 1876 Levey decided that Kosana, who was by then back 
in favour, should receive a second class chief's allowance as he could 
put a check on Sitokwe Tyali's ambitions, and "to show others that the 
Government will support loyal men . 78 In December , when Sitokwe 
Ndlela was accused of misbehaviour, Levey recommended that his chief 
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councillor, Mankeyi, a man of good Christian influence. should be made 
independent of Sitokwe and placed in the northern part of this chief's 
location. As this part was occupied by more westernized people, Levey 
hoped, by this arrangement, effectively to separate Gecelo and 
Sitokwe's people, 
qUarrelling. 79 
and thereby put an end to their constant 
Like Levey, W.G. Cumming, who became magistrate with Gecelo in 1878, 
had little regard for the rights of the chiefs. In his evidence before 
the Thembuland Land Commission, he referred to the Emigrant Thembu as 
semi-independent. They could try cases against their own people who 
had the right to appeal to the magistrate. 
magistrates could overr ide those of the chiefs. 
But decisions by 
The chiefs , in his 
opinion, did not have the right to grant land to anybody without the 
consent of the magistrate. What is remarkable about Cumming's 
evidence, is that he could not remember ever having received formal 
instructions on these very important issues, but rather that he was 
told what to do. 80 Even the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland had to 
confess in 1879 to ignorance of conditions in Emigrant Thembuland. 
"The Emigrant Thembu", he wrote, "are in a different position to the 
other natives of the District, in fact, I don't know to what position 
they are really entitled. They claim to be independent. ,,81 Yet 
Cumming's interference in land matters in Gecelo's country showed a 
complete disregard of the chiefs' authority.82 
The Cape Government was quite prepared to negate the 1865 agreement 
with the Emigrant chiefs who had no defence against such onslaughts on 
their power. This emerges very clearly from Elliot's attitude when. 
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after the war of 1881, renewed attempts were made to curb the 
influence of the chiefs. He then wrote to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs that, at the time of the Emigration , the conditions of 
settlement were traditional since there were no written records. The 
Government, he argued, had now fou nd it necessary to change t hese in 
order to meet the changing conditions of the Thembu themselves. 
Such "changed cond itions" meant that Colonial law was extended to 
Emigrant Thembuland, and that taxes were imposed upon its 
inhabitants. 83 What the chiefs dreaded had happened. Levey once 
wrote: It is a common saying with the people in my district: "u 
Rulumenti balekiti lamhlaba." (The Government has lent us the 
land.) Levey assumed, t hen , that the Emigrant Thembu looked upon th e 
land as a gift, i.e. not something to which they had a legi timate 
claim. 84 
In 1875 the "gift" was taken back. 
had been unilaterally abrogated. 
Another agreement with the Thembu 
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ii. Thembu Resistance to Colonial Control 
As the impact of Colonial control made itself felt throughout the 
Thembu territories, widespread discontent manifested itself. Unrest 
was not confined to the Thembu. The Gcaleka chief, Sarhili , resenting 
land settlements that had deprived him of territory to which he felt 
he had a rightful claim, appeared to be restless. Further afield 
there were similar signs of black discontent. In the Transvaal the 
Government was at loggerheads with Sekhuhuni's Pedi, while in Natal 
the awaken ing of Zulu power under Cetshwayo caused alarm. In the 
1870s fear of a black alliance against the white man was uppermost in 
the minds of frontier people, and this resulted in periodic "war 
scares" . In 1876 such a scare sowed panic on the frontier. Rumours 
inplicated both Sarhili and Ngangelizwe in a plot to overthrow the 
Government. The fact that the heir to the Thembu throne was Sarhili's 
grandson certainly gave credibility to speculations that the two 
chiefs had casted aside former differences and were in constant 
communication. 85 When the war scare started traders and white 
residents in Thembuland were uncertain of Ngangelizwe's attitude. 
While some took precautions by moving their fami lies to Clarkebury in 
anticipation of the outbreak for which - so the alarmists said - the 
date had already been fixed,86 others rejected the idea outright as 
absurd talk indulged in by Europeans. 87 Brownlee's visit to the 
Transkei, in an attempt to establish the true facts, confirmed the 
view of the non-al armists . He summarized the situation correctly when 
he ascribed Ngangelizwe's disaffection to his loss of power, which he 
was attempting to recover by resistance to white authority, rather 
than by invading the Colony. Brownlee found that Ngangelizwe was 
• 
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supported by his chiefs who, by then, had had time to reassess the 
step they had taken in accepting British control. They had now 
realized that such acceptance had jeopardized the whole institution 
of chiefta inship . Ngangelizwe was, after all, an independent chief 
who could not be deposed by an alien power.88 Although Brownlee was 
confident that the Thembu clans distrusted each other , and that lack 
of unity would prevent any concerted action, his tour of the 
Transkei did bring home the message that Thembu disaffection over 
Ngangelizwe's deposition could not be ignored. He was. however , 
hesitant to take immediate action. Although Wright, the Chief 
Magistrate, had reported favourably on the subject of Ngangelizwe's 
conduct, it could not be overlooked that i t was with the latter's 
connivance that war rumours had originated. His reinstatement, at 
this stage, would therefore have had a pernicious effect on the Thembu 
as war threats could in future be seen as a way of finding redress for 
grievances. 89 
But discontent among the Thembu went deeper than the deposition of 
Ngangelizwe. The magistrate's disregard of trad it ional systems of 
authority by consultation led to estrangement, and they found it 
increasingly difficult to carry out their judgements. They could rely 
neither on physical support from the Colony nor on the support of the 
black people. 90 Resentment was particularly strong in Ngangelizwe's 
country . This was borne out by general complaints which came from 
that area: "Every few miles we have magistrates placed among us. The 
old men are never consu lted with : we do not know whether those law 
talkers are for good or for evil ... We see now that it is too late - we 
are sold - we are slaves. We can't tell our minds to the white man, 
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he won't listen to us. He gets paid to come up here; he does it as a 
duty. He cares nothing for the good of this country: his mind is not 
here.,,91 The appointment of Xelo , Ngangelizwe's chief councillor. as 
public prosecutor and general adviser to W. Wright, was further seen 
as proof of Government indifference to the feelings of the ordinary 
peoPle. 92 Rumours that a tax on huts was to be introduced added to 
the general unrest. Therefore, when by the end of 1877 the Colon ial 
Thembu, as well as the Emigrant Thembu, joined the movement for the 
re-instatement of Ngangelizwe, which had by then al most developed into 
a resistance movement, Brownlee realized that the time had come for a 
more 
was 
conciliatory attitude; and, 
re-instated as chief over his 
in November 
section. 93 
1877, Ngangelizwe 
Although the main 
source of Thembu dissatisfaction had been removed, the war scare 
continued. 
In 1877 a new governor, Sir Bartle Frere , took responsibility for this 
situation. He was entrusted with the power to deal instantly and on 
his own discretion with the Africans. Frere's appointment underlined 
the expansionist trend in British policy, following the return to 
power of Disraeli, and the appointment of Lord Carnarvon as Colonial 
Secretary. The unresolved raci al conflicts in South Afri ca had 
convinced Carnarvon that the problems of the sub-continent could not 
be solved on a piecemeal basis, but only by the establishment of 
British sovereignty over Southern Africa. In his attempts to obtain 
this goal, Carnarvon was guided by two principles: the need for a 
strong central government for the whole of Southern Africa, and the 
restoration of peace and order as a pre-requisite for the successful 
amalgamation of the states. Carnarvon found in Sir Bartle a man whose 
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Victorian concepts of "the clear responsibility of sovereignty" and 
"the miss ion of the British people as an imperial and civilizing 
power", matched his own; hence his appointment, nominally as 
Governor, but really as "Statesman ... most capable of carrying out my 
(Carnarvon's) scheme in effect, and with the prospect of becoming the 
first governor-general of the South African dominions.,,94 Frere 
accepted his appointment in a spirit of great optimism. He saw his 
task as a dual one: the defence of the Colony against black 
invasions, and the promotion of the African people by the extension of 
British ru le, whereby they could be placed under a settled form of 
government. 95 He found on his arrival that, although t he war scare 
had to a certain extent subsided, white feelings were not reassured by 
a report · of the Defence Commission, appointed in 1876 under the 
chairmanship of Gordon Sprigg. The Commission's report emphasised the 
ineffectiveness of the defence system as well as pOinting out the 
stark possibility of a black coalition against the Colony. It further 
expressed indignation over the sale of arms to Africans and it adopted 
an implacable attitude towards the recognit ion of African law and 
constitutions in Black communities under Colonial control. 96 Before 
the Governor could make a proper assessment of these recommendations, 
he was summoned to the Eastern frontier where trouble was brewing. 
The explosive frontier situation was the result of a minor incident in 
Gcalekaland, when fighting broke out between Mfengu and Gcaleka guests 
at the wedding of the son of a Mfengu, Ngcayecibi. 97 The continued 
hosti li ty, after the brawl, extended into the Idutywa Reserve , with 
its large Mfengu population under Cumming's much-criticized 
administration. 98 Although Sarhili pleaded that the attacks by his 
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people upon the Mfengu had happened without his knowledge or sanct ion, 
the Cape authorities' distrust of the Gcaleka paramount, nurtured over 
many years, was too deep-rooted for them to believe in his innocence. 
William Ayliff, convinced that Sarhili was contemplating wa r on the 
Colony, advised the military occupation of Gcalekaland. 99 The 
Government furthermore saw in the Gcaleka-Mfengu conflict an ideal 
opportunity to cement their relationship with the Mfengu. Also, they 
had to convince the Idutywa people that Britain was prepared to 
protect her subjects. On Ayliff's advice, then, Brownlee sent troops 
to Butterworth, a step which further exacerbated Gcaleka -Mfengu 
feelings. 
Meanwhile Frere, accompanied by John X. Merriman , the Commissioner of 
Crown Lands, had arrived at the frontier. In the weeks to fo ll ow, 
their unfortunate delay in keeping Cape Town informed on frontier 
developments was interpreted by the Molteno Ministry as an attempt to 
conceal Sarhili's progress ; hence a decision was taken by the cabinet 
that the Governor should allow the despatch of the 88th reg iment to 
the frontier. 100 Frere, who regarded the whole problem as an inter-
tribal affair, at first refused to comp ly with this request. 101 He 
was severely criticized for his decision. But the worsening 
situation, in the fo l lowing weeks, in consequence of the decision by 
E. Chalmers 102 to move with troops to Idutywa; the lack of sufficient 
Colonial police to carry out the governmental policy of support for 
the Mfengu; the raids by the Gcaleka war faction on Mfengu - all 
these factors convinced him at last, that war had become 
inevitable. 103 From the Colonial side, war preparations were stepped 
up, and Sarhili was placed in an untenable position: he was pressured 
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by the Cape Government to restra i n his people , but this had by now 
become impossible. 
The first skirmishes between Gcaleka and Colonial troops - the latter, 
stationed at a place called Ibeka - took place in September 1877. 
Determined that the Gcaleka power must finally be destroyed, Frere 
issued a proclamation by which Sarhili was deposed and his lands 
forfeited. 104 As justification for this step, Frere maintained that 
the Gcaleka had held the lands on condition of good behaviour. 
Charles Gr iffith who, as commander of the F.A.M.P., was put in charge 
east of the Kei, acted swiftly. He invaded Gcalekaland, burned down 
Sarhili's Great Place, and forced the paramount and most of his people 
to seek refuge in Bomvanaland. By the end of November 1877, the 
Colonia l government was mistakenly made to believe. that the war had 
come to an end. However, the Gcaleka returned in full strength, and a 
more serious and protracted phase started in December. One of 
Sarhili's sub -chiefs, Khiva, made his way to the Ngqika location where 
he persuaded Sandile to join the war. 
Glen Grey.l05 
From there, unrest spread to 
Differences between Frere and Molteno on matters of frontier defence 
led to the Prime minister's dismissal and the appointment of Gordon 
Sprigg as his successor. 106 Sprigg was determined to bring the war 
to a speedy end. In a decisive battle at Kentani, the chiefs Sarhili 
and Sandi Ie, who had joined forces, were defeated, and by May 1878 , 
the costly war was over. 107 
The war demonstrated the extent to which various Thembu factions had 
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been moving along divergent political roads. In Glen Grey, where 
there had been a long history of close Ngqika-Thembu cooperation, and 
where the people, since 1870, had angrily watched the erosion of their 
traditional systems by the application of Colonial law, there was 
overt sympathy with the warring tribes which in turn found vent in 
iso l ated cases of armed resistance against Colonia l rule. The Mfanta 
and Gungubele rebellion was an example. 108 In Emigrant Thembuland 
some chiefs like Sitokwe Ndlele gave moral support to the insurgents 
while they themselves played a waiting game. Others, notably Ndarala 
and Matanzima, not prepared to take the risk of losing their land. 
pledged their loyalty to the Colony, although there were officials who 
suspected Matanzima of having secretly supported the war faction. 109 
Ngangelizwe's attitude was crucial. In his district there was 
considerable sympathy with the Gcaleka, but, as chief over only his 
section, his powers were limited. He nevertheless immediately 
complied with Elliot's request, and, with the support of all his minor 
chiefs, he induced a considerable number of men to j oin Elliot's 
Co loni al levies. 
In the final analysis, the non-participation of the larger section of 
the Thembu made little difference to Cape Colonial attitudes towards 
them in the aftermath of the war. It was the involvement of some. 
rather than the neutrality of the not negligible majority, that was 
taken into account when laws, aimed at the preservation of peace, were 
passed in Cape Town. 
During his seven month spell in the troubled area , Frere's earlier 
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convictions tha t an alliance between all the major black na t ions, from 
Sekhukuni to Sandile was possible and that it was inadvisable to allow 
Africans possession of arms , were confirmed. His open i ng speech to 
the Cape Parliament in 1878 reflected his determination to prevent a 
recurrence of "events fatal alike t o the prosperity of the Colony and 
the happiness of the Inhabitants". He therefore announced that "with 
the view of guarding for the future against the rising of any large 
number of armed natives within the Colony , a measure providing for the 
Better Preservation of Peace by the disarming of all persons whom it 
is not safe or desirable to entrust with arms" would be laid before 
parliament . 110 A disarmament bill was easil y passed in 1878 under 
the name of the Peace Preservation Act, and was immediately put into 
effect in the spirit expressed by Prime Minister Sprigg : "The 
natives", he said , "should learn that there was no other course than 
to submi t. The Government was not gOing to pursue the system of 
palaver anymore . . . "lll The Mfengu were disarmed first. As they 
showed no resistance the Government was brought under t he err ,~."l~"'<...S 
impression that there was to be no opposition to the bill. 
Although the bill was not extended to Emigrant Thembuland, Levey lost 
no time before starting to disarm the people under his jurisdiction. 
He unwisely went round with a force of twenty men to collect guns. 
The episode , interpreted by the Thembu as the "use of a large army to 
disarm t hem",l12 caused incalculable harm to Thembu-Colonial 
relationships. 
Magistrate,l13 
H.G. EI I iot, 
in later years, 
who succeeded Wright as Chief 
maintained that Levey was res ponsible 
for the rebellious acts of Sitokwe, Ndlele and Gecelo and the hostile 
attitude assumed by Matanzima in 1880 , 114 and he correctly predicted 
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that "disarmament had created a feeling of bitterness that half a 
century will not remove. 115 
Apart from having been influenced on questions of defence, Frere's 
spell on the eastern frontier had convinced him that the war was to be 
blamed on the British Government which had shrunk from the 
responsibi I ity of rul ing the black people "justly, strictly and 
mercifully, thereby having neglected its civilizing power.,,116 In 
essence his political thinking focussed on policies which stressed the 
need for "civilization" and annexation. 
Prime Minister amenable to his own views 
of frontier policy. Sprigg was an 
He found in Gordon Sprigg a 
on the most important aspects 
Eastern Cape farmer,117 and 
held very strong views on frontier affairs. His ministry was 
responsible, in the years after 1878, for the introduction of those 
administrative, fiscal and territorial policies which paved the way 
for the extension of Colonial control over the black peoples beyond 
the Kei. 
The year 1878 also saw the appointment of William Ayliff as Secretary 
for Native Affairs. 118 He followed Brownlee' s policies, albeit with 
more rashness. His attitude during his first visit to the subject 
tribes, in August 1878, showed that Cape efforts to achieve control 
over the black people were bound to escalate. AddreSSing a large 
meeting of Emigrant Thembu at Cofimvaba, he explained the disarmament 
bi II as one which had been passed in the best interests of "the 
Government's ch i I dren" . He added: "Li ke a good father who would 
takes the sticks away from his fighting children, the government now 
takes your arms away. Thus only government will in future callout 
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men to fight." After this li ttle lecture, he announced far-reaching 
administrative reforms. 
Emigrant Thembuland was to become part of the district of Thembuland, 
and would be ruled by a chief magistrate and two assistant 
magistrates. Furthermore, the Thembu were informed that they would in 
future be expected to contribute towards the Cape treasury by paying 
hut tax. As the Government was about to embark upon a program of 
educational and agricultural reform, this was from a European point of 
view a sensib le measure. But the Thembu chiefs, whose decision in 
1865 to emigrate, was in no smal l measure motivated by their dread of 
hut tax, objected to th is new infringement on their independence. 
They received little sympathy. Sitokwe Ndlele was bluntly told that 
the Government did not acknowledge chiefs, but that Government was 
"chief of all chiefs.,,119 
While Thembu dissatisfaction with Colonial measures was mounting, news 
filtered t hrough that the Government was considering the annexation of 
Emigrant Thembuland. The four Emigrant chiefs put up a united front 
:::l. ',j ... i ... ,. t: 
and jOintly sent a petit ion to protest t® this. They pointed out that 
their independence had been acknowledged at the time of their emigra-
tion, and that during the last few years they had had to surrender one 
pr ivilege after the other . They expressed their willingness to make 
concessions by agreeing to pay hut tax and to surrender their arms. 
but they objected to the proposed annexation of their land, and 
requested that a law should be passed to prevent such a step.120 
Before they could receive any reinsurance on this all-important issue. 
the Thembu were offered their la st opportunity of combining with other 
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black people against Colonial intrusion on their lands. 
In Basutoland, where relations with the Cape Colony were already 
strained, the Government met with formidable opposition when the Peace 
Preservation Act was extended to that area. 121 What started as a 
rebellion in that cou ntry developed into a war which spread to the 
neighbouring territories. Early in October 1B80 Brownlee, then Chief 
Magistrate for Griqualand East, was attacked; and, shortly afterwards 
H. Hope, Resident with the Pondomise , was killed on the i nstructions 
of the chief, Mhlontlo. Thus started the so-called Gun War, sometimes 
also referred to as Hope's War. The wave of unrest spread to 
Thembuland. Magistrates, convinced that there was a plot between the 
principal Thembu and Sotho chief s, feared a combination of forces by 
the two nations, an event which would extend both the duration and the 
area of war with disastrous consequences for the Cape Colony. But 
there was to be no general rising. Insurrections were isolated and 
disconcerted, and Thembu resistance was easily crushed within three 
weeks. Before an attempt can be made to analyse the reasons for this 
lack of cohesion it is necessary to consider events before and during 
the rebellion in the various Thembu chiefdoms. 
In Emigrant Thembuland we can, roughly speak ing, discover three areas 
within which diverse attitudes operated: 122 a turbulent northern 
belt, inhabited by the Gcina under Gecelo, and the Vundhli under 
Sitokwe Ndlele; a southern zone under the pro-Colonial Ndarala: and 
a central zone where Matanzima held sway. In this latter part 
infl uences from both the north and the south were at work. 
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Various factors contributed towards the unsettled state of affairs in 
the northern zone. First , Ngangelizwe had very little influence in 
this area. Traditionally the Gcina and the Vundhli, had only 
nominally acknow ledged the authority of the Thembu Paramount. 123 
Moreover, when the Gecelo and Sitokwe settled in Emigrant Thembuland , 
and their independence was recognized by the Colonial Government, 
their bonds with the central authority were all but snapped. Their 
attitude, once war broke out, was therefore in no way influenced by 
Ngangelizwe's policy. Secondly, both chiefs had strong ties with the 
Sotho, and ma l contents in their districts were understandably 
influenced by developments in Basutoland after the extension of the 
Peace Preservatic Act to that country had caused an uproar. The fact 
that Basutoland was readily accessible, facilitated communications 
between disgruntled people in both areas. Thirdly, the Vundhli and 
the Gcina were surrounded by troublesome neighbours. The western part 
of Gecelo ' s lands adjoined the Wodehouse part of the Glen Grey 
district. This area, situated just below the Stormberg, had for many 
years been a rendezvous of unsettled peop le , both white and black. 124 
Of more importance was the presence of Sitokwe Tyali, a Vundhli ch ief 
who lived in neighbouring Thembuland Proper . He was known as the 
"madman I' . Having refused to accept Ngangelizwe's authority. he 
acknowledged Oalasile, t he influential Qwati chief whose lands 
adjoined his own. Fourthly, from a strategic point of view this part 
of Emigrant Thembuland was favourably situated. The vastness of the 
Stormberg range and the Gatberg to the north lent itself to the waging 
of a type of guerilla warfare wh ich would put the enemy at a 
disadvantage. 
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Under circumstances such as these, it would have taken a strong leader 
to ensure a measure of stability in his domain. While Sitokwe Ndlele 
does seem to have yielded considerable influence - until hi s authority 
was comp letely underm ined by Colonial policies - Gecelo emerges as a 
weak personali ty who by 1880 had lost control over his people. To a 
large extent he himself was responsible for this situation. At the 
time of the Emigration he might have felt insecure , having not been 
the legitimate heir to the Gcina chieftai ncy. The heir, Mpangela. had 
remained in the Location, but there were from time to time rumours 
completely unfounded - that he was contemplating a move to Emi grant 
Thembuland. Such an event would have constituted a threat to Gecelo's 
position. It was probably for this reason that Gecelo found it 
necessary to strengthen his position by inviting Mfengu to settle in 
his country. Successive magistrates encouraged him to do so, and he 
was too weak to resist these magistrates when he reali zed that 
his own peop le resented the presence of foreigners on their lands. On 
his own admission it was during this time that he himself noticed that 
his authority was dwindling. 125 Therefore even if he would have 
preferred to stay neutral , he was not in a position to restrain his 
people. The introduction by the Colonial Government of unpopular 
measures such as hut tax, cuts as a pena lty measure and compulsory 
labour on a bridge,126 had already , by 1878, led to the rise of a 
militant spirit in this troubled area. Although the Chief Magistrate 
held regular meetings with the Emigrant chiefs, very little was 
achieved. 
While Gecelo's resistance to Colonial intrusion was limited to verbal 
protests, Sitokwe Ndlele's more militant stance increased tension in 
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northern Emigrant Thembuland. It was certainly Cape Governmental 
interference in his domestic affairs and the partitioning of his 
Location that brought about the radical change in this chief's 
attitude. When he emigrated in 1865 he was considered to be one of 
the most loyal chiefs, and his good conduct was rewarded by an 
increase in the stipend paid by the Cape Government to the Emigrant 
chiefs. His disputes with Gecelo, and Fynn 's interference in such 
disputes, brought him into discredit with the Cape Government. Being 
reminded by the authorities that the lands he occupied were those from 
which Sarhili had been expelled for misconduct,127 he was left under 
no illusions as to his own vulnerabil ity. It is understandable that 
he found kindred spirits in the disgruntled Glen Grey chiefs with whom 
he was suspected to have been in alliance in the war of 1878-1879. 
Although there was no proof of such an alliance having materialized, 
Levey remained suspicious and treated him with disdain. "There is 
only one way of taking down their (the chiefs ') pride", the magistrate 
wrote in 1879 when he reported on Sitokwe's unsatisfactory behaviour, 
"and that is to reduce their authority" . 128 Shortly afterwards 
Sitokwe suffered the humiliation of seeing his stipend being reduced 
from £50 to £20 per annum . 129 This was a further blow to the chief 
who, two years earlier, had had to see a part of his lands taken from 
him and being handed over to his pro-Colonial brother, MatumbeKati. 130 
Even though Elliot was not a supporter of Sitokwe - he on occasion 
warned the chief that failure to carry out his responsibility could 
lead to his dismissal 131 - he considered depriving a man of his 
stipend so serious that it could not be carried out without a clear 
case being proved against the offender. 132 He therefore disapproved 
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of Levey's high-handed actions at a time when unrest was mounting, and 
he warned the latter that Sitokwe's followers might regard the 
reduction of his stipend as an arbitrary decision, induced by personal 
considerations. Levey, however, 
Native Affairs 133 and, in February 
was supported by the Secretary for 
1880, on the matter 
closed, Sitokwe being finally deprived of 
correspondence 
his stipend. 134 By then the 
dispute between Levey and Sitokwe had developed into a personal 
affair, and the situation became increasingly explosive. When a shot 
was fired at Levey during a visit to Sitokwe's location, he suspected 
an attempt on his life. Ell i ot , after having had the case 
investigated, came to the conclusion that Sitokwe had not fired in the 
direction in which Levey was standing, and that, though the shot might 
have been fired in defiance, it was not meant to kill the 
magistrate. 135 The incident, nevertheless, showed that Sitokwe's 
relationship with his magistrate had by 1880 broken down completely. 
In contrast to the turbulent north, the southern part of Emigrant 
Thembuland remained calm, Ndarala having exerted himself to maintain 
good relationships with the authorities. 136 The geographical 
position of Ndarala's lands might have played a part in the general 
attitude of the people. These lands adjoined those of the "faithful" 
Mfengu in the Idutywa Reserve. Furthermore there were no mountain 
fastnesses in this area to afford protection to warring factions in 
the event of war. 
Matanzima's lands were wedged between those of Gecelo and Ndarala. 
Some of his people were thus in close contact with the turbulent 
north, and they eventually decided to join forces with the insurgents 
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there. Others fought on the side of the Cape Colony. The attitude of 
the chief himself was highly equivocal. 137 But even if Matanz ima 
himself did not want to fight. it had become almost impossible for him 
to preserve peace in his country as a militant faction under his 
brother Sinquanqati became caught up in the revolutionary spirit of 
the late 1870's.138 
In Thembuland Proper the Thembu were as divided as the people in 
Emigrant Thembuland. The southern boundary of this territory was 
adjacent to Bomva naland and the border dispute there sti ll lingered 
on. The Thembu may have hoped that a Colonial victory would bring a 
settlement to their advantage. In the central part. Ngangelizwe. like 
Matanzima. managed to maintain an uneasy peace. In the northern part. 
where the Qwati and Jumba were in close proximity to the core of 
unrest. problems became insurmountable. The Jumba chief . Mgudhlwa . 
had two distinct tracts of land. one just below the Zuurberg and the 
other. known as Jumba's Veldt in Maxonga's Hoek. just south of the 
Orakensberg. While the people in the former territory had close ties 
with the Hala in central Thembuland. it was in the northern part that 
unrest was brewing. as people there were strongly influenced by 
Oa I as il e. This resilient chief had in 1876 accepted Colonial rule 
under protest. When the newly appointed magistrate. Walter Stanford, 
pa id his first official visit the chief's attitude was very cool; 
and. in a deep guttural tone. which Stanford later discovered was 
assumed for effect. he warned: "I have agreed to come under 
government. but I do not give myself over as Gangelizwe has had to 
through fear of his enemies. nor do I appear before you with blood on 
my hands. These people are mine, they are sitting on my back. I 
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alone come under government. They remain on my back . ,,139 Stanford 
could see that Dalasile had no love for the yoke Ngangelizwe ' s actions 
had placed on his neck. 140 In 1879 he showed his indifference to 
the Cape Colony by refusing to send men of his tribe to fight in the 
War of Ngcayecibi. Although he appeared to be less hostile towards 
the end of that war, he was probably waiting for the opportune moment 
to throw off the Colonial yoke. 
The political unrest described above cOincided with a period of 
economic hardship. From allover Thembuland, magistrates reported 
pessimistically on the drought and consequent bad harvests. The 
decision by the Cape Parliament at this stage to increase the hut tax 
was greeted with dismay by magistrates who rightly suspected that this 
would add fuel to smouldering fires of discontent . 141 Indeed , 
towards the end of 1880 there was no doubt that dissidents in 
Thembuland, Glen Grey, Mpondoland, and Basutoland were in constant 
communication. 142 Although the magistrates were aware of such 
contact, they were at first i nc lined to underestimate the danger, as, 
on the surface, everything seemed quiet. Evidently the murder of Hope 
was the signal the war factio ns had been waiting for. In the turmoil 
that followed magistrates, missionaries and traders were forced to 
remove themselves as quickly as possible. Shops were looted and 
magistrates' 
rejoicing. 143 
offices and churches burned down amid scenes of wi I d 
The joy did not last for long. So deeply were the 
people divided on issues of war that it was impossible to distinguish 
between pro- and anti-Colonial factions. Some magistrates were kept 
well-informed as to the movements of the enemy. In Engcobo , for 
instance, Stanford knew that Dalasile would not attack the magistracy 
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before his war-priest had du ly carried out the rites t o enlist 
ancestra l aid. This war-priest, Matiwane , was connected by marriage 
to a policeman, Thomas Poswayo, who was kept well-informed on 
Dalasile's actions. Poswayo was in turn a confidant of Stanford, so 
t hat Stanford was well aware of what was gOing on in his district. 
This helped him to escape in time from Engcobo . 144 
In Emigrant Thembuland Sinquanqati and Sitokwe Ndlele, aided by Glen 
Grey insurgents who were incited by all kinds of rumours , fell upon 
Lady Frere. 145 Their attempts were frustrated by a commando led by C. 
Driver, the resident magistrate of Queenstown , consisting of sixty 
European volunteers and loyal Thembu. Another commando under Frost 
set out for Maclear in the extreme north of the Engcobo district where 
there was a European settlement. The Thembu were fo rced to retreat to 
the mountains of Maxonga's Hoek. Little resistance was left. 
For most of the Thembu leaders the war ended in disaster. Sitokwe 
Ndlele was killed in a skirmish with Col. Wavell in the valley of the 
Indwe river. Gecelo, finding himself in a situation which he could 
not handle, gave himself up under the pretext that he did not want to 
fight, but was unable to restrain his people . However , evidence of 
his complicity was overwhelming. 146 He was sentenced to imprisonment. 
Dalasile fled to Bomvanaland where he remained in exile until 1884. 
In Thembuland Proper Ngangelizwe, realizing that he could not restrain 
his people, went to Umtata where he placed himse lf under El liot's 
protection while offering the assistance of an army.147 He was, 
however, no longer in full control of his people , and this had led to 
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great confusion in his country. On the very same day that Elliot 
telegraphically informed the Cape Government of the chief's request 
for Colonial protection, he (Elliot) was notified from Butterworth 
that all Ngangelizwe's Thembu had taken up arms. This turned out to 
be a false rumour as unrest was confined to those chiefs who lived 
close to the borders of Mpondoland. Ngangelizwe was still able to 
quell these uprisings, and the assistance his people gave to Elliot 
contributed to a great extent, to the suppression of resistance 
elsewhere in Thembuland. 
The so-called Thembu Rebellion was the culmination of a long period of 
resistance to the increasing power of British imperialism, but it 
failed tragically, because the various Thembu sections were unable to 
form a united front against a formidable and militarily superior 
enemy. To a certain extent this lack of cohesion, at such a critical 
time, can be understood in view of the heterogeneous nature of 
Thembu society.148 Not only were diverse groups kept artificially 
together by a nominal head whose control, over the years, had become 
weaker · and weaker, but the Colonial policy of divide-and-rule had 
encouraged rivalries between different clans. These differences 
became so divisive that the emergence of a national movement, which 
could transcend personal and group divisions, had become an 
impossibility. After the war of Ngcayecibi, Levey could boast that it 
was only by persistent efforts to promote disunion amongst the chiefs, 
and to foster jealousies amongst the common people, that he had been 
able to prevent the prevailing sentiment escalating into active 
participation in the conflict. 149 These words might well have been 
spoken in 1881. 
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The most important Hala chiefs had not joined the war. and we may be 
justified in asking whether there were political motives behind 
their decision. To answer this question it is necessary to have a look 
at Dalasile's relationship with the Hala. Mention had been made of 
this chief's independent attitude. as well as of the fact that he was 
accepted as chief by Sitokwe Ndlele. Kosana and Sitokwe Tyali. It 
would seem. that after 1875. when Ngangelizwe fell into disfavour. 
Dalasile's influence was on the increase. This might well have 
constituted a threat to the leadership of the Hala paramount. 
Therefore. when Dalasile and his proteges showed disaffection. 
Ngangelizwe and Matanzima might have thought that by standing by. 
and watching these chiefs destroying themselves. they could strengthen 
their own position. Levey was of opinion that Matanzima followed this 
strategy in Emigrant Thembuland. where his two brothers. Sinquanqati 
and Bambendino. who had rejected his authority. joined the war. 
Levey's argument seems plausible. as after the war. Matanzima 
immediately. on the grounds of his having remained neutral. claimed -
and indeed received - the lands of these two chiefs. He thus emerged 
after the war as a wealthy. influential leader. 150 Self-interest has 
obviously then. at least to a certain extent. determined the attitude 
of the chiefs during the war. 
It would. however. be wrong to over-emphasise the lack of cohesion as 
reason for the failure of Thembu resistance. Behind the rivalries we 
can discern one common bond between the chiefs. however widely their 
responses might have diverged. and that was a real concern for their 
lands and their independence. Widespread resentment. as the chiefs 
witnessed the extension of Colonial control over them. had been 
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building up before 1880. When Sitokwe Ndlele met Ayliff in 1878 he 
had mentioned the loss of part of his lands, as one of his main 
grievances. 151 The four Emigrant chiefs also put up a united front 
when it became clear, from rumours Circulating in 1880, that Emigrant 
Thembuland was to be annexed. 152 
Transkeian magistrates had no doubt that all the chiefs were united in 
their deSire to get rid of the magistrates in their districts, and 
that this was the main cause of the war. 153 Walter Stanford 
believed that there was a plot to kill the magistrates, and he came 
to the conclusion that resentment against the judicial authority 
imposed upon the chiefdoms existed among chiefs and commoners. In his 
view, then, it was a chiefs' war as much as a peoples' war. fought to 
regain independence. 154 Levey saw the 1880-1 events as a war between 
"kaffir chieftainship and civilized government.,,155 Judging from the 
course of events in the Xalanga district, Cummi ng believed that the 
war was a desperate effort to regain "what they regarded as freedom." 
He too thought that it was as much a war of the chiefs as of the 
peoPle. 156 There can be no doubt that commoners were affected as 
adversely by the imposition of Colonial rule, as were the chiefs. 
Mention has already been made of the introduction of burdensome taxes, 
humiliating punishments and compulsory labour. Rumours, founded or 
unfounded, accused the magistrates of executing their duties in a way 
completely foreign to Africans. 157 The involvement of the common 
people is reflected in the fact that while Ngangelizwe Sided with the 
Colony, of the 23,969 men in his country capable of bearing arms. 
13,000 Sided against the Government. 158 
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To accept that the Transkeian Rebellion was a chiefs' war and a 
peoples' war to get rid of the magistrates, would however be an over-
simplification of a far more complex situation. It would seem that 
there were two parallel forces at work in Thembuland. On the one hand 
there was the rejection of white rule. Resistance, here. took the 
form of rebellion against the white government, but was not, as some 
people saw it, a conspiracy against the white man. 159 On the other 
hand there was within the chiefdoms increasing tension after 1870 as 
various economic factors led to a polarization between westernized and 
traditional Thembu. 160 The privileged people, of whom many were 
Mfengu, benefited enormously by their loyalty to the Cape Colony in 
the war of 1878. Not only did they capture large quantities of stock 
from the Gcaleka, but they were also compensated by the Government for 
duties performed. They emerged from this war as a stronger and even 
more influential group. Gecelo admitted that, after the war, he had 
settled Mfengu and other educated blacks on the lands of the ordinary 
"red kaffir". He had done this on the insistence of the magistrates, 
and without prior consultation with his people. This, he maintained, 
was one of the main reasons why his people had rebelled. He told the 
Thembuland Commission: 
"Yes, Counci Ilors, and all were against me, and they 
reported me to the Government, but what I did I did in 
deference to the wish of the magistrates who told me that 
the land was not mine, that it belonged to the Government, 
and that I had to give people land when they asked for it. 
I was but a child in the hands of the magistrate. This was 
the first time (i.e. the time when the evidence was taken) I 
heard that the ordinary red Kafir had any rights. The 
civilized kafir came in and rode roughshod over us. This 
stuck in our throats, but we had to swallow it. It was the 
wish of the magistrq~1 and we were like doves in a Krantz, 
we were frightened." 
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What Gecelo was thus insinuating was that hostilities by commoners 
were directed against him and the westernized people. as much as 
against the Government. Mag istrates' reports frequently mentioned the 
animosity between the Thembu and the Mfengu. Cumming wrote about the 
"land-grabbing propensities" of the Mfengu. 162 
The civil strife also manifested itself in the animosity between the 
mission people and those living on tribal lands. In some way the 
stations were regarded as separate from the rest of the tribe . and 
thus viewed with suspicion by chiefs and commoners alike. A.H. 
Stanford often referred to such cleavages between the two classes. In 
1879. for instance. he recommended that the boundaries of mission 
stations shou ld be clearly defined so as to avoid conflict between the 
"civilized people" and the "heathen natives". He remarked that the 
animosity between them was increasing year by year.1 63 Other 
magistrates in Thembuland notices the same divisions in their 
districts. 164 In 1880 the school people in Sitokwe Ndlele's Location 
were reported to expect a sudden attack upon them following Sitokwe's 
threat to drive them away. He was especially irritated by the refusal 
of the school people to have cases settled by him. and insisted on 
referring disputes to their own headmen. 165 Christianized Thembu were 
also likely to associate with Mfengu. rather than with their own 
kinsmen. In this way the gap between western and traditional people. 
and between rich and poor became wider. 
It therefore seems likely that the war of 1881 was not only a war of 
black versus white. but also of black against black. In its aftermath 
the Thembu were more divided than ever before. 
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Chapter 5 
In the Aftermath of the War of 1881: Annexation and i ts Consequences 
(i) The Policy of Removals 
The Basutoland and Transke ian rebel l ion has been seen by Thea l as the 
most formidable attempt ever made by black chiefdoms to throw off 
European supremacy.1 For the Cape Colony it was a tra umatic 
experience and left an indelible mark on the minds of white officials 
and statesmen alike. Many years later Sir Walter Stanford had the war 
in mind when he wrote: 
"In 1880-1 881 we had the strongest combination 
South Africa of native chiefs and thei r tribes to 
white man out. I am not convinced that led by the 
of to -day there is any greater hostile fezling or 
against the government as t here was then." 
known in 
drive the 
agitators 
as great 
The termination of the war did not put an end to white apprehensions; 
on the contrary , officials, for the rest of the century, were obsessed 
by fear of another black military alliance against the Cape Colony. 
The Secretary for Native Affairs, J. de Wet, expressed the general 
mood when he warned in 1882: 
"If in the late disturbance there has been an attempt to 
combine against the government, it became an important 
consideration to determine in what way such a combination 
can in futu~e be either averted or weakened or made more 
ineffective." 
It was commonly thought that the answer lay in a more aggressive 
application of t he Cape Colony's territoria l and administrative 
policies. The Grahamstown Journal was quick to advise that "i n 
settling t he reconquered districts they (the Government) should strike 
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decisively at the implacable enemy, chiefdom, (as) in the abolition of 
this great evil the native tribes will at last find peace.,,4 
Not all Cape officials shared such sentiments. A. Stanford, 
magistrate at Umtata, warned correctly that whether the Government 
acknowledged the authority of the chiefs or not, the fact remai ned 
that the people were guided by them. 5 The Government was therefore 
fully aware of the impracticability, if not impossibility, of the 
total abolition of ch ieftainship, but ways and means had to be found 
in which the power of the chiefs could be curta i led and their 
influence rendered ineffective . 
One way in which this could be done was by breaking up the tribes as 
much as possible. Accordingly, immediately after the war, the Chief 
Magistrate of Thembu land was instructed to resettle people regardless 
of tribal affiliation. He was further caut ioned not to al low any 
other authority than that of the magistrate to be exercised. 6 From 
the Government's point of view this pol icy was effective. The two 
Hala chiefs, Ngangelizwe and Matanzima, found their lands penetrated 
by Vundh l i, Qwati, Gcina and Mfengu who felt no loyalty towards them, 
and who would readily appeal to the magistrates against the decisions 
of t he tribal courts. The chiefs resented the presence of these 
newcomers, more so as their settlement led to endless garden disputes. 
Ngangelizwe expressed his discontent in no uncertain terms. "The land 
is mine", he said "I do not consider it forfeited through the acts of 
rebels."? In Emigrant Thembuland Matanzima voiced t he same 
object ions. 8 The discontent thus generated was intensified by 
territorial settlements after 1881. 
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The Cape Government considered as rebels all those Thembu who had 
participated in the war. This was hardly a valid argument. British 
control over Thembuland was an informal affair; Britain had no legal 
jurisdiction over the territory.9 As Britain had no authority in the 
territory, the Thembu were not British subjects, and could therefore 
not be branded as rebels. However, the Government acted on the 
principle that t hose who co l laborated with the warring nations were 
indeed rebels, and had thereby forfeited all claims to the lands they 
held before the war. These lands were now to be confiscated and 
redistributed between white farmers and pro-Colonial black farmers, 
while so-called rebels, after their surrender, were to be resettled in 
a way advantageous to the Cape Colony. To deal with all t hese l and 
matters the Thembuland Land Settlement Commission was appointed under 
chairmanship of J. Hemming. 10 
The findings of this commission were in no small way influenced by a 
new pol it ica l party, the Afrikaner Bond, which emerged in the 1880's, 
and played a dominant role in Cape poli t ics until its disso lution in 
1911. To understand the importance of the Bond for our period under 
discussion, it is necessary to have a closer look at its origin and 
composition ~ 
The birth of this predominantly Afrikaner po l itical party was the 
outflow of an awakening Afrikaner nationalism. As Herman Giliomee has 
explained, the political apathy of the Afr ikaner was disso lved by an 
expanding Cape economy and growing government revenue, particularly as 
a result of the discovery of the diamond fields. The polarization of 
latent ethnic ties was the result of the need to put a political 
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movement together which could especially promote farming interests as 
these were underrepresented in parliament. ll 
It was under these circumstances that pro-Afrikaner Boeren 
Beschermings Vereenigingen and branches of the more political minded 
Afrikaner Bond mushroomed in the 1880's. In the western Cape Onze Jan 
Hofmeyr was the leading spirit in the establishment of the 
Zuid Afrikaasche Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, the earliest 
political organization set up by Afrikaners. In the eastern Cape the 
Albert Boerebeschermings Vereeniging, established in 1879, 
distingui shed itself as t he most wide awake and fiery of all Afrikaner 
political associations. This Vereeniging established close relations 
wi t h Die Afrikaanse Patriot, a Paarl paper which championed the 
recognition of the Afrikaner people as a cultural ly distinct element 
within the population of South Africa. Although, then, the Boeren 
Vereenigingen were established in the first place to protect the 
int erests of the white farmers, they inevitably became caught up in 
the cultural issues of the day, notably the recognition of the Dutch 
language. Cultural issues in turn developed into political issues. 
By June 1879 the need was recognized for an Afrikaner Bond in which 
all Afrikaners would feel at home, and in 1880 the first three 
branches of the Afrikaner Bond were established. 
Vereenigingen and the Bond amalgamated. 12 
In 1882 the Boeren 
As the champion of farming interests, the Bond concerned itself with 
the acute land shortage experienced by European farmers after 1870, 
when the land frontier in South Africa was becoming closed . By then 
extensive farming, by means of extending the size of grazing lands or 
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by trekking further into the interior, had become impossible. Free 
land, to which, especially the poorer farmers turned their eyes, was 
limited. 13 
The policy of the Bond, as propagated in its newspaper De Zuid 
Afrikaan, was directed towards the colonization by Whites of 
Transkeian territories and the expropriation of black peasants within 
the Cape Colony so that their lands could be thrown open for white 
farmers. Hence, the support given by Hofmeyr to white squatters who 
moved into the northern parts of Thembuland during and after the war 
of 1881. 
Illegal squatting on Thembu lands had already been going on for some 
time before the war. The evacuat ion of large parts of northern 
Emigrant Thembuland and Engcobo in consequence of the participation of 
most of the inhabitants in the war, afforded new opportunit ies to 
white farmers from the north eastern districts who had for years 
been coveting fertile Thembu lands. In the Engcobo district the 
locations of Langa, son of the Jumba chief, Mgudhlwa, and those of 
Ngenqanu, a Qwati chief, were almost completely cleared of its 
inhabitants except for the presence of some pro-Colonial black 
farmers, and the white farmers of the Slang River Settlement. Walter 
Stanford watched with near-desperation as white squatters , in defiance 
of his warning that t heir actions were illegal, poured into t he 
district, arranging boundaries of farms and building homesteads. This 
pattern of white squatting was repeated in northern Emigrant 
Thembuland. 14 
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Hofmeyer's support for these squatters stemmed amongst other reasons, 
fr om his conviction t hat a broad belt of white settlement from 
Queenstown to Kokstad would be of great advantage to the Colony. In 
this way the Sotho in the north could be separated from the Thembu and 
the Mpondo in the south, order could be brought to the tr iba l areas 
and opportunities for white farmers could be extended . Hofmeyr's 
support for the squatters placed the government of T.C. Scan len in a 
di lemma. Scanlen became Prime Minister in 1881 with the support of 
the Bond on the vot es of whose members he was now dependent for his 
politica l survival . It is therefore understandable that the ideas of 
t he Bond were to a large extent ref lected in the settlements made by 
the Thembu l and Land Commission. 
In dealing wi th Engcobo and Emigrant Thembuland, the Commission was 
instructed to use lands confiscated from "rebels" for white 
sett I ement. A dividing line was therefore laid down, south of which 
land s were reserved for black settlement, while European farmers would 
receive lands to the north. 15 This measure solved none of the 
problems. 
to move. 
First, many Europeans who lived south of the line refused 
Their numbers were constantly strengthened by new arrivals 
from the Cape Colony, and there was the distinct possi bility of a 
clash between these squatters and the Thembu on whose territory they 
were now living. Secondly, by drawing this boundary l ine, the 
Commission had pressurized the Thembu into accepti ng sma l ler farms 
than was originally intended , while the Europeans came into possession 
of a much larger tract of land . 16 Black landholders, some of whom 
possessed farms of more than 1000 morgen, were informed that their 
new farms wou ld not exceed 500 morgen. 17 The Thembu farmers were 
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persuaded to accept these conditions; the Commission argued that they 
received their lands from chiefs, who did not, according to African 
custom, have the right to alienate land. Hemming abruptly told a 
meeting: "The short of it is this, that the Government says that a 
chief has no r ight to give away land of the people, but as t he chiefs 
have done this, we do not wish to oppose you if you have a good claim, 
and if you are a good man and make a proper use of the land, but it is 
an act of grace on the part of the government to give you land at all. 
There are other people to be provided for as well, but we recogn ize 
your claims to an extent of 500 morgen.,, 18 
The Commission's argument, that the ch iefs had no right to give away 
land , was strongly refuted, not only by black farmers, but also by 
miss ionaries . 19 In the final analysis, however, the cond iti ons under 
which the black farmers would have been allowed to remain north of the 
line seemed to be so unfavourable that they consented to move south. 
A number of pro-Colonia l peop le on whose loyalty the Government 
reckoned during the war , now found that their efforts brought t hem 
little material benefit. At a meeting with Hemming it was clear that 
the i r farms north of the line were al so to be reduced in size. 20 
The Hemming Commission also had to face the problem of re-locating 
thousands of so-called rebels who after their surrender reclaimed 
their former lands. This was a formidable task as a glance at the 
following table will show: 
Table 
No of people surrendered 
Southeyvi lIe 12 927 ( 1 900 men) 
Engcobo 9 488 (No of men 
Umtata 2 022 (333 men) 
Enyanyana 2 263 
Xalanga 2 257 (512 men) 
St. Marks 153 
Total 29 110 (3 319 men) 
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not 
No of families for which 
lands were available 
000 families 
availab le) 000 families 
50 families 
Not available 
250 families 
Not available 
2 300 families 
Not only was there a serious land shortage, but those lands claimed by 
returning men had meanwhile been occupied by "loyalists" who felt they 
were entitled to compensat ion . Matters were further complicated by 
the fact that it was, in many cases, almost impossible to decide which 
lands were previously occupied by "loyalists" and 
respectively as their homesteads had become intermingled. 
"rebel s" 
A solution that would satisfy all claimants to land, was impossible; 
and considerable discontent followed on the implementation of the 
Commission's recommendations . Chiefs like Kosana, who claimed that 
they did not join the war and who hoped to be compensated for their 
neutrality, were disappointed. Kosana objected not only to the size 
of the farm granted to him and his 400 loyal followers in the Nququ 
Valley, but he pOinted out that the land was of inferior quality. 
This compla int was echoed by hi s 400 ex-followers, who were resettled 
in the Nququ and Umtingwenu valley in the Southeyv ille district. 
They claimed more land as they had to resort to agricu lture on 
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unsuitable lands, having lost all their cattle during the war.21 
In Engcobo a number of hardworking, pro-Colonial men were also badly 
affected by the post-war settlements. They received farms in 1879 
when Walter Stanford had used his influence to have the defeated 
Sitokwe Tyali 's farms parcelled out among people whom he regarded as 
trustworthy. He then advised that, for security reasons, the fastness 
of Mahonga's Hoek should be kept clear of undesirable elements. The 
tract of country north of the road between Kokstad and Dordrecht, from 
the boundary of the Engcobo district to the boundary of the Slang 
River settlement with the line of the Drakensberg as its northern 
limit, should therefore, he argued, be settled with picked men likely 
to farm efficiently and to become a barrier between black and white. 
This plan had been brought into effect in 1879. The select group was 
given farms with a recommendation that in future individual titles 
would be granted in deserving cases. 22 The Hemming Commission now 
decided that the whole northern part of Engcobo should be set aside 
for European occupation. Although the black farmers who remained on 
their farms during the war were relocated on the lands of some "ex-
rebels", a fair compromise was not achieved. The settlement of about 
500 European families in northern Engcobo, coupled with the fact that 
a large number of refugee Gcalekas had to be accommodated, severely 
restricted the access to arable land. 23 The growing land shortage 
manifested itself in the ploughing of pathways, garden disputes and, 
finally, in the banding together of groups who looked for land in 
Griqualand East and Basutoland. From 1887 onwards magisterial reports 
stressed the shortage of land. 
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The post-war settlements had repercussions in Glen Grey where the 
strains in Thembu-European relationships, always present below the 
surface, became manifest in renewed and more determined efforts to 
transfer Glen Grey lands to European farmers. Foremost amongst these 
white agitators were the farmers from the Dordrecht and Wodehouse 
districts who were in close contact with the Engcobo squatters. The 
possible displacement of the Thembu and their settlement in remote and 
less fertile areas was hotly debated in the Cape parliament as Bond 
members and their allies , pledged to relieve the plight of the poorer 
farmers, advocated the removal of the Thembu from Glen Grey. They 
ma i ntained that, as a result of over-crowding, living conditions in 
Glen Grey had become impossible. 24 
In a further attempt to justify the remova l of the Thembu, both the 
Government and the Bondsmen cal led the legitimacy of Thembu claims to 
lands in Glen Grey into quest ion. It was argued that, s ince t he 
Thembu had refused the offer of emigration in 1865, the Glen Grey 
district had become crown land; the Thembu were consequently 
squatters with no legal right and could therefore be removed at any 
time. According to ev idence given by Resident Magistrate Jenner in 
1892 before the Glen Grey Commission, the Thembu had held the land in 
tribal tenure before 1870, but thereafter they resided upon crown 
land. 25 It should, however, be kept in mind that at the time of 
emigration the Thembu were to ld that the move was entirely voluntary, 
and the question of the Location becoming crown land was never 
raised. 26 Th e abrogation of promises made at the time of the 
emigration meant that the Glen Grey Thembu were l iving precariously 
under the disadvantage of not knowing when, and i f, they were going to 
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be removed, or whether other people - especially white or Mfengu were 
to be mo ved in. 
The effect of such uncertainty, aggravated by the intimidating 
attitude of adjacent farmers, was emphasised by W.J. Hughes, the 
Field Cornet for Tambookie land in his annual report to the R.M . of 
Glen Grey in 1884: 
A large number of people have trekked, not only on account 
of the drought, but because they dislike the attitude of the 
Europeans towards them, petitioning the government for their 
removal, which in their opinion is very threatening. The 
farmers have taken this course not so much on account of the 
thefts, which are often exaggerated, but because they a27 anxious to obtain the ground by having it cut up in farms. 
Understandably, then, there was great consternation when in 1884 
rumours were spread by traders and farmers suggesting that all the 
Thembu were to be removed beyond the Kei. 28 
The Thembu were further upset by Governmental procedures in 1884 when 
land was needed for a railway line to the newly discovered coal mines 
in Indwe. A meeting to discuss ways in which the land could be 
obtained, was held with the government-appointed headmen. They agreed 
to the expropriation of 25,000 morgen of land. Although the people 
were resettled on the same amount of la nd, they were disgruntled 
because they were separated in three different blocks. One block was 
near the coal mines, one near Lady Frere, and one at Idwana. 
Resentment was further felt because those who were removed were 
inadequately compensated for their cultivated lands and good 
houses. 29 They were also now living under ever more insecure 
circumstances. On the one hand, their resettlement in already over-
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crowded areas was received with misgiving by the established 
community30 while, on the other, rumours that all the Thembu were to 
be removed across the Kei were still rife. Their fear that they could 
once again be removed at any time was confirmed when, shortly 
afterwards, the Ndonga and Guba basins fell victim to the 
Government's resettlement zeal. 
A particular ly unhappy example of the way in which resettlement was 
carried out, is to be found in the history of the Umhlanga location . 
this location, s ituated just outside the border of Emigrant 
Thembu land, comprised eight farms inhabited altogether by 30,000 
Mfengu and Thembu. It was a prosperous community. "Even in adverse 
seasons, Umhlanga was a garden of Eden" , stated one newspaper. In 
1885, when many blacks could not plough on account of the poor 
conditions of the oxen, the people turned up with hoes and, after 
appealing in vain to the Cape government for a hundred bags of seed 
grain, they pledged their property to private individuals and 
purchased seed at extreme prices. 31 
As the Umhlanga Location adjoined Emigrant Thembuland, it is 
understandable that the resettlements t here, as well as in Engcobo, 
were seen as precedents for similar procedures in Glen Grey. Under 
the influence of the Bond, the Government gave in to the farmers' 
petiti ons and a commission was appo inted to investigate the 
possibility of resettling the Umh langa peop le elsewhere. Either this 
commission was incompetent or it deliberately misled the Government . 
Fol lowing their recommendations, five farms in the Umhlanga location 
were sold and the inhabitants were resettled on three other farms. 32 
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Within a year these farms were so over-crowded that the Government 
was considering other measures. 33 By then the possible removal of 
the Thembu across the Kei had already been advocated in the Cape 
Parliament. In an attempt to sway off icial opinion, the white farmers 
argued that the Thembu had in 1870 received lands in Glen Grey for ten 
years on condition of good behaviour, a right which they had forfeited 
by their participation in the war of 1881. 34 By implication 
therefore, all the Thembu were branded as rebels and therefore not 
entitled to land. What made the position of the Umh langa Thembu 
particularly vulnerable was the fact that there were indeed a 
considerable number of ex -rebels in the Cape Location. They received 
land in 1884 from the Resident-Magistrate, C. Driver, who realized the 
futility of trying to separate them from the loyals. 35 
The only safeguard that the Thembu had in the face of such onsl aughts 
was a law promulgated in 1883 to the effect that no black man could be 
resettled without his concurrence being obtained. 36 Th is security 
fell away in 1885 when a Bondsman from Queenstown, J. du Plessis, 
carried a motion which virtual ly gave the Government carte-blanche to 
deal with the Glen Grey people. Besides expressing t he desirabi li ty 
that all lands across the Kei should be settled by Colonial Africans, 
preference being given to the Glen Grey and Peddie people, it stated 
that the Government could carry out the terms of the motion as it 
thought expedient. Furthermore, a part of the 197,000 
vacant land across the Kei had to be set aside for European 
morgen of 
farmers. 37 
Having tasted this victory, the Bond members renewed their efforts to 
have black fa rmers in Glen Grey replaced by Europeans. 
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In the following parliamentary session it was argued that Du Plessis's 
motion had removed the "fetters" of 1883, and that the Government now 
had the power to remove such blacks as they thought necessary. 
Members objected to certain recommendations such as those that 
stipulated that only people willing to abandon their locations should 
be removed. They argued that those people who left the locations 
should do so as a body so that their lands might be settled by 
Europeans. 38 Although the policy of the Government was in line with 
the sentiments express"ed in Parliament, it is clear that at this stage 
strong arm tactics were not yet considered. Removal was, if possible, 
to be accomplished by agreement rather than by force. The result was 
a series of meetings between high level officials and Thembu headmen 
in Umhlanga. 
The first meeting addressed by A.M. Frost, exposed the coercion by 
which the "consent" of the people had been obtained. After having 
explained to the assembled meeting that the Government, in view of 
overcrowding, wished four hundred families to leave their farms to go 
to Qumbu and Tsolo in Griqualand East, where they could depend upon 
good crops although the land was not suitable for stock, he added: 
"You need not go if you wish to remain, but let me tell you 
that if you decline the offer made to-day, it will be 
useless for you to come to this government in a few years 
time and ask assistance in the way of lands, for they will 
have none to give you, it will be disposed of in other ways, 
for there are many other natives looking for land, ... but 
this I can saY3ghat the people of the Glen Grey will have 
first choice ... " 
The meeting was adjourned for half an hour during which the people 
came to make their decision. On their return they were unanimous in 
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declining the offer, and, on the recommendation of Jenner, the headmen 
were given t ime to consult with their people and report back within a 
week. Their feelings remained un changed. "We would rather die of 
starvation than go to a strange land", said Sam Sigeneau, supported by 
Mayekisi who said they wanted to stay where they had been brought up. 
Others vo iced the sentiment that they wished to watch their fathers ' 
graves. 40 
By now Jenner's patience was running out. Some of those who did not 
want to go were to ld that they would be removed to a different part of 
Glen Grey. The unfavourable prospects, amongst others , lack of water, 
made Qumbu seem the lesser of two evils. People in the Cacadu valley 
were, at the same time, informed that those who had gone off to look 
for pasturage would not be allowed to return. Under these 
circumstances a number of black farmers left Glen Grey. Thei r 
decision was incorrect ly interpreted as a completely voluntary act. 
The fol low ing year saw more determined governmental act ions. At a 
meeting with headmen, the Secretary for Native Affairs, Jacobus de 
Wet, warned headmen, on threat of dismissal, against any 
resistance. 41 Thi s was followed in 1886 by Frost' s warning that force 
would be used unless the people moved on their own initiative. 42 
Farms in the Umhlanga location were advertised for sale, cattle were 
impounded, 
up for sale. 
and police moved in to destroy houses on farms that were 
E. Warner wrote in desperation that in the bad weather 
women and ch ildren were left in the co ld . Understandably the Thembu 
resistance crumbled. "1 have advised the people", Warner wrote, "to 
stick to their lands as long as they can, but 1 am afraid they are 
getting rather timid.,,43 But neither the resistance of the Thembu 
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leaders nor Warner's zeal, wh i ch at t imes outstripped that of the 
Thembu themselves, could in the end prevent the removal of 6,500 
famil ies, consisting of 31,241 people, to the more remote Qumbu 
district. Further resettlements followed in 1886. 44 
Meanwhile a Select Committee had been appointed45 to investigate 
problems in the northern parts of Emigrant Thembuland and Thembuland 
Proper. The failure of the Government to resettle these areas which, 
on recommendation of the Hemming Commission had been cleared of 
rebels, created a nomansland, which attracted both wh ite squatters and 
ex-rebels. Rivalry between the two groups took on al armi ng 
proportions. 46 The further recommendations by a Select Committee 
appointed in 1882 contributed little towards a solution of the 
prob lem. 
These recommendations, which suggested that "rebel" lands should be 
thrown open for white occupation, while taking into account the rights 
of the "loyal" blacks,47 in fact imp l ied that the Cape Colony would 
have to administer an area over which it had no legal jurisdiction . 
The only practical so l ution would have been immediate annexation, a 
question which had by then become a matter of urgency as well as of 
controversy. 
The anomalous position in which the Cape Government found itself in 
its administration of Thembu territories, came to light in 1881. 
Authorities, both in the Cape and in Britain, accepted 24 December 
1875 as the date on which de facto British Government had begun in 
Thembuland, but the exact legal status of Thembuland had not been 
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agreed upon. For the next six years the administration of the 
territory had remained in the hands of the Cape Native Affairs 
Department. In 1881 Sir H. Robinson replaced Sir Bartle Frere as 
Governor of Thembuland, Emigrant Thembuland, Gcalekaland and 
Bomvanaland, with the power to issue proclamations for their 
government. 48 Up to that time the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland had 
regularly referred his actions to Cape Town for confirmation. James 
Rose-Innes, who was appointed head of the Cape Native Affairs 
Department in 1881, considered this to be wrong, since in his opinion 
the Cape had now no controlling power east of the Kei. 49 When, next, 
Chief Magistrate Elliot sent his decision in a murder case for review, 
Rose-Innes passed it on to the Attorney-General , J.W. Leonard. 
Leonard, after thorough investigation, concluded that the extension of 
British protection over the Thembu in 1875 had been an entirely 
in formal act, and had conferred no right to the Cape Government to 
exercise jurisdiction there. Elliot, he pOinted out , had been Judge 
de facto although not de jure. Lastly, he maintained , that, until the 
country was formally annexed to the Cape Colony, the magistrates had 
no legal right to exerc i se jurisdiction over Thembuland. 50 
Elliot 's interpretation as to his jurisdiction differed from Leonard's 
views on the matter. As Elliot saw it , clause V of the conditions 
under which the Thembu had been taken over granted every person in 
Thembuland a right t o appeal t o the magistrate. If, then, the 
magistrate did not have the power to compel al l parties to appear 
before him, the clause was meaningless. He furthermore maintained 
that the same clause prohibited chiefs from dealing with certain 
serious crimes. Elliot argued that if Leonard was correct the 
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magistrates would not, by implication, have the right to enforce the 
payment of hut tax and licences. He warned that should this become 
known, the revenue in the territory would be nil; there would be no 
security for life and property, and the chiefs would be able to assert 
their old powers and "pull down author ity and power that it has taken 
years to build up .,, 51 Rose-Innes thereupon instructed Elliot to 
cont in ue to exerc i se the jurisdiction in civ i l and crimina l cases as 
he had been doing up to then , whether expressly delegated, or "implied 
by the tacit recognition of the authority you have already 
exerc i sed. ,,52 
From a stri~ktly legal point of view there was therefore no question 
as to the desirability of the extension of Colonial control over 
Thembuland. When in 1882 a proclamation was issued which made 
provision for the introduction of Cape laws in Thembuland , a serious 
debate was started as to whether these territories should form a part 
of the Cape Colony or not. 
Dur i ng the next four years the ques t ion of annexation was thrown to 
and fro. The persistence with which white farmers clung to the lands 
on which they had squatted, the fear t hat the Free State could 
intervene should their kinsmen be removed by force, and, not the 
least, the declared policy of creating a continuous belt of land in 
white hands from the Indwe River to the Griqualand East border, al l 
these gave new urgency to the question of annexat ion. 
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(ii) The Scanlen Government and Annexation 
The Scan len ministry was opposed to the annexation of Transkeian 
territories to the Colony, despite strong demands from the European 
squatters that Thembuland should be united to the Cape Colony, and the 
white inhabitants be given the privileges of Colonial citizens. The 
Government's policy was influenced in part by trouble in Basutoland 
that made them wary to accept extra responsibilities in black 
territories, and, in part to the t rouble within Thembuland itself, 
where discontent, as the chiefs fel t their powers slipping from their 
hands, crystallized broadly along the lines of former divisions viz. 
armed resistance or diplomatic manoeuvre. In 1883 another war scare 
swept through Thembuland. In Matanzima's country Europeans were 
alarmed by reports tha t a diviner had held a dance at that chief ' s 
Great Place and that his people, as well as those living in Mfanta's 
former village, were purchasing saddles . Further reports warned that 
Matanzima and Ndarala, the latter hitherto a staunch Colonial 
supporter, were contemplating a combi nation for hostile purposes. 53 
In Thembuland Proper, fights broke out between school people and the 
ordinary people, and between Mfengu and Thembu. Moreover, there seems 
to have been growing dissatisfaction with Ngangelizwe ' s rule, which 
gave rise to the emergence of a strong war party. Other rumours 
implied that Ngangelizwe had received messages from the Sotho chiefs, 
Letsie and Lehana, who invited him to join in a general war. 
Matanzima was said to have made a similar proposal the previous week. 
According to these rumours, Ngangelizwe had indicat ed his willingness 
to fight and he had said that, in order to blind the government, he 
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would profess loyalty.54 There was, however, not the slightest 
chance of Ngangelizwe going to war against the Colony. His assault 
on a young boy, and subsequent rumours that the boy had died, gave the 
war party the opportunity to agitate for his deposition. At the same 
time many of his followers had lost sympathy with their king's alleged 
outrageous deeds. Others felt that they were just recovering from the 
War of 1881 and they had no desire to be drawn into another war. 55 
Nevertheless, magistrates were inclined to believe that the war 
rumours had some substance; that they were eagerly embraced by 
Ng angelizwe, and that war could easily be precipitated by any 
unfortunate event. Their minds were only put at ease after an 
investigation by Fleischer, the civil commissioner for East London. 
He was appointed to investigate the origins of the war scare in 
Emigrant Thembuland. In his report he stated that the scare had been 
started by traders who had misinterpreted a casual remark by Arthur 
Stanford. 56 Fleischer might have been correct in assuming that there 
were no serious war-like intentions, but there were, undeniably, signs 
of increasing discontent which could escalat e into another revolt. 
Scanlen thus insisted that the Imperial Government should, for the 
time being, bear the responsibility for the Thembu territories. The 
general election of 1883 strengthend the Government's hands , but in 
the following year Scanlen resigned as Prime Minister. He was 
succeeded by Sir Thomas Upington, who strongly rejected the idea of 
British rule east of the Kei. 
Upington believed that imperial participation in South Africa should 
decrease and not increase, and, in one of hi s first statements to the 
Assembly , he announced the Government's intention to push ahead with 
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the annexation to the Colony of those territories already under Cape 
administration. 57 Despite objections from humaniterians both in 
Britain and in the Cape Colony, who accused Upington of following a 
policy of severe repression of the African population,58 the 
Imperial Government was keen to be relieved of a burdensome 
responsibility. There were no further stumbling blocks in the way of 
annexation, and a bill to that effect was easily passed by the Cape 
ParI iament. In August 1885 Thembuland and Gcalekaland were formally 
annexed to the Cape Colony. 
Annexation brought the whole of the Transkei, except Mpondo l and, 
effectively under Colonial control. The territories were to be 
governed by proclamation of the Governor . ,. in Counci I, but the 
Cape Parliament had the right to amend proclamations laid on the table 
the following session. 
Penal Code of 1885. 
The legal system was clearly defined by the 
In drawing up the code, the Government was 
mindful of recommendations put forward by the Cape Native Laws and 
Customs Commission that had been at work since 1881 under chairmanship 
of Sir Jacob Barry, Judge President of the Eastern Districts 
Court. 59 The Commission warned against too rapid changes that could 
provoke resistance. African customs, it found, had been so firmly 
entrenched in tribal life that any 
could disturb the status quo would 
"premature or violent" attempt 
be extremely dangerous. 50 But 
that 
even 
if no dramatic changes were brought about by the introduction of the 
Penal Code, the judicial power of the chiefs was further restricted as 
criminal cases now fell outside their jurisdiction. 
The question that now emerges concerns the extent to which the chiefs 
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still had a role to play under the new dispensation . The truth is 
that their power had already been broken down effectively befo re 1885. 
We could quote at length from magisterial reports to substantiate 
this, but t wo examples will suff ice. 
In 1884 a headman, Ntini, committed a ser iou s crime in direct 
opposition to the wishes of some of his men, who tried to restrain 
him. Ngangelizwe asked for the removal of this Nti ni because he was 
unpopular with a section of hi s people and no longer able to exercise 
beneficial influence. Shaw, the Resident Magistrate , objected against 
such a procedure, s ince th i s could create a precedent, which could 
have enabled Ngangelizwe in future to exerci se a simi lar pr ivilege 
over other headmen who might incur his displeasure or that of some of 
his councillors. Ntini was only fined £10 , and Ngangelizwe had to 
face the fact that he could not get rid of a headma n whom he himself 
had appointed in the first place. 51 
A second example of the erosion of Ngangelizwe's power arose in 1885, 
and it concerns a tract of land that he had granted in 1881 to the 
Bishop of St. Johns. When ,the Bishop claimed title to these lands, 
El l iot disputed Ngangelizwe's right to have granted the land to the 
Bishop. In a letter to the Under-Secretary fo r Native Affairs in 
1882, he exp lained the position as follows: 
"Whatever may have been the lega l position of Thembuland up 
to 1881, it is clear t hat since the appointment of a 
Governor to it by the letters patent of the 14th November 
last , it has fo rmed pa rt of the British Colony ... and 
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Gangelizwe, therefore, has no power whatever to dispose of 
any portion of public domain over which he once held sove-
reign rights - and no grant made by him has any legal 
validity, the sovereignty and ultimate ownership in the 
whole of Thembuland having since the before ment ioned 14 
November, been vested solely in Her Majesty the 
Queen ..... and I am to add that the Government is not 
prepared to recommend a grant to the Bishop of the nature 
proposed, as it cou I d be establ i sh i ng a bad precedent. .. ,,52 
It is no wonder that when a garden dispute arose in 1884 in 
Ngangelizwe's district, the defendant in the case refused to adhere to 
hi s dec isi on, saying: "Ngangelizwe is bleeding". By this he meant 
that Ngangelizwe was no longer a chief. 53 The point had obviously 
been reached where the essence of chieftainship - a chief is a chief 
by the people - had fa ll en away,54 and chiefs could no longer be 
effective spokesmen for their people. There was, in fact, no way in 
which . they could protect their people's rights. The era of military 
resistance had passed by, and oral protests or petitions to the 
Government were regarded with suspicion by those in power, as 
Matanzima was to find out. 55 All that rema i ned was some semblance of 
authority which could be pract i sed under the white umbrella. 
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(ii i ) Thembu react ions in po l itics 
As the chiefs receded into t he background their ineffective, and 
i r relevant, leadership was increasingly chal lenged by t he emergence of 
the new el itest class which became prominent in t he 1880's . Educated 
at the mission school s , where they were steeped in Christian and 
western traditions , these re latively affluent and politica l ly aware 
members of the populat i on were in a better posit ion to t ake up the 
intermediate role between the Co lonial government and the bl ack 
peop le. The 1880 ' s , then, saw the emergence of a number of polit ical 
parties such as t he Imbumba Yama Nyama (1882); the South Africa n 
Aborigi nes Assoc iation (1883) and the South African Nat ive Pol i tical 
Association ( 1883) . These organizations broad ly aimed at t he 
unificat ion of the Eastern Cape Africa ns on po li tica l ma t ters; c loser 
union between chu rch denominat ions; 
peop le in general . 55 
and the adva ncement of black 
A detailed study of Thembu invo lvement in the political activities of 
the 1880's is not possible within the scope of this chapter. We will 
on ly concentr ate upon t wo deve lopments: t he resista nce of Thembu 
leaders to the resett lement schemes discussed earlier in the chapter, 
and the Nehemiah Tile movement which, with its blend of secular and 
re l igious ideals, aimed at the reunificat ion of the Thembu tribe and 
t he establi shment of an i nd ependent Thembu church. 
Our first focal po int then is Glen Grey in the mid 1880 ' s where a 
series of resettlements caused intense bitterness. 57 
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Prominent among the black men who resisted the Cape Government's 
reset tlement schemes during t hat period were Petrus Mahonga, Sam 
Sigeneau, Thomas Poshwayo, Klaas Mayekiso and Thomas Zwedala. They 
came from the ranks of people common ly referred to as "school 
kaffirs", and they had a vested interest in land matters since most of 
them possessed their own farms. Mahonga and Sigeneau, for instance, 
had received their farms way back in the 1850's from Nonesi and Tyopo 
who, under the influence of J.C . Warner, had followed the Rev. 
Calderwood's example in Victoria East and enticed influential men by 
means 
area 
of gifts of land for cultivation, to settle among them in the 
annexed by Sir Harry Smith in 1848. 58 Within the ranks of this 
privileged class were also men like Richard Kawa who was secretary of 
the South African Native Political Association. This association 
propagated, amongst other things, the election of black men to 
parliament, and it had contact with politically aware Africans in the 
NgamaKwe and Tsomo districts . 59 
These, then, were the leaders who opposed the resettlement schemes. 
They based their arguments against the alienation of land on the 
principle that Glen Grey (procured for them by Sir George Grey in 
1853), belonged to the Thembu as a whole. They insisted that they did 
not consider the Thembu Location to be crown land , and that the people 
were entitled to tribal title under a chief . These arguments were 
brought forward vociferously at meetings of the assembled Thembu, 
which resulted in petitions to the Government as well as by action 
groups which proposed ways and means of securing a better deal for the 
Glen Grey people. They openly showed their disdain for the paid 
headmen whom they regarded as indifferent and incapable of 
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understanding the political realities of the day. At one of the very 
first meetings, after the railway line removals of 1884 took place, 
they explained that dissatisfaction was not limited to the removal 
question, but tha t it was linked to the disarmament issue. 70 They 
further rejected governmental statements that the removals had taken 
place with the consent of the people. The 'people', according to 
them, were a few headmen who could not speak on behalf of the 
Thembu . 71 
That the headmen had indeed been reduced to nonentities was 
undoubtedly true. Those who dared to speak out against removals were 
summarily dismissed, and the Secretary for Native Affairs, J . de Wet, 
made it clear tha t any opposition from those quarters would be 
unacceptable to th e Government. Addressing a meeting at Lady Frere, 
he referred to the meeting at Qogodala which had led to the dismissal 
of some headmen, and t hen warned: "I do not say that natives have no 
right to hold meetings, but you are not yet sufficiently advanced for 
that, and had better be led by a white man for your own good ... lt is 
utterly illegal for paid government officials to take part in such 
meetings. A man who receives government pay is to do the work of the 
government, and is not to attend meetings and help to frustrate the 
actions of government." The rebuke did not deter headmen Pellem, 
Tabata and Kalipa from expressing their deep disappointment at the way 
in which deputations were ignored and promises were broken during 
negotiations on the removal issue. 72 It was, however, clear that the 
Government had no intention of deviating from its declared policy, the 
object of which was to make more land available for white 
settlement. 73 
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The failure of the 1884 protest movement to prevent any resettlement, 
can be ascribed to two factors. First , it did not succeed in putting 
up a united front against the Government; and secondly, it failed to 
reach the mass of the people. 
The lack of unity among the leading figures, may be ascribed to a 
strong tendency among the Thembu towards ethno-centr icity. Th i s made 
cooperation between Thembu and Mfengu leaders almost impossible. 
Furthermore, it would seem that the Wesleyan min i sters who were more 
closely associated wi th the Thembu than with the other population 
groups played a divisive role. E.J. Warner, especially, was 
suspected of having encouraged the Thembu in their desire to be 
recognized as an independent nation .74 His zeal in promoting Thembu 
interests at times outstripped that of the Thembu leaders themselves. 
For this there could be several reasons. He certainly had a real 
concern for the suffering of the people with whom he and his father 
had been associated for such a long time . It i s al so true that the 
cause of the Wesleyan Church which had been so closely associated with 
the Thembu , was at stake. There could perhaps have been a more 
personal reason, and that was the desire to maintain an independent 
Thembu nation in which the Warners' "father image" could survive. His 
act ive involvement in the affairs of both the Glen Grey people and the 
Emigrant Thembu undoubtedly emphasised the existence of the Thembu as 
a separate nat ional group albeit one which was politically divided. 75 
It is not possible to determine to what extent Warner's influence 
contributed towards the rifts between the Thembu and other population 
groups. Any attempt to do so would be guesswork and might be unfair 
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to Warner himself. That such rifts did exist cannot be denied. The 
Secretary for Native Affairs, Jacobus de Wet, on occasion tried to 
dissuade the Thembu from listening to Pellem by branding him as a 
Ngqika who was t rying to further his own interests through the 
Thembu. 76 The rift between the various factions in Glen Grey became 
more obvious in the 1890's during a leadership dispute following a 
governmental decision to ignore the feelings of farmers in the 
vicin ity of five Wesleyen Mission Stations, and to grant 
tenure only to inhabitants of the station. 77 Earlier, 
individual 
a survey 
had shown that various other farmers also desired this privilege, 
but doubts were expressed as to the expediency of giving the 
rights as well as the burdens of private ownership to black 
farmers. Farmers, not being attached to mission stations, were 
regarded as "ignorant heathen", incapable of looking after their own 
interests, and the easy prey of reckless speculators. 78 At a 
subsequent meeting farmers expressed their dismay and elected a 
deputation under leadership of J. Tengo Jabavu and J. Mahonga to meet 
the Government in Cape Town on this issue. 79 Jabavu and Mahonga were 
not of Thembu origin, and their right t o act as representatives of the 
people was immediately questioned. In a letter to Imvo, Thomas 
Malasili not only rejected their right to speak on behalf of the 
Thembu, but also pointed out that David Makoti, who was elected by the 
Glen Grey Thembu to be convenor of a public meeting, was ignored at 
the time of the e-Xora meeting. The result was that less than one-
third of the Thembu people involved in the issue attended the 
meeting. 80 
Clearly, then, ethnicity was a divisive factor in the Glen Grey 
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resistance movements, and it was fu rther accentuated by the 
polarization between affluent and poor people which outruled the 
possib il ity of putting up a united front against the Colonial 
Government. The que stions put to and the answers given by Johannes 
Mahonga, when questioned by the Glen Commission on the issue of land 
distribution in this district, will show to what extent polarization 
had taken place: 
Q: "How much do you think a school kafir wants?" 
Mahonga: "I think he would be satisfied with 50 morgen . " 
Q: "What do you think would be a fair extent of land for a 
Red Kafir?" 
Mahonga: "From eight to fif teen morgen." 
Q: "Why should school kafi rs have a preference over Red 
kafirs?" 
Mahonga: "On account of one being more industrious than t he 
other. The Red Kafir will only grow mealies and Kafir 
Corn whereas the sc hoo l kafir would grow all sorts of 
things." 
Q: "00 you think it is r ight that one man should have 
twice as much as another?" 
Mahonga: "Yes - because all gifts could not be alike, and their 
work could not be alike." 
Q: "How do you know that the Red Kafi r would not cuI ti vate 
30 morgen of land if they got it?" 
Mahonga: "1 see them and how they Plough.,,81 
The cleavage between the two groups was also emphasised at the time 
when the Government contemplated the granting of individual title to 
farmers in the vic inity of missio n stations in Glen Grey. These 
farmers objected very strongly to sharing commonages with the mission 
people. The inability of the educated people to identify with the 
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traditional communities, rendered their leadership ineffective. 
When studying documents covering events during the late 1880s one is 
led to the conclusion that the problems of the ordinary people were 
taken up by the white missionaries rather than by their own 
kinsmen. 82 Such observations support J.M. Lonsdale's diagnosis of the 
failures of early black nationalist movements in Africa when he wrote: 
"While old communicators were becoming less suited to their tasks, the 
new men them-selves did not make real contact with the potential mass 
following ... this contact was essential for the development of mass 
nationalism ... (The new men) were political leaders but not social 
leaders. 83 
The political organizations to which reference has been made earlier 
in this chapter functioned within the framework of white dominated 
structures. They accepted western values as the foundation of their 
political ideals; were moderate in their approach to white 
domination, and hoped that through a process of constitutional 
evolution the blacks would eventually be accommodated in the Cape 
system. But there were also those who responded differently to the 
politics of the 1880's. Disillusioned with white control, they wished 
to assert their independence, albeit without denouncing those things 
which they found valuable in western civilization. 84 Thoughts along 
these lines crystallized in the establishment of independent black 
churches of which Nehemiah Tile's Indendent Thembu Church was the 
most prominent. 
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(iv) Thembu reactions in religion 
Neh emiah Tile had his early training as a Wesleyan Minister at 
Healdtown. 85 It was perhaps under the influence of leading African 
Wesleyans , such as Richard Kawa and James Dwane, that his interest in 
politics was awakened. 85 In 1879 he moved to the Mqanduli district 
where he was first probation minister at Morley, then moved to 
Qokolweni close by, and eventually settled at Xora where he worked as 
a teacher. 
Tile's residence in the Mqanduli district was of particular 
significance in his career. Not only was he here close to the centre 
of authority, but this district had, since 1875, been a seething pot 
of discontent. After the take-over of the Thembu in 1875 frustration 
had built up as a result of Colonial delay in settling the Bomvana-
Thembu boundary disputes. When eventual ly the boundary was drawn, 
mutua l trespassing had made reconciliation between the two tribes 
impossible . The Thembu resented the Colonial Government's clumsy 
handling of this affair. It was, moreover, the district where the 
paramount's influence was strongly felt, and his fo llowers were more 
offended in 1875 by his demotion t han those living further from his 
immed iate sphere of inf luence. 87 In 1875 the Mqanduli people were the 
most outspoken in their complaints against the Government's 
destruction of Thembu chieftainship and the handing over of the 
chiefs ' jud ici al powers to magistrates. 88 That the people in this 
district did not join the war of 1881 must therefore be ascribed to 
Ngangelizwe's opposit ion to waging a war that could end in defeat, 
rather than to their feeling of affection for the Colony. 
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It was in this atmosphere, then, that the young probationer minister 
started hi s career. Here too, he made the acquaintance of an 
became his right hand man. 89 A capable, evangelist, Paul Shaw, who 
hardworking and ambitious man, it was inevitable that Tile would have 
been caught up in the political activities of the time . Hi s 
involvement in secular affairs led to a break with the Wesleyan-
Church. Like other African members, Tile resented certai n 
discriminatory practices such as the right of white Eng l ish-speaking 
ministers alone to decide on the distribution of church funds. 90 It 
was, however, most likely his political activities with i n the Thembu 
chiefdom that led to his final breakaway .91 Tile's departure from 
the Wesleyan Church was followed by the establishment of an 
independent Thembu church, and by Tile's persona l active involvement 
in attempts to undermine the powers of the white magistrates. 
The church he envisaged was to be designated the "Thembu Church of 
South Afr ica", and was to be moulded along the I ines of the Church of 
England. Allen Lea mentioned that the first separat i st Church was 
erected at Mqekweweni, near Ngange l izwe's Great Place. In th i s church 
a prayer, composed by Tile, was sung on the command of Ngangel i zwe. It 
stressed the supremacy of the king over the church and implied the 
rejection of Queen Victoria as head of the church. 92 The 
estab l ishment of this church was closely linked with Tile's political 
ideals namely the reunificat ion of the Thembu nation. As Saunders 
explained: "Tile ' s church stressed Christian allegiance to the 
paramount, and endowed him with a certain religious sanctity, which 
enhanced his traditiona l ritual role and helped to buttress his 
authority, weakened by missionary activity and the economic and 
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political change accompanying white penetration in the area " . A 
church, speaking through the chiefdom, could playa part in welding 
together, under the paramount, the whole of that area which Tile's 
programme envisaged would once again fall under his direct control.,,93 
From 1883 onwards Tile held a series of meetings at Ngangelizwe's 
Great Place, at which he called for the removal of all the 
magistrates, except the Chief Magistrate, from Thembuland; for the 
abolition of passes; for the unification of the Thembu "from the 
Indian Ocean to Glen Grey"; and for imperial rather than colonial 
rule. 94 
Tile's activities were likely to appeal to Ngangelizwe as the 
appointment of magistrates was a deeply divisive factor in Thembuland, 
and had further weakened his tottering authority. The meetings 
addressed by Tile and Paul Shaw at the Great Place , were followed by 
petitions for the removal of magistrates, signed by t he paramount in 
his capacity as "Lord of t he Thembu tribe". This would reinforce the 
suspicion that Tile had become a tremendous power behind the throne . 95 
On the other hand there is no evidence that Ngangelizwe personal ly 
attended any of Tile's meetings, and, when visited by chiefs who had 
att ended such a meeting, he cautioned them to live peacefully under 
the magistrate, sounding his oft-repeated warning that the Government 
had never yet fought a man without conquering him and driving him out 
of the country.96 It would seem, then, that Ngangelizwe, despite 
being attracted by the movement, gave it only half-hearted support . 
His hesitation to take a stand is understandable, given the situation 
in which he found himself at the time. On the one hand he could not 
challenge the Government while the outcome of a stabbing case in which 
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he was involved was still pending; on the other hand there was the 
war party which wanted his removal. 97 An egg dance between the 
extremes would have been the only way in which he could save his skin. 
There were al so rumours, supported by medical reports, that 
Ngangelizwe was a very sick man, usually under the influence of 
liquor, and by no means capable of carrying out his titular 
respons ibilit ies. 98 It may be that decisions were taken on his behalf 
by councillors who supported Tile. 99 
It is equal ly difficult to determine Tile's influence over the other 
chiefs in Thembuland. Evidence indicates that many refused to attend 
the meetings, while others seemed sceptical about his suggestions. 
Asked by one of the chiefs: "What is wrong with the magistrates?", 
Tile shrewdly answered: "The magistrates do no harm, but the chiefs do 
not get as much money as formerly for fees." Another sceptic was 
informed that "the petty chiefs ignore the chiefs, but if the mag i s-
trates were gone, they would listen to the chiefs. 100 There was on ly 
one brief period when it seemed as if success was within his grasp. 
In 1884 there were rumours that the posts of magistrates were to be 
abolished as part of an economy drive. Walter Stanford warned that 
this could be seen by Tile as a Colonial concess ion to his demands. 10 1 
Later that year, the Upington ministry came into power and all ideas 
of the Cape Colony's withdrawal from the Transkei were rejected . The 
posts of magistrates were therefore secured. By that time Tile was in 
serious troub le, following accusations that he had instigated the 
Mqanduli people to refuse to pay hut tax. He was arrested, but the 
Attorney-genera l ruled that the arrest was illegal, and af ter a 
reprimand in front of the ch iefs and headmen he was released. 102 
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After the death of Ngangelizwe, Tile tr ied with new vigou r to gain 
influence over Dalindyebo, the mission-educated successor to the 
throne, who, he had reason to believe, would give him more substantial 
support. Ear ly in 1885 a letter, dated 12 December 1884 , signed by 
Ngangelizwe, was forwarded to the Ch ief Magistrate. In this letter it 
was asked that Dalindyebo should be recognized as chief, with his 
lesser brothers as chiefs under him. It further stated that the 
Thembu nation had selected Tile to speak on their behalf; that Tile, 
Holosima, Ngonyana, and Jobinambayi represented the rea l mind of the 
Thembu people; and that those headmen, such as Cuta lel e and Nanyaki, 
who spoke against Tile, were not representative of the Thembu people . 
The latter, they said, were in fact the subjects of the Bomvana chief, 
Sipendu. The letter emphasised, in conclusion, that the Thembu had 
the right to decide for themselves who their spokesman would be. The 
authenticity of this letter was seriously doubted. By the end of 
December, Ngangelizwe was already in a dying state. Elliot was 
therefore of the opinion that it was either written at the time, but 
that the tribe refused to forward it, or that it was of their recent 
concoction. 103 
The Chief Magistrate suspected Dalindyebo of having had a hand in the 
writing and ci rculation of the letter. He had serious reservations as 
to Dalindyebo' s relationship with some ex-rebels, and he was 
part icular ly concerned about the young paramount's attempts to have 
his two "rebel" uncles, Sinquanqati and Bambendino, resettled in the 
Umtata district. The matter of their being pardoned had already been 
raised by Ngangelizwe the previous year. 104 Elliot distrusted the two 
ex-chiefs, believing that they were still in contact with the 
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Sotho. 105 In view of the declared Colonial policy of rendering any 
possible military alliances against the Cape Colony as ineffective as 
possible, it would have been most inexpedient to allow these chiefs to 
sett le in Thembuland Proper. At the same time Gungubele's people were 
settled in the Emyanyani district. Almost immediate ly trouble broke 
out between the newcomers and the old residents. It seemed that the 
ex-rebels had the support of Tile and Dalindyebo. 106 Dalindyebo's 
concern for the settlement of ex-rebels in his district was seen as 
an attempt to win the favour of the anti -Colonial fac tio n in 
Thembula nd. 
Furt her alarm in official circles arose when, in 1885, Blakeway was 
presented with a letter from Dalindyebo written by Tile. In this 
letter they informed Blakeway of their intention to visit those chiefs 
and headmen in the district whose boys had been circumcised after the 
death of Ngangelizwe, to establish why they had ignored the 
traditional period of mourning, during which boys could not be 
circumcised. 107 Blakeway indicated that while he would allow the 
vis it to take place, he would strongly object to any fine being 
inflicted on people for having ci rcumcised their boys. The i nf Ii ct i on 
of a fine would have been most unfair, since only a few favoured 
chiefs had been notified that there should be no such ceremony. In an 
attempt to settle matters, Blakeway assembled the chiefs and headmen 
at his office . The meeting was attended by all concerned, except by 
Dalindyebo's counc illors. The chiefs unanimously confirmed that no 
notice had been given with regard to the circumcision. Should 
Dalindyebo be allowed to proceed, Blakeway pOinted out, it would mean 
that t he impoverished district would suffer the loss of about three 
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hundred cattle paid as fine to the paramount. Blakeway understood 
Til e' s involvement in t his matter very well. If Dalindyebo's 
messengers could be allowed to proceed through the territory, bringing 
frivolous charges against the people for the sake of fines, while 
ignoring the magistrates in the matter, the latter ' s authority would 
soon be undermined. This was evidently Tile and Shaw's ultimate 
Object. 108 In the months following Dalindyebo's installation, Tile 
resumed his efforts to get rid of the magistrates. Early in April 
1885 a large meeting was held at Dalindyebo's great place. 109 This 
meeting is of some significance since, for the first time, Matanzima 
was present . This Emigrant chief had, by now, emerged as an 
influential leader. 110 He was an outspoken critic of Governmental 
int erference in t he affairs of the chiefdoms, and would certainly have 
been attracted by any movement that propagated the removal of the 
magistrat es from Thembuland. What is strange, though, is the fact 
that Tile, in calling on Matanzima's support, put in a plea that 
Charles Levey should not be removed from office. Between Mat anzima 
and Levey, there exist ed a very strong animosity,lll and it is highly 
unlikely that Matanzima would have been amenable to any suggestion 
aimed at strengthening this magistrate ' s position. On the other hand 
it is possible t hat Matanzima was trying to fish in troubled water, 
hoping that in giving some moral support to the resistance movement, 
he might gain some influence in Thembuland Proper. Allegedly he 
called on the chiefs to stand together, say i ng that hitherto their 
requests were ignored by the Government, because they were not 
unanimous in their decisions. He then asked that his presence at the 
meeting should be kept a secret. Dalindyebo, who presided over the 
meeting, assured the chiefs that it was in their power to bring about 
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the removal of the magistrates, especially as they could count on the 
support of a number of Europeans. 112 
When Elliot summoned Dalindyebo to Umtata asking him to explain his 
involvement in the incriminating meetings held at his Great Place, the 
chief appeared to be very well-disposed towards the Government. 
Matters such as the paying of subsidies to chiefs were discussed , and 
Elliot was convinced that a good relationship could be established 
with Dalindyebo so that he could be kept from Tile's influence. 113 
Shortly afterwards Tile clashed with Dalindyebo, after which the 
former disappeared from the scene for about four years. He returned 
in 1889 to resume his agitation for a united Thembu nation. 
Whi le it wou ld seem that Tile had not succeeded in making headway in 
Emigrant Thembuland, he maintained some influence in Thembuland 
Proper, after his return. At one of his meetings at Dalindyebo's 
Great Place in 1890, where demands for a united Thembu nation and the 
recognition of his church as the church of the people were repeated 
certainly with the whole-hearted support of Dalindyebo. Tile also 
advised that on ly black ministers should be al lowed to hold services 
with chiefs. 114 There is no evidence of any support for this 
suggestion. 
Tile lived at a site near Dalindyebo's Great Place, until his death in 
1890. Although his successor, Goduka , succeeded in maintaining the 
movement's influence in Thembuland, Dalindybeco, some years later 
broke with the Church to return to the Wesleyan fold. 115 Saunders 
pOints out that the Tile church had risen above a narrow ethnic basis, 
227 
as it was open to people other than Thembu. He then concludes that 
Ti le's political activities "may have played a part in creating a 
milieu conductive to later partic ipation in African nationalist 
po l itics," and that "the element of African assert ion in early 
religious independency, which first expressed itse lf in Tile ' s church, 
was to form a major ideo logical component of African nationalism. 116 
It is suggested here that it was the emphas i s on a united Thembu 
nation, that attracted Thembu people to Tile's church . Once this 
emphasis fel l away, the movement lost its support in Thembuland. In 
that sense it remained an ethnic church . Saunders's theory tha t it 
particul ar ly stimulated Thembu participat ion in politica l activities 
seems plausible, given the prominence, i n the 20th centuiry, of Thembu 
leaders in Transke ian and South African politics. 
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Chapter 6 
Ngubengcuka's Grandsons 
(i) King Ngangelizwe: Villain or Vilified? 
Contemporary official and newspaper reports present an unfavourable 
picture of the last king of independent Thembuland. From them he 
emerges as an ambitious and cruel tyrant, lascivious, addicted to 
liquor and po li tically inept. F. Brownlee wrote that he was "a man of 
savage disposition and ungovernable temper, ,,1 whi Ie Sir Walter 
Stanford spoke of his cruel disposition. 2 His one-time mentor and 
confidant, the Rev. Peter Hargreaves, referred to his ru le as one of 
debauchery and bloodshed. 3 The most acrimonious attacks came from 
J.C. Warner during the time that he was Thembu Agent. His letters to 
Southey between the years 1865 and 1871 frequently referred to a 
"half-cracked fellow " , a "living freak", and "a Chaka-like despot".4 
"It is dangerous to have anything to do with him", he once wrote. "He 
is such a liar that he cannot be trusted. I sometimes think I see 
signs of real insanity in him . He gets into horrid passions and does 
outrageous things. He drinks kaffer beer and sleeps alternately 
almost day and night".5 Warner was supported by the local press which 
made regular reports on the behaviour of this "monster of brutality". 
An anonymous traveller who visited Thembuland in 1867 painted a 
horrifying picture of conditions in that country. Ngangelizwe was 
said to have chopped off the arm of one of his wives, killed another, 
thrust an assegai through the body of a girl who was too tired to 
dance on his wedding night and killed a horse that stumbled. 6 Other 
reports accused him of having beaten a pregnant woman to death, of 
hav ing cut off the ears of a horse which had become tired and of 
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having killed an infant who gazed at him.7 
Less politically-minded Europeans treated the king more kindly in 
their memoirs. It is as difficult to reconcile Capt. Cunynghame's 
"coarse- look i ng savage"8 with the trader W.J. Cl arke ' s picture of "one 
of nature ' s true gentlemen",9 as it is to imagine this murderer, 
returning the day after he had been treated to a lunch, to thank his 
hostess . 10 H.G. Ell iot, who was chief magistrate of Thembu land 
dur ing the crucia l years 1879-1881, when the Cape Co lony was 
particularly keen t o strengthen its ties wi th t he Thembu para mo unt, 
was of the opinion that Ngangelizwe was not vicious by nature, but 
that he committed his atrocious acts when under the influence of 
l iquor . 11 Sihele described him as an outgo ing, ta lkative person, 
witty, and as mischievous as a boy. 12 
To view this character in any sort of realistic light, it is necessary 
to consider the profound changes that took place, both in his personal 
l i fe and in the lives of his people at the time of his accession to 
power. 
Born in the 1840s,13 Ngange l izwe grew up at a time when European 
influences were beginning to infiltrate Thembu insti tut ions to a 
ma r ked degree. The closer cooperat ion between the Co lonia l and Thembu 
Governments, which fo l lowed on Mtirara's settlement nearer to the 
Colonial boundary in 1839, was comple~ented by t he increasing 
influence of the Wes leyan missionaries. At the Great Place at Rhoda, 
near the Indwe river, the lay-preacher J.C. Warner ga ined a posit i on 
of such confidence that it earned him t he title "the uncrowned king of 
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the Thembu" .14 ,When Mtirara died in 1848, Warner assumed the position 
of head of the House of Ngubengcuka, in which capacity he hoped to 
exercise benevolent, but firm parental control over the young 
prince . 15 The Rev. Peter Hargreaves, who became missionary at 
Clarkebury in 1858, aba ndoned his predecessor' s policy of non-
interference in Thembu affairs to such an extent that he later prided 
himself on having been called the Prime Minister of Thembuland. 16 It 
was undoubtedly through the influence of Warner that the young 
Ngangelizwe became a scholar at Clarkebury and a candidate for 
Christian baptism, living in Hargreaves's house with the fu l l consent 
of Joyi. 17 We do not know whether he acquired his preference for 
western clothes and his love for music at this time. 18 What does 
emerge is that he was a kind and promising lad who showed no sign of 
the violent temper for which he was to become so notorious. 19 
This period of intense exposure to Christianity - which taught a set 
of values vastly different from those held by the Th embu, who were 
known for the i r resistance to innovation,20 was abruptly interrupted 
when Ngangelizwe became king in 1863. Hargreaves related that on his 
assumption of power he raised the matter of Christianity with his 
subjects. They warned him against it, say ing "You cannot become a 
Christian and remain a chief. Who is going to keep our tribal 
practices? Who is going to doctor us for war?" To this challenge 
Ngangelizwe allegedly answered: "Very well, you decide I must be a 
heathen. I will let you know how far heathenism can take me. 21 
According to another report, he was once again confronted by his 
conservative councillors when a marriage was to be arranged between 
himself and Emma, the Christianised daughter of the Ngqika chief, 
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Sandile. They objected to their king being married in Christian 
fashion and thus being restricted to one wife. 22 Such accounts must 
be treated with circumspection,23 but it seems reasonable to assume 
that a complete break from existing Thembu mores, on the part of 
Ngangelizwe, would have subjected him to considerable antagonism from 
his people. He may have found himself under pressure from two 
quarters - the traditiona l one from which he originated and the 
Christianized one which attracted him. A satisfactory solution to 
such a dilemma may well have been beyond the reach of one as young and 
inexperienced as he was at the time. The effects of these personal 
pressures upon him are speculat ion. What is certain, however, is that 
he was unfortunate having assumed power at a time when the friendly 
relations between Thembu and the Colonial Government were beginning to 
decline. This trend was already discernable prior to Ngangelizwe's 
accession to power as has been mentioned earlier. 24 
The basis for most of the serious problems in the Transkeian 
territories at the time must be sought in the question of la nd. Until 
Ngangelizwe became paramount in 1863, this struggle had been between 
three contenders; the Thembu, the Gcaleka and the Mfengu. Towards 
the end of the decade this pattern was complicated by an additional 
factor - the interference of the Cape Colony in the affai rs of black 
chiefdoms. Thi s interference resulted from the policy of divide-and-
rule applied by Governor, Wodehouse in the hope of preserving peace in 
the least costly way. In fact, it often threatened to disturb the 
very equilibrium the Government was hoping to establish. 
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It was therefore under conditions of uncertainty, apprehension and 
pol itical intrigue that the story of Thembuland' s "vi llain king" 
unfolded itself . It began in September 1863 when, allegedly in 
accordance with the wishes of the late Mtirara, the ailing Joyi took 
the young Qeya25 to Glen Grey to be inducted as paramount by his 
"foster father", J.C. Warner, who was then still Thembu agent in the 
Location. 26 Warner welcomed the occasion as a means of strengthening 
the equivocal Thembu-European relationship, cultivating a useful and 
obliging ally who could act as a bulwark against the Cape Colony's 
arch-enemy, Sarhili and, above all, reaffirm his own position as Head 
of the House of Ngubengcuka and, by implication, big chief of the 
Thembu. All these he considered, from a political and personal point 
of view, to be of the utmost importance. He was apprehensive of the 
possibility of Ngangelizwe becoming the most popular and powerful 
ruler in independent Transkei, which may have led to the latter giving 
way to pressure of other chiefs and transferring his allegiance to his 
black neighbours instead of to the Cape Government. Warner realized 
that all his manipulative powers would be needed to forestall such a 
development. 
In his dealings with Ngangelizwe, Warner used a blend of bribery, 
indoctrination and patronage, of which the King's induction ceremony 
was a perfect example. Warner made sure that the gift of £50 which he 
was to hand over to Ngangelizwe on behalf of the Cape Government, 
received precedence over the gifts of all the chiefs who attended the 
ceremony. In a fatherly speech, consisting of advice and admonitions, 
the young king was promised a stipend of £50 a year, provided that he 
remained faithful to the Cape Government. He was reminded of 
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Mtirara's excellent record of friendship with t he Colony, and of his 
protection of missionaries in times of war, an example Ngangel i zwe was 
advised to follow as "it was through the Bible that Britain reached 
her state of greatness among the nations of the world.,,27 
Warner's next step was to strengthen his hold on the new ruler. Not 
only did he persuade the Government to leave Ngangelizwe to his 
exclusive guidance,28 but in a clever move he also ensured that the 
annual st ipend should be paid by Warner's office to Ngangelizwe in 
person. 29 Thereby he effectively blurred the distinction between his 
personal and official capacities. Furthermore, to prevent 
interference from other Transkeian officials, in whom he had little 
confidence,30 he suggested that once Ngangelizwe was back at the 
Mbashe, all communications between him and the Government should be 
conducted through Hargreaves whom he regarded as "a sensib le man, 
deeply interested in the religious welfare of the chief, but who, will 
not fail to influence his mind or teach him the lesson of loyalty to 
the British government.,,31 One other factor had to be carefully 
managed: Ngangelizwe's position as paramount of the Location. Here 
it had to be made clear to him that, although the Location residents 
were his subjects, they lived nominally within the Cape Colony; he 
could, therefore, have no dealings with them except through the Thembu 
agent, Warner himself. 
One can only speculate as to Ngangelizwe's intentions at the time. 
Outwardly he behaved with commendable modesty ,32 and on various 
occasions politely professed his loyalty to the Cape Colony. But he 
was certain ly not being duped. Soon after he became king, he had his 
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first brush with the authorities on the hitherto unresolved questions 
of free intercourse between the Mbashe and the Location Thembu, and 
the dis t ribution of Fadana's lands. 33 He could do little, other than 
to voice his protest, but the Government was obliged to take note of 
the strong influence he had over the Location residents. When a 
census was taken in Glen Grey in February 1865 , he objected to his 
people's being "counted by the white man" without his consent having 
first been obtained. His message to the chiefs caused such excitement 
that the census had to be stopped for some time. 34 
Initially such protests were sympathetically received by Warner and 
faithfully conveyed to the Government, together with warnings not to 
estrange the Thembu king. The breakdown of these cordial relations, 
soon after the Emigration had started in 1865,35 was the result of 
the head-on clash between Ngangelizwe and Warner on the question of 
Thembu unity. Ngangelizwe's behaviour at t he time of the 
his attempts to put Mfanta up as his representative in the 
Emigration , 
Location,36 
his meetings with Nonesi, and his insistence on maintaining control of 
the Emigrant chiefs, all pointed to an understandable desire to 
restore the Thembu Empire. 37 Such designs militated against the 
successful execution of the Cape Government's policy of divide-and-
rule. 
In essence, the end result of this divide-and-rule policy was the 
destruction of traditional tribal structures, thereby leaving the 
people defenceless in the event of Colonial onslaughts on their lands 
and culture. The first step in its implementation was the weakening 
of the position of the paramount by recognising the independence of 
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the lesser chiefs. In this way the unity of the nation crumbled. 38 
The establishment of Emigrant Thembuland and the recognition of the 
four independent chiefs is an example of the way in which this policy 
was advanced. J.C. Warner believed implicit ly that t he key to future 
stability on the frontier was to be found in active ly encouraging 
estrangement between a paramount and his chiefs. "It is also my 
policy," he wrote to Southey, "to divide and conquer. This I will 
carry out with as much vigour as possible on any paramount by 
supporting hi s subordinate chieftains to maintain their 
representatives, t hus keeping up a healthy ba lance of power amongst 
them which might at any time be used t o our benefit.,,39 The 
implementation of this policy, however, involved considerable risk s. 
Warner's fostering of antagonistic interests among the Thembu, could 
alienate Ngangelizwe and drive him into an alliance with Sarhili. On 
the one hand therefore, Warner had to appease the King by al lowing the 
Thembu partial hegemony, while on the other, he had to encourage 
jealousy between the chiefs. In t his way he hoped that the two Thembu 
sections cou ld be divided into two separate antagoni st ic blocs , 
compris ing more or less equal numbers . Mater ially weakened in this 
way, their threat would be contained. The creation of such a 
Bismarckian system of alliances and counter- alliances required skilful 
manoeuvering, and Warner's actions during th is period often resemble 
those of a conspirator rather than a government official. 
Ngangelizwe must have been bewildered by such act ions by an erstwhile 
friend. He had reason to believe that, according t o agreements 
between himse lf and Warner at the time of the Emigration, his 
paramountcy over all the Thembu had been recognised by the Cape 
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Government . In this capacity he would have had certain prerogatives 
in Emigrant Thembuland such as the distribution of land and the 
settlement of foreigners among his own people, provided that no 
alienation of land took place. He would also have had the right to 
calIon his subordinate chiefs for military aid in time of war. These 
prerogatives were now disputed by Warner, who tried to contradict him 
on every pOint and to undermine his authority. 
A serious dispute between Warner and Ngangelizwe began in 1867 when 
the latter, acting in his capacity as Thembu Paramount, allowed three 
Afrikaner families and a few Sotho families to settle at the mouth of 
the Tsomo river, in Emigrant Thembuland. 40 The emigrant chiefs saw 
Ngangelizwe's interference in their domain as a bid to usurp their 
sovereignty. Matanzima, acting as their spokesman, lodged their 
complaints with both J.C. and E.J. Warner. J.C. Warner took up the 
case with his usual elan. The episode provided him with another 
opportunity of using the t wo brothers ' quarrels t o the advantage of 
the Cape Colony. By presenting Ngangelizwe as the bogeyman against 
whose tyranny t he chiefs had to be protected, he emphasised their 
dependence upon the Cape Colony, hoping that in time they would be 
willing to place themselves entirely under the Government. 41 In this 
way he was already subtly paving the way for British intervention 
beyond the Kei. But above all, Warner wanted to use this incident to 
humiliate Ngangelizwe whose act ive opposition to the Emigration had 
infuriated him. The dispute between the two men had by 1867 developed 
into a personal affair. Warner now thought that by removing farmers 
who were living on lands given to them by Ngangelizwe, he would 
demonstrate once and for all that Ngangelizwe had no say in Emigrant 
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Thembuland. The question of the Thembu paramount's relation with his 
emigrant subjects, which had not been finalized in 1865 , was thus 
reopened. 
During the meetings that followed, Warner left Ngangelizwe under no 
illusion as to the fact that he was recognised only as the nominal 
head of Emigrant Thembuland, and that by interfering in any way with 
t he chiefs he jeopardised his relationship with t he Cape Government 
from whom he received a subsidy. Southey, on receiving a letter from 
Warner on this iss ue, warned that they had dealt freely with 
Ngangelizwe when they had exchanged the land across the Kei. 
Ngangelizwe, Southey said, could thus quite rightly say: "the land is 
mine. I have a right to do so" (i .e. settle foreigners in Emigrant 
Thembuland). The Governor would probably have taken the same view. 42 
Warner was quick to retort that Southey should not stress the matter 
of the deal having been made with Ngangelizwe. "You must not forget" 
he frankly admitted, "that Qeya was only made use of 
as a convenience in the negotiations, and that the Location was only 
nominally his, and that he had no legal title to the lands, whereas 
the chiefs who have migrated had a legal title ... and that in reality 
they were the real contracting parties .... So it will be well not to 
lay too much stress on that point. In fact it would be bad policy ... 
it will never do to make Qeya greater than we can avoid . ,,43 Some 
mo nt hs earlier he had justified his policy of interference in 
Emigrant Thembuland by indicating that he was acting on official 
instructions. "I can make peace with Qeya tomorrow," he told Southey, 
"by dropping the first syllable from Disun ion - the t erm you yourself 
used to express your policy." As further justification for his 
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actions he added: "Qeya wants to unite the whole of the Thembu, 
Basuto and Pondomise, and even some Boers under his uncontrollable 
government. ,,44 It is unlikely that Southey would have taken such 
exaggerations seriously,45 but, except for the occasional mild 
reprimand, there were for the time being no efforts from Cape Town to 
put an end to Warner's interference in Emigrant Thembuland. This left 
Ng angel izwe in a quandary, but he nevertheless made a tough stand on 
the subject of the disputed terri tory. Accusing the Warner fami ly of 
sowing dis trust between himself and his people, as well as between 
himself and the Cape Government, he appealed, through the office of 
the Queenstown magistrate, for the remova l of all the Warner s from t he 
Transkei. 46 
The eventua l evict ion of the farmers by the F. A.M.P. put an end to the 
dispute, but the breach between Warner and Ngangelizwe could never be 
healed. Warner's continued interference in the affairs of Emigrant 
Thembuland drove matters to a head. When Wodehouse vis ited the Mbashe 
area in 1869 he came to the conclusion that Warner's position was no 
longer likely to be beneficial. 47 Already, in May 1869, the Governor 
had proposed the abolition of the post of British Resident as a result 
of a lack of finance and, in 1870, Warner was all owed to retire on 
pension. 48 Even in his retirement he kept a vigilant eye on 
Transkeian affairs, maintaining a regular correspondence with Southey 
until his death in July 1871 . 
The years following Warner's ret irement were pac ked with drama. 
There was the intensification of the Thembu-Gcaleka dispute which 
culminated in the war of 1872 , following Ngangelizwe's all eged assau lt 
246 
on his wife, Novili. Then came the Nonxokozelo affair which gave the 
Cape Government the opportunity of interfering in Thembuland's 
internal affairs and which led directly to the deposing of Ngangelizwe 
as chief in 1875. His re-instatement in 1876 meant that the 
traditional Thembu-Cape friendship was restored, and, despite rumours 
to the contrary, he remained loyal and fought on the Colonial side 
during the wars of resistance of 1879 and 1881. 49 He died in 1885, 
after a long period of suffering, shortly after the annexation of 
Thembuland. Dr. Johnstone, the district surgeon of Umtata, diagnosed 
his disease as the failure of the heart and liver to function 
properly, due to the excessive use of alcohol. 50 In his last days 
the king resorted to the beliefs of his people, and summoned a 
witchdoctor - in vain. 51 
In the light of all these complex factors outlined above, the 
accusations of cruelty that haunted Nganglizwe all through his life, 
can now be examined. The first references to his cruel and tyrannical 
disposition came from J.C. Warner, at a time when it was clear that he 
was no longer keen on the Emigration. It was also a time when the 
farmers and frontier officials were trying to expose the failure of 
Cape policies of non-interference across the Kei. They ·used all the 
means of propaganda at their disposal to discredit the inhuman black 
rulers, while at t he same time propagating the annexation of the 
Transkei as an obligation, 
civilising mission in Africa. 
should Britain wish to fulfil her 
One example of this is provided by the report of an anonymous 
traveller in Thembuland, referred to earlier. The author expressed 
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the hope that "Mr Warner has reported the crimes of this inhuman 
wretch. He lives on and holds land from the British crown .. .. He 
receives a subsidy of £100 per annum from the Colonial Government. 
Should the Governor fail to chastise him in some way His Excellency 
will not only tacitly tolerate and sanction t he murderous deeds of a 
weak and impetuous chief, but an Imperium in Imper io".52 Another 
example was even more straightforward. Thi s was a report presumably 
written by the editor of the Kaffrarian Watchman. Referring to 
alleged atrocities, he condemned the Bri tish policy of non-
interference. - Britain, he wrote, should have taken possession 
of the whole coast l ine and made subjects of the inhabitants of that 
area. 53 In another report the editor expressed the hope that " ... the 
authorities will learn a little practical wisdom, retake the country 
and people it with Europeans. It is high time that this beardin~ of 
the Colony by a set of nude, half-tutored savages should at once and 
for ever be put a stop t~. 54 When, by 1869, there were no si gn s that 
the Cape Government had reconsidered its policy, the newspaper came up 
with more atrocious deeds committed by the King, and it warned that if 
interference failed it would bring down upon the British name the 
scorn and contempt of all the tribes from the Kei to Natal. 55 
Conditions in Thembuland during the first unstable years of 
Ngangelizwe's rule played into the hands of his detractors. This 
instability was rooted in events that had taken place long before he 
became paramount. Mtirara's abandonment of the Mbashe area in 1839, 
the absence of the Royal House for about twenty-five years from the 
core settlement, and t he long period of rule by a regent - all these 
had left a vacuum in which contenders were eventually unwilling to 
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accept Ngangelizwe's authority. From the start the young paramount 
had had to face opposition, the most formidabl e being that of his 
uncle, Mnq~anqeni.56 Thi s chief, who claimed that he had a greater 
right to the Mbashe area, since he had been living there when 
Ngangelizwe was still wi th his father at the White Kei, tried to 
solicit Cape recognition for his attempts at secession, and for 
sett ing up an independent chiefdom. 57 The simmering dispute between 
uncle and nephew came to a head in 1870. Mnqanqeni had the support of 
several influential chiefs, and the dispute caused considerable 
commotion throughout the Mbashe area. 58 Moreover, internal rejection 
of Ngangelizwe's rule was not confined to the Hala hierarchy. During 
Mtirara's absence, the Qwati took up a more independent attitude, and 
when Joyi returned to the Mbashe, Chief Fabu refused to recognise his 
authority. His successor, Dalasile, continued his father's policy and 
only nominally recognised Ngangelizwe ' s paramountcy. 59 Ngangelizwe 
responded to such challenges by allowing the settlement of other 
groups, especially Mfengu, in his country. In this way he hoped to 
strengthen his power. It proved t o be a misca lculation. Rejected by 
the orig inal inhabitants, he found the presence of these newcomers to 
be a constant source of friction , a factor that contributed to the 
Thembu-Gcaleka War of 1872. 60 
Minor affrays added to the general confusion in the early years of 
Ngangelizwe's rule. After the establishment of Emigrant Thembuland , 
tension within the Mbashe area could be relieved by a disgruntled 
chief switching his allegi ance from the paramount to one of the 
Emigrant chiefs. Over a period of time there seems to have been a 
situation in which those who were dissatisfied were able to move to 
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and fro, possibly playing one chief off against another. If we also 
consider the disruptions that followed the traditional raids by a new 
paramount on his subordinates "to fill his milk -bag,,,61 we can 
understand that the situation during those early years of 
Ngangelizwe's paramountcy provided valuable propaganda for those who 
wished to represent him as a 'Chaka-like tyrant', despised by 
councillors and subordinate chiefs. A closer look at some of the 
facts may open up new perspectives. 
Ngangelizwe's younger brother, Sinquanqati, was one of the chiefs said 
to have fled from Thembuland in consequence of the paramount's 
tyrannical behaviour . 62 Sinquanqati eventually settled in Emigrant 
Thembuland under Matanzima, where , as it turned out, he became known 
as a difficult character and an embarrassment to Matanzima. 63 It is 
important to note the Warner family's involvement in this dispute. J. 
Warner maintained that Sinquanqati had initially placed himself under 
his son, H.B. Warner. The latter. unwilling to become involved in 
family affairs . asked advice of the Thembu chiefs . who recommended 
that he should be taken to J.C. Warner. We do not know who these 
chiefs were. Warner was only too wil l ing to interfere in a dispute 
which he thought "could split the nation." He assured Southey that in 
this matter he would act as the guardian of Mtirara ' s family, rather 
than as a government officia l , while keeping a sharp eye on Co lonial 
interests. and taking advantage of every circumstance that could 
favour these interests. If there was to be another Boer-Sotho war, he 
said . it woul d be advantageous to keep up as many clashes of interest 
as possible across the Kei. 64 It is therefore not unlikely that 
Sinquanqati was encouraged by the Warners to defy Ngangelizwe's 
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authority. In view of this we may well be justified in asking whether 
Sinquanqati had actually fled becau se, as Warner alleged, he could not 
tolerate his brother's tyrannical behav iour. It might have been that 
as an ambitious junior member of the Royal House, he saw the 
opportunity of establishing himself as an independent chief in 
Emigrant Thembuland. 55 In these designs he was active ly encouraged by 
the Warners, for reasons already discussed. 
Even mo re pertinent to the question of Ngangelizwe's reputation are 
official reports concerning the Mnqanqeni dispute. It has been 
mentioned that Mnqanqeni had gained influence in the Mba she area 
during the regency of Joyi, and that this had led to clashes with 
Ngangelizwe once the latter had returned to the Mbashe. It is also 
possible that Ngangciizwe's half-Christian views on matters such as 
divination were unpalatable to his tribal chiefs and councillors. 55 
Attent ion has also been drawn to the discontent arising from 
Ngangelizwe's settlement of Mfengu on Thembu lands. Probably, then, 
these were disputes likely to arise in any chiefdom when a new young 
ruler was establishing hi s authority over older chiefs. A settlement 
of such disputes was rendered impossible by the interference of 
Colonial off icia ls who wished to bring about disunity with the nat ion 
by sowing distrust between the chiefs. Matthew Blyth's attempt to 
bring about a reconciliation between Ngangelizwe and Mnqanqeni was 
criticised by Warner as contradicting Colonial policy, which aimed at 
maintaining divisions within the chiefdoms. 57 With the assistance of 
E.J. Warner, Mnqanqeni was settled on Matanzima's lands and awarded a 
second class chief's allowance. 58 In this way both Mnqanqeni and 
Matanzima were being supported at Ngangelizwe's expense. 59 Inc idents 
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such as Mnqanqeni and Sinquanqati's flight from the Mbashe area 
do therefore not provide any concrete evidence of the despotic 
acts of which Ngangelizwe was accused. On the contrary, Sihele 
emphasised that he respected the opinions of his councillors, 
and that he ru led according to their advice. 70 The Judge 
Commission of 187271 concluded that he was a weakling, rather 
than a despot. "Gange li swe is a promising young man, 
by his councillors for political 
stated. 72 
reasons," thei r 
forced 
report 
Ngangelizwe ' s al leged cruelty, as was his despotism, is also open to 
conjecture. Warner ' s report that the King had chopped off the arm of 
one of his wives, were understandably greeted with disgust by 
officials in Cape Town, and the Governor seriously cons idered 
punishing him by stopping hi s st ipend. However, when Southey asked 
Warner for more informat ion, the latter was evasive. He answered that 
the incident had occurred a long time before he had informed Southey 
of it and that it would be difficult to prove that it had been done 
wi t h intent . He further evaded the issue by accusing other chiefs of 
being guilty of the same kind of atrocities. Sarhi l i, he said, had 
stamped out the 'derms' (sic) of his pregnant daughter. 73 When 
Southey was questioned in Parliament on Nganglizwe's alleged 
atrocities, he answered that, in his opinion, the newspapers had made 
a little too much of it, and that he himse lf did not think it was as 
bad as it had been presented. 74 
It should be noted here that the African use of the expression 
"chopping off an arm" was never meant to be taken literal ly; it was 
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merely an idiomatic expression for severe crue lty.75 Clearly, then, 
Warner's report was based on hearsay, and forwarded to Cape Town 
just at the time when Ngangelizwe started working against the 
Emigration. Such rumours, true or false, had thoroughly discredited 
Ngange l izwe. Therefore when rumours were rife in 1869 that he had 
assaulted and badly maimed his Great Wife, Novili, the daughter of 
Sarhili, most Cape government officials readily accepted them as 
true. As little effort was made to establish the facts, although 
judgment in the case was passed by the Cape Government,76 the 
whole episode remains clouded in uncertainty. Was t he Mfengu 
agent, Matthew Blyth, speaking the truth when he cla imed that, 
the day after the alleged assault, Novil i had been seen in 
the Idutywa Reserve with Veldman Bikitsha,77 and that, not only 
was she perfectly we ll , but also denied having been ill-treated?78 
If so, what was her connection with Bikitsha? If she had been maimed 
as badly as the newspapers stated, how cou ld she have reached 
Gcalekaland without her escape being discovered by her husband? Why 
did Sarhili de lay fo r months before sending messengers to Thembuland 
to find out the truth? Nor do we know whether Novili was as cruelly 
assau lted as has been alleged. Ngangelizwe at first denied all the 
rumours, but l ater admitted t hat he had chastised but not maimed her. 
According to traditional law, a scratch on a woman of Novili's rank 
was considered more serious than a welt on a common woman. Reports 
about Ngangelizwe ' s treatment of hi s wife may thus have been 
exaggerated. Al l that we know for certain, is that both the Cape 
Government and Sarhili used the incident to further the ir own 
interests. 79 
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has the mystery that surrounds the death of Novili's niece, 
Nonqxokozelo, been successfully solved. 80 At the time of her alleged 
murder there was a British Res ident in Thembuland who could have 
ordered an immediate investigation. From the start the behaviour of 
th is officer, Wi lli am Wright, was equivocal. He took no steps to 
establish the veracity of rumours that the woman had been killed, when 
t hese began circ ulating in May 1875, but allowed such rumours to 
contin ue until it ended in the woman's actua l death. For th i s neglect 
he was later reprimanded by the Sec retary for Native Affairs .81 The 
rumours were undoubted ly false; the woman was i n fact seen by people 
weeks after the alleged murder had taken place. Moreover , when Wright 
and Ayliff, who were appointed as a two-man commiss i on to investigate 
the affair, visited the grave (if it was the real gravel) they found 
it to be not more than one month old . This was at the end of August 
1875. The occupant of the grave had probab ly died in l ate July, two 
mon th s after Nonqxokoze lu' s death had f i rst been reported. 
These strange events raise another quest ion: who was re sponsi ble for 
these rumours and why had they been started? Brownlee was of the 
op ini on that Ngangelizwe had committed a brutal attack upon the woman, 
so serious that she was reported to be dead , when in fact she was 
still alive, and that i t was arra nged by Ngangelizwe that this fa l se 
report should be spread in the hope that Sarhili would make an 
unjustif iable attack upon the Themb u, bringing himse lf into conflict 
with the Colony. That this could have been the motive seems 
reasonable and would indeed have been an astute move by Ngangelizwe . 
His plans, according t o Brownlee, were frustrated by Sarhili who 
dec ided to ta ke the matter to the Government instead of resort ing to 
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war. 
It is difficult to follow Brownlee's reasoning when he carries the 
argument further by saying that "meanwhile, Ngangelizwe, believing 
that he would effectually stop the mouths of all witnesses through 
fear of his anger, in a most diabolical manner actual ly put the woman 
to death and then reported that she died of natural causes. 82 This 
i s unconvincing, as there was already a strong susp icion that she was 
being ill-treated . Ngangelizwe could hardly have hoped that both 
Sarhili and t he Government would believe hi s version of what happened. 
W. Wright also be li eved that the murder (if it happened) was a 
deliberate act to provoke war with Sarhili. 83 but there is no 
evidence that Ngange l izwe made preparations for war. Furthermore, 
there could have been no doubt in his mind that Colonia l goodwill 
towards the Thembu depended upon his behaviour. After al l , 
shortly before the above events he had been severely reprimanded by 
Brownlee for not hav ing exerted himself in settling a case of cattle 
raiding in wh ich his people had been implicated. He had then been 
warned, through his agent, that "if he permits th ese things to take 
place, how can he in case of trouble appeal to the Government for 
aid?,,84 Ngangelizwe would certainly have been aware that the 
Government would react f ar more strong ly in the case of murder. C.C. 
Saunders, in The Annexation of Transkeian Territories agrees with 
Governor Henry Barkly who blamed the murder on "a f it of 
un9o"'tln""~I~ ' passion, ,,85 but if the story of the murder, as told by 
witnesses and accepted by t he Wright-Ayliff Commission is correct, 
then it was certainly a premeditated act. There is no sat isfactory 
, 
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answer as to the origin and motives of the rumours. 
Of significance in any attempt to gain a clearer understanding of this 
story, i s the source of information about the murder. The main 
witness was the Mfengu chief, Mensiwe, who had settled in the Idutywa 
Reserve in August 1875, after having allegedly been driven away by 
Ngangelizwe. 86 According to Mensiwe's son, Mbande, it was the murder 
of Nonqxokozelo that caused the rupture between Ngangelizwe and 
Mensiwe. The latter, unwilling to risk another war against Sarhi li , 
made known his intention of not fighting should Sarhili go to war. 
Ngangelizwe threatened him with retaliation . Mensiwe fled to the 
Reserve, where he told the story of her death. Yet the question 
remains whether Mensiwe fled to avoid getting involved in a war, or 
whether he fled as a result of some other dispute, and then, in an 
attempt to solicit Colonial or Gcaleka aid, spread the news that the 
woman had been murdered. It is significant that the Commission was of 
the opinion that, but for the dispute between Ngangelizwe and Mensiwe, 
the details of the murder would never have become known87 - a 
statement which contradicts Wright's belief that Ngangelizwe 
deliberately spread the news himself. 
All these rumours make it difficult to establish the true facts 
concerning the alleged murder. On the pretext that it would be 
difficult to obtain unbiased information, Sarhil i persuaded Wright 
not to hold the investigation in Thembuland. Ngangelizwe was given 
the choice of attending the inquiry (to be held in the Idutywa 
Reserve) in person or of sending representatives. As he chose the 
second alternative, sending four representatives, he himself was never 
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questioned nor did he state his case. The inquiry seems to have been 
conducted in a peculiar manner. The representatives were allowed to 
ask questions on Ngangelizwe's behalf, but were not themse lves cross-
examined. 88 
The final verdict of the Commission was based on unsatisfactory 
evidence. The only witnesses to be called were two Mfengu, both 
of whose impartiality is dubious. One witness was Mbande and 
the second, Klaas, was a Mfengu, who for unknown reasons, had 
chanced to be "hanging around" Ngangel i zwe ' s Great Place for 
four months. Mbande told a sordid ta le. Ngangelizwe, he sa id, 
had on the Friday evening made an unprovoked assau lt on the 
woman. The next day , a Saturday, he sent her to a beer drinking 
with the clotted blood stil l upon her face and head . On Monday 
her death was reported. Mbande also alleged that she had been 
ill-treated before and had on occasion tried to escape to her people. 
The second witness, Klaas, gave evidence which in some respects 
differed from Mbande ' s. While he agreed with Mbande as to what 
happened on the Friday, he stated that a doctor was sent for, who 
attended to her injuries. Klaas menti oned nothing about the beer 
drinking on Saturday, in fact he said that he did not see her the next 
day, but was told by the doctor that she was past cure. On the Sunday 
Klaas was incidenta lly near the kraal when he heard blows. The woma n 
was beaten, on instruction of Ngangelizwe, by a young man, Ndevu. 
Early the next morning he (Klaas) heard from the doctor that she was 
dead, and he fled. It is no exaggeration to say that the findings of 
the Commission were based upon a stunningly inadequate inquiry. The 
Commission did not "consider themselves justified in checking any 
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questions that were put to statements that were made, for fear of 
natives getting hold of the impress ion that they were not permitted 
all they had to say ." Furthermore, they om itted to contact the 
doctor, who, accord ing to the statements made by Klaas, had attended 
the woman after the assault. 89 Their ineptitu\de was further 
illustrated by the i r response to Brownlee's query as to why they had 
not made arrangements for the body to be exhumed . Wright ma intained 
that such a cour se by non-professional peop le would have had l ittle 
meaning, and that they had not been authorised, in their instructions, 
to proceed to a post -mortem examination. 
professional help was obtained . 
They di d not explain why no 
However critical we may be of the manner in which the Comm is sion 
conducted the inquiry, i t is impossible to dispute their f indings 
after so long a lapse of time. But whatever the truth may have been, 
they did not seem anxious to estab li sh it . In the light of 
subsequent events 90 we are justified in saying that the Commission 
used specious reason ing to t ake advantage of a situat ion that coul d 
lead to an extens ion of the British sphere of inf luence. 
In 1875 there were once again rumours that Ngangeli zwe had assaulted 
one of his wives, Nosepessi. Des pi te Wright's adv ice to the contrary, 
Captain Bowker attempted to arrest him , but when the police 
arr ived at the Great Place they found that he had f led. Nosepessi 
denied that she had been assaul ted, and even Thembu who admitted that 
Ngangelizwe had previously been gu i lty of cruelty, now conf irmed his 
innocence. It should however be kept in mind that the Thembu, 
disgrun t led at Ngangelizwe's deposition, might have rallied round him 
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for the purpose of preventing the Cape fr om any further medd ling in 
their affairs. 
In the years after Ngangelizwe's deposition when war scares sowed 
panic on t he frontier every attempt was made by the Colonial 
government t o secure the Thembu king's loyalty in the event of 
trouble. The vilification thus came to an end. In 1878 Chief 
Magistrate Elliot told the Emigrant Thembu: "Many bad things have 
been said about Ngangelizwe. I speak of a man as I find him, and I 
believe him to be a good and loyal man, having the interests of his 
people at heart while wishing to obey the commands of the 
Government. ,,91 And when, in July 1878, it was said that Ngangelizwe 
had once again assaulted Novili (who had meanwhile returned to 
Thembuland) the Government expressed their disgust with his behaviour, 
but was unwilling to interfere in the matter. 92 The Government's 
confidence in Ngangelizwe was further proved by its willingness to 
arrange for him to visit Cape Town. William Wright was to accompany 
him, but the Thembu, apparently not trusting the Government, blocked 
the road and insisted on their chief's return ing to the Great Place. 93 
In the last years of Ngangelizwe's li fe, when tension between him and 
the war party in the country escalated94 he once again became 
involved in an assault case. 95 According to his own version, he 
reprimanded a lazy boy for having failed to milk the cows. The boy 
picked up an assegai, whereupon Ngangelizwe got hold of the weapon and 
stabbed the boy in the arm. The boy alleged that Ngangelizwe had made 
an unprovoked attack upon him. Gangrene set in and the boy lost his 
arm. A doctor who was consulted short ly after the incident, testified 
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that he wanted to take the boy with him for treatment, in which case 
the arm would probably have been saved. The boy refused to accompany 
him. This incident caused a commot ion in Thembuland, and t he war 
party, hoping to get rid of Ngangelizwe, ins isted on Cape Governmenta l 
action. Accordi ng 
particular ly concerned 
to traders, most of 
about t he incident. 96 
the Thembu were not 
The attitude of the Colonial Government in this case forms an 
interesting contrast to the general attitude in the 1870s when each of 
Ngangelizwe's atroc ities was given all possible negative publicity. 
Now, it would have been inexpedient to estrange an ally, and there was 
genuine concern lest the boy shou ld die and Ngangelizwe, as a Brit ish 
subject, should be tr ied for murder. The Chief Magistrate, H. Elliot, 
recommended that, in the event of t he boy's death, judgement should be 
postponed until the report of the Commission on Native Laws and 
Customs was completed, s ince it might emerge from the report that the 
death sentence, according to Native Law , would not be applicable in 
this case .97 To everyone's relief the boy recovered. 
Ngangelizwe will remain a controversial figure. It is as difficult to 
prove as to disprove many of the allegations against him. Peter 
Hargreaves believed tha t other chief s were equally cruel; they were 
only more cunning about it. 98 Furthermore, the vilification of bl ack 
chiefs for political reasons was a common feature of 19th century 
colonial policies. w. Beinart showed that the Mpondo chief Sigcau 
became the object of a campaig n of vilification by the Kokstad 
Advertiser during the few years before the annexation of Pondoland. 
Like Ngangelizwe, he was labelled a despot, a tyrant and an 
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incompetent ruler. 
What finally then emerges is that Ngangelizwe's unpopular image cannot 
be explained only in terms of hi s personality: it must be related to 
the political preoccupations and pressures of his time. 
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(ii) Matanzima Mtirara: Pawn or Plotter? 
Matanzima rose to prom inence in Thembu history during the Emigrati on 
of 1865 1869. 99 We know very li ttle about his life prior to that 
event . We catch a glimpse of the young Raxoti - as he was called at 
this stage - where he was a member of the royal household at Rhoda; 
being the eldest son from Mtirara ' s Right Hand Hou se . In 1849 , when 
the Royal House, which included t he heir to the throne, moved back to 
t he Mbashe, and Nonesi was made regent over the western Thembu, 
Matanzima remained at Rhoda. 100 Did he remain because he had 
pol iti ca l aspirations? We do not know . Even his age at t he time 
remains uncertain. If Walter Stanford was correct in saying that he 
came of age shortly before the Emigration started, he would have been 
more or less in the same age group as Ngangelizwe, who came of age in 
1863. 101 But according to Sihele, Matanzima was considerably older 
t han Ngangelizwe. 102 Sihele pOinted out that the British action of 
elevating Nonesi to the regentship, was alien to African thought and 
custom. He implied that Matanzima should have been given precedence. 
The fact that Queen Victoria was reigning in Britain at the time may 
wel l have been, according to Sihele, a determining factor favouring 
Nonesi. 103 Sihe le wo uld probably have felt le ss strong ly about the 
issue if Matanzima had been a child at the time. 104 When t he 
Tambook ie Location was proclaimed in 1853, and the paramountcy of 
Nonesi was reaffirmed,105 Matanzima retired once again into the 
shadows. We hear no more about him until the Emigration started, and 
Warner had become thoroughly disenchanted with his earlier favourites, 
Ngangelizwe and Nonesi. Matanzima then stepped into the breach, 
showi ng that he was willing to cooperate with Warner, and play a 
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leading role in persuading as many Thembu as possible to settle across 
the Indwe river. 106 His enthusiasm for the project was certain ly 
fostered by his desire to break loose from his grandmother who, he 
believed, had usurped his hereditary rights. 107 Warner now cleverly 
instigated trouble between Matanzima and Ngangelizwe in order to 
prevent the unif ication of the Thembu nation. He made it his business 
to keep himself informed about family tensions and disputes, 
magnifying each problem and always insinuating that it was either 
Nonesi or Ngangelizwe who had instigated the trouble. 108 But even 
while denigrating the activities of Nonesi and Ngangelizwe, thus 
ensuring Matanzima's anger against them, Warner was obliged to work 
secretly against Matanzima in accordance with the divide-and-rule 
strategy. When Richard Southey expressed the fear that Matanzima 
might become too powerful, Warner emphatically assured him that he was 
constantly playing the one chief off against the other. 109 
At the same time Matanzima emerges as having his own share of guile. 
Later events seem to suggest that the enmity between Ngangelizwe and 
Matanzima, actively encouraged by Warner, was apparent rather than 
real, and that under the cover of division, they were working towards 
the same end, which was the strengthening of t he Hala clan. In times 
of distress Ngangelizwe tried to solicit aid from Matanzima and it 
would seem that it was only fear of Colonial disapproval that withheld 
the latter from complying with such requests. At the time of the 
Novili incident Matanzima was willing to help Ngangelizwe in forcing 
Sarhil i to return her to Thembuland. 110 During the Thembu-Gca leka 
War of 1872 there were likewise signs of Matanzima joining 
Ngangelizwe. lll When Ngangelizwe was deposed in 1875, Matanzima made 
263 
no secret of hi s opposition to the Cape Government's actions. 112 The 
irony of the situation, then, lies in the fact that the cohesion 
Warner had striven so hard to prevent, might already have been brought 
about and that, unknown to him, the brothers had despite family 
disputes been allies all al ong. 113 
Warner found himself in a situation more complex than he realized at 
the time. Contrary to the divide-and-rule policy which aimed at 
weakening the chiefs' power he was obliged to implement, he found 
himself f avouring Matanzima's aims to establish himself in his new 
country thereby strengthening this chief's position. Matanzima, 
playing a clever game of his own, managed to obtain from Warner the 
very concessions that went against the official policy. When the 
chiefs settled in their new country, there was no suggest ion that the 
one should at any time gain ascendency over the other. In 1871, when 
Sitokwe and Gecelo applied to have their separate locations marked 
off, Matanzima did not request a similar dispensation as, according t o 
Warner, he wished Emigrant Thembuland to be as undivided as possible 
in order to gain supremacy over the whole area. 114 Warner supported 
Sitokwe and Gecelo. He hoped that by separating the chiefs, their 
power would be weakened, and they would become more dependent upon the 
Cape Government. Matanzima's pers istent protestations of loyalty to 
the Government, his active cooperation in bringing the Emigration 
about , and his attempts - real or pretended - to discredit Nonesi and 
Ngangelizwe, all brought Warner on to his side. "Our policy," Warner 
exp I a i ned to Southey, "therefore requ i res that we shou I d ... ga i n over 
as many (i .e . African chiefs) as we possibly can to our interest, and 
it seems to me that our greatest dependence is on the Fingoes , and the 
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Emigrant chiefs, especially Raxoti.,,115 A year later separate 
locations were indeed marked off, and, through Warner's influence, 
Matanzima received the largest share of Emigrant Thembuland, as well 
as lands east 
Ngangel izwe. 116 
of the Tsomo that originally belonged to 
He scored another victory when he won recognition as 
"head of the Transkeian chiefs." Whi Ie he was st i II in the Location 
he was considered to be under Nonesi's authority, and he received a 
stipend of £26 per year. 
chiefs Ndarala and Gecelo. 
This was only half the amount paid to the 
Once in Emigrant Thembuland, he claimed 
that, as representative of the paramount who was too far away to 
exercise authority, he shou ld also receive £52. On Warner's 
recommendation, the request was granted. 117 Matanzima's eventual 
recognition as chief of Emigrant Thembuland was therefore due as much 
to Warner's influence as to hereditory factors. It was also through 
Warner' s influence that Matanzima was able to extend his authority 
beyond the boundaries of the territory originally allocated to him. 
The Cape Government's removal of Afrikaner families who received lands 
from Ngangelizwe at the mouth of the Tsomo, and the addition of their 
lands to Matanzima's , occured on the insistence of Warner. 118 
Furthermore, disgruntled relatives, such as Ngangelizwe's brothers, 
Sinquanquati and Bambendino, and his uncle, Mnqanqeni, were encouraged 
by Warner to sett le in Emigrant Thembuland under Matanzima. 119 By 
1875 Matanzima had thus emerged as an influential Thembu leader. It 
seems as if he could be ruthless, and the Colonial Government from 
time to time frowned upon his over-hasty actions and the excessive 
fines that he levied. 120 
The years after 1875 show that the threat to Matanzima's power did not 
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emanate from his brother - as inferred by Warner - but from the 
Imperial Government, and its Colonial administrators. The appointment 
of Levey in 1875 as Thembu agent, and his promotion to resident 
magistrate in 1876, led to a clash of wills between two obstinate 
personal i ties. Levey's policy, from the beginning, aimed at the 
weaken i ng of the power of the chiefs, and the undermining of their 
independence. The chiefs, he mai ntained, were utterly unfit to 
exercise the power with which they were entrusted . 121 Understandably 
a headstrong chief, whose ego had initia l ly been boosted by the 
Colonia l official with whom he had deal ings, would have resented any 
restrictions on his traditional rights. Matanzima's outspoken 
criticism of Cape Governmental policies embarrassed and annoyed the 
authorities. He made no secret of the sympathy he evinced for 
Sitokwe Ndlele when this chief was deprived by Levey of his 
stipend. 122 Moreover, at a series of meetings in 1879 with the Chief 
Magistrate he was blatant ly insolent. "Government must let us know 
when we lose privilege of our independence," he remarked at one such 
meeting. 123 On another occasion he remarked bitterly: "Government 
is awol f. Government does not come like a man and say frankly to me 
that he is going to take away my privileges, but removes them one by 
one like a thief in the night. 124 
Matanzima had every reason to suspect the Cape Government of looking 
for excuses to deprive him of his chieftainship. In 1879, for 
example, when he fined an offender, Elliot interfered and issued him 
with an unequivocal warning. This case arose when a certain Booy 
Solomon first refused to obey when ordered to accompany Matanzima on a 
special visit to the magistrate, and thereafter ignored Matanzima's 
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summons to the Great Place. For these offences, he was fined 288 
sheep and a horse, a portion of which Matanzima kept for himself. 125 
Elli ot, at a meeting some time afterwards, told the chief: "No 
advocate for upholding the power of a chief can uphold a man who 
commits acts of oppression. The charges to the Government against 
Matanzima's people are rapidly accumulating and one day there will be 
a last straw.,,126 
Through his allegations Levey attempted to convince Elliot that 
Matanzima was not deserving of being entrusted with the 
responsibilities that the position of chief entailed. This emerges 
clearly from two charges that he brought against the chief. In the 
first case Matanzima was accused of laxity as to the settlement of a 
case of theft. The second charge arose from a complaint coming from 
Mfengu, who said that some of Matanzima's young men had abducted girls 
from their village, and taken them to their chief, where they had been 
raped. 127 The letter in which the Chief Magistrate was informed 
about Matanzima's activities contained serious accusations against the 
chief, amongst others, that his opposition to law and order had 
rendered the effective administration of the district virtually 
impossible. At his next meeting with Matanzima, Elliot issued a very 
stern warning. Matanzima, he said, was either unfit or unwilling to 
carry out his duties, and should there be no improvement, the 
Government would find it necessary to replace him with a more suitable 
person . 128 The Secretary for Native Affairs was even more outspoken 
on this matter. "Should Matanzima continue", he wrote to Elliot, "you 
would have the right to discontinue his authority.,,129 
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Matanzima was supported by E.J. Warner in his di sputes with the 
magistrates, even after the latter had left the civil service, and 
became a miss iona ry at Mount Arthur. The friendship between Matanzima 
and Warner was firmly cemented when, in 1873, the chief deviated from 
the tradit iona l custom of giving land to missionary soc ieti es, and 
instead made a grant to Warner personally for his establishment of a 
station. 130 H.B. Warner, a brother of E.J., carr ied on the work at 
this station. Levey believed that the Warner s were the real 
inst igators of the trouble, and that, but for them, Matanzima wou ld 
have been perfectly content. "It is high time", he wrote to Elliot, 
"that the little game of a few people acting through Mr. Warner should 
be exposed . The chief Matanzima and Sitokwe, without the knowledge of 
the majority of the i r people , are agitating through Mr. Warner to 
become independent chiefs - a position that they have not da red to 
assume since I have been in this district, nor would they now unless 
supported by the messrs . Warner. ,,13 1 Warner retorted that the 
imposition of hut tax on the Emi grant chiefs, coup led with the 
magistrate's disregard of the traditiona l system in the application of 
justice, were a violation of the 1865 agreement by which the chiefs 
had settled in Emigrant Thembu l and. The chief Matanzima, he said, had 
repeatedly sent to him, begging him to intercede on his behalf. 132 
Warner's intercession on Matanzima's behalf certainly encouraged the 
chief in defying the Cape Government's restrictions on his power. 
When Levey was transferred to Cofimvaba in 1878, and a cousin of the 
Warners, Robert Stanf ord, was appointed acting-Resident Magistrate, 
Matanzima gained another valuab le al ly. 
In vi ew of all that has been said about the relationship between 
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Matanzima and his magistrates it is understandable that there has been 
much divergence of opinion concerning the role he played in the 
troubled years 1878 - 1881. When the Mfanta rebellion broke out, he 
was suspected of having been in alliance with this brother of his. 
Given his frustrat ions, fo ll owing the appointment of Levey as Resident 
Magistrate, there can be little doubt that he evinced strong sympathy 
for the rebels . It was perhaps only from a realization that the risks 
involved in fighting the Colony were too great that he refrained from 
joining the warring factions, and eventual ly tried to dissuade his 
brother from doing so.133 During the war of 1881 his attitude was 
highly equivocal. Levey scorned the chi ef ' s dubious loyalty, in 
particular pOinting out his failure to come to his aid when, in 1881, 
he was hemmed in at Southeyville. 134 But R. Stanford commended the 
chi ef for his loya lty and compensated him accordingly with one hundred 
head of cattle. Stanford justified this reward by referring, amongst 
others, to an incident when Lady Frere was attacked. On t his occasion 
Matanzima summoned his people and ordered them to be loya l. As proof 
of his loyalty he sent his catt le into the COlony.135 Stanford 
emphatically denied that Matanzima played a double game during the 
war. J. Hemming also believed implicit ly in Matanzima's innocence. 
"How the magistrate of Cala (i.e. Levey) can denounce Matanzima as 
'such an unreliable chief' when his whole conduct during al l the 
di sturbances from 1877 to the present time has been loyal and faithful 
to the Government, notw ithstanding much interference with his 
independence, I do not know," he wrote to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs in 1884. 136 
To understand t hese conf l ict ing reports, it must be remembered that by 
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the late 1870's Matanzima's power had been thoroughly undermined by 
magistrates who, over the years, encouraged various factions to 
question his authority. Reference has already been made to 
Sinquanqati. Another example is that of the Mfengu chief , Mtyak isane, 
who received land from Matanzima in 1879. Through the years Mfengu 
had been cordially received in Matanzima's country as the presence of 
these relatively wealthy men streng thened his position. The problem 
was that first W. Fynn, and then Levey, not only allowed Mfengu 
settlers in Matanzima's country, but afforded them a measure of 
independence not contemplated by the chief, when he first started 
giving land to these new-comers. When Mtyakisane entered Matanzima's 
territory in search for land, the chief did not forma lly allocate 
lands to him, but, following Levey's instructions, he allowed him to 
settle on unoccupied land. In time Mtyakisane, supported by Levey, 
started to settle cases in his own way, and like Sinquanqati, became 
virtually an independent chief. 137 Given the support that the Mfengu 
received from the magistrates it is understandable that they were -
generally speaking - Cape Colony supporters, and they were encouraged 
by Levey to undermine Matanzima's authority. In this way the 
territory over whi ch Matanzima was in 1880 nominally the head, was 
infil trated on the one hand by anti-Government factions such as 
Sinquanqati and Bambendino, who had become more or less independent. 
They probably hoped that, by joining the warring factions, they would 
stand a chance of oust ing Matanzima. On the other hand, pro-
Government Mfengu constituted a threat to his power from another 
angle. It is not surprising, then, that he would have disappointed 
those people, like Levey, who expected him to exert influence on the 
Government's behalf. It was absolutely impossible for him to control 
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Sinquanqati, and other rebellious chiefs; especia lly as the 
boundaries between his lands and those of his younger brother had 
never been clearly demarcated. There could be no certainty whether 
insurgents spotted in the heat of battle, belonged to Matanzima or to 
Sinquanqati. Stanford claimed that he had all Matanzima's men 
registered, and that not one of them went into war, but allowances 
must be made for the fact that Stanford was very biased in favour of 
Matanzima. 
However difficu lt it may be to assess Ma t anzima's motives and conduct 
during the Tran ske ian war,138 there can be no disputing the fact that 
he emerged after the war both richer and more inf luential t han before. 
With the deposition of Gecelo in consequence of his part in the war, 
and the death of Sitokwe Ndlele, the non-Hala leaders had disappeared, 
and their dispersed followers were located under various magistrates. 
The on ly other chief left was the ageing Ndarala who had always been 
inclined to follow Matanzima 's lead. 139 When Ndarala died in 1884 the 
Ndungwana inf luence in Emigrant Thembuland was further weakened. The 
heir , Siyabalala was still a minor . During the ensuing dispute over 
the appointment of a regent, it emerged that supporters of the popular 
choice, Getye, accepted Matanzima as their paramount. 140 Although 
there is no evidence that Matanzima interfered in the matter, the 
Government certain ly had to take note of the chief's increasing 
influence and amb itions. Ev en Levey, who was never inclined to see 
Matanzima as a particularly influential leader,141 now had to revise 
his judgement, and admit that Matanzima was regarded by the Emigrant 
Thembu as a great chief. 142 The increasing power of such an ambitious 
271 
chief, Levey warned, could become a threat to the interests of the 
Cape Colony, so that it was essential to prevent him from obtaining 
any more land. Levey therefore believed that the lands across the 
Tsomo, which formed the greater part of the Southeyville district, and 
had become vacant during the War of 1881, should be settled by people 
loyal to the Cape Colony.143 Matanzima, who wished to locate his own 
followers there, was supported by E. Warner and the Stanford brothers, 
Robert and Art hur. 144 Warner defended Matanzima's claim on the 
grounds that the "rebel chiefs", Sinquanqati, Bambendino and Falo , had 
been settled, with the support of the Cape Government, in Emigrant 
Thembuland under Matanzima's authority in the 1860s . In course of 
time Sinquanqati had been recogni zed by t he Government as a chief in 
his own right, despite Matanzima's objections. Matanzima could 
therefore not be held responsible for the behaviour of the rebel 
chiefs. In Warner's opinion it would have been an act of gross 
injustice to deprive Matanzima of lands legally given to him in 1865, 
as a result of the conduct of chiefs whose disobedience was, in t he 
first place, condoned by the Government. 145 Matanzima gave substance 
to his claim to the land s by referring to the Sotho chief, Letsie, 
who, during the war of 1881, had remained neutral, and who was 
rewarded with a grant of lands. Levey , on the other hand, maintained 
that Matanzima did not have any rights to the rebe l lands . 
Sinquanqati and his brothers, he said, had already been living in 
separate locations, independently from Matanzima, when he (Levey) 
arrived as Magistrate. Furthermore, at the time of the dispute, a hut 
tax return would show that Matanzima did not have a single f ollower 
there. 146 In this he was certain ly correct, as he himself had made 
sure that the rebel lands were settled by people not particularly 
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faithful to Matanzima. 147 
The question was settled in a way unsatisfactory to both Matanzima and 
Levey. With the delineation of the magisterial boundaries in Emigrant 
Thembuland in 1881,148 a part of Matan zima's lands now fell in 
Levey's distr ict, Cala. Levey was under the impression that the lands 
were incorporated into the Cala district, and that Matanzima had no 
authority there. However, when Matanzima complained about his loss of 
lands, he was assured by the Chief Magistrate that the territory was 
simply divided for administrative purposes, and that Matanzima's 
rights there, were in no way affected. 149 This did not satisfy the 
chief. His continued request that his grievances should be 
reconsidered, was eventually met when part of the Cala district, to 
the dismay of Levey and some traders, was transferred to his location. 
It turned out to be mere ly a symbolic gesture. The headmen in the 
district were assured that although they would in future have to 
recognize Matanzima, their re l ationship with the Government was in no 
way affected. 150 
As he saw his power being diminished, Matanzima made use of various 
ploys to maintain as much authority as possible under the white 
umbrella. In view of the large-sca le alienation of tribal lands by 
the Cape Government after 1881,151 he repeatedly asked that tribal 
title should be given to his people, while at the same time he 
requested a large farm for himself. 152 He did not succeed i n 
obtaini ng tribal title for his people. In 1894, C.J. Rhodes assured 
him at a meeting that the people were secure in their lands as long as 
they behaved themselves; it was only in the event of their being 
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disloyal to the Government that their lands would be parcelled out 
among whites. 153 However he eventually 
petitions, to secure for himself a large farm 
managed, after severa l 
of 4000 morgen. 154 
It was not only the problem of land alienation that occupied 
Matanzima's mind; he also had to devise strategies to cope with the 
problem of overcrowding that was causing numerous garden disputes. 
One of his ploys was to settle his sons uncomfortably near to the 
homesteads of people whom he wanted to get rid of, and then to start 
ploughing up new garden lands for his own benefit on lands claimed by 
such people. 155 Many Mfengu fell victim to these strategies; the 
great exodus of Mfengu from Matanzima's lands in the 1880s perhaps 
being attributed as much to the chief's attitude as to the periodic 
droughts. 156 
An interesting case that further illustrates Matanzima's tactics to 
obtain land arose in 1888, when the chief claimed lands in the Engcobo 
district for one of his sons. Prior to the outbreak of the war, these 
lands formed part of Emigrant Thembuland, but in consequence of post-
war settlements, it was included in the Engcobo district. 157 By that 
time Levey had already settled people there who rejected Matanzima's 
authority. In an attempt to regain influence over the territory, 
Matanzima now asked that one of his sons should be granted a farm. 
Stanford had no objections provided that none of the black farmers in 
occupation of the lands would be dispossessed. Unfortunately the 
particular spot that Matanzima desired had already been cultivated for 
twenty five years by a headman named Nconyana. Matanzima took up an 
aggressive attitude, demanding that the homesteads should be removed 
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and the gardens given up to his son. 158 In this case his request was 
not granted, but Matanzima had twenty-two sons and he certainly was in 
a favourable position to expand his territory by infiltrating the 
land s of his rivals. 
Understandably, uncertainty as to the ownership of land, as well as to 
the extent to which Matanzima could exercise power i n his location, 
caused increasing tension, especial ly after the formal annexation of 
Thembu territories in 1885. He annoyed the Resident Magistrate by 
carrying on with his titular responsibilities as if there were no 
Governmental restrictions. He settled criminal and civi l cases, sent 
out armed patrols to apprehend thieves, imposed fines and allocated 
l ands to his favourites. 159 Such actions often led to court cases as 
the more enlightened people could make use of law agents for a redress 
of their grievances, and, not infrequently, sentences were set 
as ide. 160 While Stanford was magistrate, Matanzima cou ld stil l lodge 
complaints agai ns t the interference of law agents in his district. He 
was therefore embittered when Stanford was repl aced in 1886 by R. 
Merriman. When he met the Chief Magistrate in Umtata in 1885 he 
condemned Merr iman ' s handling of affairs in no uncertain terms. The 
magistrate was, in his opinion, incompetent. He alleged that Merriman 
had time and again failed to keep appointments when boundary disputes 
had to be settled; that he had resorted to the burni ng of homesteads 
before a dispute concerning Matanzima ' s settlement of people on lands 
previous ly allocated to traders Birch and Aldun could be reso lved ; 
that he had allowed himself the authority of controlling 
woodcutters (hitherto Matanzima's prerogative); and lastly, that 
people who went out to follow t he spoor of cattle thieves were 
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disarmed. 161 
Because the chief was so outspoken in his crit icism of the 
Government's policies and of some of the officials, he was always 
regarded with suspicion . In the 1880s , he was twice involved in 
events that questioned hi s loyalty. The first was his attendance at 
meetings held by Nehemiah Tile at which the removal of magistrates was 
advocated . Taking into account the erosion of his authority by 
successive magistrates, his sympathy for Tile's sentiments would have 
been understandable, but we have no proof that his involvement ever 
stretched further than having attended one meeti ng. 162 Then, in 1883, 
another war scare swept through Thembuland and various civi l 
commiss ioners suspected Matanzima of having been in commun ication with 
some of the leading agitators. 163 Again, it is possible that he did 
show an interest in anti-Government activities. After all , some years 
earlier Robert Stanford had warned that there was no te lling what a 
man would do wr.en provoked too far. 164 Matanzima was, however, t oo 
much of a pragmat ist to consider armed resistance against the Cape. 
During the last years of his chieftainship, he managed to establish a 
cordial relationship with successive resident magistrates. True, he 
was never trusted implicitly. In 1891, for instance, there was great 
alarm when his son, Sabata, accompanied by three hundred armed 
followers, was seen in the northern part of the district. Their 
explanation that they were looking for cattle thieves was not readily 
accepted, and Matanzima had to assure the Government telegraphically, 
through his resident magistrate, that he had no warlike intentions. 165 
On another occasion he was thought to be behind a large-scale killing 
276 
of pigs in the district - the rumour being that people were instructed 
by him to kill all their pigs. It turned out to be a harmless 
incident, the people having thought that the animals were spreading a 
deadly disease. 166 Magistrates were further influenced against the 
chief by law agents, who pOinted out that he levied excessive fines 
and often lined his own pockets with money that should have reached 
the treasury.167 
On the other hand, there was evidence that he cooperated actively with 
the Government in improving conditions in his district . He personally 
contributed funds towards the building of a bridge over the Tsomo 
River, supported the Scab Act at a time when other chiefs regarded it 
with suspicion, and actually asked for the erection of dipping tanks 
as well as for somebody to instruct his people as to the benefits of 
the dipping. 168 In 1894 C. Bunn, the resident magistrate, supported 
Matanzima's claim to a farm, on t he ground that the chief had rendered 
excellent service to the Government. 169 Matanzima also managed to 
establish a warm relationship with the missionaries in his district, 
and their reports might have swayed official opinion in his favour. 
He would from time to time visit the mission station at St. Marks to 
ensure that everything was going well. 170 On the occasion of R. 
Stanford's official attendance at a service, Matanzima carried the 
sword of state by the side of the magistrate. 171 Archdeacon Waters 
commended him for his abstinence from brandy, as well as for his 
interest in education. 172 
However, while accepting certain western standards, such as having his 
sons educated at Clarkebury, Matanzima took care not to estrange his 
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peop le , who were stil l tied to tradition. From time to time he was 
accused of having all owed divination to take place, or to have revived 
certain "heathenish" customs such as the Untonyani dance, or the 
killing of the Mgidi beast. 173 He defended his leniency toward such 
practices, by saying that they were very old customs, and espec ially 
important to young men who hoped to obtain important positions with 
the tribe, and that it would therefore be very difficult to eliminate 
them without causing great dissatisfaction. 174 
How then are we , in retrospect, to view Matanzima? Are we to see him, 
as a Black Nationalist might well do, as a white stooge and a 
worthless traitor to the cause of the black people? Was he a narrow-
minded tribalist who could not see beyond the needs of his own smal l 
clan? Or should we agree with Levey and some historia ns who see him 
as a leader intent on promot ing his own interests? Or would it be 
nearer to the truth to see him as a shrewd and desperate man carrying 
on a covert fight (under the guise of cooperation) to salvage what he 
could for the people of his clan in t he face of the overwhelming 
ons laught of the Colonial tide? Whichever of the above may 
approximate to the truth most closely - whether Matanzima was pawn, 
plotter or talented diplomat - his ach ievements lie in history. He 
did manage to keep his people's lands intact, and further, he 
succeeded in laying the foundations of the House of Matanzima for the 
weal or woe of South Africa. 
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(iii) Mfanta: Rebel or Freedom Fighter? 
The Mfanta-Gungubele Rebellion of 1879 
Oh, the tragedy of the bones of Mfanta! 
It is Mfanta who leapt into action, 
He seized his fighting-sticks and entered Gwatyu, 
Helping the forces of Gungubele of Bawana, 
For the whites caused the troub le 
On the day the weapons clashed 
Gungubele quarrelled with the English; 
But the English ground us underfoot, 
Yet we will make a fresh start 
For the black stick is kept in safety. 
We will speak on the day the bones tremble175 On the day we recover the bones of Mfanta. 
Mfanta does not figure prominent ly in European and early African 
historiography. He is not even mentioned in Sihele's rather detailed 
account of Thembu leaders. What we do know about him comes to us 
through documents dealing with the War of Ngcayecibi . However, in 
such writings it is the Tshatshu chief, Gungubele, who is given a 
central place, and not Mfanta, the leading spirit in the resistance 
movement in Glen Grey . It is only in modern times that he has emerged 
in African minds as a national hero - one of a long list of black 
leaders whose resistance to a white government has ended in prison. 
Mfanta was the eldest son from Mtirara's Left Hand House. Li ke 
Matanzima, he chose to rema in with Nonesi when the Great House moved 
back to the Mbashe in the 1840's. If he was the ambitious young man 
later events seem to suggest he was, he would have grown up knowing 
many frustrations . The formidable Nonesi maintained firm control over 
her grandsons, and in the event of her death, her mantle would have 
fallen on the shoulders of the much older Matanzima, who, in any case, 
enj oyed a position of superiority due to his being born f rom the Right 
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Hand House. Thus, even the Emigration had not afforded him the 
opportunities it had offered the other chiefs, as, in the new country, 
he would have been subject to Matanzima. He remained in Glen Grey, 
and in 1867 Warner was disturbed by rumours that Ngangelizwe wanted to 
nominate him as his representative. 176 Although Ngangelizwe denied 
the allegations, the possibility that Ngangelizwe hoped to gain 
control over Glen Grey and that he was instigating Mfanta to resist 
Colonial rule, cannot be discarded. 177 It is also possible that 
Mfanta was one of those chiefs who remained behind in Glen Grey, 
believing that Colonial rule would never be applied there, in which 
case he would be able to step into the vacuum left by the departure of 
the emigrant chiefs. 178 
For some unknown reason, he left Glen Grey in the late 1860's. We 
could speculate that, this being the time when the Cape Government 
took action against Nonesi and her councillors, banishing the former 
to Mpondoland, the lat ter to Robben Island, Mfanta was trying to 
escape the same fate. We have, however, no evidence to prove this. 
He returned in 1871 at a time when an accumulation of poli t ical, 
economic and social factors had caused mounting oppos ition to the Cape 
Government. 
As a result of Glen Grey's proximity to the eastern frontier zone, the 
Thembu there were understandably sensitive to any disaffection among 
the Ngqika and other Xhosa peoples in the contig L\o~s areas. Having 
been l iving for years far from the paramount's immediate sphere of 
influence, 
attitudes. 
they were less affected by traditional pro-Colonial 
When, after 1865, the paramount's authority was no longer 
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recognized by the Cape, another bond was snapped, and chiefs were free 
to act as individuals, rather than to be dictated to by tradition. 
Furthermore, unfavourable conditions, which De Kiewiet sees as the 
cause of war and tension, were especially conspicuous in this area. 179 
Not only had the Thembu suffered loss of land in consequence of the 
creation of a white buffer zone between the Queenstown and Wodehouse 
districts, but the land policy, introduced by E. Judge, was highly 
discriminatory. This policy, which was devised with the dual purpose 
of combatting squatting and of solving the Cape Colony's labour 
problems, made provision for the granting of farms of limited size to 
deserving men. 180 The so-called ordinary people, who were unable to 
obtain farms, found it increasingly difficult to meet the needs 
created by their contact with western influences. The dearth of land 
also had implications for the distribution of wealth. The general 
assumption that the Thembu were more prosperous in 1876 than ever 
before was false, as it rested on misleading statistical evidence 
regarding the incidence of stock in the Location. This stock, in 
fact, was distributed among a small number of families, ma inl y 
concentrated around mission stations. 181 During the early 1870's the 
economic impact of Cape Colonial expansionism was not so severely felt 
by the poorer families, but the drought of 1876 exposed the realities 
of their situation. The Government, relying upon reports from 
appointed headmen, failed to realize how serious the situation had 
become. The extent to which the traditional systems of communication 
between chief and subject had degenerated under Cape Colonial rule 
emerges from W.E. Stanford's annual report on the Tambookie Location 
in 1875: 
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"The system (of paid headmen) works well, and has had the 
effect of breaking to a very great degree the power and 
influence of the chiefs who did not emigrate to the 
Transkei ... The headmen value the authority given to them and 
soon become jealous of any interference on the part of the 
ch ief, and as their power is derived sole ly from us, they 
are thoroughly under our control, and when necessary a 
headman may be removed from his office without danger of 
raising those feelings of discontent amongst the pe9g~e 
which might have been the case in deal ing with a chief." 
Missionaries like J.P. Bertram and E.J. Warner warned against the 
unreliability of information obtained from headmen, who often said 
what the magistrate wanted to hear. They had a far better grasp of 
the situat ion than officials who believed t hat the influence of chiefs 
was declining. 183 It is understandable t hat at a time when every 
effort was being made to curb the influence of chiefs, Mfanta's return 
to Glen Grey was viewed with apprehension, especially as the Hala 
immediately rallied around him. J.C. Warner, still smarting under the 
humiliation of the Emigration catastrophe, which could largely be 
blamed on the uncooperative attitude of the Hala , advised that, since 
there was no reason to apprehend Mfanta, he should just be treated as 
an ordinary man, neither being given a f arm nor made a headman. He 
was indeed later made a headman, but he could have derived little 
satisfaction from hi s appointment as his powers were effectively 
curtailed by the policy applied, in accordance with the Judge 
recommendations in the Bol otwa part of the Location where he settled. 
This district was divided into farms, each const ituting a sort of 
township, under headmen each of wh ich had jurisdiction on ly over his 
small commun ity. Ten or twelve of these farms const ituted a Field 
Cornetcy under supervision of a black Field Cornet. The headmen had 
to report periodically to the field-cornets and the latter reported 
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once a month to the magistrate. 184 On the surface, chieftaincy 
was effectively eliminated, but ambitious chiefs did not accept the 
new dispensation complacently, and Mfanta found a kindred spirit 
in Gungubele, the son of the erstwhi le enemy of the Cape Co lony, 
Maphasa. 
Although Sir George Grey had decreed after the war of Mlanjeni tha t 
the name and the lands of t he Tshatshu should be forfeited in 
consequence of their participation in the war, this clan lived on as a 
dist inct group . They were relocated under Gungubele's mother, 
Yi liswa, in the area between the Black Kei and White Kei at Gwatyu. 
Gungubele came of age in 1871 at a time when the first attempts were 
made effectively to implement Colonial law in Glen Grey. Under these 
circumstances the young Gungubele's requests to have his chieftainship 
recognized were firmly rejected by the authorities. 185 He settled 
down quietly for some time, so much so that the civ il commissioner 
spoke highly of his diligence in suppressing cattle raids, but the 
authorities expected his mother and his councillors to be less 
submissive. 186 It was perhaps on their insistence that he became 
increasingly opposed to the presence of government appointed headmen 
in the Tshatshu area. On occasion he told the civil commissioner that 
only he, as chief, had the right to appoint the headmen. 187 His 
aversion to government appointed headmen found expression in threats 
and even assaults upon them. 
Because of the contiguity of Sitokwe Ndlele's location at Stock's 
Basin in Emigrant Thembuland, the Tshatshu would certainly have been 
influenced by this ch ief's resistance to the curtailment of his powers 
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of chieftainship that led to his losing part of his lands in 1878. 188 
It was, then, under these conditions of increasing discontent in Glen 
Grey, that the war scare of 1876 sent Brownlee in great haste to this 
troubled area. 189 In his memorandum on this vis it, Brownlee 
expressed his concern over the dogged and sullen attitude of the Glen 
Grey people which contrasted so sharply with the frank and open 
discussions he was used to in his dea lings with the Thembu. 190 Even 
E. J. Warner, always ready to defend the Thembu , and the Rev. Dugmore 
warned that immediate steps shou ld be taken to defend Queenstown,191 
while the Queenstown Chamber of Commerce, as well as the mu ni cipa l 
commissioners, emphasised that there should be a restriction on the 
sale of arms. 192 
Brownlee's remarks as to a possible outbreak in Queenstown, were 
criticized by the Commissioner of Crown Lands, John X. Merriman, who 
blamed the unfriendly attitude on the injustices to which the Thembu 
were subjected, and on the unfounded suspicions evinced by the 
Government with regard to the general feeling of disaffection among 
the Colonial Thembu. He denied that there were any proofs of such 
dissatisfaction, and insinuated that many of the accusations were 
fabricated by newspapers. The Thembu, he thought, had behaved 
exceptionally well under insults and provocations which had been 
heaped upon them. Taking all these facts into consideration he 
concluded that they would be "less than human if, during a time when 
the Colonial press is ringing with ta lk of war, and when the whole 
frontier appears to be utterly prostrated by the most abject panic, 
they were to abstain from any talk on similar subjects, and I think it 
rather unjust that suc h talk should be adduced as a proof of 
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disaffection.,,193 
It seems unlikely, in view of later events, that an armed attack upon 
the Colony was actually contemplated. There was nevertheless no doubt 
that Glen Grey was in a disaffected state, and perhaps only internal 
divisions had kept the Thembu people from overt acts of hostility. 
Not only were there inter-tribal divisions,194 but the emergence of a 
wealthy class which would not easily risk the loss of their 
possessions in case of war, militated against a concerted movement. 195 
There was one way in which the chiefs could raise sympathy for 
themselves, as well as a spirit of revolt, and that was by the 
exploitation of grievances. Such an opportunity presented itself when 
Gungubele and Mfanta became embroiled in law suits . 
The introduction of Colonial law subjected the Thembu to a judic ial 
system which they found difficult to reconcile with their traditional 
outlook. Stress had already been laid upon the misunderstandings that 
arose from the settlement of cases regarding inheritance, dowry and 
marriages. 196 It had been such misunderstanding that led to the 
trouble in which Gungubele found himself in 1878. 197 What happened 
was that he bought a farm, part of his father's former territory, from 
a Mr. Bouwer. The transaction took place against the advice of 
Hemming,198 at an inflated price of £2 ,200. As Gungubele was unable 
to pay the last installment of £1000, Bouwer offered to cancel the 
sale, on condition that he cou ld keep £500 to cover expenses. 
Gungubele refused, arguing that it was unfair that Bouwer should 
remain in possession of the farm and keep the money. Th is incident 
exacerbated the ill-feelings between Gungubele and the Colonial 
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Government. More important, it gave him the opportunity to consoli-
date behind his follower s. They were now told that the issue was in 
the Government's hands and that he would be arrested for not paying. 
We have less evidence concerning Mfanta's law suit , and the story 
which he spread about his possible arrest, certainly rested upon very 
flimsy foundations. It arose from what appears to have been a libel 
suit, brought by him against a certain Schultz who had accused him of 
warlike intentions . Mfanta expected that Schultz should be fined, and 
the fine be handed over to him. When Hemm i ng failed to act according 
to his wishes he resigned his headmanship in protest . He now alleged 
that he was going to be apprehended for having done this. 199 
Meanwhile, the Ninth Frontier War, in which the Ngqika had become 
involved, had broken out. Not surprisingly, malcontents among the 
Colonial Thembu were excited by t he prospect of at las t settling 
accounts with the Colony, and once again the Location was in 
turmoil. 200 In view of conflicting pre-war rumours and post-war 
evidence - which was also often contradicting - it is difficult to 
establish whether Mfanta and Gungubele actually planned to fight. 201 
Of the two ex-chiefs, Mfanta undoubtedly appears to have been th e more 
militant leader. He instigated the burning down of shops at the 
Bolotwa because, as he said, it was the habit of the English to open 
one shop and then another, until there was a whole town like 
Queenstown. 202 On a visit to Beaufort West he met the Ngqika chief, 
Tini Maqomo, who also claimed that he was going to be arrested . 203 On 
this occasion Mfanta made statements that could officially be 
interpreted as inf lammatory . He told the peop le that it was 
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unnecessary for their children to starve when there were so many 
cattle and so many young men. Translated into plain language this 
meant that he was encouraging cattle raiding. 204 On several other 
occasions Mfanta openly showed his contempt for the Government. When 
the Thembu were invited to the installation of a new magistrate at the 
Bolotwa, he advised a stay_away.205 It would also seem that he 
instigated the burning down of the houses of so-called loyal people. 
These illegal acts called for governmental interference, but before 
Hemming could take any decisive steps, rumour once again added to the 
crisis. 206 
Msheshwe, a step-brother of Gungubele, reported to the Ngqika chief, 
Anta, that Gungubele was prepared to fight. At the same time, he 
confidentially informed Hemming about communications that were taking 
place between Sandile and Gungubele. Msheshwe's conversation with 
Hemming was overheard by the latter's interpreter, Dondasha, who 
informed Gungubele accordingly. Advised by his missionary, the Rev. 
Newton, who was stationed at Gwatyu, Gungubele went to see Hemming. 
The latter denied having had communication with Dondasha. Mfanta now 
warned Gungubele against the danger of seeing the magistrate again, 
and maintained that he had information from various sources about 
their possible arrest. After several attempts to meet Gungubele had 
failed, Hemming decided to go to Gwatyu in person. Mfanta ' s attitude 
became more aggressive. He urged Gungubele to kill the magistrate and 
he assured him of the support of a "whole string of chiefs including 
Sitokwe, Moorosi, Adam Kok and Sandile." 
Hemming was in a difficult position. Since there was not enough 
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evidence of Gungubele's personal responsibility for the assaults on 
Colonial supporters, he could not be arrested. Merriman, too, 
cautioned Hemming, and suggested that both Mfanta and Gungubele should 
be deposed as headmen. 2G7 Hemming tried in vain to arrange a meeting 
with Gungubele, and by December the situation was explosive. The 
Tshatshu, claiming that the war cry had been sounded against them, 
refused to pay taxes. Hemming recommended that Gungubele should be 
brought to account, and in January 1878 he proceeded to arrest the 
ringleaders. The Tshatshu, having received the news of Hemming's 
approach via Newton, still tried to preserve the peace, urging them to 
talk to Hemming. However, spurred on by Mfanta, who warned that the 
actual purpose of the expedition was their arrest, Gungubele took up a 
position under a hill, whence he could, if necessary, launch an attack 
upon the expedition. 
settled by negotiation; 
Initially it seemed as i f matters could be 
but when a shot was fired (by which party it 
is not known), fighting broke out. The battle ended indecisively, and 
the matter could have ended there, had it not been that Gungubele, 
still bearing a grudge against Msheshwe, made known his intention to 
kill the latter. While the burghers were retiring, Msheshwe was 
actually killed, and thus hostilities were renewed. 
Up to this point the Government was hesitant to take action. As there 
was no clear evidence of Gungubele's direct implication in the 
lawlessness, he could not be arrested. Furthermore, the Government 
was also unwilling, at that stage, to extend the war. 2G8 But when in 
January the Ngqika joined the Thembu in a futile attempt to break 
through to Emigrant Thembuland, the Government was jolted into action. 
The initiative was now taken by John X. Merriman, a former 
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Commissioner of Crown Lands and Publi c works, who had, since the 
outbreak of the war, acted as a sort of Min i ster of War. On heari ng 
of the news of Msheshwe's death he ordered Griffith to the Thembu 
locati on to crush all disaffection and to arrest the leaders. This 
campaign was launched without previous knowledge of , and cont rary to 
the wishes of, the general commanding forces and the Governor . The 
latter had to obtain informat ion on this from very imperfectly 
fragmented and very unsatisfactory pieced-together te legrams. 
Mfanta, as could be expected, came to Gungubele's aid, but their 
rebellion ended in tragic fail ure. It was clear that there were not 
only divisions bet ween the three main Thembu sections (those in 
Thembu land Proper, those in Emigrant Thembul and and those i n Glen 
Grey), but al so among the Glen Grey Themb u themselves. Gu ngubele 
could not muster aid from any group other than the Tshatshu, and even 
they were divided. In the final skirmish, in which he was captured, 
he could muster only six hundred men. 
Mfanta must have been sorely di sappo inted, as he fared even worse than 
Gungubele. Only three hundred men came to hi s aid, a clear indication 
that the majority of the Colonial Thembu were not prepared to settle 
their di sputes by means of armed resistance . He was furthermore let 
down by hi s brothers. Matanzima refused to come to his aid, while 
Ngangelizwe eager after his reinstatement to maintain his friendship 
with the Colonial Government, was said to have threatened to ki l l 
Mfanta with his own hands. ZOg Not one of the Emigrant chiefs was 
prepared to gi ve the Glen Grey Rebellion any assistance other than 
moral support. 
289 
After his defeat in the Glen Grey, Mfanta man aged to slip through 
Emigrant Thembuland to join Sitokwe Tyali in Engcobo where they 
occupied the fastnesses of the Drakensberg at the Xuka river. An 
expedition under Wal t er Stanford , consisting of thirteen European 
officers , sixteen European volunteers and a thousand Africans, were 
sent against the two rebels. Ngangelizwe personal ly took the field 
with his men. 210 The expedition was further strengthened by 
volunteers from Barkly East. In a short and decisive campaign which 
lasted only eleven days, the Maxonga's Hoek wa s cleared of Tyali's men 
and a large number of cattle were captured . 211 Mfanta , realizing 
that the enemy was closing in upon him, slipped back to the Glen Grey 
where he surrendered to the authorities. He was tried as a Bri t ish 
subject in Queenstown and sentence of death was passed on him . It was 
afterwards commuted to imprisonment with hard labour for life. He died 
at the Breakwater Convict Station in Cape Town. 212 
Whether Mfanta's decision to diverge from the traditional Thembu 
policy of avoiding war with the Colony, was motivated by personal 
ambition or by gen uine grievances, will never be known for sure. From 
a European point of view it may be argued that his mil itance brought 
disaster over his people, while Matanzima and Ngangelizwe had, by 
their co-operation with the Colony, secured the lands , life and 
property of their people. From a modern black point of view , it may 
be argued that it was the early resistance movements which had 
produced the envi ronment from wh i ch modern black nat iona I po lit ic'iqns 
get their inspiration. 
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Chapter 7 
Aspects of the Economic Development of the Thembu (1870 - 1900) 
Three Thembu territories have been singled out for discussion. The 
first two, the district of Glen Grey and Emigrant Thembuland had a 
long history of close Thembu-European contact. At the start of the 
period under discussion acculturation to western norms had already set 
in. The third district, Engcobo, which formed part of Thembuland 
Proper, was more isolated, had less access to European markets, and 
was described by Sir Walter Stanford as the most "tribalized" of all 
Thembu communities. The economic developments within these three 
territories wil l be discussed in the context of their own historical 
and geographical divergencies, and of South Africa as a whol e dur ing 
the period of late nineteenth century dynamic change. 
The profound changes, brought about by South Africa' s 
industrialization after the mineral discoveries of the 1870's and 
1880's, have been well documented. 1 There was a drive for cap ital 
from overseas. Commerce expanded. The boom in railway building, 
together with the exploitat ion of mines, offered hitherto unknown 
labour opportunities to black and white. 
The prosperity fo llowing the industrial revo lution was increased by 
the unprecedented agricultural progress in the 1870's. The production 
and export of wool rose dramatically, while the production of moha ir, 
hides, skins, ostrich feathers, fruit and vegetables advanced rapid ly. 
Agricultural production was further stimulated by the growth of 
secondary indu stries and the build ing of new rai lway lines which 
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created new markets in the interior . The expans ion of interior 
markets. in turn. initiated a boom for wagon makers and transport 
riders. Understandably there was now a new emphas i s on forestry as a 
source of income . 
In th i s chapter the degree and rapidity with which Thembu farmers 
ava il ed t hemse lves of new opportunities will be investigated. An 
at tempt will be made to establish whether the process of adaptation to 
the western economic system was slower in i so l ated Engcobo than in the 
two other districts where missionaries and trader s played a decisive 
role prior to the period under discussion . How did white farmers 
react to the competition offered by black farmers? This question will 
necessarily focus attent ion upon the Afrikaner Bond and its role in 
the alienation of triba l lands in the 1880's. Another focal pOint 
will be the conditions in the black agr icultural communities towards 
the end of the century. and the relationship between such conditions 
and the policy of the Cape Colonia l Government. which had become 
increasingly concerned with the protection of white farmers and the 
maintenance of a regular supply of black labour . 
The exploitation of the 'black labour market once the min ing era had 
begun. is seen by many modern historians as the central dynamic in the 
late 19th century Cape Co lonial and Imperia l policies. 2 Both mine-
owners and farmers. so it has been argued. called for a constant and 
cheap supply of labour. They demanded such a supply under condit ions 
whereby the majority of the potential black labour force retained its 
access to independent subs i stence in rural reserves. The Glen Grey 
Act of 1894 has especia l ly come in for crit icism as the provisions of 
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individual land tenure combined with a labour tax, stipulated by the 
Act, on the surface seem to fit in exactly with such demands. 3 While 
there can be no doubt about the close connection between the demand 
for labour and the passing of the Glen Grey Act, other factors that 
played a pa rt in the late 19th century leg islative process need 
examination. One such factor was the need for the Cape Government to 
devise strategies through whi ch to establish its supremacy over 
thousands of people of dubious loyalty who were inc luded in the Cape 
Colony by the large scale annexation of black areas. Another 
important factor was the desire of some black farmers to obtain title 
to their lands, thereby obtaining security in the face of land 
alienation. 
Previous chapters concerned t he onslaughts on the cultural and 
political traditions of the Thembu in the immediate post -annexation 
period; t he economic ramificati ons of the Cape Government's policies 
of the late 1870' s are now due for discussion . There were the 
introduction of more burdensome taxation, restrictions on cash 
croppers, and the alienation of tribal lands. How did the land s from 
which people were expe lled compare with those where they were re-
settled? How did communities react to prolonged fear of expulsion? 
Was taxation as burdensome as is usually accepted, or coul d people 
find effective ways of avoiding payment? 
In conclusion, then, the aim of this study is to reconstruct as far as 
is possible the economic and social forces at play which changed the 
destiny of the common black person in the areas concerned during the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century. 
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(i) Gl en Grey 
The district of Glen Grey was the original Tambookie Location which 
was proclaimed by Sir George Cathcart in 1853. In 1870 the Location 
was divided into two sections with the larger part joined to the 
Dordrecht district and the rest to the Queenstown district . As a 
result of administrative problems the two sections were amalgamated in 
1878 under the name Glen Grey, with the chief magistracy at Lady 
Frere. The administration was placed in the hands of a c ivil 
commissioner. 4 
The district, inhabited in 1870 by about 30,000 people,5 comprised 
208,000 morgen . On the whole it was well-adapted for both 
and pastoral farming despite some unfavourab le agricultural 
conditions: almost one-third of the territory was very rugged, and 
the rainfall was erratic. However, the river valleys were very 
fertile and irrigation from the two main rivers, the Cacadu and the 
White Kei, as well as from numerous mountain streams, supplemented the 
annual rainfal l of 600 mm. A long-stand ing resident of Queenstown 
described Glen Grey as an extremely fertile district, unsurpassed for 
horse-breeding and sheepfarming, and capable of growing enough wheat 
for the whole Cape Colony.6 Sir Richard Southey considered it to be 
the most valuable part of the Cape Colony,7 while a Mr. Hopley, who 
was well-acquainted with the area, stated emphatically: "There is not 
a part in the Colony, east, west, north or south, taking acre for 
acre, worth anyth i ng like it. ,,8 
Mention has already been made of contact between the western Thembu 
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and Europeans - missionaries, farmers, traders and officials - since 
the 1820s. 9 At the beginning of the period under discussion, the Glen 
Grey Thembu had already been exposed for nearly half-a-century to 
western influences, and they had adopted various western methods of 
production. As early as 1864 J.C. Warner had stated in an offic ial 
report that hundreds of Thembu had substituted the plough for the 
wooden hoe and had cut watercourses for purposes of irrigation; owners 
of wagons could be counted by scores. 10 They also valued money, and 
practised diversified agriculture. In years to follow various reports 
confirmed that the Thembu had responded keenly to the Cape Colony's 
expanding economy. A trader, M. Wilson, wrote in 1873 that while a 
few years earlier he counted it a good deal t o sell ten ploughs a 
season, he then counted as many as fourteen at work in one small 
valley.11 The civil commissioner for Wodehouse reported at the same 
time that in his district he noticed a desire among the people to 
obtain clothing and other luxuries, and that they had developed a 
"keener sense of the value of money and labour as means to obtain such 
luxuries.,,12 
An important development in Glen Grey was the acceptance by a large 
number of people of the concept of individual landownership. This 
advancement to a stage where a man could possess his own piece of l and 
was certainly stimulated by developments in nearby Victoria East. 
The Rev. Henry Calderwood, on instruction of Sir Harry Smith had in 
1848 settled there a large number of Mfengu in locations where they 
received individual holdings at a quitrent of £1 per annum. The 
Thembu lands to the west of the Kei were annexed in the same year and 
in 1849 placed under the regency of Nonesi . 13 Under influence of 
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J.C. Warner, Calderwood ' s policy was partly adopted in the newly 
annexed area. Both Nonesi and the Gcina chief, Tyopo, enticed 
influential men with gifts of land to settle among them. 14 
When Warner was Thembu Agent it became official policy in the 
Tambookie Location to grant sma ll farms to black farmers who, by 
industry and hard work , had improved their condition . In 1868 the 
Land Tenure Act was passed, making provision for individual 
landownership in the Location. When Warner left in 1869 his 
recommendation that the policy of grant ing farms should be extended, 
was accepted by Sir Ph iIi p Wodehouse . 15 Although onl y a small nu mber 
of men received land in this way, the density of the populat ion 
created a situation where many people at least became acquainted with 
tenurial experiments in surveyed plots and qui t rent holdings. 
Developments, such as outlined above, in turn, led to the rise of a 
westernized class whose way of life diverged from those of t he i r 
tribal kinsmen. Their affluence was conspicuous, as can be seen from 
the report of a trave ller who visited the area in 1885. One farmer, 
Thomas Zwedela, had erected a brick house, with eight rooms, the usual 
outbui lding s, and a school buildi ng for forty pupils. He could boast 
of superior stock, including a well-bred stallion, and a shorthorn 
bull. Another enterprising farmer, Fortuin Peits, had planted seven 
hundred fruit trees, while many other black farmers possessed merino 
sheep.16 
Superficially this presents a picture of unprecedented prosperity. In 
1874 the civi l commissioner for Wodehouse reported that, in his part 
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of the Location, four hundred bales of wool were produced, and that 
agriculture f lourished. 17 J. Hemming proudly testified that in the 
Queenstown part people were showing signs of "civilization" - they 
sowed wheat, barley and oats instead of sorghum and 
had made progress and there was little crime. 18 
Location, from which the Thembu were evicted in 
maize; educat ion 
In the Umhlanga 
1885 ,19 a hard 
working, enterprising community was highly appreciated by white 
inhabitants of Dordrecht. They objected to the removal of the 
Umhlanga people, and pointed out that not only did the black farmers 
possess more cattle, sheep, horses and pigs than the white farmers by 
whom they were replaced, but that they had also suppl ied t he Dordrecht 
and other contiguous markets with more dairy and agricultural products 
and had purchased and consumed more household goods. As one resident 
put it: "they are a mi ne of wea I th and an army of consumers and 
producers.,,20 
Perhaps the most telling evidence came from John X. Merriman when, in 
1894, he opposed the introduction of a labour tax under the Glen Grey 
Act. Statistics, he said, showed that the Glen Grey district rated 
fifth in the production of corn in the Colony, had as many sheep and 
ten times the number of cattle as the Caledon district, produced half 
the quantity of wool produced in the who le of the Fraserburg district 
and a hundred times the quantity of mealies. 21 The Frontier Guardian 
pointed out that the agricultural produce of the 6,800 families in 
Glen Grey amounted to £145,000. Even in adverse seasons, the paper 
maintained, the black farmers cultivated more intensively than 
Europeans could or would do. 22 
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Obviously this picture of dramatic economic progress must be 
qualified. Fluctuations in the Cape Colony's economy were reflected 
by variations in those of black communities, and magisterial reports 
were often grim, in stark contrast to the glowing reports quoted 
above. The years 1877-1878 saw a severe drought. 23 Conditions were 
aggravated by the War of NgCayecibi. 24 "The drain on the division in 
the matter of defense has been very severe", wrote the c i v i I 
commissioner for Queenstown, "It has been dra i ned of food supp lies. 
Everything had risen in price, especially as the rates of carriage 
from the seaports are very high and there are few carriers willing to 
transport under present circumstances.,,25 In 1885 another severe 
drought forced a large number of Thembu to seek refuge in the 
Transkei. 26 
It must further be kept in mind that wealth was very unevenly 
distributed as an analysis of statistics provided by the 1891 census 
suggests. 27 The population numbered about forty thousand, of whom 
just over eighteen thousand were males. The average number of cattle 
per family was seventeen, and that of sheep fifty-three. An average 
of twenty-six bags of corn and sorghum, forty-seven bundles of oats 
and hay, and nine bags of other grain were produced. About one 
hundred and sixty pounds of mohair were cultivated per family. 
At first these figures look impressive, but given the fact that there 
were several farmers who owned well-stocked farms of up to 1500 morgen 
on which large herds of cattle and sheep grazed, and taking into 
account the greater productivity of the wealthier people, we can 
assume that a section of the population possessed very little stock 
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and cultivated very little . A Law Agent. Kelly. said in his evidence 
before the Glen Grey Commission that there were men who cultivated 
twice as muc h as others. while some did not cultivate at all. 28 This 
was confirmed by David Malasile who said that "some men had very small 
pieces of land. They cultivated as far as they could go and depended 
upon friends for the rest.,,29 
Despite such obvious signs of poverty. the impression we get is that 
most households could still sustain themselves without men being 
forced out to look for work . It is true that Warner estimated in 1865 
that one thousand men were annually selling their labour to farmers in 
the Wodehouse and Dordrecht districts. 30 but available evidence 
suggests that farmers who gave evidence before the Cape Labour 
Commission in 1893. wh i Ie unanimously agreeing that these two 
districts had never at any time experienced a labour shortage. 
nevertheless stressed that the Thembu were a nervous and timid people 
who refused to go far from their homes. though they were also 
gregarious. They preferred to work during the shearing season. but 
even then were unwilling to go as far as Cradock and Graaff-Reinet. 31 
There were some exceptions where men ventured further afield. for 
farmers from Victoria West told the Labour Commission that Thembu from 
the Queenstown district often worked for them. and that they preferred 
them to labourers from their own district. 32 
Reluctance to take up employment far from home is also reflected in 
Thembu attitudes towards new labour opportunities. In the 1870's jobs 
became availab le on the railway lines. and the wages of 2/6 to 3/6 a 
day were considerab ly higher than those offered by the farmers . 33 
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The Glen Grey people, however, responded reluctantly to attempts by 
the c ivil commissioners to recruit labour. They might have been put 
off by the unsatisfactory conditions of employment for those who did 
go complained regularly of delays in payment. Even in 1885, when 
Field Cornet Hughes found that many people in his district were 
starving, strenuous efforts by civil commissioners to find men to work 
on the Aliwal North-Queenstown line, met with little success. 34 It 
was the more enterprising men, rather than the extremely poor, who did 
look for employment . Hemming, the civil commissioner for Queenstown, 
linked the rise of a westernized class to the increase of shops 
throughout the district, while Cole, his counterpart in Wodehouse, was 
convinced that the men went to work so that t hey could buy luxuries, 
western clothes, ploughs, sheep and (illegally) brandy from these 
shops.35 
From 1880 onwards the pattern of labour migrancy changed dramatically 
as an increasing number of men left the Location to look for 
employment. 36 One factor that led to this situati on, was that of 
over-crowding in the Location. In the mid-1880 's civi l commissioners 
agreed that this problem had reached alarming proportions. Not only 
could the distr ict not carry the natural increase, but the situation 
was exacerbated by various other factors. There was first the far-
reaching revolution in both the socia l and economic organization of 
the Thembu. This revolution which showed itself in the changing 
structure of the homesteads was set in motion with the introduction of 
the plough in the 1860s, whereby the traditional male-fema le role in 
the cultivation of land was reversed. 37 This in turn struck a blow at 
the system of polygamy. The increa sing tendency towards monogamy and 
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the consequent reduction of the lobola value of cattle 
emphasised the economic expediency of concentrating on the 
attainment of draught animals and small stock such as sheep, which 
grew their money on their backs. 38 The importance of these 
developments can only be appreciated if we take into consideration 
that under the traditional system a young man who went out to 
work might in practice never have seen any money, as his obj ect 
was the attainment of cattle. Once the cattle were advanced 
he had to work unt i I he had earned them. 39 It was therefore only 
after he had worked off his payment that he was in a position 
to c laim his land and set up his first household . There was 
consequently a waiting period before manhood was achieved. 
Wi th the acceptance of westernized farming methods the economic 
effectiveness of at least a section of the population was 
increased, and a man could buy cattle, get married and claim 
land at an earlier age. The waiting period for manhood was thus 
reduced, a development which strained the capacity of the ch ief 
(or headman) to find land for all the legitimate claimants. Land 
shortage set in earlier. According to a Mr. Cooke who gave evidence 
before the Native Grievance Commission of 19 14, the rate at which this 
happened could not be ascertained, 
tendency.40 
but there was a definite 
As land shortage increased, it was especially the younger sons 
in the fami ly, or in the case of polygamous marriages 
those from lesser houses , who often found themselves in trouble. In 
traditional societies the law of primogeniture was followed .41 
Unless a man made a wi II by ca l ling together his friends and 
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explaining to them how his possessions had to be distributed, his 
estate would devolve on his eldest son, or the son of his Great Widow. 
Their he-i l' became guardian of the women and the minor sons in the 
family. Once Glen Grey had become crown land such minor sons, on 
having obtained manhood, had to apply to the magistrate for land, and 
not to the chief as had traditionally been the case. The outcome of 
such applications was often unsatisfactory as the magistrates 
themselves were not always fully acquainted with the circumstances 
surrounding applications. 
The history of the Kulu family is an example of such an 
unfortunate situation. 42 In 1869 Kulu received 12 morgen quitrent 
land situated in the division of Queenstown. On his death in 1885, 
leaving behind nine sons, letters of administration were issued 
to his eldest son, Mayekisi, who received the deed of transfer 
the next year. Mayekisi , having mortgaged the farm for £250, 
notified his brothers, on threat of ejection, that they had to 
qu.i t. The brot hers lodged their complaints via a law agent 
to the Secretary for Native Affairs, who found their case to 
be a very weak one as the farm was legally bequeathed to 
Mayek i so. The brothers were at a further disadvantage since the 
magistrate, Jenner, had a few months earlier rejected their 
application for farms on the grounds that the lands belonged 
to the Kulu family and that they were thus provided for. Further 
correspondence on this issue brought little satisfaction, except that 
their names were placed on a waiting list for land in the Macibini 
location. The outcome is not clear, but given the land shortage , they 
may well have suffered a considerable period of uncertainty followed 
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by landlessness. 
In view of the existing land shortage civil commissioners began to 
pressurize men into taking individual tenure as a means of securing 
their land. 43 In Queenstown, Jenner pOinted out that the available 
248,476 morgen of crown land had to be div ided among 9,464 adult 
ma les. He calculated that an average family of eight needed at least 
fifty-five morgen on which to keep seventeen large and fifty-three 
small stock, while producing twenty-six bags of sorghum, nine bags of 
wheat and forty-seven bundles of oats. 44 There was thus hardly any 
more land left for distribution, and he could not cope with the 
dramatic increase of population which occurred in the 1890 's. This 
increase was due to natural factors as we l l as to the return of 
labourers from the Cape Colony . In the first months of 1894 Jenner 
had to relocate eight hundred peop le who had returned from labour; 
thereafter he received instructions not to locate any more. Jenner 
found it difficult to carry these instructions out. People, desperate 
for land, threatened to take the law into their own hands and start 
ploughing up communal lands. He warned the Government that should 
there be no sett lement of the land question within the next three or 
four years, 
land. 45 
there would have to be a general re-distribution of 
The population pressures, the fact of which was emphas i sed by white 
officials, coincided with two important deve lopments; the intensified 
efforts by the Cape Government in the wake of the annexation of 
Transkeian territories to undermine whatever vestiges of tribalism had 
remained; and an increasing demand for labour, following the discovery 
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of gold in 1886. Under these circumstances official minds began to 
see in the introduction of a system of individual tenure a possible 
solution to the existing problems. This led, in 1892, to the 
appointment of the Glen Grey Commission to inquire into the tenure of 
land in Glen Grey. The Commission was instructed to report upon the 
following: 
(a) The nature and conditions of the tenure under which Glen Grey 
lands were held in native occupation. 
(b) The extent and natural features of the ground so occupied and its 
suitability for pastoral and agricultural purposes. 
(c) The number of ma le residents and the number of huts occup ied by 
them. 
(d) The practicability of reducing the number and extent of the 
locations by combining two or more locations into one. 
(e) The best way of disposing of vacant land. 
(f) The desirability of giving individual tenure to those black 
farmers who wished for it; and the best course to adopt 
regarding those who did not want it. 
The findings of the Glen Grey Commission were published more or less 
at the same time as those of the Cape Labour Commission. From the 
minutes and proceedings of these two Commissions, as well as from the 
debates in the House of Assembly, it emerges that there was an 
intimate link between overcrowding , land tenure and the question of 
labour supp ly to a growing market. In the words of Charles Levey, 
then civil commissioner of Cofimvaba, the land question and labour 
were inseparable. 46 
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The link between individual tenure and labour demand was eloquently 
expounded in parliament by John Frost, the M.L.A. for Queenstown. 
Amid cheers from the House, he argued that as long as the Location 
(i . e. Glen Grey) existed, and individual responsibility was removed 
from the shoulders of the Africans, there would be difficulties 
connected with the labour market. 47 Under individual tenure, C.J. 
Rhodes argued, the majority of farmers would be secured in their 
rights and there would be a surplus of men to supply the labour 
market. "In future," he elaborated, "nine-tenths of the native 
population will have to spend their lives in manual labour. The 
enormous increase in population will soon make it impossible for the 
locat ions to support them and they will then turn to canteens, and 
will thus not be taught the dignity of labour.,,48 The African policy 
which Rhodes envisaged, and on which the Glen Grey Act was eventually 
based, rested then on four points: land settlement s, t he establishment 
of location boards and district councils, a labour tax and liquor 
provisions. 49 
The final findings of the Commission on Glen Grey were certainly 
influenced by reports from various sources which emphasised the system 
of tribal tenure as the root cause of lack of progress in the 
locations. 50 The Commission also concluded that, contrary to 
offi c ial statements, the Thembu were legally in possession of the 
Glen Grey district. They further concluded, on rather dubious 
grounds, that the majority of black farmers wanted individual tenure. 
There was in fact widespread opposition to this system of 
landownership. Those farmers who were anxious to take up title ei t her 
belonged to the more educated or to the more affluent section of the 
318 
population. In studying the evidence before the Glen Grey comm issi on, 
it would also seem that the Mfengu were more inclined to support the 
system than the Thembu. This could be because the Mfengu were, 
generally speaki ng, the more prosperous section of the community. It 
could also be ascribed to the conservatism of the Thembu and their 
resistence to novel ideas. It could also be t hat the Thembu, with 
their strong sense of ethnicity, wanted to keep the tribal lands 
intact. 51 The Glen Grey Commission based its claim that the majority 
of people desired ind ividua l landownership on the fact that they had 
visited eleven locations to test the feelings of the residents. They 
found that 2,356 people were in favour of it while 1,321 were against 
it. However, this was by no means a true reflection of the general 
attitude of the residents. The Commission, in "testing" the feelings 
of the people, made it clear that rejection of the individual tenure 
could result in loss of land. The people in the Bengu location were 
asked whether they realized that Glen Grey lands were crown lands with 
which the Government could deal as it saw fit. In the Mkapusi 
Location, where individual title was rejected by an overwhelming 
major ity, the inhabitants were threatened with forced removals. 52 
Those people who accepted individual landownership might have done so 
for fear of losing their lands . 
The reports of the Glen Grey Commission and the Labour Commission, as 
well as those of various Transkeian magistrates, swung public opinion 
among whites in favour of granting individual tenure to the Glen Grey 
people. Such a step was seen as the solut ion to the problems of 
overcrowdi ng and labour shortage . An additional problem raised its 
head in the 1890s: the possibility that black fa rmers and squatters, 
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not tied to the locations, could flood into the border districts. 
Merriman argued in parliament: "The real danger of the native 
question is not so much in the filling up of the Transkei, not in the 
increase of natives in their own country, but in the increase of the 
natives in the white man's country, and we must be careful in our land 
settlement that we do not increase that danger.,,53 J. Rose-Innes 
remarked: "European intrusion has ceased to be a menace; the anti -
native forces have adopted a new alignment; the slogan now is not 
dispossession, but segregation . Nat ives are not to be driven out, but 
into their reserves. The problem is now how to provide the necessary 
land.,,54 Other Europeans , not ab ly some Bond members, favoured the 
granting of individual title despite the fact that more Africans would 
obtain the vote. They hoped that the lands of black farmers would 
soon become liable for debt and available for purchase by white 
farmers. 55 Acting then on the reports of t he two commissions, Ceci l 
John Rhodes and his secretary, Milton, drafted the Glen Grey Bill 
which was eventual ly promu lgated in 1894. 56 
The Bill stipulated that title deeds were to be issued to Africans, 
subject to perpetual quitrent of 15/- per annum, which mea nt 5/- more 
than the hut tax it replaced. All otments could not be subdivided, but 
land had to remain intact under one owner. There were provisions for 
forfeiture of title should the holder be involved in rebellion. or for 
having previously been convicted of theft for which he had been 
sentenced to imprisonment of not less than twelve months. Lands could 
also be forfeited in cases where owners failed to cultivate t heir 
allotments for a period of twelve months. An important part of the 
bill was the provis ion that land should pass according to the law of 
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primogeniture . In view of this provision a table of succession was 
drawn up. The Government's adherence to the law of primogeniture 
rested upon the argument that it would not be sound economy to allow a 
man to divide his land among four or five ch ildren. Land had to be 
kept intact as a reserve to which children , who went out to work, 
could return. It was therefore essential to l imit ownership of land 
to one man On ly . 57 
The most controversial part of the bill was the provision for a labour 
tax of 10/- on each adult ma le, unless he could show to the 
satisfaction of the resident magistrate that he had been at work 
beyond the borders of the district for a total period of three months 
during the preceding year or had been employed outside the district 
for a total period of three years. 
The introduction of this clause is not surpr i sing, taking into account 
the findings of the Labour Commission which emphasised that the want 
of sufficient farm labour was acutely and increasingly felt in the 
western districts of Worcester, Malmesbury and Piquetberg and that 
several thousands of labourers could be absorbed in that area. 58 
This situation was the direct result of the competition between the 
great employers of labour, the mines and public works, which under 
stress were beginning to compete strongly against each other, thus 
fixing a wage rate beyond that payable by the white farmers. Since 
these large employers had organizations, means and agencies to 
organize a labour supply, the country and towns became drained of an 
adequate supply. Besides, farmers had to compete against each other, 
especially in critical times, under pain of losing a sowing, harvest 
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or vintage. Some stock farmers had to compete with wine farmers and 
manufacturers. That the mines were beginning to draw labour away from 
the farms was borne out by the evidence of Solomon Kalipa, who told 
the Labour Commission that since farmers did not pay Johannesburg 
wages, and more-over paid in stock rather than in money, people 
preferred going to the mines. 59 
The provisions of the bil l , t hen, which aimed at bringing about a 
stable farming community by giving them security of property while 
forcing the less energetic, by means of a labour tax, to look for 
work, were seen by the Cape politicians as an ideal compromise 
between, on the one hand, the farmers' demand for labour which 
necessitated the presence of thousands of Africans on white-owned 
land; and on the other hand, the demand of farmers for protection 
aga inst black intrusion. The introduction of the labour tax in Glen 
Grey was greeted with misgiving from various sources, although there 
were , surprisingly, Africa ns who supported it outside their 
district. 60 El liot was of opinion that the desire for people to earn 
money was a sufficient inducement for them to go out to work, and that 
the tax, even if enforceable, would have little effect . 61 There were 
Africans who saw it as a "black man's tax"; a means of discriminat i ng 
against the African. One deputation expressed its feelings, when 
testifying before the Select Committee on the Glen Grey Act, as 
follows: "You have thousands of lazy wh ite men in the Colony who do 
not work; they sit all day drinking coffee. They grow nothing 
because they have no servants to work for them. and they do not work 
themselves. Why is not the tax put upon them?,,62 
322 
In the final analysis the Glen Grey Act solved none of the problems it 
was intended to solve. The Labour Tax was soon considered a dead 
letter, and numerous problems regarding the survey of lands resulted 
in farmers feeling less secure than when they held the lands i n the 
traditional way. The Glen Grey district was divided into eighteen 
locations, each surveyed and divided into allotments of approximatel y 
four morgen. Initially the cost of survey was estimated at £2.10, but 
it finally amounted to £5, of which half had to be paid immediately. 
The rest was spread over four annual instalments. Although 6,576 of 
t he 7,093 plots were taken up within the firs t three years, resident-
magistrates had little cause for satisfaction. Many people could 
simply not afford the survey costs , and shortly after the survey had 
been comp l eted, various farmers had to forfeit their claim to land 
following their non-payment of the f i rst insta lments . J. Sweeney's 
experience as resident-magistrate at Lady Frere had convinced him that 
Glen Grey was, from every point of view, an unfortunate choice for t he 
launching of the great experiment. Most of the surveyed plots had to 
rely on an erratic rainfall. He pointed out that in the eight years 
since the Act had been introduced, there were only three good crops. 
A succession of dry seasons made it impossible for farmers to meet 
their obligations, especially as they had to pay an annual quitrent in 
addition to survey costs. This fee of 15/ - per year replaced the old 
tax of 10/- per hut. Furthermore, the survey cost of £5 for a four 
morgen holding was well above the market value of land. Farmers also 
found themselves at a disadvantage in that they were now confined to a 
si ngl e plot which was often not of the same value as the several 
fertile patches which they were allowed to cultivate under the old 
system. 53 
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As many farmers fell vic t im to droughts and other disasters, and 
consequent ly failed to pay their quitrent, the old pattern once agai n 
emerged: those who had land had to support the landless. Also, si nce 
the labour tax was ineffective in forcing people out to work, the 
problem of overcrowding was by no means resolved; in fact it wou ld 
seem that the habits of encroaching on each others lands or of 
ploughing up commonages and path ways were as alive by 1900 as had 
been the case before the Act was applied. 54 
As t he century drew to a close we can detect defi nite signs of 
arrested progress in Glen Grey. 
concluding part of this chapter. 
This will be discussed in the 
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(ii) Emigrant Thembuland65 
In 1880 the Chief Magistrate of Thembuland wrote as follows, in a 
reply to a circular from the Cape Legislative Council as to the best 
way of extracting labour from the black territor ies: 
"I believe that the Transkeian territory is one of the 
richest in South Africa, that if properly developed it wou ld 
compare well in proportion to its extent with any other in 
the Colony. It is surely well worth opening up. The cry 
now is for labour in the old Co lony. Why not try what the 
new can produce? .. . Make roads, establish model farms , train 
the natives tenderly and carefully in their own land, and 
then they may be disposed to seek labour at a distance .. . I 
do not think it would be difficult to induce, by force of 
example, the natives of the Transkeian territor~6to produce 
more breadstuffs than the Colony could consume . " 
Elliot's letter reflects the growing awareness in the 1880's among 
Transkeian magistrates that the Transkei had enormous potentia l as a 
contributor towards the Cape Colony's revenue, as a consumer market 
and as a labour reservoir. The Chief Magistrate was therefore 
advocating the direct intervention of the Cape Government in the 
economic life of black Transkeians, and the restructuring of the 
traditional subsistence economy . What was needed, then, was the 
creation of an educated class of farmer who could actively contribute 
towards the development of a viable rural economy. 
In Emigrant Thembuland various f actors enabled the Cape officials to 
embark on experiments in building up peasant production. 67 The 
Emigrant Thembu , like their kinsmen in Glen Grey, had a long history 
of western contact. For almost forty years they had been renowned as 
excellent farm workers . As labourers on white farms they became 
acquainted with the western monetary system and they were introduced 
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to western agricultural methods and implements. 58 After the 
Emig ration, in 1855, they continued to sell their labour on 
neighbour ing white farms, and the new district benefited greatly from 
this. I t would also seem that the peop le who emigrated came from the 
more affluent section of the Glen Grey district. They took into their 
new country cons iderable numbers of sheep, goats and catt le. 59 
Furthermore, the geographical s ituation of Emigrant Thembuland, 
bordering on the districts of Queenstown and Wodehouse, from whic h it 
was separated only by the Indwe river, made it easily accessible to 
traders and missionaries. 
Al t hough the Wesleyan Church was traditiona ll y most close ly assoc i ated 
with the Thembu, it was t he Angli can Churc h that played the major ra'le 
in Emigrant Thembuland. In part this could be accounted for by t he 
fact that already in 1855, when the lands belonged to Sarhili, the 
Ang l icans established St. Mark's Mission Station on the banks of the 
Kei River with the Rev . Henry Waters as the first missionary. This 
station made rapid progress after 1855 . In 1879 Waters could report 
that there were 2,843 church members and that as ma ny as 4,305 people 
attended serv ices . 70 He referred to his station as an English 
Vil l age with we l l-supp l ied shops, a wagon-making establishment and a 
shoe-maker . These business concerns had, in the missionary's words, 
"a beneficial influence on the native mind", as they provided 
employment as well as the opportunity to exchange their produce for 
western articles such as blankets, clothes, ploughs and spades. 71 
Various other missionary societies found their way to Emigrant 
Thembuland, where they were cordially received by the chiefs. Under 
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mis sionary influence education made rapid progress. In 1872 it was 
reported from the Xalanga di strict that young men, who had considered 
themselves too old to be educated, had formed a large class and that 
good schools were erected at Cofimvaba, Isobeka and Southeyville. 
Elementary schools were established at Seplan, Inbekwateni and 
Xalanga. In 1879 the Rev. Henry Waters wrote with great satisfaction 
that there were ninety-five boys and seventy-five girls in his day 
school where pupils were instructed in the making of wagons, scotch 
carts, post carts, tables, chairs, wardrobes, couches, shoes and 
tinware. Girls were instructed in needlework. 72 
It was a rule at mission stations that all people had to be neatly 
dressed, even if they wore a blanket instead of European rags. 73 
Emphasis was also laid on other symbols of "civilization" such as the 
building of square houses and the acquisition of furniture. Traders 
were therefore rapidly attracted to the new country. In 1881 there 
were seventeen trad ing stations in the vicinity of St. Mark's alone, 
while in 1883 thirty-four traders claimed that they had been granted 
licences at £5 per annum by various chiefs. 74 There is definite 
evidence that a brisk trade was carried out . Shopkeepers often had 
stock up to the va lue of £5000 in their shops. Such stock consisted 
mai nly of superior blankets, beads, clay and agricultural products. 75 
Magistrate's reports for the first decade after settlement in Emigrant 
Thembuland had taken place, portray a peasantry that had advanced well 
beyond the subs is tence level . By 1873 the plough was in common use; 
water and irrigation furrows were cut; hundreds of fruit trees were 
planted; and sheep-farm ing was rapidly gaining popularity over 
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cattle-farming. 76 A glance at some statistics which were made 
available during the 1870s will confirm W. Fynn's observation that the 
Thembu were a very wealthy people. In 1876 the total popu lation which 
numbered 40,000 (almost 7,000 adult men) possessed among themselves 
5,384 horses, 38,749 cattle, 82,201 sheep, 107 wagons and 898 
Ploughs. 77 
If we take Cumming's estimate in 1878 of twelve persons per household 
as correct, there would have been about 3,400 homesteads. This would 
give an average of twelve cattle and twenty-four sheep per family; 
but in a report of 1879, he estimated that each household had from 
twenty to forty cattle and a small flock of sheep.78 It should be 
taken into account that it was very difficult to make such 
estimations, as people were often unwilling to make known the exact 
number of stock in their possession. The general prosperity of the 
district was also clearly reflected in export figures for 1876. Wool 
was exported to the value of £50,000, hides and skins to the value of 
£4000, grain to the value of £3000 and timber to the value of 
£3000. 79 
One other factor which contributed towards the relatively rapid 
economic transformation of Emigrant Thembuland must be discussed here 
in detail: the rise of an elitist class, deliberately cultivated by 
the Colonial Government . The presence of a number of men who could be 
collaborators in time of war and spies in times of uncertainty was 
considered to be of the utmost importance in this territory, 
strategically situated as it was between Thembuland Proper and Glen 
Grey. It was for this reason that magistrates exerted themselves in 
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furthering the interests of those black farmers who were potent ial 
allies . The most influential of these magistrates was Charles 
Levey.80 However critical one may be of his authoritarianism, and 
his disregard for the feelings of those people who were stil l deep ly 
attached to traditional institutions, he was undoubtedly an extremely 
capable administrator who was also genuinely interested in the 
economic development of his district . He asserted that the key to 
prosperity rested upon two pillars: the fixity of tenure which was to 
go hand in hand with the development of self-government, and a sound 
agricultural policy . To this end he untiringly pleaded for the 
improvement of education, and, more specifically, for the establish-
ment of technical and agricultural schools. Half-educated people, he 
believed, were use less to themselves as well as to others, since they 
were on ly producers of an increased population ! He gave substance to 
his arguments by referring to France where agriculture was considered 
to be the cardinal principle underlying all education .81 His uniq ue 
system of land tenure in the Cala district, and his agricultural 
societies - about which more will be said later - contr ibuted largely 
to the emergence of a class of westernized farmers, from whose ranks 
he sel ected the leaders of the community . In accordance with his 
be l ief in self-government, he prided himself that he would not even 
erect a pound without consulting the people,82 and he regu larl y 
conducted meetings with the chiefs and other leaders to stimulate the 
cultivation of wheat . He founded, with great success, a Farmers ' Tree 
Planting Assocation, estab l ished a nursery for trees, and propounded 
the idea of introduci ng some form of municipal government, in which 
Africans would be represented. 83 We can see that from the l ate 
1870's Levey was already applying those principles on which the Glen 
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Grey Act was based. In later years he was very keen to have the act 
extended to Emigrant Thembuland, although he disag reed with certain 
stipulations, amongst others the labour tax. 84 
The emergence of a substant ial peasantry, as advocated by Elliot, and 
encouraged by the activities of Levey and other mag i strates, could 
on ly be brought about by a radical change in the system of 
landownership. The traditiona l system, whereby the al location of 
arable land was vested in the chief, had to be broken down to be 
replaced by one in which specia l treatment cou ld be given, no t only to 
Colon i al allies, but al so to men who showed the inclination to improve 
their position. 
the Emigration. 
Such changes were already visible immediately after 
Chiefs, departing from the traditional system, which 
did not allow the ali enation of tribal lands , fol lowed the adv ice of 
magistrates, and made gifts of lands to so-ca ll ed deserving men. 
Init ially the chiefs followed this policy to enhance their prestige in 
their new country, and to increase their income. Gradually the 
mag istrates became close ly involved in land transactions so that 
eventua ll y ch iefs only allocated lands to men approved of by the 
magistrate. 8S E.J. Warner informed the Thembul and Land Commission 
that chiefs were encouraged to make gifts of land to a certain class 
of blacks who could be an example to others and who could "teach the 
real kafir civilization." On the que stion of whether these people 
wou ld form a protective shield round the Government, he answered: 
"Yes, they were men that could be depended upon - they were 
thorough ly loyal . ,, 86 
The interests of these Colonial alli es were further advanced by the 
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land settlements after the war of 1880-81 - settlements in which an 
overlap between black elitist and Cape Colonial interests were 
conspicuous. The Thembuland Land Settlement Commission recommended: 
"That natives of known loyalty, good character, with small 
means, and irrespective of na t ionality, should receive small 
locations of from one to five morgen of arable land at a 
quitrent of five shillings per morgen per annum, that this 
should give them the right of from ten to fifteen morgen of 
grazing land to each morgen of arable land without further 
payment, and a building plot of about half an acre, the 
grazing rights to give the allottee the privilege of grazing 
five head of large stock or twelve sheep or goats for each 
morgen of arable land registered in his name ... that a certi-
ficate securing to the grantee and his heirs ownership to 
such allotment be granted; that in case of rebellion the 
land to be dec lared forfe ited to the Crown; that the grantee 
shall personally occupy the ground, failing which for three 
consecutive years, t he land to revert to the Government; no 
change of ownership to be permitted without the consent of 
Government ... that the land allotted be no security for debt; 
that the Government sha ll have the preferent claim on the 
crops of the grantee for the payment of qUitrent and taxes, 
such crops to be liable to seizure and execution without 
further process of law afteS7 14 days notice of such arrears having been duly served ... " 
While the Colonial allies were compensated in this way, the Commission 
dealt harshly with those who fought against the Cape. It was 
stipulated that they would be located on a piece of garden ground with 
commonage for their stock, and that they should not receive a 
cert i f i cate of ownershi p for such gardens unt i I "they had proved 
themselves worthy of such privilege by their loyalty, industry and 
progressive disposition." It was further emphasised that 
"they (should) be overlooked by headmen to be appointed by the Govern-
ment, who for such service should receive a large concession of land , 
such headmen to be of approved loyalty of character," ... Las t ly "ex-
rebels" were to pay a sum of twenty shillings annua lly in lieu of hut 
tax and house duty and they were liable, on proof of misconduct, to be 
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expelled from their location. 88 
In their settlements the Commission further made provision for a 
number of black farmers who already possessed a considerable extent of 
lands before the war had broken out. With regard to these farmers it 
was stipulated: 
"That: all loyal claimants who had fu l ly established their 
claims should receive grants not exceeding 500 morgen , 
either where they now occupy, or in such other locality in 
Emigrant Thembuland as can be found for them, and they 
consent to accept, at a Quitrent of not less than 20s per 
100 morgen. That in deciding the extent of grant and amount 
of Quitrent, the Commission take into consideration the 
length of time the claimants have occupied, the amount of 
improvement and cultivation on their farms in relation to 
the quantity of arable land, time of occupation and quality 
of land, and that in event of the grantee at any time taking 
up arms agaInst the peacSgof the country, the land should 
revert to the Government." 
There were after 1883 three classes of farmers: those who did not own 
any land; those who owned very small patches of land and those who 
owned relatively large farms. In no instance did farmers receive 
title deeds to their farms. Although there were some requests for 
title deeds by some farmers, Elliot did not consider the time ripe for 
such a step as title deeds were only to be given to black farmers who 
had sufficiently improved their holdings, and who gave proof of being 
able to maintain certain standards. In the event of failure to comply 
with Governmental requirements, they could be expropriated. In the 
uncertain politica l climate of the 1880s, El l iot thought it would be 
unwise to implement any system that could cause such discontent as 
would have arisen should farms be taken away from the owners. It was 
only after the passing of the Glen Grey Act that the Government became 
favourably disposed towards the granting of individual title to lands . 
333 
number of advanced people, a council should be formed consisting of a 
president and t hree or four councillors who should then, under 
guidance of magistrates or officers nominated by the Government, have 
control of these villages. All regulations for the management of the 
villages were to be made by the council and submitted to the 
Government. Levey hoped that young men with fair education and those 
who had been taught trades, could serve on these councils. 
At this first meeting, Levey could also report with understandable 
pride on the great progress that had taken place since the formation 
of the society. Between 1875 and 1877 the number of square houses had 
increased from four to seventy, and the number of water courses from 
t hirty to two hundred. Far more wheat was sown - ten bags for every 
one sown before - and the amount of land under cu lt ivation had 
doubled . "The agricultural societies" , Levey noted on another 
occasion, "form a bond of association among the wealth iest classes, 
and do much to counteract the influence of the chiefs whose authority 
is too often exerted in a manner prejudicial to Government and the 
spread of civilization.,,91 
We could quote at length from various sources in support of the 
argument that a substantial class of farmer had emerged, who grew 
large quantities and varieties of grain solely as cash crops, planted 
fruit trees and vegetab les and competed favourably with white farmers 
at cattle sa les and auctions. A few examples, however, wi ll suffice. 
In the Xa langa district 5000 bags of wheat and 80,000 lbs of wool were 
produced in 1880. The members of t hat district's Agricultural Society 
had erected their own hall in 1883 at a cost of £400, and the annual 
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Native Farmers' Report mentioned with great pride the achievements of 
the top farmers. There was Mankayi who sowed 81 bags of wheat, 8,400 
bundles of forage, sixteen bags of barley, five and a half bags of 
peas and nine bags of beans. In addition he planted more tha n a 
thousand fruit trees. Another progressive farmer, whose example was 
soon followed by two others, imported a threshing machine from Europe. 
The same pattern of economic growth was apparent in other parts of 
Emigrant Thembuland . Responses to a government inquiry of 1882 
revealed that there were farmers who owned up to five hundred sheep. 
So l Kalipa possessed one hundred and twenty cattle, twenty horses, 
five hundred small stock, two wagons and three ploughs. Petrus 
Mahonga had two hundred and twenty cattle, forty-four horses, three 
hundred and fifty small stock and five ploughs. In the Cala district 
one man was said to have possessed a vineyard large enough to supply 
all Cala with grapes. In this flouris hing district the black people 
built a hall at a cost of £350, the whole of which sum was subscribed 
among them before the build ing was opened. It was used by both 
Africans and Europeans for concerts and dances . 92 
People who had made this much progress were in the position to avail 
themselves of opportunities offered by the Cape's expanding economy 
after the discovery of first diamonds and then gold. Cumming noted in 
1880 that the advanced farmers in the Cofimvaba district were not only 
cu lt ivators, but that in time of leisure they increased their income 
by transport riding or by purchasing timber, which they took to the 
upper parts of the Cape Colony and the Free State, where they so ld it 
at a profit. 93 Some wagon owners hired their wagons out. 94 The 
increased demand for square . houses and outbuildings offered 
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opportunities to builders, and the wagonmakers, carpenters, shoe-
makers and other artisans stood an excellent chance of being rewarded 
for their services in a community where there was a growing demand for 
their skills. 95 
It is incontrovertible that the prosperity of peasant farmers and 
entrepreneurs rested upon the compatibility of the i r interests with 
those of the colonial state . The distribution of superior seed among 
advanced farmers, aid given in the combatting of animal diseases, and 
the undertaking of pub l ic works,96 cou ld either be attributed to a 
genuine desire to improve the condition of the black people , or to the 
more selfish motive of enabling them to meet the demands of the 
colonial state. Without the necessary means taxes, court fees and 
fines could not be paid; and during an adverse period Elliot warned 
correctly that when men have neither money nor produce they cannot 
become purchasers. 97 
Furthermore it was the black entrepreneural element's dependence upon 
improved communications which faci l itated the building of roads and 
bridges in Emigrant Thembuland. The extent to which the Cape Colony 
benefited from free labour, obtained from work parties, which were 
often organized by chiefs and headmen, as well as from voluntary cash 
contributions from black communities, emerges from the evidence 
prov ided by J. Hemming when he was questioned on the advisability of 
Colonial expenditure on the road from Cala to Queenstown, and a bridge 
over the Tsomo river. Asked in whose interest these works were to be 
undertaken, he answered: "In the interest of the Colony" . On being 
more closely examined he expla ined that the road would provide a 
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shorter route from the East London-Queenstown railway to the districts 
of Mac lear, Kokstad and Barkly. He was finally asked: "And would 
you say that this would justify the expenditure of money which 
Government has put in the estimates for the sake of making the road to 
Cala?" To this he replied: "Yes, because the expenditure is not 
simp ly intended for native benefit.,,98 This project, however, was 
only completed several years later, and t hen with the aid of free 
labour offered by men in the St. Marks district, while Matanzima and 
his people donated £3000 for the building of the bridge. 99 Peasants 
not only helped wi t h the building of new roads, they also contributed 
towards the maintenance of those already in existence. 
Far more beneficial than these indirect taxes were the direct 
contributions towards the Colonial revenue in the form of hut taxes 
and fines. To gain some perspective upon the symb iotic relationship 
that existed between the Colonial state and its dependencies we can 
look for a moment at the Transkei as a whole. Although the figures 
which will be quoted below are those for the year 1907, they 
nevertheless reflect a pattern which had started in the 1870s. While 
it was generally believed that the Transkeian territories were the 
beneficiaries after annexation, the editor of the Territorial News 
argued convincingly that the black Transkeians paid a fairer share of 
taxes than white citizens. The Cape Colony's deficit for 1907 was 
£421,340 while the Transkei had a surplus of £123,000. This surplus 
was used to reduce the Cape's deficit. Despite the Transkei's 
considerable contribution towards state expenditure, t his territory 
suffered most under the Colonial policy of retrenchment. The Cape 
Riflemen were replaced by black policemen, roads were not kept in good 
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order, schools and hospitals did not get their fair share, and grant s 
for agricultural societies were withdrawn. 100 When, on a later 
occasion, it was proposed in the House of Assembly t hat Transkeians 
should contribute something t hemselves to the ma intenance of their 
roads, John X. Merriman retorted that they had already collected 
£46,000 among themselves in the form of taxes. Of ~his sum they spent 
£20,000 on education, £12,000 on the maintenance of roads and a 
considerab le amount on hospitals .101 
We are now in a position to assess the s ituati on in Emigrant 
Thembuland . There, because the magisterial districts were relatively 
smal l, it was easier for magistrates to collect taxes, so that even in 
years when a district like Mqanduli had large sums of taxes 
outstanding, the magistrates of St. Marks and Xalanga reported no 
arrears. It was, in fact, only during the exceptionally bad years 
1884-1885 that they found it diff icult to collect the full sum. In 
1885, a year of severe drought, Sweeney, then mag istrate of St. Marks, 
resorted to the se izure of catt le in an attempt to wipe out arrears. 
He blamed the situation on the laxity of the headmen, and he suggested 
that the salaries of efficient headmen should be increased and that 
they be allowed 5% of all taxes collected. 102 This suggestion was 
favourably received by the Cape authorities, who disagreed with th ose 
magistrates who asked that grain should replace money as a means of 
paying taxes. 103 
The effectiveness with which taxes were co llected is reflected in the 
fact that, while in 1888 the outstand ing account in t he whole of 
Thembu l and amounted to £15000 - and the prospect was that it would 
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increase each year l04 - arrears were either non-existent or 
negligible in St Marks and Xalanga right up to the end of the century. 
The tax system was, however, not without loopholes. A man could get 
by with building a house for all his wives instead of a hut for each 
one, retaining their labour and their garden land, but avoiding the 
tax . A certain Belindi, managed to get hold of nineteen gardens while 
paying for only one hut. 105 Payment of tax on one hut might have 
meant little to affluent farmers such as Belindi, but for t he poor man 
the same tax accounted for a large proportion of his scanty means. 
When, in 1885, Sweeney seized stock as payment for taxes, there 
existed such poverty in the St. Marks district that women were found 
on unfrequented paths, digging roots to eat. 106 This suggests that 
the impact of Colonial rule sat heavily on the poorer homesteads. 
The plight of the poorer farmer was exacerbated by the acute land 
shortage and resultant overgrazing and overcrowding in Emigrant 
Thembuland. At the time of the Emigration, J. Warner 
warned that the land was too small to contain all the 
had already 
people. 107 
Large tracts of the most fertile lands were soon afterwards 
appropriated by missionaries and traders. Emigrant chiefs and petty 
chiefs, keen to enhance their prestige and income, made considerab le 
grants to such newcomers. Chief Usachili for instance, gave a tract 
of land, four by three miles, to the Anglican Church, whi le 
considerable grants to other societies were also made by Ndarala, 
Sinquanqati, and Si t okwe Tyali. 108 These lands comprised the most 
fertile parts of Emigrant Thembuland. Traders, also, were not slow in 
taking advantage of the chiefs' willingness to alienate tribal lands 
to enrich themselves. Trader Kenneley was granted, in addition to a 
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shop, a house with a garden and commonage as well as a part of the 
fertile Papasa Valley. Trader Moore opened a shop and shortly 
afterwards acquired so much livestock that he requested, and received, 
some grazing land from the chief. 109 
In 1880 the resident magistrate of Xalanga warned that there was not a 
vacant spot left in that district. This situation was the direct 
result of the land settlements of 1883. Not only did these provide 
for a redistribution of land which favoured the Colony's black allies 
at the expense of the ex-rebels and those commonly referred to as the 
"red-kaffir" (i .e. those who clung to tribal tr~ditions). but in the 
final delineation of boundaries between black and white 229,000 morgen 
in Emigrant Thembuland were set aside for white settlement. The 
object of this was to maintain a safe access route between the Cape 
Colony and Maclear so as to prevent the hemming in of magistrates in 
the event of war. 110 The Thembu were thus squeezed into an area too 
small to support them. In Xalanga 512 families surrendered but the 
district could only hold two hundred and fifty, while in Southeyville 
more than a thousand ex-rebels had to be located on land that could 
hold a thousand families. 111 From 1880 onwards there were constant 
complaints about land shortage that culminated in garden disputes. 
Headmen in St Marks objected in 1894 to the granting of any more lands 
to traders as the land was already over-crowded l12 and the resident-
magistrate warned t hat owing to population increase, lands that had 
supported ten would soon have to support twenty people. 113 Land 
shortage was also one of chief Matanzima's main complaints when he 
met the Prime Minister at Queenstown in 1894. On this occasion Rhodes 
told him bluntly that those chiefs who had lost their land had on ly 
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themselves to blame, that there was no more land and that they had to 
rest content. 114 
In desperation people trespassed upon each other's lands or they 
started ploughing up roads and footpaths. Others turned to those who 
were better off to hire lands from them, or to find grazing for their 
cattle , or to cultivate their lands for them. However, ploughing for 
another man presupposed the possession of a plough and oxen, so these, 
too, had to be hired . A pl ough could be hired at £3 for one year, and 
an ox for 10/- a season . A farm could be hired at £10 a year, and 
grazing for four catt le could cost £4 a year. 115 Droughts and crop 
failures often left a man without the means to pay such hiring fees. 
This resulted in his being embroiled in a court case for debt, the 
outcome to which was usually an order to pay the creditor in cash. 
Not having the cash , it was not unusual for the debtor to borrow the 
money from affluent neighbours at an interest t hat varied from 6% -
8%.116 He could then still consider hi mself to be lucky. If he was 
forced to turn to a trader he might have paid an exorbitant interest 
of up to 200% on his small loan. 11 ? 
Under these circumstances, the increasing impoverishment of many 
homesteads by 1890 is understandable . The affluent farmer still 
prospered. The possess ion of a wagon or of cash to pay transport 
costs enabled him to compete with white farmers on the Colonial 
markets or else his entrepreneural activities could provide him with 
money to meet his obligations. The poor farmer, however, found 
himself in a dilemma. He needed money to pay his taxes, or in adverse 
seasons, to buy his food. But it was almost impossible to obtain 
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money within his district. He could only try to sell his labour on an 
expanding market, Here , too, he met with ma ny problems. These 
prob lems, as well as others that contributed towards the adversities 
of the late 1890s will be dealt with when similar developments in the 
other two territories are discussed. 118 
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(iii) Engcobo 
When Thembuland Proper came under British authority in 1876 it was 
divided into four magistracies namely Emyanyeni, Engcobo, Umtata and 
Mqanduli. 119 Engcobo, formerly known as Dalasile's country, was the 
largest district, stretching from the Drakensberg in the north-east 
and the Tsomo river in the south-west over an area of 2,100 square 
miles . 120 
Thembuland. 
Engcobo was also the most populous district in 
In 1876 the population numbered about twenty thousand, 
the majority of whom - about 60% - were Qwati under the headstrong 
chief, Dalasile. Next in numerical importance were the Jumba under 
Mgudhlwa who constituted about 30% and the two thousand Vundhli under 
Sitokwe Tyali. Besides these three tribes there were by 1876 a number 
of Europeans, a small settlement of Hottentots and a sprinkling of 
Mfengu. 121 
We lack detailed information on the socio-economic conditions in this 
district prior to 1876, but a collage of scant pieces of evidence 
portrays a society organized on the same basic principles as all other 
Nguni societies. The chiefs acknowledged Ngangelizwe's authority in 
varying degrees, but his control over the district was weak. 122 He 
did, however, demand certain royal privileges, such as having large 
numbers of cattle slaughtered on the occasion of his visits,123 and 
the right to make certain land settlements. In an attempt, for 
instance, to form buffers on his outlying borders, he granted farms to 
Europeans on lands under control of Mgudhlwa and Sitokwe Tyali. At 
Mahonga's Hoek, just south of the Drakenberg, some eighty farmers were 
sett l ed in 1863 along the Slang River under an arrangement whereby, in 
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return for the use of a farm and protect ion against cattle lifting, 
each man was to pay the paramount £6 a year. At a second settlement 
on the Pondo and Pondomise boundary, farms were marked off by natura l 
boundaries and here, too, right of occupation was given to European 
farmers on payment of a rental of £6 a year. A council lor, Ngayi, 
greatly respected by the Europeans, was put in charge of the 
settlement. 124 Ngangelizwe held full control over these lands. 
There was no alienation of land; the right of occupation was given in 
the same way as to any other subjects except that boundaries were 
drawn and rental had to be paid . When a farmer left or failed to pay 
rent, the land reverted to Ngangelizwe. As far as could be 
established, the Paramount di d not extract income in any other way 
from this district. Traders, of whom there were six in 1876, paid 
licences of £6 p.a. to the chiefs from whom they received land. The 
only other Europeans who lived in the district by 1876 were those on 
two mission stations. All Saints, an Anglican station, situated in 
the centre of the district, was established in 1860 by the Rev. John 
Gordon of the Church of England on Dalasile's lands. A Morav i an 
station under a Mr. Jutzen was founded on lands granted to them by 
Sitokwe Tyali with the permission of Ngangelizwe. 
The arriva l of newcomers was welcomed by the two great rivals Dalasile 
and Mgudhlwa who, by an increase of followers, could enhance their 
prestige, increase their income and expand their frontiers. Mfengu 
from the neighbouring districts who possessed large herds and could 
make substantial gifts to the chiefs were particularly welcome. In 
this way the Mfengu chief Mendele received land, that actually formed 
part of Mgudhlwa's domai n, from Dalasile. 125 After the War of 
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Ngcayecibi many impoverished Gcaleka also received warm welcomes even 
if unable to reward the chief accordingly. 
Like other Nguni tribes the Engcobo people lived in scattered nuclear 
homesteads, the populations of which varied considerably. The largest 
concentrations of homesteads were to be found in the well-watered 
areas, fed by the three branches of the upper Mbashe area. The nearby 
forests provided wattle for houses, brushwood for cattle kraals and 
ample firewood, all of which could be obtained freely. Even in 1891, 
after severe restrictions had been placed upon the cutting of wood, 
98% of the houses in the district were still built of wattle and 
daub. 126 
Arable garden lands which were allocated by the chiefs to each 
homestead were cultivated with wooden implements. Traditional methods 
of cultivation survived throughout the period under discussion. 127 
Maize and sorghum were the main products. Each woman usually had a 
hut in which grain, stored after the harvest in June, remained for a 
few months or, in good seasons when pits were full, all year. In such 
times the surplus sorghum was consumed in the form of beer. Under 
normal circumstances threshing started in August and the grain was 
pitted in September. After the lands were reaped stock could freely 
graze on the old lands, a custom which would explain the resistance to 
the introduction of wheat farming in the 1880's which did not a l low 
for such practices. Poor people were assisted by the system of 
Umkumgana whereby a man could plough a land for somebody else on the 
promise that he would get certain land for use that year.128 Food 
supplies were further supplemented by the hunting of bushbuck. The 
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chiefs did not demand any fees for this. 
The important role of cattle in Nguni societies and the drive to 
accumulate large herds have been stressed by all writers on pre-
colonial Nguni history. The people in the Engcobo district, living in 
an area well suited to pastoral farming were no exception. In typica l 
fashion there was a constant circulation of cattle, not only from 
chief to commoners and from homestead to homestead, but also between 
the various districts. As Beinart has explained, the wide 
distribution of herds in a pastoral environment, where the only fodder 
available was the stubble left in the fields after the harvest, was 
the only safeguard against over-grazing. 129 Although the payment of 
bridewealth in the form of cattle was an important factor in the 
distribution of these animals, calculations based upon census 
statistics and the examination of the ratio between men and women in 
the number of returned rebels after 1881, would suggest that polygamy 
was not as widespread as was commonly accepted. The passage of cattle 
through the lobola system was therefore limited. 130 
Another way in which the constant dispersion of cattle could be 
ensured was through loan relationships . In Engcobo the system of 
Ngoma was in common use. A man would borrow anima l s either from the 
chief or from one of the commoners, supervise their grazing, make full 
use of them and return them with some part of t he off-spring at a 
determined date. In such cases ownership of cattle could not 
pass. 131 Men also freely borrowed cattle from their kinsmen in the 
Cape Colony. Police officers disapproved of what they interpreted as 
begging, giv i ng men the opportunity to enter the Co lony and commit 
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theft . Stanford, however, defended this old custom, and explained 
that farmers had to certify all stock that were given to a man in this 
way, and t he recipient had to go to the nearest magistrate to have the 
certificate endorsed. They were only allowed to travel on highways, 
and cases were known where men were sent back eighty-five miles to 
have their passes endorsed. The system therefore could hardly be open 
to abuses. 132 
Unlike Glen Grey and Emigrant Thembuland, where the impact of 
"civilizing agencies" such as individual land tenure, diversified 
agri cu lture and the western monetary system were a I ready noti ceab Ie in 
1870, production in the Engcobo district was then still firmly based 
upon the two traditional concepts of subsistence economy and common 
ownership of land. There was little driving force in the community to 
produce above the subsistence level. Trading opportun ities with both 
African and European neighbours were limited. The district was not 
only far from good markets in Queenstown, King William' s Town and East 
London, but a mountai n barrier prevented intercourse with the white 
farmers in the Maclear and Barkly East districts. Bad roads also 
hampered contact with other Thembu districts. Although Engcobo was 
only thirty-seven kilometres from Xalanga, a distance of almost eighty 
miles had to be travelled t o get there. The road to Umtata was almost 
impassable. There were therefore very limited opportunities to get 
rid of surplus production. 
From what has been said above it must not be concluded that there was 
no contact with Europeans. A few traders had by 1876 already opened 
shops in the district,1 33 and a number of men regularly worked on 
347 
white owned farms in the adjacent districts. The most valuable 
contact with whites was made in 1863 when, in response to demands from 
Aliwal North, Barkly East and the Orange Free State, large-scale 
sawing of forests commenced. Hundreds of people became involved in 
one way or another with the forestry business, and timber became very 
valuable. Not only was the wood used for poles, houses and for cattle 
kraals, but also for bartering. 134 There were considerab le 
opportunities for enterprising men to enrich themselves . Together 
with the influentia l farmers - mostly wealthy Mfengu - who were 
invited by Mgudhlwa and Dalasile to settle among them, they formed a 
privileged class who were willing to give their support to the Cape 
Colony when the district was taken over in 1876. 
With the extension of Colonial control over the district, t he scene 
was set for rapid socio-economic changes. The first magistrate was 
the dynamic Walter Stanford, who received his early training as civil 
servant under his uncle, J.C. Warner . Like Warner, Stanford believed 
in the ever-present danger of a black alliance against the Europeans 
in the Cape Colony, and he regarded a policy of westernization and 
detr ibalization as the only key to future peace and stability. His 
term of office was characterized by the introduction of various 
western concepts such as the monetary system, stock fairs and 
diversified agriculture. The Thembu responded rapidly to these new 
influences, and there followed a decade or so of relative prosperity 
in which most households were able to hold their own while adapting to 
the cash economy. In 1879, shortly after the introduction of ploughs, 
there were already six hundred in use. 135 The number of woolled 
sheep rose from 16,390 in 1879 to 141,975 in 1891. 136 Stanford 
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remarked in 1885 that slaughter oxen and sheep were readily available, 
and that stock fairs were well-attended by both "school-kaffirs and 
red kaffirs". 137 They were prepared to pay such prices that traders 
often went away without buying a single animal as they were outbid by 
the Africans. The prices realized at Engcobo were much higher than at 
Umtata. 138 In 1887 532,000 pounds of wool were produced, which so ld 
at 4d per pound. Pigs, fowls, turkeys and geese were seen on many 
farms. 139 The rapidity with which the Engcobo people responded to 
new cha llenges seems to show that the length of exposure to new 
influences does not play a significant role in the process of 
adaptation. The production of maize and wool in this district 
compares favourably with that in the two other districts under 
discussion, which had a much longer history of contact with western 
influences. 
The production of wheat, although encouraged by Stanford, who believed 
that cultivators fe lt more secure in their possessions than stock 
farmers, was not so commonly accepted. 140 Since land was held under 
communal tenure, the wheat producer, as has been pOinted out above, 
found himself consistently at loggerheads with his neighbours, for 
according to traditional practice they allowed the ir stock to graze on 
maize and sorghum lands after the crops had been harvested. 140 
Di versified agriculture was therefore practised mainly by those 
farmers who received farms after the wars of Ngcayecibi and of 1881 
when the lands of defeated chiefs were parcel led out among Colonial 
allies. 14 1 
A number of enterprising men made full use of the opportunities that 
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became available when the Cape Colony experienced its boom period 
following the discovery, first of diamonds and then gold. Transport 
riders and sawyers were in great demand. The civil record books of 
the successive magistrates reflect the activities of enterprising 
African f armers in those years. If a man possessed a wagon, he would 
be in great demand as transport rider. Some men preferred not to make 
t he trips themselves, but to hire their wagons and oxen out. That 
this was common practice emerges from the resident magistrates ' 
criminal record books. In one court case a charge was laid against a 
man who failed to pay £2.40 for the four oxen he hired for a trip to 
Queenstown. Another accused owed money for having hired oxen at 1 & 
6d each for a trip to the Cacadu river. Wagon owners were also 
required to take timber to Aliwal North , Barkly East and even as far 
as Bloemfontein. Tariffs were estab lished either according to the 
number of pieces of timber that had been transported, or at a tariff 
fixed per day. Not many farmers possessed their own wagons, hence the 
flourishing business that cou ld be conducted by those fortuna te enough 
to have t hem . 142 
The valuable forests also offered new job opportunities. A large 
number of men were employed as sawyers and woodcutters either by 
whites or by other blacks, to produce poles and timber required by 
farmers in the Slang River Settlement. Timber was often used in place 
of money. There was, for instance, a court case involving of a black 
man who employed a sawyer, paying him two pieces of timber for every 
ten that he sawed. Another court case revealed that a man could 
barter a horse for eighty pieces of timber. Timber was used for 
bartering pigs, chickens and ploughs, and a trader even exchanged a 
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bag of salt for seventy pieces of this now valuable commodity. 143 
However, people became increasingly restricted in wood sawing 
activities. Shortly after the annexation of Thembuland a number of 
European and Coloured sawyers migrated into the district from the Cape 
Colony, ma inly from King William's Town. They obtained monthly 
licences at 5s for cutting wood and started a flourishing trade with 
nearby towns. The newcomers devastated large parts of the forests, 
and although the forest soil produced excellent crops, it became 
completely exhausted after a few years. 144 Magistrates increasingly 
expressed their concern about the destruction of forests, and the 
first act to prevent this was passed in 1883. According to this act 
forests of more than five acres in extent were declared government 
property,145 and thereafter licences had to be obtained before wood 
could be cut in such preserved areas. 
confusion as was explained by Stanford. 
This act caused considerable 
On some farms, especially in 
the European section, where more than five acres of forests existed, 
farmers fenced out those who had paid licences to the Government, 
while in other cases farmers refused right of way arguing that, 
although such forests were government property, no provision was made 
for right of way for licence holders . Further strains developed over 
the Preservation of Forests Act, passed in 1885, according to which 
licences of £1 for each load of a hundred pieces of timber or fencing 
poles were charged. A licence to cut spars costed lOs while a 5s 
licence gave rights to the cutting of dry wood for fuel. The Colony 's 
total amount of revenue from licences in 1885 was £575. 146 Forest 
rangers were appointed and headmen were employed and rewarded for 
cases brought forward. Even more confusion arose in 1890. Until then 
people had the right to cut wattle for houses, gates, poles, sledges, 
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hoes and handles, provided these were not cut in government reserved 
forests. (The making of bush kraals, however, had been forbidden 
since 1881). These rights were confirmed in 1893, by proclamation 209 
of 1890. However, under this permit, reserved trees could not be 
cut. Most of the trees that could be used for building purposes were 
reserved trees, except for Gonici (underbush) which were insufficient 
for building requirements. 147 
As a result of all these restrictions many people, hitherto dependent 
upon forestry for a livelihood, fe ll fou l of the law. In 1884, 
seventy-two cases of trespassing were brought before Stanford, and the 
number rose to eighty-five the next year. Fi nes varied from 2s to 
lOs. The most common trespasses were the cutting of poles to 
to farmers. 148 The fores t laws caused considerable bitterness 
sell 
as 
people were often unaware of the restrictions. In 1888 a number of 
women were arrested for entering a forest with axes, a privilege which 
they had enjoyed up to then. 149 
Economic changes after 1870 emphasised the fact that the acquisition 
of money had become a dominant factor in most households. Once power 
. was transferred from the tribal to the magisterial cou rts, cattle 
fines were replaced by fines to be paid in cash. Magisterial record 
books are studded with references to fines which varied from 10/- for 
a stolen chicken to £10 for horse theft. Even a successful plaintiff 
in a civil case needed money for court fees. Furthermore, there was 
in the 1880's an insis tence on the part of the Government that hut tax 
should be paid in money. And finally, the influx of traders created 
new needs for which money was required. 
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In 1883 there were 17 European traders stationed on the main routes 
from Engcobo to All Saints, Ngkozi, the Mbashe river, Immaume and 
Mahonga ' s Hoek. 150 There were also a number of black traders such 
as Paulino Tanbinoy, Simon Mbalali and Pambani Ntombini. Most shops 
were well-stocked with soap, calico, shirts, trousers , hats and 
blankets. By 1890 they also boasted luxury items like lace, ribbons, 
shaw l s, beads, saddle cloths, belts, handkerchiefs, cups, dishes and 
earrings. 151 A typical examp le of goods bought on credit from a 
trader can be found in the case brought forward by Siman Mlabalu in 
1889: 
Jacket 15/-
Shirt 3/6 
1 Woollen Blanket 15/ -
Paraffin and matches 9d 
1 Hat 4/-
1 Cotton blanket 3/6 
Opportunities of earni ng money to meet al l these ob l igations were 
limited. Although, men had for a long time been accustomed to work on 
adjo ini ng white-owned farms, wages were extremely low and often not 
paid in cash. It was espec ial ly Afr ikaans - speaking farmers who 
preferred paying in stock which varied from three sheep for six months 
to a heifer a year. 152 With the emergence of a black peasantry 
black farmers employed men at the same wages that wh ites paid. 153 
Employees were often at a disadvantage in that their employers failed 
to pay their wages. They could hardly find redress in taking the 
defaulter to court since they did not have the money to pay court 
fees. 154 
However , in Eng cobo, as in the other two districts, there was a 
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reluctance on the part of the men to sell their labour in far-off 
labour markets. After the war of 1881 when many households were 
poverty-stricken, Stanford tried by public speaking to persuade men to 
take up employment further afield, but the attachment to land seemed 
to be too strong. Some simply relied upon friends to carry them 
through the period of distress. Stanford was aware of the fact that 
men were often deterred from leavi ng the district by obligations 
towards the old and sick and he asked the Government for £1000 to 
spend on the repair of roads so as to create job opportunities within 
the district. 
homesteads . 155 
He also asked for seed to be distributed among poorer 
Governmental aid , however, could only bring 
temporary relief . As the century proceeded the emphasis was 
increasin ly on forcing men out of the di strict rather than on keeping 
them on their lands. The 1890s saw a rapid dec li ne in economic 
growth, manifested in the many debt cases that were brought to the 
courts, and the trespassing on each other's lands as the problem of 
over-crowding became more acute. 
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(iv) Conclusion 
Two phases are discirnable in the economic history of the three 
districts during the period under discussion. The first, which lasted 
roughly until 1890 was a period of relative prosperity as peasants 
availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the Cape Colony's 
expanding markets. This was foll owed by a period of decline 
culminating in an exodus of men looking for employment on the gold and 
diamond mines and on farms as far as the Orange Free State and the 
Western Prov ince . However, complex situations where societies are in 
the process of social, po liti ca l and economic transformation do not 
all ow for precise periodizations . Already in the early 1880's there 
were strains and tensions as ma ny homesteads became impoverished, 
social strat i fication became more marked and traders' debts increased. 
The extension of Colonial rule in the 1870s over Thembul and brought 
burdens such as taxation, quitrent and custum duties. It also 
brought about the conversion to the western monetary system, a 
development which adversely affected the poor homesteads as will 
become clear. Although the evasion of hut tax was possible either by 
making use of the loopholes within the system156 or by escaping from 
the tax -collectors,157 these homesteads suffered since magistrates 
from time to time resorted to the seizure of stock when people were in 
arrears with their obligations. In 1887 many Engcobo people, in 
consequence of drought and the depreciation in the val ue of grain and 
wool, could not pay their hut tax . A.H. Stanford first proposed the 
confiscation of cattle. This proved to be impracticable as the 
an imal s were in too poor a condit ion to be t ransported to t he Cape 
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Colony. As a last resort he then confiscated sheep.158 Where 
people had already suffered stock losses, this added burden might well 
have caused a devastating blow to farmers struggling to keep their 
heads above water. Furthermore, the Cape Government's reluctance to 
allow seizure of stock instead of cash, left homesteads with the 
problem of finding money in some way or other to meet their 
obligations. 
Thu s far it has been argued that it was the poorer homesteads that 
bore the brunt of Colonial intervention: the more affluent farmer was 
affected less directly. The Cape Government imposed a duty of up to 
100% on beads, and it also received the larger part of profit on 
blankets sold to Africans. On shawls and similar articles there were 
duties of 18% - 25%. In addition t here was a duty on the bales and 
boxes in which these items were packed. 
work, and who had no money bought little; 
Those peop le who did not 
it was consequently the 
industrious people who contributed in t his way towards the revenue. 159 
The customs duties on luxury items and the resultant escalation of 
prices of goods was a contributing factor towards the increase in 
traders' debts from 1870 onwards. Traders had no hesitation in giving 
cred i t. "Kafir debt is the best debt" was a common saying in Glen 
Grey.160 The availability of credit led to overspending and 
extravagance. A court case revealed, for instance, that a man bought 
a wedding outfit of £75 for his daughter. It is no wonder that there 
were traders who had up to £4000 debts on their books. Magistrates 
disapproved of the indiscriminate credit system as it led to 
impoverishment of the people. They were furthermore sensitive to the 
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fact that money was spent at the shops instead of being used for the 
payment of hut tax. 161 
Traders also acted as law agents and money lenders, and they admitted 
frankly that they made more money by lending than by legitimate 
business. 162 In St. Marks interests on small loans varied from 40% 
to 200% and Levey ascribed the bankruptcy of many farmers in the 1890s 
to usury that was doing incalculable harm. 163 In Engcobo where 
interest in 1890 rose to 8/- in the £1, traders c lashed with the 
Resident Magistrate, R. King, who refused in court cases to allow such 
exorbitant interest. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the traders 
to have hi m removed from office . It should be noted, though, that 
King emphasised that the hone st traders in his district supported him. 
It wou ld t herefore be wrong to see all traders as dishonest exploiters 
of the people who were at their mercy . 164 It can, however, not be 
denied that many took full advantage of the existing situation to 
enr ich themse lves. 
As a result of the lack of markets, black farmers having no bargaining 
power were at the mercy of traders. In times of scarcity the farmer 
had to pay what the trader asked, and in t imes of surplus he had to 
se ll at the trader's price. During a period of drought in the St 
Mark's district, traders resold grain at £1.10 a bag having bought it 
the previous season at £1.10. 165 Farmers in Engcobo were 
particularly at a disadvantage as they were further from the Cape 
markets than their kinsmen in Glen Grey and St. Marks. In times of 
surplus traders came into the district and bought grain very cheaply. · 
In 1887, which was a very good year, a farmer cou ld not get more than 
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2s a bag for his grain, and then the value had to be taken out in 
goods. In bad seasons, as in 1893, cheap grain was resold at 30s a 
bag. 166 Many farmers did not have the money to pay such high prices 
and this added to the number of those who went bankrupt. 
The vulnerability of farmers to the effects of Colonial intervention 
and traders' exploitation was increased by a conjunction of setbacks 
such as droughts, locusts and animal diseases. The drought of 1885-
1886 resulted in the loss of 10,000 cattle and 30,000 sheep in 
Engcobo. 167 The next year locusts descended upon the district. 
Then followed another severe drought in 1892, aggravated by the 
destruction of the maize crop by what was called Isihlavu (grub); and 
damage to the millet crops by maggot flies. In Glen Grey and Emigrant 
Thembuland conditions were no better. During the drought of 1889 
heavy stock losses were reported in these districts and in St. Marks 
farmers lost all their lambs. Although magistrates were inclined to 
see such disasters as blessings in disguise, since it brought relief 
to over-stocked lands, we can well imagine that in the poorer 
homesteads it could spell famine. In fact, Stanford reported in 1892 
from Engcobo that in some homesteads not a chicken could be 
found. 168 
Apart from droughts, cattle diseases such as scab and redwater which 
constantly plagued farmers, added to their expenses as various 
were introduced to combat diseases. 169 The greatest disaster 
laws 
was 
the devastating rinderpest that ravaged the districts for the greater 
part of 1897. In Xalanga 75% of the cattle died and in St Marks 85%. 
Although the chief Matanzima set an example by inoculating his cattle 
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not many people were willing to follow his example. 170 The disease 
struck with the same ferocity in Glen Grey and Engcobo. 171 The loss 
of trek cattle forced farmes to fall back on agriculture for a 
l ivelihood. 
The adverse conditions in the 1880s were aggravated by the problem of 
over-crowding. Ever since 1881 when people were squeezed into 
unfavourable areas or in areas that were too small to carry an 
increasing population, magistrates' reports had reflected an 
accelerating process of proletarianization and polarisation. In 
overcrowded districts the condition of stock deteriorated rapidly. 
Not only did farmers find it difficult to sel l infer ior stock, but the 
quality of wool was also adversely affected. Furthermore, where 
draught animals are too few or too weak, they become incapable of 
doing the desired ploughing. Agriculturalists are in agreement that 
poor tillage of land can result in the loss of potential crops. 
Finally, then, overcrowding resulted in malnutrition and the outbreak 
of diseases. l72 
As the cumulative effects of Colonial intervention, natural disasters 
and traders' activities, made itself felt after 1890 in the three 
Thembu territories, a change in the pattern of labour migrancy as 
evidenced in the 1870s and 1880s emerged. In 1871 E. Warner was 
unable to persuade men from Emigrant Thembuland to take up jobs in 
King William's Town. 173 Eleven years later this same re luctance to 
leaving their district was still evident in Thembu responses to the 
attempts of labour agents to canvass labourers for the Kimberley 
diamond fields. Levey warned beforehand that there was not the 
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slightest possibility of their induc ing people to go there,174 and 
he proved to be correct. The magistrates in Cala, St. Marks and 
Engcobo expressed concern over this attitude of the people when, in a 
joi nt statement in 1888, they condemned the system of spasmodic labour 
as being detrimenta l to t he interests of both the distri ct and the 
industries . 175 
We do not know to wha t extent chiefs were able to force or motivate 
peop le in going out to work. In Basutoland and Mpondoland, the ruling 
lineages played a central role in organizing and controlling the 
pattern of labour migration, by organizing work parties to their 
advantage. 176 A hint that th is mig ht have happened in Emigrant 
Thembuland, comes from a report written by Levey in 1874. In that 
year, according to Levey, a work party , badly dressed, left the 
district in search of employment on public works. Amongst them was 
Ndarala's son, Dindala. Dindala returned some time later on 
horseback, and well-dressed. He immediately started organ izing his 
own work parties. 177 But even if chiefs had had a hand in the 
organization of work parties we have no evidence that they were 
successfu l . The prob lem experienced by the Kimberley diamond fields 
in canvassing labourers would suggest that such part ies were the 
excepti on rather than the rule. Levey ascribed the 
district's people to go to Kimber ley, to fear of the 
p.' 
hesitancy of hi s 
Sotho . 178 Other 
reasons forwardee by mag i strates, for people not accepting jobs, were 
the low wages paid by the mining companies and the inconvenience of 
travelling long :;ii.s t aT)CI!s. 
While, then, in the 1870s and 1880s peop le were decided ly disi nclined 
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to leave the ir districts, we see a dramatic change in the 1890s. 
There was now a mass exodus of men who left the Transke ian districts 
in search of employment. In 1899, from Engcobo alone, 7,675 men had 
left. Of these 4,111 went to various parts of the Cape Colony, 145 to 
Kimber ley, 14 to the Ora nge Free State, 4,283 to Johannesburg . 
Men were st ill inc l ined to sell their labour on their own cond it ions. 
In 1895 when the Pen shaw Colleries in Indwe tried to recruit labour 
from St. Marks, they found an unwil lingness to be bound to contracts 
for longer than six months . A request of the Transvaa l Government for 
six hundred men to work in Vereeniging also met with little 
success . 179 But labour migrancy was influenced by the economic 
conditions at particu lar periods . The years 1888 and 1889 were 
re l at ively good years; in that period the number of men who left 
Engcobo dropped considerably. In 1892 , which was a parti cula rly bad 
year, almost 4,000 men left the di strict for the gold f iel ds. Another 
350 went to the diamond fields, 150 went to work on the ra i lways in 
various parts of the Cape Colony and 2,000 were employed on 
neighbouring Eu ropean farms. 180 Stanford had not iced in 1891 with 
concern that it was not t he able-bodied men in hi s district who were 
in arrears with their taxes, but the old and decrepit. Another 
disturbi ng observation was that an amoun t of hut tax was owed by men 
who had left for the Cape Colony, apparently in an attempt to avoid 
the payment of tax. When suc h defaulters were traced, there was no 
way in which pressure cou ld be brought upon them to take up employment 
on public or any ot her works. He therefore urged that section 49 of 
Proclamation 140 of 1885 should be used to exercise such pressu re . 181 
Simi la r ly, we find that in lB95, a particularly bad year, numbers once 
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again soared. 
Magisterial reports from Emigrant Thembuland suggest that the people 
there were more amenable than their kinsmen in other districts to sell 
their labour. This cou ld be ascribed to the presence of a larger 
number of affluent people who wished to improve their pos itions. It 
would therefore seem to imply that it was the wealthier rather than 
the ext remely poor who went out to work. Significantly, in 1893 when 
there was no hope of inducing men from poverty stricken Mqanduli to 
take up employment, the more affluent St. Marks di str ict sent a 
thousand labourers to all parts of the Transvaa l. H. Bunn, the 
magistrate, was confident that under a practica l labour scheme, the 
farmers in the Cape Colony cou ld be well supplied wi t h labourers from 
his district. 182 This was confirmed by Levey who wrote that the 
people in the Xalanga district were well suited for taking up 
employment on the railways, and that a large number of men went to 
Johannesburg every year where better wages were earned. Farmers, who 
were then paying their shepherds wages of 7s to 10s a month could no 
longer attract labourers. 183 
Labour migration tendencies for t he year during 1897 would confirm 
that far more people left Emi grant Thembuland for employment than from 
any other districts with larger populations. 
the following table of statistics: 
Thi s can be seen from 
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Statistics for 1897 to compare labour migrancy in Emigrant Thembuland 
with that in other districts: 184 
Home 
District 
Umtata 
Mquandul i 
Engcobo 
St. Marks 
Xalanga 
Johannesburg 
1068 
221 
3905 
1770 
685 
Kimberley 
31 
4 
11 
Cape Colony 
522 
61 
1859 
OFS 
24 
Total 
1360 
286 
5799 
3243 16 5210 
(Inc.K imberley) 
1087 1087 
It should be kept in mind that Xalanga at this time had a population 
of less than ha l f of that of Engcobo and that Mqanduli and Umtata were 
also far more densely populated than Emigrant Thembul and. While the 
larger number of labourers from Emigrant Thembuland can be partly 
ascribed to the fact that the more affluent people needed more money 
than their poorer kinsmen, it should be kept in mind that St. Marks 
and Kei Bridge were also the principal outlets for the labour supp ly 
for the Cape Colony. Emigrant Thembuland was al so close to the Indwe 
coal mines, where after 1890 attempts were made to improve working 
conditions. Besides paying wages of 2s to 4s a day , fuel, water and 
accommodation were avai labl e . Underground workers earned £2.10 for 24 
days, and were given as much mealie meal as they could eat and meat 
twice a week. There were also jobs available for women. Labour agent 
C.F. Innes and the magistrate of Cofimvaba agreed that it would be a 
good plan to engage petty chiefs at £5 per month to collect one 
hundred men for work in their mines. Between 1895 and 1898, when many 
people responded to the call of the gold mines, it was not uncommon 
for people from St. Marks to work on the Indwe collieries until they 
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earned enough to go to Johannesburg. 185 It was clear that the 
Thembu preferred to make their own arrangements rather than to work 
under government contracts. 
In Glen Grey we find a similar exodus of labourers after 1890. A 
certain Ngqika, Pelem, who was appointed as labour agent in Glen Grey, 
told the Cape Labour Commission in 1894 that in less than two months, 
more than two hundred men were contracted to work on the mines for 
four months at a payment of £3 a month plus food. 186 Another 
witness, Qunqu, ascribed the greater willingness to go to the mines to 
the working conditions that compared very favourably with those 
offered by other employees. Since farmers usually paid in stock, a 
man returning from the Cape Colony first had to have his sheep dipped, 
thereby running the risk that they might get stolen. Not only was it 
difficult to apprehend thieves, but if the owner succeeded in a court 
case he had to sell some of his stock to obtain money for the case. 
On the other hand those who went to the mines returned with enough 
cash to invest in houses, wagons and stock. 187 Whether the Labour 
Tax that was introduced under the Glen Grey Act did in the final 
analysis make much difference in the number of people that left this 
district is questionable. It is true that there was in the years 
immediately after its introduction an increase in the number of men 
who left the district - in 1898 the number exceeded 7,000, but the 
increase could be accounted for by the general population increase. 
Magisterial reports from that region indicate that it was drought and 
rinderpest, rather than the Labour Tax t hat forced men out of the 
district. In fact, the weight of evidence before the Native Affairs 
Commission of 1903-1905 pointed to the tax having become a dead 
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letter, and more of an irritation than a st imulant. Sweeney, the 
resident magistrate wrote in 1896 that of a total of 5,400 people 
li able for tax, 3,400 had already been given full exemption while 
another 600 were due for exemption the next year. There were 
therefore, according to him, only 1,100 liable for tax, but at the 
time of his writing on ly fl00 had been collected. Men got out of 
paying the labour tax either by prevarication or they ignored the 
claims altogether. 188 It would therefore seem, that while taxation 
certainly did force some men out to look for employment, i t was but 
one of the factors that led to the great exodus of the 1890s. 
The detrimental effects of the exodus of thousands of able-bodied men 
were severely felt in the three districts under di sc us sion - as was 
also the case in the rest of Thembuland. Women and ch ildren were left 
to cultivate the lands. Many children were not equal to t hese jobs, 
and in the process of ploughing they merely scratched the ground. 
This in turn led to weaker crops and hence greater poverty.,189 
As the century drew to a close it was only too evident that El liot ' s 
dream of opening up the new colony was not to materialize; on the 
contrary the signs of economic collapse in Thembuland were only too 
visible. 
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CONCLUSION 
The compl ex relationship which existed between the Cape Colony and the 
Thembu developed in the 1820s when both parties were driven by common 
insecurity into forming unofficial alliances. Throughout the period 
under discussion they remained uneasy bedfellows. 
The Thembu paramounts, from Ngubengcuka to Ngangelizwe, embroiled as 
they were in perennial warfare with their Xhosa, Pondo and Pondomise 
neighbours, sought security in a pragmatic policy of cooperation with 
the militarily superior Cape Colony. In the Frontier War of 1836 the 
regent, Fadana, proved his goodwill towards the Colonial Government by 
giving refuge to missionaries, thereby incurring the wrath of the 
Xhos a. Mtirara's attack on the dissident Tshatshu chief, Maphasa, 
during the war of the Axe, eliminated a potential threat to the 
Colonial forces in the north-eastern frontier zone. The War of 
Ml anjeni which lasted from 1850- 1853 was the longest and most costly 
war up to that time. It was prolonged and the area of conflict 
greatly extended by the participation of Maphasa's Tshatshu on the 
side of the warring African tribes. 1 Nonesi's collaboration with the 
Cape Colony, and her remova l of a large section of her people across 
the Mbashe to prevent their joining the anti-Colonial forces , had 
greatly eased the pressure on the Colonial armies, and also 
facilitated Governor Cathcart 's task in 1852 of bringing hostilities 
to an end. Further it made possib le the systematic opening up of the 
north-eastern frontier zone for white Settlment. 2 It was with the 
help of so-called loyal Thembu that the Sitokwe and Mfanta campaign 
was undertaken during the war of Ngcayecibi. 3 Above all, it was 
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Thembu attitudes during the Transkeian Rebellion of 1881 that 
determined t he course of this war. Ndara la and Matanzima, by their 
support, contributed towards a quick Colonial victory over the 
insurgents in Emigrant Thembuland , thereby leaving the Cape forces 
f ree to focus their attention elsewhere ,4 and in Emigrant Thembuland 
Ngange l izwe turned out in person commanding a strong army to assist 
Major Elliot. This he did despite the fact that almost half of his 
peop le had jo ined the anti-Colonial forces. The outcome of t he war 
would have been uncertain had it not been for Thembu involvement on 
the side of the Cape Colony. However , considering the ability of the 
Cape forces to put down all resistance without having to ca l I on 
Bri t ish help, it cannot be said beyond all doubt that Thembu 
alignments with the Cape had prevented the warring Afri ca n fac t ions 
from gaining a victory at a most crucial ti me in their history. 
However, if we take into account the numerical strength of the Thembu 
at the timeS it seems reasonable to assume that their full-scale 
participation on the side of the Africans could have resulted in a 
prolonged and more costly war which would further have delayed, or 
even wiped out, Colonial and Imperial annexation of the Transkeian 
territories. 
The Cape Colony had to rely heavily on African co llaborators, but as 
the Mfengu experience had proved, the white government never 
completely trusted its black al l ies. 6 The Cape officials saw in the 
increasing Thembu population a threat to the security of the Colony; 
they often suspected the Thembu of playing an ambiguous role in 
harbour ing cattle raided by the warring nations, while they thems elves 
professed to be on the Colonial side; they lived in constant fear of 
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the Thembu switching their allegiance should that seem to be in the 
latters' own interest; and they were apprehensive of a black alliance 
against the Cape in which the Thembu might play a dominant part. 
White farmers saw the Thembu as competitors for land, and as a 
political threat once considerable numbers began to qualify for the 
vote. European suspicions of their Thembu allies were not always 
unjustified. Frequent rumours regarding the meet ings between Thembu 
chiefs and those of nations hostile to the Cape,7 would have suggested 
that the Thembu had never complete ly cast aside the cultural ties t hat 
linked them to other black nations . Officials had reason to ask 
whether a people torn between two loyalties could ever be trustworthy 
allies. 
In the final analysis, then, the Thembu did not derive much benefit 
from the i r allegiance to the Colonial Government, whose policy was 
aimed at undermining their military potential. In 1848 Mtirara saw 
his lands annexed and he himself subjected by Sir Harry Smith to the 
same humiliating treatment that the Governor had meted out to other 
chiefs. If Nonesi 's cooperation in the War of Mlanjeni was rewarded 
with the acknowledgement of her paramountcy over the Tambookie 
Location, it was a position she held on ly as long as it suited the 
Government, and her long history as "Nonesi the faithful" finally 
ended in ban is hment in Mpondo land. The Emigrant chiefs who cooperated 
with the Government in 1865 in the hope t hat their independence in 
their new country would be secured to them, soon witnessed the 
extension of Colonial control over their lands . When in 1879 
legislat ion was passed to disarm all Cape Africans, they were included 
in the order. With the annexation of Thembuland in 1885 the Thembu 
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finally lost their independence, and under the new dispensation 
collaborators with the Co lony found themselves in the same position as 
those Africans who had for almost a century resisted Cape intrusion on 
their tribal lands and culture. The ambiguity of the Cape Government 
towards its Thembu allies is reflected in its dea lings with the 
paramount, Oliver Oalindyebo, at the end of the century. In 1900 this 
chief, in his capacity as Chief of Native Intelligence, commanded a 
force of five hundred men against the invading armies of the two 
Afrikaner republics. He was rewarded for his services with a visit to 
• 
Cape Town after which the magistrate for Umtata expressed the hope 
that the strength of the forces along the railway line had given the 
chief some conception of the strength of the British in t he Colony.8 
The fact that the Thembu were able to keep their lands intact 
throughout the t urbulent nineteenth century was the only rewarding 
aspect of their long history of cooper ation with the Colony. Unlike 
the Xhosa, who had lost most of the ir land, the Thembu could pride 
themselves in never having been driven from their territory. 
Referring to Ngangelizwe's cooperation with the Co lony in the war of 
1881, Sihele remarked with great pride that Ngangelizwe was in a 
position to invite rebellious ch iefs li ke Mnqanqeni and Bambendino to 
return to Thembuland where they were resettled on the ir former lands. 
"All in all," Sihele wrote, "Ngange lizwe became the beacon of hope to 
the sub-nations just as his fore-fathers had done before. He also 
managed to save the territory of the abaThembu from being captured by 
enemies, especially whites.,,9 
Each of the African nations in Southern Africa responded in its own 
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way to nineteenth century Imperial and Cape Colonial policies. The 
Xhosa chose the path of military resistance. Jeff Peires has argued 
that it is an exaggeration to ascribe their eventual defeat in the 
century of long drawn-out frontier wars to their internal divisions. 
As he sees it, a decentralised political leadership resulted in a 
decentralised army which might well have served the Xhosa better than 
the large, but conservative army of the Zulu monarchy. The Xhosa, he 
maintains, had, through their long exposure to European methods of 
making war, lea rned how to face fire-arms and how to use them to their 
best advantage. They adopted tactics which neutralised the massive 
technological superiority of their opponents. If, therefore , the 
Xhosa had achieved no great victories, during their "heroic age", 
comparable to the Zulu's Ishlandwana, they at least learned something 
about frontier warfare that the Zulu never understood. 10 For the 
Thembu there were no great battles; there was no heroic age in the 
sense that Peires describes Xhosa resistance to white intrusion. It 
is true that large numbers of Thembu were caught up in the African 
resistance movement of the t ime, and joined forces with other nations. 
Even so leaders like Maphasa, Mfanta and Gungubele have never been 
afforded the place in history given to Sarhili, Sandile, Hintza and 
Shaka, and they could never succeed in mustering enough support for 
any significant resistance. For most of the Thembu independence was 
subordinate to security, especially the security they found in th e 
possession of their lands . This will certainly provide one answer to 
the question as to why the Thembu , next to the Mfengu, became the 
greatest military co ll aborators with the whites. A search for further 
explanations will lead us to the second political theme that emerges 
from a study of Thembu history: the divisive nature of the Thembu 
382 
monarchy, and the failure of successive leaders to achieve unity. 
It would seem that the conglomeration of clans loosely connected by 
common loyalty to the Thembu monarch 11 had been offered three 
opportunities of welding themselves into one strong nation . In each 
case failure to do so had left the nation more divided and more 
vulnerable than before. 
The first opportunity arose when Ngubengcuka became king after a 
succession of weak rulers. According to tradition he had al l the 
personal qualities needed in a great nationbuilder. 12 His misfortune 
was that his assumption of power coinc ided with the period of 
devastating Mfecane wars 13 which sent waves of emigrants into the 
Cape's north -eastern frontier zone. Thus, the Thembu kingdom was 
materially and politically weakened before Ngubengcuka had time to 
consolidate his earlier victories over the Qwati and other 
neighbouring clans,14 and sectionalism was already firm ly established 
at the time of his death. Not only were the eastern and western 
Thembu separated by the diversification of their cultural and economic 
interests, but the emigration had also precipitated a major break 
between the royal Hala clan with their tribal centre at the Mbashe and 
the non-Hal a clans which made up the bulk of the emigrants. A strong 
king might have been able to pick up the threads, but after 
Ngubengcuka's death the government devolved for the next fifteen years 
upon a regent. Under these circumstances Mtirara had little chance of 
bringing the scattered cl ans together when he moved to the White Kei 
river in 1839. 15 By that time the ambitious Tshatshu leader, Maphasa, 
had already assumed a position of semi-independence and he overtly 
383 
challenged the Hala paramountcy. A complicating factor at this stage 
was the expansionist pol icy of the Cape Government, the effect of 
which was to polarise the Thembu into collaborators (mainly Hala) 
and non-collaborators (mainly non-Hala) with the Cape Colony. 
In the 1860s the Thembu had their last opportu ni ty to un ite. On 
becoming king in 1863 Ngangelizwe had ambitions of bringing about a 
ki ngdom that would stretch from the Mbashe to present day Queenstown. 
Had he succeeded this would have been the largest African kingdom in 
southern Africa. The Em igration of 1865 offered him the opportunity 
of fu lf i lling this dream, but the movement failed. The split that now 
occurred cut right through the Hala clan and had repercussions that 
made themselves felt in 20th century Thembu and South African history. 
The Hala chief, Matanzima, like th e three other emigrant chiefs, 
insisted on their independence from the Hala paramount being 
recognized, and, in time, Matanzima gained recogni tion as Chief of 
Emigrant Thembuland. 16 Sihele went to great lengths to emphasise the 
emergence of Emig rant Thembuland as a separate political entity. With 
reference to disputes between Ngangelizwe and Matanzima in consequence 
of which E.J. Warner laid down boundaries separating the chiefs, he 
wrote: "The idea that the great house of Mtirara could wield 
authority over the territory that belonged to the Right Hand Hou se was 
defeated during Ngangelizwe's time, a time when tradition was still 
respected. " 17 In a further reference to the chi efs who in 1849 
refused to follow Joyi back to the Mbashe,18 he added: "The reader 
should also note that in all those lineages, Matanzima is the most 
senior, besides the fact that the Right Hand House normally is a 
branch that is independent and different from the Great Place . .. All in 
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al l readers should take note of the claims made by some people , that 
the house of Ngangelizwe has authority at Rhoda, this is because these 
people lack the details to the whole matter. When Ngangelizwe died he 
knew the real s ituation ... ,,19 Th e emergence of Emigrant Thembuland 
set a precedent for the subsequent appointment, almost a century 
later, of Matanzima's great grandson, Kaiser Matanzima as paramount 
chief of Emigrant Thembuland. 
Historians are inclined to dismiss Ngangelizwe as a weakling, 
incapable of the leadership qualities that could have prevented the 
fragmentation of the Thembu kingdom following the Emigration of 1865. 
It has been argued in this thesis that the young and inexperienced 
king assumed power when official minds were obsessed with the fear of 
a black alliance against the Cape Colony, and they saw the extension 
of British control over the Kei as the only safeguard agai nst such 
dangers. A strong, united Thembuland did not fit in with Cape 
expansionist ideals, and the king was impotent in the face of 
increasing interference in his domestic and external affairs by t he 
militarily superior Cape Colony. It is doubtful whether a man even of 
Ngubengcuka's stamp or any other 19th century African leader, would 
have fared better at that particular pOint in time. 
The failure to bring about unity had weakened the position of the Hala 
clan to a point where its paramountcy was questioned by other clans, 
notably the Qwati. It has been pOinted out that it was mainly the 
Hala chiefs who had refrained from joining the f rontier wars. They 
possibly saw in an alliance with the Cape Colony the possibility of 
strengthening the Ha la clan at the cost of riva l clans. In Emigrant 
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Thembuland Matanzima's cooperation with the Colony at a time when the 
non-Hal a clans joined the Transkeian war certaily resulted in his 
emergence as the strongest leader in that area. 
One other factor that could have contributed to the ambiguous attitude 
of the Thembu during the frontier wars can be mentioned here. This 
was the strong sense of exclusiveness and ethnicity that existed among 
them. 20 A call for black unity in which Thembu interests might have 
been subservient to the cause of a greater African nationalism would 
have had little appeal for Thembu chiefs who cherished their own lands 
and ethnic patterns. 
The effects of Cape-Thembu relationships could also be felt in the 
economic field. As allies of the Cape the Thembu were receptive to 
western influences, and when the mining era began, there had already 
emerged, in Emigrant Thembuland and Glen Grey, prosperous peasant 
communities,21 competing favourably with their white neighbours. 
Enterprising farmers made full use of the opportunities offered by the 
Cape's expanding economy after 1870 , while some benefitted 
considerably from their cooperation with their white administrators. 22 
The collaborators with the Colony in the wars of 1879 and 1881 came 
mainly from the ranks of t hese affluent farmers, and the rewards for 
services thus rendered enabled them to further improve their 
positions. 23 However, the prosperity experienced by Thembu farmers in 
the 1870s and early 1880s were short-lived. Towards the end of the 
century magisterial reports increasingly reflected a gloomy picture of 
increasing impoverishment, and indebtedness to traders. 
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It has been argued that there is a tendency among modern historians to 
lay too much stress on the role of Cape intervention, in an attempt to 
secure a regular labour supply for white farmers and mine-owners, as a 
factor in the decline of the nineteenth century black peasantry.24 
The reasons for such a decline were far more varied and complex. 
Burdensome taxations certainly rested heavily upon many homesteads , 
but in view of the many loopholes in the system,25 t he importance of 
hut and labour taxes in the process of proletarization should not be 
over-emphasised . There were other causes of impoverishment such as 
lack of capital and agricultural training, both of which were 
essential to enable farmers to overcome the effects of droughts, 
plagues and animal diseases of which the devastating Rinderpest 
epidemic of 1898 was the most serious. Many farmers did not have the 
money to buy superior stock, nor to erect dipping tanks nor to acquire 
the necessary implements. As for the question of education, 
magistrates time and again pOinted out that farmers did not know how 
to repair a plough or how to prune a tree . Also, there were farmers 
who could for some time rely upon other sources of income, but 
enterprises which in the beginning seemed to be successful, were in 
fact beset with prob lems. The difficulty that experienced by 
transport riders in recovering fees due to them; the high cost of 
wagon repairs; the scarcity of draught animals; the competition from 
white entrepreneurs; 
lucrative business 
all 
than 
of these made transport riding a far less 
it might have seemed superficially.26 
Forestry, which in the 1870s was an important source of income to ma ny 
homesteads, became less and less viable as foresters were prevented by 
numerous forest regulations from chopping wood, and they moreover 
became vulnerable to the fines imposed on them in cases of 
387 
trespassing such regulations. 27 Furthermore, the dearth of land, 
intensely experienced in Glen Grey, Emigrant Thembuland, parts of 
Thembuland Proper, fo llowing the Government's policies after 1880 of 
alienating tribal lands and of resettling large numbers of people, 
resulted in over-crowding and soil erosion. Already at a disadvantage 
in competing with their white neig hbours, the Thembu further became 
the victims of discriminating laws towards the end of the century, as 
the influential Afrikaner Bond t hrew its weight behind the poorer 
white farmers who felt threatened by the emergence of an affluent 
bl ack peasantry.28 The Government, more ~ver, became sensitive to the 
cause of white farmers as the 1800s saw an increasing awareness of the 
poor white prob lem .29 By the end of the century white farmers were in 
a position to secure subsidies, grants, better communication and 
spec ial cred it fac ili t ie s - all of which were almost unattainable by 
the ir black neighbours. 
Ha ving pin -pointed reasons other than Cape Governmental efforts to 
extract labour from the Transkeian territories, for the economic 
decline of t he thembu peasantry, does not mean that the effects of 
such efforts - notably heavy taxation · - has been underestimated. It 
is argued here that it was the combined effect of Government policies, 
natural disasters and indebtedness to traders that drove men in 
increasing numbers to white farms and to the cities in search of 
employment. 
Notwithstanding these negative effects of their contact with the 
Colony, they did derive one other benefit, apart from retention of 
their lands, from their cooperation with the Government. This was 
388 
that, never having been driven off their lands and dispersed, as was 
the case with the Xhosa , it was possible for education to make more 
rapid headway in the Thembu territories. Although education never 
reached the masses, there emerged a literate, educated class t hat was 
not without po l itical influence . Furthermore, the Christian church 
had a particularly close and strong relationship with the Thembu, and 
it was from the pulpit that the cause of education was further 
fostered. It was al so, as Donovan Williams has pointed out, from the 
Christian pulpit t hat, very often and very effectively, a vehic le was 
provided for the African to express his growing consciousness of 
belonging to the supra -tribal community, and that the cause of African 
nationalism was fostered. 30 It would seem, t hen, more than just 
coincidence that Thembu involvement with the activities of the African 
National Congress has since the inception of this organization up to 
the present day, been parti cularly strong 30 Oliver Dalindyebo, who 
became paramount in 1885 was a product of the mission schools. At its 
foundation in 1912 he was made honorary president of the Afr i can 
National Congress, and he appeared at the Universal Races Congress in 
London in 1912. On the other hand the Thembu is equal ly strong ly 
represented in conservative Transkeian po l itics. While at present the 
ruling Transkeian National Independence Party consists ma inly of 
Thembu, it is sti l l also the Thembu that is most strongly represented 
in the leadership of the African National Congress. 31 It could be 
that the acquisition of wealth and education, which was made possible 
for the Thembu through their cooperation with the Cape Co lony, has 
enabled them to become leaders in the political field. 
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31. Walter Sisulu was a founder member of the African National 
Congress Youth League and Secretary-General of the ANC from 1949 
to 1954. Alfred Xuma, who like Sisu lu , was born in the Engcobo 
district was President-General of the organisation from 1940 to 
1949. The nationa l organiser of the ANC in the mid-1950s was 
Enoch Ka Tshunungwa, a member of the Thembu royal house. He was 
arrested in 1956 and during his trial he found himself at odds 
with the ANC and more in sympathy with the emerging Pan African 
Congress. Following his aquittal in the Treason Trail in 1961 he 
became an aide to Matanzima and eventually member of the 
Transkeian. Parliament. (See T. Karis and G. Carter: From 
Protest to Challenge, pp.143, 160, 164 ) . The best-known of these 
leaders is Nelson Mandela, who was born into the royal Thembu 
household. In 1930, after the death of his father, he became 
ward of his cousin, David Dalindyebo, then paramount chief of 
Thembuland. He was trained to become a chief, but when he 
reached the acquired age, he was no longer prepared to have a 
position of authority over an oppressed people. Mandela's long 
association with the African National Congres, his arrest and 
trial and his influence, f rom prison, on South African politi cs 
i s now history. 
391 
Nxeko - -Hlanra·- -·Mndlo\·u-- -·\l3leki- - _____ _ 
- amaHlanga '--11-360-- Mqlnduli 
GH. 
fjr>l-
------amaHlanga'--11-362---Umllll 
Diomo---,· ·Hala- -~ladiba- - Tho,-~ ____ _ arnaDlomo·--11 -330---L.;mtata 
i 
i 
I 
I 
i 
lULl 
-------i.imaD!cir.o ·--·11 )31---L'm:ata 
------amaDh):1ln'--_ll · 33~---lJ;-r.tJta 
·-----amaDlllmll ---II-3:\.1---Umtata 
------amaDll>mo· __ 11 · 334 ___ Cmtlta 
-
----··---an1all"b "---11 3';O---F.ngeobo 
------amaDlomll·--11 .165---Y.qJnduli 
-------amaDlomo---11 3.1o---L'll1lala 
-------------------SL \Iarks 
. . ------ amalhla ·----11 ·.1.1S---SL \larks 
------amalhla*---II · .1.1'---Sc ~Ia,ks 
------amallala·---II-.1.19---SL \brks 
------amaHal,,*---\I ·3-:I---Gkn Gre, 
------amaDlomcl---ll- .1.'7---Um:Jla 
------ amaHala ·---II .. J~~---SL Marks 
. , 
-----'---amaJt!:i1ba *--11 -345---E~~L\)ho 
------ amaJumba *---.1 I- JSO---SL \!Jrks 
------amaJumba ·---11- 352---Umlata 
M:lnu,i - - Tukwa- -Xot, _____ _ 
_ amaTshatshu --1I -34J---Eo£co:'0 
------amaTshatshu--1I -344---Glcn Grey 
born nor' N...!uogw:Jna- -· Diya- - Gungu- - -L, ______ ama"dung\'.:Jl;a!..t I J):7 ___ SL Mark~ 
heir 
. -Vckbayi-ama~dung\\'ar.:i-II ·3 5i---Qumcu 
(tl This is basically the genealogy gi\en in Soga Ihese tribes arc officially rceo~ni scJ and arrointoJ er.;cis. 
p_ 46(.). supplemented or varitied by data obtained f 
ilks or from thi! tribal unit, identified here. Supcnlu. 
and ·n.~m:s hay: been omitted. The genealogy ginn by 
(p. 19) agr~s largely with that of Sop. but differs in 
older name,. (') SOb~n{Cl represents a j"nior ho~ s c of Gcuwa a: 
regarced as acting head of t~is unit. 
392 
APPENDIX 2 
The Fynn Family 
William McDowell Fynn 
Came to Cape Town in 1808 with his parents. Employed by John Murray 
Ship Chandler in Cape Town from 1822 to 1827. Spent five years in 
Natal. Appointed in 1838 , by Sir Andries Stockenstrom as British 
Agent beyond the Great Fish River. ApPointed Assistant-Commissioner 
to Ndhlani tribe in 1847 and Commissioner of the Gcaleka in 1849. 
(D.S.A.B., pp.170-171) 
William Raffely Donald Fynn 
Son of William McDowell. ApPointed Resident Magistrate with Sarhili 
in 1865. In 1871 Sarhili laid various charges against him, and he was 
replaced by James Ayliff. In 1873 he was appointed Tambookie Agent 
with the Emigrant Thembu. Appointed magis t ra t e of Bomvanaland 1874. 
(Davies, M: Twin Trails, pp.39-49) 
West White Fynn 
Son of William McDowell. Appointed in 1874 as Chief Clerk to Resident 
with Sarhili. Served, in this capacity, first under James Ayliff and 
then under John Eustace. Left the Transkei during the War of 
Ngayecibi. Later took up farming in the Transkei. We have evidence 
of close relationship between West Fynn and Sarhili. Fynn was 
presented with Sarhili's favourite armlet at Sarhili's express desire. 
In 1911, when Fynn moved to the then Rhodesia, Sarhili's sons sent him 
a letter of appreciation. 
(Twin Trails, pp.57-59. MS 2018 (Cory Library): Mcotoma 
Kreli and others to Fynn, 16 Aug. 1911; Spicer, p.83) 
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APPENDIX 3 
The Stockenstrom-Maphasa Treaty, 1837 
Source: Cape of Good Hope - Treaties with Native Chiefs 1806-54 
TREATY entered into between Andries Stockenstrom, Esq., Lieut.-
Governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope, on the part of his Britonoic Majesty, and the Tambookie chief 
Mapassa, when, after the fullest explanations by means of the Resident 
Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, the following articles of convention were fully 
agreed upon, in the presence of Hougham Hudson, Esq., Agent-General, 
and the said Resident Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, as also the Tambookie 
Counsellors Quasha and Nyela, subject, nevertheless, to the 
rati fication by or on behalf of his said Majesty. 
Article 1. There shall be peace and amity for ever, between his said 
BritQ~nic Majesty, his subjects - particularly those of the said 
colony - and the said contracting chief and his tribe, - and both 
parties shall honestly and faithfully use their utmost endeavours to 
prevent a rupture of the same, to remove every cause for disagreement 
which may occur, and scrupulously to abide by the engagements 
contained in this treaty. 
Article 2. The said contracting chief doth acknowledge that the 
country which he and his tribe do occupy between the Stormberg and 
Kaffraria, 
of what 
and adjoining the eastern frontier of the colony, is part 
was the Bushman country, still thinly inhabited by the 
remnants of the said tribe. 
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Article 3. The sa id Lieut.-Governor doth engage, on the part of his 
said Majesty, not to molest the said chief or tribe, or cause him or 
them to be molested in the possession of the said territory, or to lay 
claim to any part thereof, provided the said ch ief or tribe do not in 
any way disturb the peace of the colony, or molest the inhabitants 
therein; and provided also the said chief and tribe sha ll strictly 
adhere to the terms of this treaty. 
Article 4. The boundary between the said colony and the territory 
possessed by the said chief and tribe is agreed to be the Zwarte Kei 
or Winterberg Spruit, from its source in the Winterberg down to the 
colonial hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of 
land ca lled Rhenoster Hoek into the 'Klaas Smit's River, and thence the 
latter river to its source in that kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called 
Buffels Hoek; provided, however, that the free communication between 
the Kat and Gonappe Rivers, and the said territory, of the Shiloh 
missionary institution, as also between the Tarka and Kaffraria 
through the now uninhabited country east of the Winterberg, continue 
uninterrupted as hitherto. 
Article 5. The said contracting chief engages to protect by all means 
in his power the Bushmen who reside, or may come to reside, within the 
said territory, as the original proprietors of the soil, to let them 
enjoy all the rights and privi leges to which the Tambookies are 
entitled, and to be responsible for their acts, in the same manner as 
he binds himself by this treaty for the acts of the Tambookies. 
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Article 6. No Tambookies, armed or unarmed, single or in number, male 
or female, shal l be allowed to cross the said boundary into the 
colony, and no British subject, armed or unarmed, single or in number, 
shall be allowed to cross into the said territory occupied by the 
Tambookies, except with permission and under the restriction 
hereinafter to be specified in article 10. 
Article 7. The sa id contracting chiefs shall, with t he concurrence of 
the said Lieut.-Governor, or person appointed by him, fix upon certain 
points in the said territory, as near to the said boundary and to each 
other as convenient, at each of which he shall station a chief or 
responsible man of his tribe, to be called, for the sake of 
distinction, "pakati", to reside there, and to act as a guard. 
It shal l be the duty of such amapakati to keep a good and constant 
understanding with the field-cornets residing nearest to their said 
residences, and to do every thing in their power to prevent inroads or 
aggressions, either on the part of the co lonists against the 
Tambookies or of the Tambookies against the colonists. 
The amapakat i, who shal l be so stationed, must, by the said 
contracting chief, be made known, by name, to the said field-cornets, 
and any change, either of person or station, which may take place with 
reference to the said amapakati, must be previously communicated to 
the said field-cornets. 
The amapakati shall be responsible to their own chief, who will see 
the necessity of selecting for such stations trustworthy men, and to 
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punish every neglect, fraud, or deception, which they may commit, as 
the said contracting chief hereby pledges himself to do. 
Article 8. The said Lieut.-Governor engages, on the part of his said 
majesty, to place an agent, to reside in a convenient situation in the 
said territory, which agent shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity; 
and the said contracting chief binds himself to respect such agent as 
the representative of the British Government, and to protect his 
person, family, and property, to the utmost of his power, and to leave 
him full liberty of ingress and egress through the said territory, or 
across the boundary into the colony, at all times, without the least 
molestation of hindrance. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Emigrant Thembuland 
Administration 
When Emi grant Thembuland came into existence in 1865. E.J . Warner was 
stationed at Southeyville as "Tambookie Agent". He was succeeded by 
William Fynn. 1 In December 1875 Charles Levey succeeded Fynn. After 
the War of Ngcayecibi. Emigrant Thembuland was divided into two 
judicial districts. Southeyville and Xalanga. The Tambookie Agent was 
now termed Resident Magistrate. William Cumming assumed duty as 
Assistant Magistrate at Xalanga. After the war of 1881 the district 
of Cala was formed of parts of the districts of Southeyville and 
Xalanga. 
C. Levey was stationed at Cala as Resident Magistrate. The remainder 
of Southeyville was formed into a separate district. St. Marks. where 
R.W. Stanford assumed duty in 1881 . St. Marks and Ca la were mainly 
occupied by Africans. while Xalanga was predominante ly acq uired by 
Europeans. In 1884 these districts were again formed into two. by the 
partition of Cala between Xalanga and St. Marks. 
The name of Charles Levey is most close ly associated with Emi grant 
Thembuland. He first entered the civil service as clerk and 
interpreter to Capt. Cobbe in Mfenguland. In 1874 he was appointed 
Government Labour Agent. a post which he held unti l his appo intment as 
Thembu Agent in Emigrant Thembuland in 1875. In the War of Ngcayecibi 
1. Brownlee in The Trans keian Native Territories. p.27. wrote t hat 
it was William Fynn. 
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he commanded the Thembu volunteers. In the war of 1881 he 
successfully defended Southeyville and assited in the defence of Lady 
Frere. He held the post of Resident Magistrate of Xalanga until 1900, 
when he was appointed Resident Magistrate for Wodehouse. 
(Cape of Good Hope Civil Service List, 1899. 
Brownlee: Transkeian Native Territories.) 
" 
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APPENDIX 5 
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE TEMBUS AGREED TO 
BE TAKEN OVER BY THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT AND 
BECOME BRITISH SUBJ ECTS (1875) 
1st. That the foll owing Chiefs be recognised as chiefs -
Ngangeliswe, Umgudhlw(a), Umdukiso, Bacela, Umhloba, 
Umdulasi, Sandili, Umdiki, (Sidikf ), T'sompa , Dubelikwele, 
Umtyedwa, Udwanyaza, Stockwe son of Chamlie, (Tyali), 
Umganyana and Maramouna (Maramnowa) 
2nd. That t he following salaries be paid to the Chiefs. 
Ngangeliswe £200, Umg udhlwa £50, Umdukiso £50, Bacela £30, 
Umhloba £30, Umdulasi £20, Sandili £30, Umdiki £20, 
T'sompa £20, Dubelikwele £20, Umtyedwa £20, Udwanyaza £20, 
Stockwe £20, Umganyana £20. 
3rd . That in order to induce t he return of those Tembus who have 
been compelled to leave through mismanagement and wars, the 
hut tax shall not become due until January 1878. 
4th. That t he boundary on the North-west be that fixed by the 
Commission, the members of which were Messrs . Griffiths, 
Ayliff and Grant, the boundary on the South-east, be that 
fixed by the Hon'ble Mr. C. Brownlee in 1873. 
5th . The Chiefs to exercise authority and settle lawsuits 
(excepting cases of murder, crimes existing out of charges 
of witchcraft, serious assaults, and thefts from other 
tribes and from the Colony) within t heir own sections, 
subject to right of appeal to the magistrates. The 
Chief Ngangeliswe having hitherto been considered the 
paramount chief of the whole tribe, it is now proposed 
that his authority should not extend beyond his own 
section. 
6th. That the Government of the Mission stations sha ll not be 
interfered with for the present. 
7th. That in order to remove all cause of irritations and 
heart burning, arising from the compulsory return of Menziwe, 
he and his tribe be located in the land vacated by the 
chief Umtata, and the land at present occupied by Manziwe 
be fi l led up by loyal Tembus, who choose to return to this 
part. 
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8th. I t is understood that Government will prohibit the sale 
of li quor to all na tives . 
Office of the Resident with 
Gangeliswe, 28 October 1875. 
The Revd. Mr. Hargreaves appears at the office and states that 
he is deputed by the Tambookie tribe, to submit the above proposals, 
to the Resident, for the cons ideration of Government. 
Mr. Bowker, Commandant of Poli ce, being present, the above proposa ls 
are submitted to him for his information, who fully concurs in its 
being forwarded to Government. 
Copies in NA49, p.71 and G4-83. 
Sgd . W. Wright 
Resident. " 
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APPENDIX 6 
List of Cape Government's prime ministers, Cape officials 
and some other personalities referred to in the text and 
f ootnotes, with short biographical notes on some of t hem. 
Governors and High Commissioners (1850-1900) 
Major-Genera l Si r Harry Smith: December 1, 1847 - March 31, 1852. 
Leiutenant -Governor George Cathcart: March 31, 1852 - May 25, 1854 . 
Sir George Grey: December 5, 1854 - August 15, 1861. 
Sir Philip Wodehouse: January 15, 1862 - May 20, 1870. 
Genl. Charles Hay (acting): May - December 1879. 
Sir Henry Barkly: December 31, 1870 - March 31, 1877. 
Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere: March 31, 1877 - September 15 , 1880. 
Sir Hercules Robinson: January 22, 1881 - May 1, 1889 . 
Sir Henry Lock: December 13, 1889 - May 30, 1891 
Sir Hercules Robinson (Lord Rosmead, 1896): May 30, 1985 - April 21, 
1897. 
Sir Alfred Milner: Apri 22, 1897 -. 
Pri me Ministers of the Cape Colony (1872 - 1900) 
Mol t eno, J.C.: December 1, 1872 - February 5, 1877. 
Sprigg, J . Gordon: First ministry: February 6, 1878 - May 8, 1881; 
Second ministry: November 25 , 1886 - July 16 , 1890; 
Third mi ni st ry: Ja nuary 13, 1896 - October 13 , 
1898. 
Scanlen, T.C.: May 9, 1881 - May 12, 1884. 
Up ington , T.: May 13, 1884 - November 24, 1886. 
Rhodes, C.J.: First min istry: July 12 , 1890 - May 3, 1893; 
Second ministry : May 4, 1893 - January 12, 1896. 
Schreiner, W.P.: October 14 , 1898 - . 
Secretaries for Nat ive Affairs (1878 - 1900) 
Brownlee, C. P.: Appointed Ngqika commissioner in 1854. Restrained 
Sandile in 1857 from joining the Cattle-K illing. 
Secretary for Nat i ve Affairs December 1872 - February 
1878. Appointed chief magistrate for Gr iqualand East, 
1878 . 
Ayl iff, W.: February 1, 1878 - May 8, 188" 
Sauer, J.W.: May 9, 1881 - May 12, 1884. 
De Wet, J.A.: May 13, 1884 - November 24, 1890. 
Faure, P.H.: July 17, 1890 - May 3, 1893. 
Frost , J .: May 8, 1893 - September 11, 1893. 
Under-Secretaries for Native Affairs 
Bright, H.E. : 1878 - 188" 
Rose-Innes, J.: 1881 - 1891. 
Chief Magistrates of Thembul and (1878 - 1900) 
Wright, W.: Served as Lieutenant in F. A.M . P., Took part in campaign 
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against Sarhili and Fadana; served under Walter Currie 
in war of Ngcayecibi; British resident with 
Ngangelizwe, 1873; Chief Magistrate of Thembuland 1876 
- 1877. 
Elliot, H.G.: Came to South Africa in 1870 for health reasons, after 
having resigned from military career in England with 
rank of major. He was persuaded by J.C. Molteno to 
take up post of chief magistrate of Themb uland . Became 
chief magistrate of all Transkeian territories in 1891. 
Resident Magistrates in Thembuland (1878 - 1900) 
(a) Umtata 
Boyes, J.F.: 1876 - 1881. 
Merriman, T.R.: 1885 - 1892. 
Sweeney, C.J.: 1892 - 1894. 
Stanford, A.H.B.: 1897 - 1900 -
(b) M~qanduli 
Blakeway, C.F.: 1878 - 1896. 
Farrant, F.E.: 1897 - 1900 -
(c) Engcobo 
Stanford, W.E.M . : Appointed magistrate with Dalasile, 1876. 
Title was changed to resident magistrate for Engcobo 
1882. Became chief magistrate for Griqualand East , 
1885. Served as member of the Native Laws and Customs 
Commission, 1881. ApPointed under-secretary for Nat ive 
affairs, 1896. In 1902 he became chief magistrate for 
t he newly united Transkeian territories. Served from 
1903-1905 as member f the Native Affairs Commission. 
He was knighted in 1919. 
Stanford, A.H.B.: 1885 - 1894. 
Warner, C. J.: 1894 - 1900 -
(d) St. Marks (Previously Southeyville) 
Sweeney, C.J.: 1885 - 1888. 
Harris, R.L.: 1888 - 1892. 
Bunn, H.H.: 1892 - 1895. 
Bel lairs, W.G.: 1895 - 1900. 
King, C. A.: 1900-
(e) Xalanga 
Cumming, W.G.: 1876 - 1878. Commanded Engcobo levies in the war 
of 1880. 
Levey, C.J.: 1884 1900 - First appointed Thembu agent in 
Emigrant Thembuland in 1875. Resident Magistrate of 
Southeyville 1878. Defended Southeyv i l le in war of 1878 
- 1879 . Assisted in that war in defence of Lady Frere. 
Served in expedition against Mfanta and Sitokwe Tyali. 
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(f) Glen Grey and Queenstown (resident mag istrates and civ il 
comm i ss ioners 
Driver, C.H .: Special magistrate Glen Grey 1877 - 1878; resident 
magistrate Glen Grey, 1879 - 1884. 
Garci a, E. : Civil commissioner for Queenstown 1883 - 1895. 
Griffith, Charles D. : Served under Wa lter Currie in t he F.A.M.P. 
Took part in the Fadana expedition . Civil commissioner 
f or Queenstown 1859 - 1868. Appointed High 
Commiss ioner ' s agent in Basuto land in 1871. 
Hemming, John : Civil Commissioner for Queenstown 1875 - 188 1 and 
from 1882 - 1883. Served as cha i rman of the fol lowing 
commiss ions: Kamastone Land Commission (1875); War 
Losses (1880); Thembuland Land Sett l ement, 1882 
1883 . 
Jenner, H.A.: Joined F.A.M .P . 1870; sub-inspector of F.A.M.P. 
1871; civil commiss ioner ' s clerk at Dordrecht 1877; 
commandant command ing Dordrecht troops in Xa langa and 
Mac lear districts; re si dent magistrate of Glen Grey, 
1894 - 1895. 
Jennings, H. J . : civ i l -commissioner, Queenstown (March - December 
1883) . 
Rawstone, L.G.: resident mag i strate Wodehouse 1880 . 
Other persons involved in Thembu affairs (1850 - 1900) 
Blyth , Matthew: British Resident in Mfenguland (1869 - 1876); Chief 
Magistrate of Griqualand East (1876); Chief Magistrate 
of Transkei (1878) . 
Bowker, Jame s H.: Appo inted inspector of F.A.M.P . in 1855; and in 
1870 succeeded Currie as commander. 
Chalmers , LB.: British Resident with Ngangelizwe 1871 - 1873 ; 
inspector of F.A.M.P., 1873 - 1879; civil comm issioner 
Wodehouse January - March 1880; civil comm is s ioner 
Queenstown, 1878. He was special commissioner under 
t he Glen Grey Act, 1896. 
Cunynghame, Arthur A.: Came to South Afr ica in 1875 as lieutenant-
genera l . Commander of army in Themb uland in War of 
Ngcayecibi, but had serious difficulties with Merriman 
over control of Cape forces. He was nick -named the 
"War-Horse" . 
Currie, Walter: Appointed by Sir George Cathcart as first commandant 
of th e F.A . M.P. Sir George Grey established this as a 
permanent force with Currie as first general 
commandant. After his expulsion of Sarhil i beyond the 
Mbashe in 1858 he was knighted. 
Cummi ng , J. : Acted as acting resident magistrate for Idutywa from 
time to time between 1877 - 1879. 
Hargreaves, Peter: Miss ionary for 48 years at Clarkebury and 
Mfundisweni, Ea stern Pondoland. Of ten referred to as 
t he Pri me Minister of Thembuland. 
Hook, David B.: Joined the F.A.M.P. in 1885. Served in 1858 in expe-
ditions against Sarhil i and Fadana, as well as in the 
war of Ncgayecibi. Led small army to capture Nonesi. 
Acting magistrate of Transkei and Gca lekaland (1883). 
, 
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Judge, E.A.: Civil commissioner for various districts in the Western 
Province; civil commissioner for King William's Town. 
Served on the following commissions: re boundaries of 
Dordrecht settlement of Tambookie Location (June - July 
1870); disturbances in Transkei between chiefs Kreli 
and Gangelizwe (November - December 1872); war 
expenditure Basotholand-Transkei (July - November 
1884). 
Maclean, John: Served in the Sixth Frontier War. Succeeded 
Theophilus Shepstone in 1845 as diplomatic envoy to the 
Ndhlambi and Ngqika. Became chief commissioner of 
British Kaffraria in 1852, and served as Lieutenant 
Governor 1860 - 1863. Became Governor of Natal in 
1864. 
Merriman, John Xavier: Elected member of House of Assembly for Aliwal 
North 81869 ); for Wodehouse 1874; Namaqualand 1879, 
1884. Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works 
1876 - 1878 and 1881 - 1884. During the war of 
Ncgayecibi he became a sort of minister of war, and in 
1878 he almost single-handed ly took over the conduct of 
the war. 
Southey, Ric hard: Served in 1828 with volunteers in charge of 
Colonial military outposts. Distinguished himself in 
Hintza campaign; resident agent with certain tribes in 
Province of Queen Adelaide; secretary to Sir Harry 
Smith and later to Secretary-General of the eastern 
dis t ricts; colonial secretary 1864 - 1872 . 
Smith-Abercrombie, M.: Studied at Cambridge and Glasgow; Fellow of 
5t. Peter's College, Cambridge. Member of Executive 
Council (1872); Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public 
Works (1872 - 1875); Became Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Cape Town. 
Tainton, C.: Clerk at De Beers Native Offices, Kimber ley, 1885. 
Theal, George Mcall: Government agent with Ngqika chief, Oba (1877); 
in charge of natives of western districts (1878); 
keeper of co lonial archives, 1879. 
Tooke, William Hammond: Clerk in audit office (1878); promoted to 
Department of Crown Lands (1882). Received a medal for 
services in war of Ncgayecibi. 
Warner, Ebenhaezer: Son of J .C . Thembu Agent in Tambookie Location 
1865 - 1867; stationed at 50utheyville 1867 - 1873. 
Resigned from the civil service to take up missionary 
work at Mount Arthur. 
Warner, Joseph Cox: Thembu Agent in Tambookie Location (1852 - 1864); 
British resident in the Transkei (1865 - 1869). 
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1. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS 
Kn:gEr, D.W. and Beyers, C.J. (eds.) Di ct ionary of South African 
Biography (Cape Town, 1967, 1972 , 1977) 
Long, Una. An index to authors of unoff icial private ly owned ma nu-
scripts relatI ng to the hIstory of South AfrIca. 1812-1920. 
( London , 1947) 
Mendelssohn, S. South African Bibliography (London , 1910) 
Muller, C.F.J . , Van Jaarsveld, F.A. and Van Wijk , T. (ed .). A Select 
Bibliography of South Afri can History (Pretoria, 1966) 
Robi nson, A.M. Catalogue of theses and dissertations accepted for 
degrees at South African Universities 1988-41 (Cape Town , 
1943) 
2. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
Pretoria Archives 
Ethnological Section: 
A. OFFICIAL 
W.T. Brownlee: The Precedence of the Thembu 
File 6/12/ 1 Butterworth 1825 
In the Cape Archives, Cape Town: 
(1) COLONIAL OFFICE 
CO.1156: Native Affairs . Letters received from Foreign 
Governments, 1881 
CO.2756: De spatches from Civil Comm issi oners from Albany and 
Somerset 1835 
CO .2851, 2852, 2857 , 2866 , 2895: Despatches from Civil 
Commissioners for Victoria and Albert 
CO.2959, 2978, 3043, 3069: Letters received from Civil 
Comm i ssioners 1859 
CO.3062: Letters received from Secretary to Lieut. Government 
1865 
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CO.3075, 3076: Letters received from Civil Commissioners 1864 
CO.3082: Letters received from Civil Commissioners 1865 
CO.3140 : Letters received from Resident Magistrates, Border 
Magistrate and Transkeian Territories 1868 
CO.3163: Letters received from Resident Magistrates, Border 
Magistrates and Transkeian Territories 1869 
CO . 3179: Letters received from Resident Magistrates, Transkeian 
Territories 1870 
CO . 3193: Let ters recei ved 
Commissioner's Agent, 
Territories 1871 
CO. 3205: Letters rece i ved 
Commissioner's Agent, 
Territories, Basutoland 
from Resident Magistrates, High 
Border Magistrate and Transkeian 
from Res ident Magistrate, Hi gh 
Border Magistrate, Transkeian 
1872 
CO.3262, 3277: Letters rece ived from Border Magistrates, Native 
Commissioners, Agents, etc., Transkeian Terr itories, 
Basutoland and Griqualand West, 1876-77 
CO.3282, 3283: Let ters received from Civil Commissioner, Ki ng 
William's Town, January-December 1878 
co. 3299: Letters 
Commissioners, 
BaSotoland and 
received from Border Magistrates, Native 
Agents, etc., Transkeian Territories, 
Griqualand West , 1878 
CO . 5491-2 : Letter Book, Co lonial Secretary and Commissioner 
Merriman, while on Frontier duri ng t he Gaika-Gcaleka 
Rebellion. 10-29 September 1877-28 April 1878 
Transkeian Residents Letter Book, W.R.D. Fynn -Col.Sec., 70-71 
(2) GOVERNM ENT HOUSE 
GH.8/4: Tambookie Agent Folder 
GH.8/3 1: Schedule of Documents submitted for the consideration of 
H.E. the High Comm i ssioner, 1857 . 
GH.8/48: Letters received from Native Chiefs and Residents with 
Native Chiefs on t he Eastern Frontier 1854-1884 
GH.12/ 13 : Letters from Individuals (1871-80) 
GH. 14/17: Letters from Chiefs, etc. (1864-83) 
GH.17/4: Pa pers from Native Affairs Department (1858-83) 
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GH.19/4: Border Tribes Treaties and Mi scellaneous Papers (No 
Date) . 
GH.21/8: Papers re the Gaika-Gca leka Rebellion 
GH.22/2: High Commissioner's Miscellaneous Papers (December 1847-
June 1848) 
GH.22/3: Ibid. (February-June 1848) 
GH.23/32: General Despatches (23 Augus t 1872-25 May 1875) 
(3) PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE 
PMO.132: Van Zyl Commission Report 
PMO.144-5: Despatches for Chief Magistrates 
PMO.152-6: Miscel laneous Correspondence 
PMO.260: Prime Minister-Gordon 
(4) NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT 
NA .40-116: Letters received from Chief Magistrate, Thembuland 
(1876-91) 
NA.150-8: Letters from Government Agents, etc. (1872-78) 
NA.215-225: Glen Grey Papers 
NA.294: Letters rece ived from Colonial Secretary, (1878) 
NA.398-400: Miscellaneous letters and other documents received 
( 1873-8) 
NA.454: Tour of SNA . (1890) 
NA.613: No . 1804: Encrochments on Location Commonage, Glen Grey. 
NA.840-841: Tambookie Agent Letter Book (1873-1874) 
(5) CHIEF MAGISTRATE, TRANSKEI AND TEMBULAND 
CMT.1/1-14: Papers Received from SNA., Col. Sec., High 
Commissioner and Government (1872-91) 
CMT.1/26: Papers Received from Resident Maigstrate Emyanyani 
(January 1883-August 1886) 
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CMT.l/30-31: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate Engcobo 
(January 1884-31 August 1891) 
CMT.l/32-34: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate Maquanduli 
(1 September 1876-June 1891) 
CMT.l/35-37: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate Umtata (1 
February '79-30 June 1891) 
CMT.l/38-39: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate Cofimvaba 
(1 October 1873-31 December 1880) 
CMT.l/40-43: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate St. Marks 
(1 January 1882-31 August 1891) 
CMT.3/65-66: Papers Received from Resident Magistrate Cofimvaba 
(1 September 1891-31 December 1896) 
CMT.l/83: Papers Despatched to SNA., Letterbook, Vol.l1, (1 
January 1886-30 June 1889) 
(6) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
LG . 409-10: Lett ers received from the Tambookie Agent in 
Tambookieland 
LG.592: Papers relative to squatting in the Tambookie Reserve 
LG. 602: Kaf i r Treat i es 
(7) OTHER 
UG.37-14: Report of the Native Grievance Commission 
PMO . 132: Report of the Van Zyl Commission, 15 November '95 
South African Native Affairs Commission (Lagden Commission) 
Vol.2 , Cape Town Government Printer 
Archives of the Magistrates of Engcobo, Xalanga, Cala 
(Southeyville) and Umtata 
(i) Archives of the Magistrate of Cala (Southeyville) 1881-1884 
lCAA.2/1/1: Papers Despatched, Miscellaneous 
January 1881-June 1883 
lCAA.l/1/1: Letters Received from CMT . , 
August 1883-November 1884 
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(ii) Archives of the Magistrate of Cofimvaba 
lCOF.2/2/1/1-14: Civil Record Book 
January 1882-July 1890 
lCOF.5/1/7/3/1: Individual Letters Received 
January 1881-December 1895 
lCOF.5/1/6/1: Letters from Government Labour Agents 
(iii) Archives of the Magistrat e of Engcobo 
lECO.l/l/ l / 1-6: Criminal Records: Criminal Cases 
May 1881 - June 18B6 
lECO.l/l/1/21-23: Criminal Records 
September 1896-September 1897 
lECO.5/1/3/2: Letter Despatches - Confidential Minutes 
January 1893-September 1897 
lECO.2/1/1/1-14: Records of proceedings - Civil Cases 
June 1881-December 1892 
lECO.5/1 /1/1: Papers Despatched 
May 1881-December 1882 
(iv) Archives of the Magistrate and Bantu Commissioner of Umtata 
lUTA.l/l/l/1-17: Criminal Records - Criminal Cases 
April-December 1895 
lUTA.2/2/1/1/1-2: Civil Record Book 
April 1882-December 1886 
(v) Archives of Magistrate of Xalanga 
lXAA: Odd references 
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B. NON-OFFICIAL 
(1 ) PRIVATE PAPERS 
(i) JAGGER LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Walter Stanford Papers 
Diaries, 1875-1885 01-010 
Correspondence 1872-1885 (F4.1ff) 
James Stewart Papers 
(ii) SOUTH AFRICAN LIBRARY, CAPE TOWN 
J.F. Cumming Papers 
J.X. Merriman Papers 
J.C. Molteno Papers 
J. Rose- Innes Papers 
(iii) THE CAPE ARCHIVES, CAPE TOWN 
E. Judge Papers (ACC.533; B.500) 
R. Southey Papers (ACC .511) 
(iv) THE METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE, CAPE TOWN 
P. Hargreaves Papers 
(v) CORY LIBRARY 
MS . 1158: Extract from a letter Warner-Stanford 23 February 
1913 
MS.2018 : Mcotoma Kreli and others to Fynn 11 August 1911 
MS.7377: Dig~t of Evidence in Gungubele rebellion 
MS.7378 : J. Merriman C.C. Queenstown re Gungubele , 5 October 
1877 
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MS.8730: The condition of the Native Tribes during the 
century preceeding the introduction of the Gospel among 
them, by Charles Brownlee, read at the jubilee of the 
Rev. W. Thompson, Glasgow Missionary Society 
MS.9600-10540: Sprigg Papers 
MS.14304: McLoughlin Papers 
MS. 14635, 14636, 14641: Burton Papers 
MS.14693: Letter H. Dugmore to his father 16 September 1857 
(or 1858) 
MS.15045: Committee of Priviledges and Exigencies 1885-1886 
MS.15048: Correspondence re land claims in Glen Grey 
Di strict 1886-7 
MS. 15211: Biography of the Rev. Peter Hargreaves by the Rev. 
S. Clark 
E. Sihele's manuscript, two translations; one by N.D. Sandi 
and one by N.C. Tisani 
MIC.19: (Microfilm reel 1) J.C. Warner-R. Godlonton, Private 
letter , Lesseyton, 30 January 1850 
MIC.172: United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 
E33-E39 
(2) MISSION PAPERS 
CORY LI BRARY 
(i) Methodist Collection (Mss. 15000-16000) 
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Reports 1850-1855 
(ii) United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Mic.172, 
E33-39 (Cory Library) 
(3) OFFICIAL PRINTED SOURCES 
(a) British Parliamentary Papers (cited in footnotes as BPP.) (The 
year in which the paper was printed is followed by the vol. no., 
then then sess ional number, and then an abbreviated form of the 
subject title. 
1835 xxxix (50,252) Papers re Cape (Native Inhabitants) I , II 
1835 xxx ix (279) Kafi r War 1835 
1836 vii 
1837 xliii 
(538) 
(503) 
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Select Committee on Aborigines 
Despatches re Caffre War 
1847-1848 xliii (912, 969) Correspondence re Kafir Tribes 
1851 xxxviii (1334) Correspondence re Kafir Tribes 
1851 xxxviii (1380) Papers re Kafir Tribes 
1855 xxxviii (1969) Papers re state of Kafir Tribes 
1857 Sess .1x (2202) Further papers re state of Kafir Tribes 
1857 xL (2352) Paper re Kafir Tribes 
1865 xxxvii (3436) Correspondence re annexation of British 
Kaffraria 
1877 Lx 
1878 LV 
1879 
1881 Lxvi 
1881 Lxvi 
1882 xlvii 
1883 xlvii 
(C.1748 , C. 1776) Correspondence re Native Affairs in 
South Africa 
(C.1961) Further correspondence re affairs in South 
Africa 
{C.2220, C.2222, C.2242, C.2252, C. 2260, C.2269, 
C.2308, C.2316, C.2318, C.2367, C.2374, C.2454 
Further correspondence respecting the 
affairs of South Africa 
(C.2740, C.2783) Correspondence re South Africa 
(C.2755) Correspondence re Basutoland 
(C . 2964, C.3112) Correspondence re Basutoland and 
Territories to Eas t ward of Cape Colony 
(C.3493) Correspondence re Basutoland and the 
Native Territories 
(b) Annexures and Appendices to the Vote and Proceedings of the Cape 
Parliament (cited in the footnotes as CPP., the series number "C" 
Papers printed by order of the Leg . Co., "A" ones by order of the 
Assemb ly, "G" ones by order of the government is followed by the 
number of the Paper and then the year in abbrev iated form , 
followed by the title, also in abbreviated form) . 
G16-'58: Reports on Native Industrial Schools at Heald Town, 
Salem and Lesseyton 
A40 - '58: Communications from the agent with the Tambookies 
A48-'65: Correspondence re excitement along the frontier 
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A49-'65: Proceedings and Evidence of Native Affairs Commission 
(1865) 
C10- '68: Report of British Resident in Transkeian Territory 
G41-'72: Reports on the Social and Political condition of the 
Natives in the Transkeian Territories (June. 1872) 
A10-'73: Report of Secretary of Native Affairs 
A12-'73: Report of Select Committee on Native Affairs 
C12-'73: Barkly's Speech at the opening of Parliament 
G35- ' 73: Report on the Socia l and Political condition of the 
emigrant Tambookie 
G39-'76: Report on Probart's mission to Tambookieland 
A1-'77: Speech at Opening of Parliament 
G1 - '77: Report of Co lonial Defence Commission 
A16. 17-'78: Despatches re Fronti er 
A52-'78: Correspondence and other documents relative to the 
expedit ion aga in st Tini Macomo 
C5-'78: Papers re Griqualand East Land Commission 
G17-'78: Further Despatches - Governor and Secretary of State 
for Colonies re affairs of the Frontier 
A54-'80: Petition of Emigrant Thembus 
C3-'80: Return of Cost and Working of Colonial Rai lways 
G48-'81: Papers re cattle taken from certain Tambookies by 
Colonial Forces 
A3 -'81: Correspondence of Bright and Rose-Innes 
A25-'81: Reports of Chief Magistrates and Resident Magistrates 
in Basutoland and Transkei 
A67-'81: Petition of certain traders re compensation for losses 
in Tambookie rebellion 
C20-'81 : Reports from various Magistrates in Thembuland 
G38-'81: Native Laws Commission Report 
A15-'82: Select Committee on Settlement in Thembuland 
A23-'82: Papers re proc l amation of a Code of Law in Tembuland 
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A26-'82: Correspondence between Government and Officers re 
future settlement of country occupied by rebel emigrant 
Thembus 
A52-'82: All correspondence on future sett lement of the country 
lately occupied by the rebel emigrant Tembus and other 
tribes 
C2-'83 : Comp laints of Emigrant Tembus 
G4- '83 : Reports and Proceedings, with Appendices, of the 
Government Comm ission on Native Laws and Customs 
A31- ' 83: Select Commi ttee on Thembuland 
G66-'83: Report of the Thembuland Commission 
Gl09- '83: Reports and Correspondence relative to the recent 
scare of threatened combination of native tribes in the 
extra colonial territories 
G59-'84 : Despatches re Transkeian Territories 
G6-'92: Census of Cape Co lony 
A3-'92: Report into the Tenure of Land in the Glen Grey 
Di st rict 
Al-'93: Glen Grey Comm i ssion 
A33 - '98: Report of Committee on working of Glen Grey Act 
G39-'93: Labour Commission, 1893, Report 
G3- '94: Labour Commi ss ion, Vols. II and II I 
G72-'98: Rinderpest Statistics 
Blue Books on Native Affairs 
G27-'74; G21 - '75; G16-'76; G52- ;76 (Appendix to Blue Book on 
Native Affairs '76); G12-'77; G12-78'; G33-'79; G43-'79 (Appendix 
to Blue Book on Native Affairs '79) ; G13-'80; G20-'81; G47-'82 
(Part 2); G8-' 83 and Appendix; G3-'84; G2- '85; G5-'86; G12-'87; 
G6-'88; G3-'89; G4-'90; G4-'91; G7-'92; G4- ' 93; G9-'94; G8- '95; 
G5-' 96; G19-'97; G42 - '98; G31 - '99; G50-1900; G52-1901; G25-1902 
(c) Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette 
1848, 1856, 1877, 1885 
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(d) Cape of Good Hope Civil Service List 
Odd references - 1886, 1888-1900 
(e) Cape Hansard 1893, 1894, 1907 
(f) Transkeian Territorial United Counci l : Proceedings and Reports 
of Select Committee 1959, 1960, 1961 
4. PRINT ED COLLECT IONS OF DOCUMENTS 
Bell, K. and MorreD, W. (eds.) Select Documents on British Colonial 
Policy, 1830- 1860 (Oxford, 1928). 
Eybers, G.W. (ed.) Se lect Constitut ional Documents Ill ustrating South 
Afr ican History, 1795- 1910 (London , 1918). 
Mood ie, D. (ed . ) The Record of a Series of Of ficial Papers re l ative to 
the condition and treatment of the Native Tr ibes of South 
Africa Photo Reproduct ion, (Amsterdam, 1960). 
Theal, G. M. (ed.) Basutoland Records, 3 vols. (Cape Town, 1883). 
Records of the Cape Colony, 36 Vo l . (London, 1897-1905). 
5. NON-OFFIC IAL PUBLISHED CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 
A. Books and Pamphlets 
"The Author" A sketch of the publ ic career of Co l . Charl es Duncan 
Griffith, King Will iam's Town, 1881. 
Ayliff, J. and Whiteside, J. History of the Abombo Generally known as 
Fingo's (Tra nske i , 1912, reprint Cape Town, 1952). 
Backhouse, J. A Narrative of a visit to the Mauritius and South 
Afr ica (London: Hamilton, Adams & Co, 1844). 
Barrow, J. Travels in the interior of Southern Africa, 
1806) . 
I (London, 
Beattie, T. R. A Ride through the Transkei (King William's Town, 1891). 
Brown lee, C. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History (Lovedale, 1896, 
2nd edn. Lovedale , n.d.). 
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Brownlee, F. The Transkeian Native Territories, Historical Records , 
(Lovedale , 1923). 
Bunbury, C.F.J. Journal of a Res idence at the Cape of Good Hope 
(London: John Murray, 1848). 
Cathcart, Sir George. Correspondence of Lieutenant-General Sir George 
Cathcart, K.C.B., relative to his military operations in 
Kaffraria (London, 1856). 
Chase, J.C. The Natal Papers Vol.l (Grahamstown 1843). 
Clarke, W.J. Native Reminiscences. South African Pamphlets, Vol.23 
(Grahamstown, Grocott & Sherry, n.d.). 
Cunynghame, A.T. My Command in South Africa, 1874-1878 (London, 1879). 
Davis, W.L. Trooper and Trader, being the reminiscences of W.E. (Seff) 
DavIs of early days in the Transkel (Published by the Alice 
Times, Seymour, n.d.). 
Henkel, C.C. The Native and Transkeian Territories (Hanbury, 1903). 
Hofmeyr, J.H., in collaboration with Reitz, F.W. The Life of Jan 
Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan) (Cape Town, 1913). 
Holden, W.C. Past and Future of the Kaffir Races (London, 1866). 
Hook, Major , D.B. With Sword and Statute on the Cape of Good Hope 
Frontier (2nd ed. Cape Town, n.d.). 
Kay, S. Travel s and Researches in Caffraria describing the charades 
and moral conditions of the tribes (London, 1833). 
Maclean, J. A Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs (Mount Coke , 1858). 
Macquarrie, J.W. (ed.) The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, Vol.l 
1850- 1885 (Cape Town, 1985). 
The Progress of His Royal Highness, Prince Alfred Ernest Albert 
through the Cape Colony . . . . (Cape Town, Saul Solomon, 1861). 
Rose-Innes, J. Autobiography, edited with an introduction by B.A. 
Tindall (Cape Town, O.U.P., 1949). 
Smith, E. (ed.) Autobiography of Lieut. Genl. Sir Harry Smith (London, 
1 90 1 ) . 
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries . Autobiography The Autobiography of the late 
Sir Andri es Stockenstrom ~ by C.W. Hutton) (Cape Town, 
Juta, 1 B87) . 
Sullivan, J.R. The Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone 
(Johannesburg , Walker and Snashall, 1928)·. 
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Van Reenen, J. Journal (Graham Botha (ed.) Wrek of the Grosvenor. 
West, W. Fynn. The '77 War (East London, 1911). 
B. Periodicals and Periodical Articles of Spec ial Interest 
Cape of Good Hope Almanac 1848- 1857 
The Cape Monthly Magazine (Cape Town) 1870-75. 
The Cape Quarterly Review (Cape Town) 1881-83. 
The Kaffir Express 1870-75. 
Albert District (Cape of Good Hope Almanac) 1848, 87, 54. 
Majoba of Jozana's Village: The Story of the Fetcani Hordes by one of 
themselves (Cape Quarterly Review) 1882. 
C. Newspapers 
Cape Frontier Times 1851 
The Colonist 
Daily Despatch 1878 
The Frontier Guardian 1883, 1884, 1885 
The Grahamstown Journal 1837, 1848, 1851-2, 1859, 1864, 1869, 
1871 -2 , 1875-7, 1880-1 
The Kaffrarian Watchman 1866-7, 1870 
The King William's Town Gazette 1864 
The Queenstown Free Press 1868-1875 
Territorial News 1905, 1907 
The Queenstown Representative 4 March '94 
Rand Daily Mail 1 July 1965, 2 August 1965' 
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6. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. Books and Pamphlets 
Atmore, A. and Marks, S. The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the 
19th Century (JICH, 1969). 
Beinart, W. The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1982). 
Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and disposses-
sion in rural South Africa, eds. W. Beinart, P. Debus. S. 
Trapidol (Ravan Press, 1986). 
Bergh, J.S. Die Lewe van Charles Pacalt Brownlee tot 1857 AYB., 1981. 
Bradlow, E. 'The Cape Government's rule of Basutoland 1871-1883' 
AYB., 1968, 11. 
Brookes, E. The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to 
the Present Day (2nd ed. Pretoria, 1927). 
White Rule in South Africa 1830-1910 
University of Natal Press, 1974). 
(Pietermaritzburg: 
Bundy, Colin. The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry 
(Heineman Educational Books, 1979). 
The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.8 (Cambridge: C.U.P., 
1936) . 
Campbell, W. The South African Frontier 1865-1885 (AYB, 1959). 
Cingo, W.D. Ilali Laba Tembu (Palmerton, n.d.). 
Cohn, N. The Pursuit of the Millenium (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1957). 
Cory, Sir George. The Rise of South Africa, 6 volumes (Struik Reprint, 
1965). 
Davenport, T.R.H. The Afrikaner Bond (University Press, London, New 
York,1966). 
South Africa, a Modern History (MacMillan, 1987). 
Davies, Marjorie. Twin Trails: the Story of the Fynn and Southey 
Families (Salisbury, 1974). 
De Kiewiet, C.W. British Colonial Policy and the South African 
Republics 1848 1872 (London: Longmans, Green for the Royal 
Empire Society, 1929). 
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The Imperial Factor in South Africa (London, 1937). 
History of South Africa, Social and Economic (London, 1946). 
De Kock, M.H. Selected Subjects in the Economic History of South 
Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 1924). 
De Kock, W. 'Ekstra Territori ale Vraagstukke van die Kaapse Regering 
1872-85', AYB., 1948 , I. 
Duggan-Cronin, A.M. The Bantu Tribes of South Africa (Reproductions 
and Photographic Studies, Cambridge, 1939). 
Duignan, P. and Gann, L. The Economics of Colonialism Vol.4. 
(Cambridge, 1975). 
Duly, L.C. Brit i sh Land Policy at the Cape 1795-1844: a study of ad-
ministrative Procedures In the Empire (Durham (U.S.A.): Duke 
University Press, 1968). 
Du Plessis, J. A History of Christian Miss ions in South Africa 
(London, 1911) . 
Duminy, A.H. 'The Role of Andries Stockenstrom in Cape Politics 1848-
1860, AYB., 1960, II. 
Du Toit, A.E. 'The Cape Frontier: a study of Native Policy with 
Spec ial Reference to the Years 1847-1866', AYB., 1954, 1. 
Edgecombe, R. Local Origins of an aborted bil l for Africa in J.A. 
Benyon (ed.): Studies in Local History. (Oxford University 
Press, 1976). 
Ellenberger, D. Ancient and Modern (London, 
Caxton 
Engelbrecht, J.A. The Korana, an account of their customs and history 
(Maskew Miller, 1936). 
Etherington, N. Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Federa-
tion in the 1870's. J.A.H. Vo1.20 (1979). 
Galbraith, J.S . · Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African 
Frontier 1834-1854 (Bekerley, 1963) . 
Gann, L.H. and Duignan, P. Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 , Vol.1 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966). 
Geyser; o. 'Die Bantoebeleid van Sir Theophilus Shepstone 1845 1875', 
AYB., 1968, I. 
Gilbmee, Herman. Afrikaner Nationalism in Societies of Southern Africa 
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